

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368,
H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R.
10077, AND H.R. 11718, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF
A FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY

Part 2

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 20, APRIL 7 AND 8, AND MAY 19 AND 20, 1964
(INCLUDING INDEX)

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PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946]; 60 Stat. 812, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * **

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *
17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *
(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.
(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEE

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 88TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 9, 1963

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * *

(r) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

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* * * * *

27. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, H.R. 11718, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF A FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY

Part 2

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1964

**UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
*Washington, D.C.***

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in the Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana; William M. Tuck, of Virginia; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; August E. Johansen, of Michigan; and Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director, and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

We are pleased to have with us as our first witness this morning Mr. Schweiker of Pennsylvania, an author of one of the bills we are presently considering.

Mr. Schweiker, we are delighted to have you, and look forward to hearing your statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA**

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee this morning in support of legislation creating a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy.

I sponsored such legislation in the first session of the 87th Congress and reintroduced this proposal as H.R. 8757 in the current Congress. I am particularly pleased to note that this idea has received widespread sponsorship within both parties and throughout the broad spectrum of political philosophies.

Few today would question the fact that the Communist bloc is waging total political warfare against the United States and other peoples of the free world. Unfortunately, in many instances the Com-

munists have won important battles because they have so adroitly fashioned propaganda and political skills into weapons equally as dangerous to our freedom as bombs and missiles. Using an elaborate network of training schools, the Communists have developed their version of political warfare into a highly effective operational science. Every citizen, every economic, cultural, religious, or ethnic group is a target and may come under direct or indirect Communist attack.

For several decades the forces of communism have carefully prepared their conspirators with the means to engage in new forms of struggle using the techniques of political, ideological, and psychological assault. They have employed an elaborate research and training system and have succeeded in imparting this knowledge to their followers. Their success, it seems to me, is due in large measure to the careful preparation and training which they have given to their collaborators.

If the peoples of the free world are to defeat the Soviet political warfare offensive, they must understand the true nature of the international Communist conspiracy and the dimensions of the global struggle between freedom and communism. Only with such an understanding of the scope and nature of the threat can people be expected to know how to participate in the continuing struggle in an effective, sustained, and systematic manner.

This Nation has been careful to prepare adequately for military conflict with the forces of communism. But our preparation to win the cold war through other than military means has been woefully inadequate. We have properly devoted great efforts and developed our service academies to achieve hot war capabilities, but we have neglected to develop the expertise and facilities needed to wage and win the cold war.

The bills under consideration today would create a nonpartisan seven-member Freedom Commission and, under its jurisdiction, a Freedom Academy, an advanced research, training, and development center. The Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy would fill the current void in United States cold war efforts. Members of the Commission would be appointed by the President and not more than four could be members of any one political party. H.R. 8757, which I have introduced, would provide that one member of the Commission would be selected from the higher echelon of the State Department.

The Freedom Academy would provide Government personnel, private citizens, and foreign students with professional training in the political, economic, ideological, psychological, and paramilitary aspects of the cold war. The program would include study of our national purpose and objectives, as well as the development of proposals for coordinating various methods into strategy for victory. Students at the Freedom Academy would be educated in all aspects of communism, the nature of the worldwide struggle between communism and freedom, and the science of counteraction to the Red conspiracy. They would be selected from diverse groups within the United States and in other countries, where trained leadership and informed public opinion are most needed.

I hardly need point out to my colleagues that the Communists have been most active in providing such training for thousands of persons from other nations. I think it important that we remember the fan-

tastic success which the Communists have achieved in recruiting the young elite in the developing nations. It is difficult for us in the United States to fully comprehend the extraordinary ambition within the youth of these countries. The strong nationalistic forces which prevail impart to the young people a great sense of urgency about the need for modernization and reform. They desire to lead. The Communists have been eager to teach them the deceitful Red techniques of leadership and power acquisition.

Under H.R. 8757, the Freedom Commission would be authorized to make grants to Academy students, to pay expenses incident to their training, and to provide financial assistance to their dependents during the training period. The Commission could also establish an information center to distribute publications and other materials designed to assist people in better understanding the Communist threat and the means to combat it.

Representatives from the private sector—labor, business, colleges, and schools—could attend the special classes at the Freedom Academy. In this connection I think it is appropriate to note the outstanding work which the AFL-CIO has been doing in Latin America. Through the Institute for Free Labor Development, American labor is providing Latin American workers with the knowledge to develop stable and democratic organizations. Representatives in this private organization are working with members and officers of the Latin American unions who are engaged in the desperate struggle against the resourceful Communists, who seek to subvert and destroy legitimate labor organizations, as they did in Cuba. What could be better than to have available to such officials a training ground such as the Freedom Academy would provide. Then, too, I believe the Freedom Academy could make an important contribution to the field of business, particularly with those representatives of business who would be working abroad.

I would envision the Freedom Academy providing training of varying duration and intensity for professional and officer personnel throughout Government who serve in positions related to foreign affairs and security activities. Officers at the lower echelons might be trained between 6 months and 1 year, while those at midcareer and in top-echelon posts would be trained for longer periods, ranging perhaps up to 2 years.

Creation of a Freedom Academy would meet the first important test in winning any struggle: know your enemy. In many ways, the Communist forces are a unique enemy relying on total warfare, with political, economic, ideological, and psychological measures organized as systematically and as efficiently as military power. Primary weapons are lying words; deception; infiltration into educational, religious, labor, and farm groups; and political subversion. One of our chief difficulties in the cold war has been that we have not mastered, or even fully recognized, this unorthodox form of warfare. Obviously, our moral standards will not permit us to employ many of the tactics used by the Communists. But our Nation can launch a crusade for freedom in the minds of men, using the "big truth" as often as the Communists use the "big lie." The Freedom Academy would become "the West Point of the cold war," permitting us to send pro-

professionals rather than amateurs into the battle against communism and helping to avoid more Cubas.

I would like to emphasize my strong belief that the Freedom Academy, to accomplish its purposes, must be a first-class academic institution. It must be able to attract the top minds in our country, among them some of our leading university scholars.

One reservation which has been raised by some persons not enthusiastic about the Freedom Academy proposal is that such a school could conceivably be used by an administration for its own partisan purposes as a political propaganda school. I feel that the independence of the Freedom Commission and its bipartisan nature provide adequate protection from such an occurrence. As a matter of fact, this is one of the distinct advantages which I find in the Freedom Academy and Freedom Commission proposal as contrasted with the proposal to create a National Academy of Foreign Affairs. The National Academy of Foreign Affairs would be much more closely associated with the administration in power and, I fear, would suffer from an ingrown viewpoint serving primarily the interests of one department.

In pressing for creation of a Freedom Academy, I express my conviction that the United States must develop an extensive program for nonmilitary conflict. The Communists already have such an effective program, and it has become evident that nonmilitary action often is the decisive factor in international conflict. The United States has done little to train its governmental officials, let alone its private citizens, in this nonmilitary conflict.

I see the Freedom Academy as an essential addition to our weapons system in our arsenal of peaceful means to curb and set back the Communist challenge. It is to be not an operational agency, but rather a valuable research and training institution.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schweiker. We certainly are indebted to you for your clear and enlightening statement. We will, of course, give an ear to you and to all other witnesses in trying to find a solution to the problem we are faced with.

Are there any questions?

Mr. POOL. I do not believe so.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

Mr. Schweiker, the criticism has been made of all four of these bills that there is danger in the establishment of such an institution in that it might fall in the wrong hands. Do you consider there to be any validity to that criticism?

Mr. SCHWEIKER. I think the fact that you are putting it directly under the President in terms of the appointments, the fact that it is bipartisan in nature, and the hope that we would pick the highest caliber men for this Commission would negate that viewpoint. I will admit it might be a danger, but I think it is a very remote one and I think it is one risk we should take because we have done very little in this area.

Mr. ICHORD. Now your bill was the last one to be introduced on this subject. I notice that you have omitted the Advisory Committee, nor have you provided for a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee as one of the other bills provides. Don't you think that there would be some necessity for an Advisory Committee to coordinate the activities

of the various agencies involved in this problem of fighting communism?

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg entered the hearing room.)

Mr. SCHWEIKER. I can see some logic for an Advisory Committee, Dick. My reason for omitting it was that I just did not want to see us follow the stereotyped departmental approach of the past.

I think that too often this has been our thinking, that we channel our thinking into either the diplomatic field or the military field. And my contention is that this dichotomy is what has defeated us in the cold war up to this point, that we think of dealing with the Soviet Union through diplomacy or through military might, and these fields are not where we are getting behind. We are doing all right in these two fields.

The area in between the diplomatic field and the military field is the new, uncharted ground, and I have a little concern about putting all these formal organizations back into the picture in that maybe we will revert to one or the other type of thinking. However, I am not strongly opposed to it.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, the members of the Commission would be independent appointees of the President.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. That is right. I mean in terms of the Advisory Committee, might—in other words, I am trying to get away from some of our past departmental thinking, because I feel that this brings us back to what I call an inadequate approach through either military or diplomatic channels, which the Communists have long ago abandoned and now use any means to gain their ends in the cold war.

That is why I want to see the Commission independent and why I did not put that provision in the bill. However, there is some merit in the provision.

Mr. ICHORD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

I think I am correct in the observation that you have omitted the paragraph which was found in section 13 of Congressman Herlong's bill, which provides that the Committee shall transmit to the President and to the Congress in January of each year a report containing a comprehensive description of plans, programs, and activities of the Commission and Academy during the preceding year and its recommendations for the improvement of those programs and activities.

(At this point Mr. Tuck entered the hearing room.)

(At this point Mr. Willis left the hearing room.)

Mr. JOHANSEN. I wonder if there was a reason that you omitted this annual report requirement, particularly to the Congress?

Mr. SCHWEIKER. No, sir; I will say if it was omitted it was an oversight. I would certainly concur that this should be in there.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I am glad to hear you say that, because I think there is a very important overseeing role for the Congress and I think that is the safeguard, one safeguard, against the concern my colleague expressed.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, I believe—if the gentleman will yield—Mr. Johansen, he omitted the entire Advisory Committee, and Mr. Herlong had the Advisory Committee reporting to Congress rather than the Commission, itself.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, and I share your question as to the advisability of omitting the Advisory Committee but, regardless of that, it would seem to me imperative, as I am sure is the case with those other commissions or independent agencies, that the requirement of the report to the Congress be included.

I think that is a safeguard against the kind of misuse which the gentleman has expressed.

Mr. ICHORD. Definitely so.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. I would certainly concur with that. This was an omission that should be included; a report from the Commission to Congress.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Thank you.

Mr. TUCK (presiding). Any further questions, gentlemen?

Mr. SCHADEBERG. No questions.

Mr. TUCK. We thank you. Do you have anything further to say?

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Sir?

Mr. TUCK. Did you have any further statement?

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Just one or two observations that were not in my statement. I think it is significant that there have been approximately 20 revolutionary overthrows of governments since 1945, and with one exception, which I think was Czechoslovakia, in each case the government in power had the preponderant military power. So here is a case where they had the reins of government. They had the military power, and yet the Communists through the methods that we are not familiar with were able to overthrow 20 governments.

There has never been one instance of a Communist government being overthrown. So I think just the score to date would indicate we have a tremendous void and that we have really wasted our efforts by not filling it. Also it has been estimated—I am not sure of the reliability of this figure—that the Communists have about 100 schools of political warfare throughout the world. I do not know if that is quite accurate but I am sure it is somewhere in that area. It is rather ironic that they have 100 schools to do what we have not yet done and that we, with all our schools and universities in the United States, do not yet have one school in this field. Maybe that is why we have lost the cold war so far as the 20 revolutions are concerned.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one further question?

Mr. TUCK. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. One of the things that concerns me is whether this can be truly an independent Commission and agency to the point that it will carry on its function without the charge by the State Department that it is running contrary to national policy. And to put it in the simplest terms, if this Commission is developing evidence and promulgating the fact that the designs of international communism remain unchanged and the State Department decides that this is contributing to tensions, I think it is tremendously important that this agency not be subservient to the current line of the agency to the point that it has to say that, after all, communism is getting mellow and mellow and we do not want to have tensions anyway, so that it becomes subordinate to the official propaganda line of the Department.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. I would certainly concur with you, Mr. Johansen. I think that is very important and why the independent nature of this Commission is so important. I want to say, though, that we should

not lose sight of the fact that this is basically a training and research group and not operational.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I understand that. That is important.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. I think that State might be a little bit unjustified in claiming this, because it is not an operational agency, but I agree there is a danger that exists here and I certainly concur.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, we have the distinguished representative of the State Department, who has just arrived, so we will let him respond to that question.

Mr. TUCK. Well, we thank you very much, Congressman—

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Thank you.

Mr. TUCK. —for appearing before this committee.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TUCK. I noticed the arrival of Secretary Harriman and I believe he is next on the list. We will be delighted to hear from the Secretary at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee.

If I may speak personally for one moment, this is the first opportunity that I have had to express to you the great sorrow that I share in the loss of your former chairman, Congressman Walter. I knew him over the years and considered him a friend and shared the loss with you. I appreciate the opportunity of recording that in the record of your minutes. He was a great patriot.

Mr. TUCK. Thank you very much. We miss him greatly here on this committee, not only a very fine patriotic person, but one of the most distinguished members in our entire work.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have been asked to appear before your committee and speak for the Department of Commerce. I have a brief statement, a copy of which has been furnished to you and the members of the committee, which I shall read, if I may.

Mr. TUCK. You said the Department of Commerce. I believe you meant the Department of State?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The Department of State. I beg your pardon. I used to speak for the Department of Commerce.

I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to present the views of the Department of State on the bills pending before this committee relating to the establishment of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy.

As the committee knows, the administration last year proposed establishment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs—a proposal aimed primarily at improving education and training of many thousands of officers and employees of the Federal Government who are already engaged in work directly affecting foreign affairs and national security.

We believe the National Academy of Foreign Affairs proposal is the more appropriate and more effective way to accomplish what we understand to be the basic objectives which we share with the proponents of the Freedom Academy. The administration feels this is

the better way to help win the cold war and advance our interests abroad.

I have been concerned over the dangers of communism since the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. I have had direct experience in dealing with Communist imperialism—in many forms and in various international and domestic situations—since the twenties. Chairman Khrushchev told me when I was in Moscow last summer that “there can be no coexistence in ideology; that conflict goes on.” Mr. Gromyko confirmed this in his recent speech at the United Nations when he said there could be no compromise in ideology.

We all know that the Communist effort against the free world is conducted in many ways, that the developing countries are particularly vulnerable to Communist penetration, and that these pose a massive set of problems for the United States. It is clear that we need to train people throughout the Government who can meet these problems, indeed all our national security problems, with all the tools available.

However, the administration believes the Freedom Commission proposal would not be an effective answer to our present training requirements. Moreover, it would not provide a practical administrative setup, in our judgment.

While the objectives which have moved the sponsors of the Freedom Commission are certainly worthy, I would not be helpful to this committee if I failed to pinpoint some of our differences in viewpoint and emphasis.

First, the Freedom Commission proposal places great stress upon the mobilization of private citizens—domestic and foreign—to fight the cold war and upon the systematic indoctrination of our citizens against communism. It contemplates that *both* tasks be undertaken on a large scale by the executive branch of the Government.

The administration believes that in certain circumstances it is useful to train U.S. citizens who are not in the Government, as well as foreign nationals. But what we need first and most is to improve in all possible ways training of Government personnel involved in the conduct of foreign affairs. This training should be conducted on an interdepartmental basis and should be directly connected with research in depth into past successes and failures and possible future courses of action in foreign affairs.

This, the administration now seeks to do, with limited resources at the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department and in other ways. Establishment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs would greatly improve our current efforts to give advanced training to officers of the State Department and the many other Government agencies involved with foreign affairs.

Much of this training, of course, depends on the use of classified materials.

Certainly, any effective research requires, or is very much assisted by, the availability of classified materials. This creates another problem with regard to the training of outsiders.

I think it is obvious that the use of classified materials would be impossible if private citizens or noncitizens were to be trained on any sizable scale. It is also likely that the freedom of discussion within the classroom would—and properly should—be inhibited by the presence of students from even the most closely allied countries.

Even if this were not a problem, the training of foreign nationals on a large scale by the United States Government in a Federal institution could be self-defeating. If such students returned home and organized anti-Communist movements—as I believe the Freedom Academy proponents contemplate—they would be instantly labeled “Yankee stooges.” In those rare but inevitable cases where they returned home and joined the ranks of anti-American subversion, the propaganda possibilities for the Communists would be even richer.

In this respect, let us not forget the Soviet failures to win the minds of many of the African students they have tried to indoctrinate at Patrice Lumumba University. And, incidentally, I may say they have failed in the indoctrination of their own university students, if my information is correct—at least, the overwhelming majority of them.

Unquestionably, the American educational system is a magnificent tool with which to develop an understanding of the fundamental human value of freedom. There are 50,000 foreign students now in the United States, taking training in a wide variety of specialties, in all kinds of American schools. The same is true of the military personnel that are over here in our military schools. It is surely better to have foreign students in our schools and homes and see the way we live, rather than try to indoctrinate them in a Government institution. In this way, freedom has been allowed to speak for itself to these people. And freedom is, by definition, its own best advocate. That is our strength. It is always a mistake, in my opinion, to adopt the methods of the enemies of freedom.

We have, however, a strong interest to help increase the knowledge and capacity of governments and peoples on how to deal effectively with Communist tactics in their own countries. These efforts are being expanded. In Latin America, for example, we are helping to improve the capacity of governments and peoples to deal with general and local Communist infiltration and subversion, both through the Organization of American States and through bilateral measures. Students and other peoples in that region are becoming increasingly able to deal with Communist efforts to control and manipulate them, although the problem is still unsolved.

All over the world, we are also helping to strengthen free labor unions against communism. In the same way, we are attempting to strengthen the youth movements against Communist infiltration.

If we consider solely the training of private U.S. citizens, the problems are somewhat different in nature, but they are equally great.

The United States Government should and does maintain informal links with all sectors of our society. The Department of State, in particular, brings leaders from business, labor, and the academic world together to discuss foreign policy problems. In these efforts, the learning process is an invaluable two-way thing.

In addition, the Department of State and other agencies of Government produce a steady flow of pamphlets, reports, and other educational material which is of great value to the general public.

Another question raised by the bills before you today involves Federal control. The Freedom Commission, to quote from H.R. 352, would be “authorized to prepare, make, and publish textbooks and other materials, including training films, suitable for high school,

college, and community level instruction." The bill further provides that the Commission can distribute such material on "such terms and conditions as the Commission shall determine."

This seems to me to be a drastic departure from our traditions of the Federal Government's role in the field of education. In all the far-ranging controversies over Federal aid to, and responsibility for, education, I have seldom heard even the most zealous proponent of such aid recommend that the Federal Government enter the field of textbook preparation. I can think of no aspect of education more universally regarded as outside the province of the Federal Government as the preparation of textbooks.

It is not the business of the Federal Government to indoctrinate our citizens. I fear that such a Freedom Commission would be charged with being a tax-supported, federally managed effort at mass indoctrination.

One other aspect of this proposed legislation also disturbs me—the organization of the Freedom Commission. As I read the bills, the Commission would be an independent agency of the Government with no operational responsibilities. Yet, even training cannot be completely divorced from operations, particularly in the crisis-ridden field of foreign affairs. Training has to be realistically geared to actual day-to-day problems and the needs of the Government, and our personnel must have access to classified materials in order to accomplish their job.

That is very briefly, sir, the statement which I have prepared to submit to your committee.

Mr. TUCK. Thank you very much, sir.

As I understand your proposal for the National Academy of Foreign Affairs, the principal difference between that and the bills we are considering here is that you propose to train people who are already in the governmental service, or who are going into the governmental service.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes.

Mr. TUCK. You are opposed to the training of people who are not in the Government service or the people who come from foreign countries?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Of course the admission of specially selected foreign government personnel has not been fully considered in our War Colleges. However, in our War Colleges, foreign military students from countries who are our allies are admitted and have special training, but the principal purpose of the academy that the State Department proposes is to train the Foreign Service officers in the State Department and officers of all other departments of the Government who have contact with foreign affairs.

They would have access, of course, to classified material and expert instruction on the specific problems in which they are engaged and also on the specific problems of the day as we face the changing world scene. They would have other advantages, of course, in addition to the fight on communism, but I, for one, believe that the fight with international communism is our major foreign policy problem and attention should be given of the highest priority.

We have also problems of the bringing together the free countries for common action, the problems of how to solve issues between na-

tions that are friendly to us, and the strengthening of the free world is an important aspect of the fight against communism.

We are not the only country fighting communism. We are one of a group of countries that are dedicated to preserve their own freedom and to protect freedom in the world.

Mr. TUCK. To comment on other aspects of your statement, in stating my views on it, I might say that I wholeheartedly believe in one statement that you made, and that is that I am opposed to the Federal Government preparing textbooks to be used in the States. I think that that is a matter for the States to interpret. I believe that it is better to leave the education of our children in the public schools to the people of the States.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt right along there?

Mr. TUCK. Yes, sir.

Mr. POOL. That is all true, and I agree with you, but on the other hand, as I view this problem, we are deciding whether or not we will have professionals in the field of political warfare. Of course we do have ROTC in the high schools, and things like that. We do have the Federal Government that trains our officers in military warfare.

As I see this problem, it is a little different from the average problem on Federal control of education, which I am opposed to.

I am really kind of surprised at the State Department bringing up the argument of Federal control of education, because in most cases they would be pushing for more Federal controls. I just wanted to make that comment.

Mr. TUCK. Do you have any questions?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, this is only one side. I am glad to hear what you say and I am sure you would have felt that way. This is only one aspect of the bill which I mention in passing, but it does relate to the whole principle of the Federal Government attempting to have an indoctrination course for its citizens. It takes on the methods of the Soviet Union. They have indoctrination of all of their citizens, and I am very glad to say that the more recent reports indicate that they are not able to brainwash this present generation of young people who are now in the universities of the Soviet Union.

Our information may not be accurate, but all we have indicates that, although there are some very ardent Communists, there are a great many of them who are not impressed and are longing for the kind of freedoms that our system provides—the right to read, the right to debate, the right to write what they feel like writing, and above all, the right to travel.

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg left the hearing room.)

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman, may I reply to that?

I think that we certainly are not doing all that we can in the field of political warfare and I think that is the main purpose of this bill. Certainly we are going to have to use revolutionary and new ideas, and if we copy the Soviets on this point, it is all right with me.

I will copy them or add to it or use our own imagination to try to improve on it and come out with a better system, but I think it is so important that we do get into this problem and come up with something that is a practical approach.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, Congressman Pool, I fully agree that we are not doing everything we can do. There is great room for improve-

ment. I have been involved in this thing since I came back from the Soviet Union in 1945. I said we were going to have problems with the Soviet Union. In fact, I said our objectives were irreconcilable.

At that time, there was a wave of enthusiasm in the country for our allies and I was considered an outcast. I have been considered an outcast on many occasions and if this committee considers me one, I am sorry, but I am a professional in this business and I have been at it for many, many years. And I do not think, sir, that this Freedom Academy is the right way to go about fighting communism.

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. HARRIMAN. We have a series of programs to train individuals for particular purposes, and also foreign individuals. I talked yesterday to our Police Academy, which brings the heads or senior men of police forces from different countries. Not only do we train them on how to organize and maintain law and order in a democracy, but also how to deal with internal subversion. It is a very effective course.

I am only mentioning that as one case. There were 30-odd senior men in the police departments of a number of different countries in the group yesterday, and they are gaining a great deal from the course.

I think you have got to shoot with a rifle on specific problems, particularly because Communist methods are changing. They are learning from their own mistakes, and I am satisfied, myself, that the competition between Peiping and Moscow will lead to greater effort on the part of the two of them in order to make an impression upon the Communist international movement.

So, sir, I do not bow to anyone in my determination to do everything I can as an individual, or to sponsor anything the Government can do, which I think contributes to the battle against communism in the world.

Mr. POOL. If this Freedom Academy bill is passed and it becomes a fact, what would you say would be the attitude of the State Department about cooperating with the Freedom Academy?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, the State Department works for the United States Government. There is no group of men and women in the United States Government service that works more loyally for the Government of the United States than the Foreign Service. They work as loyally for Republicans as for Democrats. They are trained that way. I have worked with them intimately, although I have never been part of the Foreign Service.

I have worked intimately with the State Department Foreign Service and I do not know any group of Americans in the United States that is any more loyal to the decisions of the Government. Obviously, when you are working for the Government, you have to accept decisions the Government makes. You may not always agree the decisions are a hundred percent in accordance with what you would like to see done. But you learn, before you work very long in Government service, that you can contribute and be loyal to the Government only if you conform not only to the laws but also to the direction of the President of the United States and whomever he delegates to have charge of the work that you are doing.

So, you need not question, need not give a moment's thought about, the loyalty with which the State Department will carry out laws that are passed.

Mr. POOL. Well, we must have that cooperation or there would not be any point to passing the bill, and I appreciate what you have just said. I think it is very commendable that the State Department has that attitude.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Johansen.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I notice, Mr. Secretary, you point out that the State Department in particular brings leaders from business, labor, and the academic world to the Government to discuss foreign policy problems. I notice you testified that the Department of State and other agencies of Government produce a steady flow of pamphlets, reports, and other educational material which is of great use to the general public. I notice you also referred to the activities of the Department in cooperation with the labor unions in some of the Latin American countries and you refer to their work with youth groups.

Now, I also notice your repeated references to the fact that it is not the business of the Federal Government to indoctrinate our citizens. Mr. Secretary, what is indoctrination?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, indoctrination, I would define it—I have not given it the widest thought and I hope you will not try to trip me up on it—

Mr. JOHANSEN. Nobody is trying to trip you up, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Indoctrination would be that what the Communists do is to get a group of people together and try to instill into them preconceived ideas. I believe that our system in America, the strength of our system, is freedom of discussion. To bring together a group of private citizens of a formable age and attempt to indoctrinate them in particular Government ideas and methods is improper. We do not know who these five men running the Freedom Commission would be. They would be five people who would decide what courses would be given. I seriously question whether any five men should be given the right to determine what the Government uses.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, let me say, Mr. Secretary, that I know of nothing in this bill that says that this Commission is to engage in indoctrination. It is to engage in information and in training regarding Communist methods, Communist ideology, Communist goals.

I just reject the premise that the purpose of this is indoctrination. I also reject the premise that the State Department does not ever attempt to sell its viewpoints and its position through these various media which you yourself testified to. I fail to see where the concept of indoctrination gets into this discussion at all.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, sir, don't you think it is quite a different thing to bring free people of different groups together here and have 50, 100, 200, or 300 sit down and spend 1 day, 2 days, sometimes a week here, seeing everybody? They have a free discussion, they ask questions, and there is an exchange among themselves as well as with Government officials. They are people who are in one way or another interested in foreign affairs.

Obviously, in a democracy, foreign affairs policies must be based on popular support, and the only way you can get that support is by or through the normal democratic processes—the statements of the President, the speeches, the statements of members of the Cabinet, the state-

ments of the Members of the Congress who are in support, and the use of the press, radio, and television.

But these are discussions in a most democratic way. The people are not brought behind closed doors with a group of high-powered instructors attempting to indoctrinate them in any particular line of action. The problems are put before them along with the manner in which the State Department is attempting to deal with them. I find that, by and large, the discussions are useful, and, as I have said in my testimony, it is a two-way street. Although I think that the members of the Foreign Service are very well versed by and large on international affairs, they live abroad, I think contact with the American public is one of the most important aspects of their continuing effectiveness.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, Mr. Secretary, is there any reason why in the functioning and operations of the Freedom Academy there would not be opportunity for free discussion and for questions and the very type of process you are describing?

Do you regard it, Mr. Secretary, as indoctrination to inform and document to the students of this Academy the declarations of the Communist program and objectives, the pronouncements of Marx and Lenin and Mr. Khrushchev as to their objectives?

Do you regard that as indoctrination?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, I do not. I have been rather advanced in the idea. You know, there was a time when we took all Marxian works out of all the school libraries. At least, some people attempted to do it, and I was utterly opposed to it. I thought that there was nothing more un-American than to censor our libraries.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, do you—

Mr. HARRIMAN. Let me just finish, sir. I have listened to you, sir.

I have stated very strongly that I thought high schools should be encouraged to have courses to explain to the students what the objectives of communism are by teachers who understand their evil and danger to freedom and I think that is the way to get an informed public opinion.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Couldn't that Academy help train the teachers to become qualified instructors in that very area?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, you can set up any school for the training of teachers, but I feel it is not the United States Government's job to train teachers in this country. I think our educational system should not be directed by the Federal Government.

I was very strongly for Federal aid to education as Governor of the State of New York and I know something about the educational problems of even a rich State like New York. I also think very strongly that nothing the Federal Government could do would advance the interests of our country more than by helping all the States, particularly the States that have limited means, to improve the educational system. But I very strongly am for not only leaving the curriculum to the States but leaving it, as far as is practical, to the local school boards. I think that is the strength of our democracy, sir.

And I would not be in favor of an institution which tried to train teachers.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I understand, and I am just anxious to get your thinking in the thing, and appreciate it, but would you feel differently about this Academy if it were totally a nongovernmental operation enlisting the aid of—

(At this point Mr. Willis returned to the hearing room.)

MR. HARRIMAN. No, I think it would not be a Federal Government affair if it were attached to one of the great universities, or if the Government encouraged this type of research and this type of study in other universities around the country. I would think that would be helpful to education throughout the country.

But I would not like to see such an academy directed by the Government.

MR. JOHANSEN. I want to be sure I understand you, Mr. Secretary. You would not oppose this program if it were voluntary or if it were connected with a university or something of that kind.

MR. HARRIMAN. If it was part of the general aid to institutions of learning around the country and if it was left to the local authorities in those institutions to develop the program.

MR. JOHANSEN. Now, I have one other question, Mr. Chairman. Am I to understand that you think it is important to Americans and to all free peoples to have a greater diffusion of knowledge with regard to the literature and the ideology of the Communist leaders, such as Lenin and Stalin and Khrushchev?

Now, before you answer that, I ask you the question particularly because of a statement attributed to you by *Time* magazine August 2 of last year, in which you said, or are reported to have said—and I will be glad to have it corrected if it is in error—

I'm not a great Kremlinologist; I don't go off in a padded cell and read the literature. I can't tell you what Lenin or Stalin or Khrushchev said on a given date. But I think I have a certain feeling for the place and for what goes on.

Now, do you feel it is important that there be a thorough familiarization of the free peoples and of their civilian leadership in this country and in other free nations with the teachings and doctrines of Lenin and Stalin and Khrushchev just as it was important, and unfortunately was not done, that there was a full understanding of *Mein Kampf* and what Mr. Hitler pronounced?

MR. HARRIMAN. Mr. Congressman, may I comment on that statement that you read from *Time*?

MR. JOHANSEN. Surely.

MR. HARRIMAN. I recall making some statement of that kind at some press conference or when some correspondent came and interviewed me, and I have often said it. A fellow who is a Kremlinologist is a man I respect very much, such as some of the university professors who are dedicating their lives to, or others conducting research toward, a thorough understanding of the ideological developments in Moscow and at Peiping and the differences that develop.

These studies are very important, and so is the literature the scholars produce; and, as far as I can, I try to keep in touch with it. But I think I said it a little bit more humbly than I am alleged to have spoken.

I am not a Kremlinologist. I have not spent my life trying to analyze every statement that is made and to show the detailed developments. But since the early twenties I have been very much involved in a study of the Communist movement in the world. I have a feeling for it and I think that has been the reason why I have been right in many of the positions that I have taken, in indicating how we ought to fight the developments of the Communist movement.

This movement is not monolithic. It is not rigid. It is a changing scene with developments, and if we attempt to deal with it in a rigid way, we will miss the target.

Now, the other side of your question related to the question of whether the American people should be informed about communism. I feel very strongly that they should. As I have said, I have advocated—at a time when it was thought to be unwise to have even Karl Marx's books available to students—that our high school students should be taught by competent teachers who are opposed to Marxist philosophy, in order that they may be able to deal with it.

But I am very much impressed, sir. I followed some of these youth meetings, you know. There have been several in the last few years, and our American youngsters have stacked up with the Communist-indoctrinated youngsters at those meetings and taken them over the coals and, I thought, had the best of the debate.

Now, they developed that knowledge through our American free educational system and they were not indoctrinated by the Government, and I thought they did a job. I was very proud of them.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, I just want to say in conclusion that I again reject the premise that this program calls for indoctrination. I think it calls for the most vital form of information.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOHANSEN. That is all. I yield the floor.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, may I simply say, I am not going to argue about the word "indoctrination." I am just against the Federal Government in direct charge of the education of our people. I think that, in our free society, education ought to be disseminated and be a responsibility which should be carried on in the American tradition, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. "Education," in quotes.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I would like to make it clear, Mr. Secretary, that it is not a matter of whether you or any other member of the State Department or the Congress is more interested in fighting communism than the others. I work on the premise that we are all Americans, and we have had, and I am sure that we do have, a difference of opinion as to how to best serve the cause of freedom. I think it is good that we should be able to discuss it. Now, I am interested in this word "indoctrination." You suggest that we should not indoctrinate. Would you not think that the Communists indoctrinate? That the Communists have free discussion in their indoctrination schools?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. They allow a discussion?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They have a certain amount of discussion, but it is not free in our sense. They argue about their ideology much in the same way as it used to be in the early days of the development of religion as to how many angels could dance on the head of a pin.

I do not mean to be facetious about it, because I have great respect for the religious development of our country and the free world and I believe that religion is one of the strongest forces against communism. They do have ideological discussions, but no one is allowed to question the fundamental doctrine.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Would you suggest, Mr. Secretary, that in discussing these matters or in the schools, whether it be in the Freedom Academy or any other place, that we should not put stress on and try to indoctrinate people for the cause of freedom?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, I think it is a question of whether you are talking about education or indoctrination. Perhaps I misused the word "indoctrination." I haven't a dictionary here, but we generally use it—or at least I have been accustomed to using it in terms of a type of brainwashing. Perhaps that is too extreme—but I mean the type of effort that the Communists make to impose upon their students thought control by constant repetition, constantly keeping away from the discussion the various other influences, and attempting to achieve a prescribed and preconceived objective.

Our educational system has a freedom about it, and we do not believe the system of indoctrination which the Soviets follow and the other Communist states is the kind of thing that we want to adopt.

Now, on the word "indoctrination." I haven't looked it up in the dictionary. I will be glad to submit a little memorandum on the sense in which I use it. I do not know that we need quibble so over a word, because I am sure that we both have the same objective of fighting communism. Of course, the problem is how you do it.

(Secretary Harriman's letter clarifying his use of the word "indoctrinate" follows:)

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, March 4, 1964.

The Honorable EDWIN E. WILLIS,
Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: When I testified before your committee on February 20, I promised to clarify my use of the word "indoctrinate." I find that the Webster's International Dictionary gives the following definitions:

(1) To instruct in the rudiments or principles of learning, of a branch of learning; to instruct (in), or imbue (with), as principles or doctrines;

(2) Sometimes, in a derogatory sense, to imbue with an opinion or with a partisan or sectarian point of view.

Obviously I was using the term in the secondary dictionary sense. I think you will agree that this is the accepted usage in international politics.

With my kind regards.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. Averell Harriman,
W. AVERELL HARRIMAN.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I have no doubt of that, Mr. Secretary, but—

Mr. HARRIMAN. And the question is whether you have a place where there is concentrated attention, in the Federal Government, or whether you leave the job of education of our public to the non-Federal educational system.

Now, when it comes to educating the servants of the American Government, the people who work for it in the field of foreign affairs, why, I believe that there should be instruction in fighting communism.

I also believe that we should do all we can, and we are doing it in many ways, through our AID organization and in many other ways. Through our embassies and in other ways, we are attempting to bring the right kind of information to the people of foreign coun-

tries. We do this through our USIA and through special courses of training; for example, as I mentioned, training police officials who have the responsibility for developing a police system which not only can keep law and order in a democracy, but also can root out the rats that are involved in the subversive activity in these countries.

Now, these are hitting the problem with a rifle shot rather than a shotgun blast. What I don't like about this bill is the general approach to try to have the Federal Government—I don't know a better word than indoctrinate—but try to get the Federal Government to enter the field of education. I would much prefer to see the energies of the Government develop the right kind of education for those who work for the Government, both on the civilian and the military end, and also to contribute to our educational system so that it may give a rounded education in the whole range of subjects which will produce effective citizens.

I earnestly believe, sir, as you do, that a knowledge of communism is an important aspect of the education of young people and is an important part of the training that they need in order to understand the problems of the day.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Where we may have a little difference of opinion is the fact that if we consider the hot war as a means by which the Government—as you say, the police, it would be military—teaches them how to use the tools in fighting a hot war, are not ideas weapons in the hands of people to fight the cold war?

And why should we not also have an opportunity to teach these, to put these tools in the hands of our people?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would rather see it, sir, done by a normal educational institution, rather than of a special Academy here to teach our American youth.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Who is going to train the teachers?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, we have universities that have extremely good departments which are extremely well versed in every aspect of Communist activity in the Soviet Union and other countries. The training of teachers in communism can be readily achieved through existing institutions, particularly if those institutions are given enough money to expand their activities in all fields of education.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I would like to make this one comment, Mr. Chairman, for the record, and that is that it seems to me—and, of course, I am a layman in this, too—that one of our failures in fighting effectively against communism is that we, under the guise of so-called tolerance or academic freedom or whatever you want to call it, that we give communism equal status with freedom and I think that communism does not have it.

They say that Leninism, the Marxist state is certainly a superior state. I cannot personally see anything wrong in saying that freedom is right and it has a greater status than Marxism.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I hope I was responding to what Congressman Johansen was saying. Obviously, we do not want to teach communism as a virtue. We want to expose it in our educational system. But you know, it is an interesting thing. I believe I am right in saying that the educational system in Russia has failed in one of its most important objectives. We have got to recognize it has been extraordinarily effective in taking a nation that in 1917 was 80 or 85 percent illiterate and

educating the people so there is now a very low rate of illiteracy in the Soviet Union. They have developed, as you know, very skillful scientists and technicians, but with it all, throughout all that system, they practice indoctrination of the Communist ideology and that is hammered, hammered, hammered, into the youth.

And it was supposed to be that when this new generation emerged, it would be so indoctrinated with communism that it would be amenable to the leaders. Now, I am told—I cannot give you convincing evidence—that among the universities there are, of course, certain people who are very, very vigorous Communists, but that the rank and file of the students are interested in the broad educational subjects. They want to have the freest kind of discussion. They resent the fact that books from the free world are not available, that they are not able to write as they wish and discuss things as they wish. And above all, as I say, they want to travel. Now, this is the type of indoctrination that I think is a failure.

Now, I think our freedom, freedom itself, use of the free system, is the way to convince people that that is the proper system to be adopted. But I have been constantly fighting what some people call “taking on the face of the enemy,” adopting the methods of totalitarianism in order to fight totalitarianism.

MR. SCHADEBERG. Well, I would agree with you, Mr. Secretary, on that.

MR. HARRIMAN. I would hope that this committee could concentrate on ways and means to help our general educational system reach all of the people in our country and have them understand communism. I do not think that there would be such opposition to foreign aid if the people understood where the Communist movement was going. When I was in Moscow in 1945, I reported to the Government, to the President of the United States, that I did not think UNRRA was enough. I said Stalin would take over Western Europe if we did not give the people living there in the chaos of the postwar period a chance to have working capital to buy raw materials and get their factories moving.

I did not realize at that time, of course, that the Marshall plan would be as ambitious a program as it was, or that we would go on and develop NATO, but I did point out that Stalin wanted to take over Western Europe. In my opinion, if it had not been for the Marshall plan and NATO, Western Europe would be dominated by communism today, just as Eastern Europe is.

We were successful in turning Stalin back. Now it is perfectly plain from what Mr. Khrushchev says that the new battle against communism is in the undeveloped countries. And yet there are strong opinions held by people in some quarters, including Capitol Hill, that our foreign aid program is not the way to fight communism. Well, I believe it is, and I think that should be stated very firmly and definitely.

It is not the only thing. Our political policies, the way we treat our friends and allies around the world, our information service, the manner in which we exchange students—the way we bring them over here and how we deal with them, are vitally important. But unless the people of the world can get some improvement of their

lot, can move toward freedom, there is an evidence that they will turn to the false promises of communism.

I would like to see the widest discussion of the foreign aid program and what its objectives are, and I would hope that this committee would see that there was wider discussion of the program.

I would be very glad to testify before the Un-American Activities Committee and discuss what countries should get support for the battle against communism, in which I have been involved since 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I am sorry I had to be away when you appeared—and I apologize for that—so I cannot undertake too much examination on your statement, which I did not hear. But two questions occur to me. I have been impressed and have listened carefully to your argument against indoctrination.

Actually, I have before me here the bill we are considering and also the National Academy of Foreign Affairs proposal introduced by Mr. Hays, on request, which is known as H.R. 3668. The bill we are considering contains the language that the Commission "shall establish under its supervision and control an advanced research, development, and training center."

The language of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill provides for "the establishment of an institution at which training, education, and research * * * may be undertaken."

I do not find such vast difference in language. Why would one be indoctrination, using the term as you have used it, and the other not?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not fully understand your question, sir. I am a little bit deaf, sir, and so I did not quite hear your question; but if I understood it correctly, the National Academy which has been proposed is the result of a very prominent group of people studying the need for it. Dr. James A. Perkins was chairman of the group. He was with the Carnegie Foundation and now is the president of Cornell. A committee headed by former Secretary of State Herter made similar recommendations. The National Academy of Foreign Affairs, which the Perkins and Herter committees and the administration proposed, we believe, is the best place to carry on research and to concentrate on training those people working for the Government who have contact with international problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, my question was why, from any point of view, would one be indoctrination and the other not, when the language in the two bills is practically the same?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, this is a question of indoctrination of the public, rather than taking mature people and training them to deal with the problems that our Government faces in its relations abroad. The manner in which we can concentrate our research in this Academy would be of greater value. They would have access to classified material. They could study the past mistakes and the past successes and what can be achieved.

The CHAIRMAN. But that would be indoctrination, though, in the same context; would it not?

Mr. HARRIMAN. What?

The CHAIRMAN. My question still remains the same: Why, the language of the bills being practically the same, can it be said that, under one approach, we would have indoctrination and, under the

other, we would not? I do not think you have faced that issue. I am not pressing you, you understand.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, before you came in, Chairman Willis, we had an interesting, perhaps academic, discussion of the meaning of the word "indoctrination." I was using the word "indoctrination" in the form in which the Communists attempt to indoctrinate their people. That I think we all understand.

They indoctrinate their people. Maybe the word "indoctrination" is the wrong one, but, sir, we believe that to achieve the objectives that you have in mind, one of the steps is to support the proposal for a National Academy of Foreign Affairs.

Now, that is not the only answer. It is only one more of the potential activities of the Government, and I think there are other activities of Government which could help the educational system of our country. But I would not like to see private citizens brought here in large groups to deal with communism as one subject at an Academy being run by five men who are not part of the Government machinery. And I would much prefer to see our educational system of the public be left in the hands, as it now is, of the local authorities.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, what you say there is incontestable. I have not been an advocate of even Federal aid to education, so I am not in disagreement with you on that.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am, sir, if I may say so. I am very strongly for Federal aid to education.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, and I also vote for a lot of things that you are probably for, too.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I respect your views.

The CHAIRMAN. But I was trying to find out, very honestly, in answer to the second question: Why could one be characterized and labeled "indoctrination" and not the other?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, shall we drop the word "indoctrination" and try to paraphrase it? I feel that the education and training of Government employees is a perfectly appropriate function. We have military men who train experts in their field and we should have civilian personnel in our Government trained in all aspects of our foreign problems and particularly with the most important of all, which is how to deal with the cold war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say, sir—

Mr. HARRIMAN. But the other question is, as I understand the proposal, the emphasis on the Government's getting into the business of educating private citizens. And that is what I am expressing opposition to.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand, and a while ago you used the words "people of maturity" as compared to those of immaturity. I do not know that that is justified, but I am quite sure at least the intent of the authors of these bills is to use quite mature people as a student body.

Mr. HARRIMAN. When I was 17 years old, I thought I was mature, so perhaps we had better not go into that.

The CHAIRMAN. But you see, you have been using the word "students." I think we should talk about participants. Those could be very mature—labor leaders, management, professionals. We are not talking about high school students or even college students in the sense that I think you have been referring to them.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, I did not come here to attempt to score debating points on members of the committee and I don't care whether debating points are scored on me, as long as I can attempt to get across what my basic convictions are.

I think the National Academy, as contemplated by the proposed legislation which was the result of a studious group, would be an important addition to our training of men—and when I use the word “mature,” I am talking about men in the middle of their careers—in making them more effective in this fight.

There are other things that should be done, other educational activities which should be expanded, but I do not agree with the idea that it is the Government's job to bring in private citizens and have them trained by—let's forget the word “indoctrinated”—trained by a Commission which is not responsible to our Government, nor is it responsible to the local communities.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you to understand, sir, that I am not an author of the bill. I am trying to get the facts. My mind is completely open on this proposal.

May I suggest this? Would it remove any of your opposition if the student body would be limited to Government employees and foreign nationals?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, I think the Government employees can be better dealt with through the proposal that we have made, that has been made after a considerable study by distinguished citizens who are skilled in education, including the former Secretary of State, Mr. Herter. I think that it is a better formula. I think that many of the objectives as described in the Freedom Academy bills are more or less parallel with the objectives that are specified for the National Academy of Foreign Affairs, so it is a question of machinery. And I think that the general setup, the manner in which the National Academy of Foreign Affairs would be operated, is wiser than the setup that is proposed by these four bills, all of which, I understand, provide for an independent group.

Mr. ICHORD. Will the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I understand your views. I am not debating. I just want to read from the record—since you included a number of people who played a part in the formulation and final language of the National Academy approach—the authors, on the Senate side, of one of these Freedom Academy bills. They cut across political lines and their views toward foreign aid obviously vary.

For instance, among the authors are Senators Mundt, Douglas, Case, Dodd, Smathers, Goldwater, Proxmire, Fong, Hickenlooper, Miller, Keating, Lausche, and Scott.

So there is quite an array of responsible people behind this approach, too. And I myself do not want to belabor the point, Mr. Secretary, or debate with you or cross-examine you. I just wanted to have these facts in the record.

Mr. ICHORD. Will the chairman yield for a question on that?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I bring out the fact that the bill which the Department has testified in favor of is proposed also by a cross section of members of both parties. May I read them, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Symington, Mr. Saltonstall, Mr. Bayh, Mr. Boggs, Mr. Byrd of West Virginia, Mr. Clark, Mr. Engle, Mr. Gruening, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Long of Missouri, Mr. Mansfield, Mr. McGee, Mr. Moss, Mrs. Neuberger, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Ribicoff, Mr. Smathers, Mr. Williams of New Jersey, Mr. Yarborough, Mr. Monroney, Mr. Fong, Mr. Hart, Mr. McIntyre, Mr. Brewster, Mr. Javits, and Mr. Cannon.

The CHAIRMAN. It looks like Mr. Smathers is on both sides, which shows, I suppose, that we are all trying to get at the same thing. And that is why we are having these hearings—to get at it.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. Of course, sir, I came here to express my strong belief that this committee can make a contribution to this all-important question, and I only hope that it will direct its efforts in the direction which I think will be most effective. But it is up to this committee, in its wisdom, to decide what it wants to recommend; and as I had testified before you came in, the State Department will conform to, and work with, whatever Congress passes and the President approves.

Mr. ICHORD. Would the chairman yield for a question on that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. As to the matter of why the Secretary thinks one would be indoctrination and the other would not be, I would like to point out that on page 7 of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill, there is also permitted the authority to—subsection (c) reads on page 7, line 16, “permit other persons, including individuals who are not citizens of the United States, to receive training or education or to perform research at the Academy,” so apparently the National Academy of Foreign Affairs would also permit the training of private citizens as well as foreign nationals.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. So I do not see—

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir, that is true. In our National War Colleges—as you know, we have six War Colleges—we have carefully selected the men from other countries who would gain by the participation. At the National Academy, presumably, there would be carefully selected foreign personnel who would profit from the general education.

Mr. ICHORD. Then I take it the objection—

Mr. HARRIMAN. Now, may I say that the National Academy would be primarily for Government employees and not for private citizens in large numbers, whereas I understood that under the Freedom Academy proposal there would be very large numbers of private citizens from all countries. The bill we have been supporting would relate to Government employees and would make it possible, therefore, to deal with classified material.

Mr. ICHORD. Then I take it the objection of the Secretary is to who is going to run the Academy, or the Academy of Foreign Affairs, rather than the training. You yourself would object to the training of private citizens in large numbers.

Mr. HARRIMAN. In large numbers, yes. I would rather leave it to the States, to our normal educational system. You know, there was a general impression at one time after the war that it was a mistake to

let any young people read Karl Marx or any literature that related to communism. I am glad to see that that idea is waning and that it is now recognized as important for the young people of our country to understand the Communist menace by becoming more familiar with it.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, I would point out to the Secretary, Mr. Chairman, that under the terms of the Boggs bill and the Taft bill and one of the other bills only foreign nationals would be admitted that have been approved by the Secretary of State.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct. And carefully screened.

Similarly, we have six military colleges, specializing on different problems, and all of them have a certain number of carefully selected foreign officers and also nonmilitary Government officers.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. POOL. Was the National Academy bill that you are in favor of proposed after the Freedom Academy idea first came forth?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, I have forgotten how long ago it started, but I do know that this committee that Dr. Perkins was chairman of worked for several months. There was another committee which former Secretary Herter was chairman of. The idea has been studied over quite a number of years, but I can't tell you for exactly how long. I will be glad to find out just when these studies in the State Department began and put it in the record.

(The information furnished by Secretary Harriman follows:)

The State Department subsequently reported that plans for creation of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs to improve upon and supersede the Foreign Service Institute were first formalized early in 1962. The President's Advisory Panel on a National Academy of Foreign Affairs headed by Dr. James A. Perkins was created in June 1962. Dr. Perkins' panel submitted its report to President Kennedy on December 17, 1962.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, of which Secretary Herter was chairman, was established in August 1961. The Committee submitted its report to the Secretary of State in December 1962.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Incidentally, the State Department has today a less adequate form of trying to achieve the same objective in its present Foreign Service Institute. We have also a brief course for senior officers and middle-level officers, specifically in counterinsurgency. It lasts 4 to 5 weeks. I have spoken to it on four or five occasions and have followed it very carefully. That is a new, more recent addition to the training. They concentrate on countersubversion, believing that that activity is increasing in a number of the underdeveloped countries and that our Foreign Service officers should be thoroughly schooled and trained in that field.

This Institute includes officers from the Military Establishment as well as officers from the State Department, from AID and USIA, all those that are involved in the cold war in the field.

Mr. POOL. The point has been made that—

Mr. HARRIMAN. And these are courses that go on, sir, month after month, with 70 to 90 officers at a time taking those courses. It is very effective, I think, and a useful addition to the normal training they have had, bringing them up to date with the changing Communist methods and the changing Communist scene.

Mr. POOL. The point has been made that the National Academy bill was introduced as a defensive way of fighting this Freedom Academy bill. Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I wouldn't think that was true at all, sir. I think it was a development over a period of years which finally found its shape in this bill which was introduced by the members of the Senate and House that I mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask one final question, sir? Because I do not know what direction this committee will go in the handling of this legislation.

The Freedom Academy bill, as you probably know, contains provision for an Advisory Committee to the Academy, and that Advisory Committee would be composed of a representative of the Department of State; the Department of Defense; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Agency for International Development; and the United States Information Agency. And it goes on to provide that this Advisory Committee will itself have a chairman and meet periodically with the Commission, and make recommendations and consult with the Commission, and I paraphrase the bill, with regard to plans, programs, and activities of the Commission, and so on. That, at least, is a good provision; is it not?

Do you feel that we have to go in that direction? Could you enlarge on that, perhaps? Would that be a proper linkage with the Federal Government, I mean, the State Department, and so on? Because the very purpose of the Advisory Committee, as stated in that section, is "to assure effective cooperation between the Freedom Academy and various Government agencies concerned with its objectives."

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, I am opposed to the purpose of the Freedom Academy. Therefore, I do not think that it is wise for any of these agencies of Government to be involved in the education of large masses of private citizens. It is appropriate for them to control the education of those in Government service, but I do not think it is appropriate for a Federal Government body to control the education of masses of private American citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have several questions.

Mr. Secretary, when this bill was first brought to my attention, I was inclined to be against it because I thought it was not necessary, that there would be overlapping of duties and duplication of functions with the State Department, but after hearing the testimony, I have changed my mind.

Now, have you had the opportunity to read the statement of Mr. Grant, a charter member of the Orlando Committee, who originated the idea of the Freedom Academy and who testified before the committee Tuesday, I believe?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, I haven't had that privilege. I don't know who Mr. Grant is.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, Mr. Grant, in his statement to the committee, referred to a speech made by Senator Young of Ohio last September, who had the same idea that I had when this bill was originally presented to me. Senator Young in his speech pointed out that we already had a Foreign Service Institute, five War Colleges, a Special

Warfare School at Fort Bragg, and a Russian Research Center at Harvard, and various other areas of study at universities, so he asked the question: Why do we need a Freedom Academy?

Then Mr. Grant in his statement pointed out that the committee made a study of the training offered in these various institutions and he made what I consider several serious charges against the training that is provided in these institutions, and I think these charges should be presented to you and you given a chance to answer the same in the record.

First of all, he stated that the Orlando Committee found, No. 1: "In general, the training, especially as it deals with nonmilitary conflict, tends to be skimpy, superficial, or nonexistent and provides the student with little motivation."

I would like to have you comment upon that statement, Mr. Secretary, if you would, please.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, Mr. Congressman, I haven't had the opportunity to read this, it is just in my hand now. I wouldn't want to comment about it. This is a free country, everybody has got a right to express his opinions, and I applaud Mr. Alan G. Grant, attorney at law, of Orlando, Florida, who is interested in this very important subject of battling the cold war. I applaud all private citizens' interest in it. I just don't happen to believe that his judgment in this thing is right, really.

I am entitled to my opinion, sir, as well as he his, but I don't know what particular expertise Mr. Grant has. I have no knowledge of who he is or what he is and I don't think he has had the experience, for instance, of either former Secretary of State Herter or Dr. Perkins, who was the head of the Carnegie Foundation and now is president of a very great university in my State, the State of New York.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Secretary, I am just trying to get enough facts on which I can base what I think to be a valid judgment of the legislation, but you indicated in your statement that you thought that the Freedom Academy would be considering communism in a vacuum.

As I read the various bills, I think that they will offer a broad spectrum training in foreign affairs, but will also concentrate on nonmilitary conflict. I believe that the Freedom Academy bill covers everything that the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill covers and a little more. But Mr. Grant states that the committee was unable to find a single Government or university training program that deals with the difficult and sophisticated subject of Communist political warfare, insurgency, and subversion in depth, much less the means of defeating it, and certainly I think we should have institutions where the availability of study in those things is there and it is very important that we study Communists' warfare, political warfare, and insurgency, and the means of defeating it.

I hope that that statement is not justified.

Mr. HARRIMAN. If that is the statement he makes—I haven't had the privilege of reading it—I don't agree with him. I have spoken to each one of the six of our military colleges. I know in a general way what their curriculum is and all of them, in addition to what their particular activity may be in training for combat, are also involved in the general aspect of the cold war and how to deal with specific subjects. As a matter of fact, the talks that I have given at the War Colleges were in that field of the cold war.

We also, as I said, have a training course of 4 or 5 weeks, specifically directed at counterinsurgency. Communist insurgency is one aspect of the conflict.

Now, the point that I think perhaps Mr. Grant doesn't realize is that to do real research and to have real discussions you have to have access to classified material. Now the Freedom Academy couldn't have access to classified material because it would not include Government employees. It would be, I gather, 10,000 or so private citizens, and classified material would not be available to them.

I believe that a more concentrated course in how to fight and carry on and win the cold war—incidentally, I think we are winning it—can better be done by training Government officers and leave the general training of private citizens to our universities.

You speak of Harvard University. I know I have spoken at many of the universities in our country. I am very much encouraged to find that there are an increasing number of institutions of learning that are giving very great attention to the subjects which would be covered by the Freedom Academy and I think it is better done that way. I think the Government should train its own employees and bring to its own school Government employees, either military or non-military, as it sees fit. We have found that selected foreign students who have come here have been very well trained and have gone home, in most cases, well inspired by our methods in this country. But I think the general public from abroad should be allowed to have access to all of our nongovernmental institutions of learning. Some 50,000 foreign students are here in the country.

I think our institutions of learning are improving all the time in the manner in which they attempt to give the foreign student the maximum value in the period of his studies in this country.

I would not like to see it publicized in the world that the United States Government had a Government institution for the purpose of training great numbers of foreign students. I fully agree with Chairman Willis that our private institutions and our State institutions should carry on the general educational work in our country.

If this committee wants to encourage our private institutions or feels that it is wise to do that, I would welcome it. I would also welcome including in the support for education the encouragement of the whole area of study of Communist activity, Communist philosophy, and manner in which to deal with communism. But I earnestly believe that it is better in our American system to leave that education to our private institutions, sir. And I would hope that you would encourage the Government to round out and expand its activities not only in the United States, but through the various means that we now have of encouraging the training and education in free countries which are our friends and allies.

Mr. ICHORD. You have objected to the training of private citizens in large numbers in an Academy of this sort. Has the State Department made any study of the role that private citizens could be playing in helping to solve our local problems?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know that the State Department has ever had a project, or money for a project, to study or make a complete study of what is done in this field. If the Congress directed the Department to do it, I think it would be a very healthy thing. But

I do know that the State Department is, in one way or another, in very close touch with many of the universities and colleges that are particularly interested in foreign affairs, and particularly interested in the subject which is being directly discussed now. Members of the State Department staff do go and lecture to them, and we ask the universities to come down and consider with us projects which are important. In fact, some of the officers of the Department are drawn from the universities, and they come and work for the Government and then they go back to their academic fields. It is stimulating to the academic field. But I don't know of any study. If there is one I will let you know, sir. If this committee wishes such a study to be made, I am sure the State Department would be only too glad to do so, and it might be of use and illuminating to all of us. I am not sure whether the Perkins committee made such a study.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I just say, sir, that I am very heartily in sympathy with the idea that more knowledge should be disseminated in our country, that more people should be stimulated to study and understand, and that those in our Government who are charged with carrying out our policy and conducting the battle that is going on—both militarily, unfortunately, in some areas of the world, but also on a civilian basis—should have more education. I say again that, although we are having setbacks, fundamentally and as I have watched the world develop since 1945, gravely concerned about Communist takeover, I think we are by way of winning the cold war. If we continue to have the determination which increasingly our people are showing and the stimulation this committee is giving, I hope will contribute to that.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, I might say, Mr. Secretary, that the only difference that I see in these two proposals is that the Academy, Freedom Academy, puts emphasis upon the training of private citizens, both of them permit the training of foreign nationals, even the Academy of Foreign Affairs permits the training of private citizens. However, you have objected to them, in training in large numbers, and the Freedom Academy does permit the establishment of an information center, which you are opposed to. But really, I think your opposition, other than the information center and the training of private citizens in large numbers, goes to the fact as to who is to run the institution. You feel that it should be run by the Department of State, while the sponsors of the bills want an independent agency.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, sir, I am afraid the word "only" is rather a broad word. It covers quite a considerable area.

The objectives of the two bills, as you read the preambles, appear to be generally in agreement, but the methods are quite different.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I would like to thank the Secretary for being here. I know it has been helpful for me, at least, but in view of the fact that the Secretary has commented several times on the fact that he thought that we ought not to burn books on Marxism and communism and so forth, and I agree with him, I would like at least to be on the record that I have always contended that we ought to teach about communism.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Good.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. But I would feel that I would like to see it taught by professors who are oriented toward freedom and a free society and not oriented toward the Marxist way.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is one statement, sir, that I agree with 1,000 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your appearance.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you. I am grateful to you, Chairman Willis, for the privilege of appearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make a suggestion that you might counsel with your aide, here. Would you care to offer a rebuttal, explanation, or enlargement on what you had to say, vis-a-vis the criticisms by Mr. Grant, of the Foreign Service Institute and the War Colleges?

Mr. HARRIMAN. If I may take this copy, I would be very glad to take it and I would be very glad to—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking for it. I said perhaps you might care to do this.

We want a record as complete as possible.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Could I read it first, sir, and then see whether we are ready to take up your very courteous offer? It is a question of making a general comment on it or a detailed comment on it. I think that depends upon it. We have to read it first.¹

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I wish you well in your objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I think one of our colleagues is here.

Mr. Taft? Glad to have you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT TAFT, JR., U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO

Mr. TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I shall not take long for this statement. I realize that the committee has heard a great deal about this subject. I am sure that many members are more familiar with the background of the proposal than I am.

I gave this bill some study before introducing it and I have listened with great interest to the testimony of Secretary Harriman here this morning.

My interest in sponsorship arises from the conviction that we are engaged in an ideological battle for the minds of men that is bound to determine the future course of this country and of mankind. While the basic differences between our system and the Communist system (the contrast of individual freedom and responsibility, as compared to authoritarian direction and submission) may be clear to all Americans (I am not so much worried about the matter of indoctrination that has been discussed here this morning, because I feel that most Americans do not need indoctrination in knowing which direction they want to go), I am concerned with laying bare and exposing some of

¹ No further communication was received from Mr. Harriman on this point.

the techniques, methods, and stratagems that have been developed in spreading communism. These are extremely complex and extremely subtle and have not been adequately revealed. I think the record of progress in recent years for Communist ideology in much of the world stands as mute but mighty testimony to our lag in these areas, despite the superiority of military force that we have held and despite our complete conviction, I am sure, that our system offers far more to mankind.

I do think that a few points might be specifically examined by the committee in the determination as to what direction it may want to go on the various proposals that are before it. I don't say that either one of these proposals, mine or the National Academy as proposed by the Secretary, or others, are the only answers, but I think certain things should be considered and taken into consideration as background for the decision that you are going to be called upon to make.

First of all, I think we have to admit that the need for some activity in this area is pretty clear. Recent history, I think, shows the spread of Communist subversion and our complete failure to check the increased growth of Communist subversion, and its effect evidenced in many areas of the world is in itself enough to prove this.

Secondly, I think we have to recognize that research as well as training is vitally important. Of course, national security provisions must be observed, but there are many governmental functions and activities to which security provisions offer no complications. A public body has the advantage of ready access to the information necessary to do the job. Our private universities may attempt to get this kind of information, they may attempt to draw conclusions from it, but in the last analysis they don't have the same access. There are some notable exceptions in specific areas. The Hoover Institution, for instance, out in California, is doing a wonderful job of getting basic raw material in this area, and in the entire area beyond this, of the whole nature of revolution.

But I think that there is a real need for governmental activity here.

I think next we have to recognize that it must not be—it must not be—partisan, and it must not be a witch hunt by any particular group of one sort or another. I think that would certainly defeat the purpose of it very quickly. But I think, therefore, that having a bipartisan Commission (not having it under any particular department of the Government) offers a great deal more hope for the chances of success than having it under the Secretary of State or having it under anyone else. I think we have to face the fact that private universities and existing public bodies have not been able to do the job. The record is such that I think this is clear.

I think that we also have to admit that in a very real sense, perhaps not broadly through their people, but in the very real sense of having a real trained cadre or core of subversives, that the Communists have been doing this job. I do not think we have to adopt their methods to succeed or to oppose them; I think we can develop our own methods consistent with our ideas of freedom and of proper activity.

Finally, I think that this area of private concerns and private individuals is extremely important. It is becoming more important all the time.

I have had a few connections in the past with American organizations doing business overseas. Many of those organizations very frankly simply will not deal through the regular American channels, the American State Department representatives. They say they are only a handicap. They are no help. These organizations, many of them, are not called upon, ever, by the State Department or by anyone in Government for the information that they do have available. This is becoming more and more true for the information that is available, I think, is becoming broader all the time. For instance, we have the whole question of trade fairs. We have had Americans going into joint trade fairs in Europe, that some of you gentlemen may know about. We have sent over private citizens who have not been trained as to what the problems may be. I think they should have been trained, and the enactment of my bill would see that such training was provided.

I think the same thing is true of many joint ventures. We find many nations now require a certain amount of stock ownership among nationals in those particular countries. (This is true in many Latin American countries, and the contacts that we are making here and the problems of Communist subversion in those nations are vital to these businesses.) If U.S. businessmen are going to invest in those areas, they are going to have to be arriving at conclusions, anyway. But are they going to be arriving at sound conclusions in making the decisions that will affect what happens to America in these areas?

I cannot share with the Secretary the idea he has that clearance is a real problem, and security is a matter here that is of great, great importance. I do not think that any of us really believe that the Freedom Academy proposal is to train the broad mass of people in this country; it is to train people who are directly concerned here and who can take an important part in it, and many of these are private individuals, many of them have security clearances, as you know.

The military continuously is taking civilians on indoctrination trips, giving them security clearance before they do it.

The same thing, it seems to me, could be true here.

These are just a few of the ideas that I have.

The information center proposal is, of course, a little controversial, but I would point out to you that we are doing exactly the same thing overseas with USIA.

I would point out to you also that insofar as, for instance, ROTC courses or the FBI school, agricultural extension colleges, various War Colleges, I am sure that we are presently preparing textbook information and other basic information, where the Government is the only body that has the proper information for preparation for these courses, and that would be true here. There is nothing compulsory in this bill compelling anyone to use the information that is prepared. It is merely an authorization to prepare the information, so that if some group wants to use it, and it is proper for them to use it, it will be available.

These are some of my views, and I would just like to conclude by saying that I strongly agree with the position that has been taken by Congressman Schweiker. I feel that it is extremely important that this committee report out a bill and get us moving toward the

solution of these problems. The bill won't be perfect. No bill, the first time around, ever is. It may not even succeed. But at least we will know that we have taken a shot at it and tried.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I have no questions.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the distinguished gentleman from Ohio for making such a fine statement.

As I understand it from your testimony, this is not a matter of ideology as it is informing the people as to methods by which the Communists undertake to infiltrate this and other countries.

Mr. TAFT. That is my feeling, Governor Tuck.

Mr. TUCK. And that people would be left free to enjoy the ideologies which they already have.

Mr. TAFT. Yes, indeed. I do not think this is an attempt to—

The CHAIRMAN. Indoctrinate?

Mr. TAFT. —indoctrinate, or propagandize I think was the word I was looking for, Mr. Chairman, the American people in any sense.

Mr. TUCK. I take it also from your testimony that you believe—which undoubtedly is true—that private and State universities and schools do not have the means to supply the information which it is necessary for them to have in order to train teachers and others who are engaged in educational work.

Mr. TAFT. That is my feeling.

Mr. TUCK. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Is Dr. Niemeyer with us?

Dr. NIEMEYER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Dr. Niemeyer.

STATEMENT OF GERHART NIEMEYER

Dr. NIEMEYER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: This bill proposes a new agency for research and training in order to enhance the political warfare capabilities of the free world.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Niemeyer, may I interrupt?

I wonder if you could give a thumbnail sketch of your background for the record.

Dr. NIEMEYER. Indeed. I am professor—

The CHAIRMAN. I have something here handed to me. Let me read it and see. Well, give it in your own words, in thumbnail fashion; will you?

Dr. NIEMEYER. I am a professor of political science at Notre Dame, one time member of the State Department, one time member of the faculty of the National War College, and one time consultant to your committee, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I know. Didn't you also teach at Princeton?

Dr. NIEMEYER. Indeed. At Yale, at Columbia University, at Oglethorpe University.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think you are the author of a book entitled *An Inquiry Into Soviet Mentality*?

Dr. NIEMEYER. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think you collaborated with our committee in connection with a volume put out, *Facts on Communism*?

Dr. NIEMEYER. Right. Also editor of *A Handbook on Communism*.

The CHAIRMAN. And then, way back in 1958, the committee published a consultation with you on the subject of *The Irrationality of Communism*.

Dr. NIEMEYER. Indeed, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said something about being connected with the State Department for a while.

Dr. NIEMEYER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In what area?

Dr. NIEMEYER. In the Office of United Nations Affairs. I was a planning adviser in the Office of United Nations Affairs from 1950 to 1953.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Dr. NIEMEYER. Thank you.

I submit that a new agency of this type as outlined in H.R. 5368 is called for, because the conflict itself is of a new type unprecedented in the history of this Nation, a type of conflict for which we are very poorly organized.

We have been conducting the cold war as if it were a traditional conflict between great-power interests. This type of conflict, with which the 19th century has made us familiar, turns on territories, boundaries, and the imponderables of a nation's position among other nations. Its ultima ratio is a military test of strength, for which nations prepare through armaments and alliances. In this kind of conflict, one tries to protect one's interests while avoiding war as much as possible. If war breaks out, though, one fights it until a peace treaty is achieved, after which the contestants continue as nations, albeit in different political circumstances.

The cold war appeared to be that kind of a conflict because the Communist Party obtained control of Russia, a great power, and has used Russia's manpower and other resources for its strategic purposes. The cold war, nevertheless, has not arisen from a clash between the national interests of Russia and those of the United States. It has arisen out of the ideological obsession of Communists with the destruction of what they call the bourgeois society or, as they now term it, the world system of imperialism. Although our country is located at the opposite side of the globe from Russia, the Communists have identified the United States as their main enemy because they see in us the core of capitalistic imperialism. They are fighting us with the power means of Russia, but what fights us is not Russia. Rather, it is the ideological enterprise of communism aiming at the total destruction and subversion of our society.

In the cold war, it is not boundaries and territories, spheres of influence and relative power which are at stake, even though all these play a certain role. Nor is war the ultima ratio of this struggle. Nor is a peace treaty the prospective outcome if war should break out. The Communists are fighting to dissolve, decompose, disintegrate, and destroy our society, institutions, authorities, and habits of thought and heart. We are fighting to free our society from this kind of assailant. The Communists do not look on war as their chosen means to obtain

their ends. In all their history, they have opted for a minimum of force when coming to power, and for a maximum of force and terror only after they had secured full control of the public means of compulsion. They have gained access to these means mostly with the help of allies with whom they were united in coalitions and whom they destroyed as soon as they had become public officials.

Internationally, the same is true. We have armed ourselves and successfully maintained a formidable alliance. We have deterred the enemy from any large-scale military attack on us. But in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America the Communists have established new positions of strength without military attack. Our military ramparts are still strong. But the enemy has moved underneath and around them, even in our midst, creating a neutralist movement directed against the possession or use of nuclear weapons. These are not the methods of conventional great-power conflict. We are fighting an enemy who controls a nation and often looks like that nation's representative, but has aims and motives quite different from those of a national government. We are threatened by an intent that assaults not merely our power but our way of life. And we are confronted by methods of persuasion, manipulation, and subversion the like of which no great nation has faced before.

I am saying all of this in order to establish to some extent the reason why we have done poorly in the cold war so far.

I believe that this is not due to any "softness on communism" in leading circles, as has been often alleged, but simply to a confusion of the cold war with a traditional great-power conflict. And that confusion I do not think stems from sinister motives. The truth is that our Government is now organized in its external capabilities to meet the kind of threat that is involved in a traditional great-power conflict, the only kind of power conflict with which we have been familiar.

For instance, the State Department is organized by regions and countries. To this day, it does not have a single office which is devoted to the problem of communism, as such, or to the problems of fighting communism on a global scale. Its capabilities in general are mainly in the field of diplomacy, that is, dealing with other nations' governments. The enemy we are facing may have a power base in one country, but it is an enterprise with a worldwide organization and a global strategy.

We have no Government agency geared to world communism as such. The Psychological Strategy Board, which functioned for a while, has ceased to operate as a cold war agency. The regional organization of the State Department is reflected in the regional or area studies in our universities. Again, countries, languages, cultures, and governments are the focus of our efforts there. We do not train anywhere experts in communism or experts in the methods of communism.

The Freedom Academy bills are designed to remedy at least one aspect of this deficiency. The Academy is, as the State Department acknowledged, designed as a cold war agency.

Creation of such an agency would mean that we would at long last begin to adjust to the kind of conflict in which we are. So far, we have created only one other agency directly geared to cold war requirements, Radio Free Europe. Significantly, it is an agency working in, and with the help of, the private sector in order to attain the

flexibility which the Government officially could not have in this capacity.

This acknowledges the fact that the official organization of our Government is not geared to the medium and the methods through which the cold war is largely fought. Not only can a government through its official agents not penetrate into all the nooks and crannies where cold war operations are going on, but even if it could, it would not be to the nation's best interest that its government should be engaged in power contests with forces which appear in private garb. In many countries in the world, local Communist and pro-Communist elements confront directly the official representatives of the United States. It would be far better if battle against the Communists were done equally by forces operating in the private sector with local organizations and local means of influencing opinion and allegiances. The Communists have a network of party organizations throughout the world. We have nothing like a pro-American Party or a pro-Freedom Party anywhere in the world. Maybe it is good that we have nothing of that kind. I think it might be a great danger if we would aim at a party to match the totalitarian Communist Party. It would not destroy freedom, though, if people willing to fight Communists in other countries received training and information, financial and moral support from a cold war agency equipped with the best human resources we have. It does not take a totalitarian party to fight the Communist Party and it does not take Communist methods to frustrate the Communists in their designs. It does take, however, people and organizations and methods other than we are employing now. The cold war is so unprecedented that we still have to learn how to fight it. The Freedom Academy would be an institution where this learning could be done.

Now, it seems to me that between the two possibilities which have been discussed this morning, the Freedom Academy is better designed for its purpose for three reasons: It is meant to devote intensive study to communism for a period long enough to produce results; it would be set up within the Government, but sufficiently apart from the existing agencies to allow the development of new ideas of cold warfare; and the inclusion of the private sector in the range of its competences will make it possible to mobilize forces for the cold war which alone can meet the Communists on the ground where the telling battles are fought.

Among those who for many years have fought Communists abroad, in other countries, often alone, mostly without support, quite frequently against resistance of our foreign personnel, and entirely without our guidance, the proposed Freedom Academy has inspired hopes that finally the free world will gird its loins for political warfare. Our best hope for countering Communist advances is to mobilize this latent strength, to close the ranks of all potential victims of communism, and to unite the already existing centers of resistance. If the Communists can extend their influence by nonmilitary means, under the cover of the mutual atomic deterrent, so can we, and with better chances of success.

The Freedom Academy is significant as a mute declaration that we are out to win the cold war without an atomic holocaust.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard Secretary Harriman testify this morning?

Dr. NIEMEYER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any comments you would care to make on some of his objections?

Dr. NIEMEYER. I think the questioning of the committee has brought out quite rightly that there are no substantial differences in the purposes of the two bills and the two training institutions; and Congressman Ichord, I think, has come to the conclusion here, in questioning Mr. Harriman, that therefore the essential difference which the State Department must see is in the control of these institutions.

As I see it, the State Department wants to have an enlarged Foreign Service Institute, whereas the Freedom Academy bill foresees an agency which is sufficiently separate to be novel and, therefore, flexible enough to develop new methods and new insights into cold war operations.

Now, it seems to me that to the extent to which our training and information on communism has been deficient—and the course of the cold war suggests that it has been deficient in more than one way—to this extent a simple enlargement of the Foreign Service Institute does not promise any improvement over the previous performance, and I would say that an improvement over the previous performance could only be hoped for by the establishment of something that is new and to some extent—not wholly, but to some extent—separate from the existing State Department agencies and State Department controls.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

(At this point, Mr. Tuck left the hearing room.)

Mr. POOL. Governor Tuck had this question, and he had to leave. But we were discussing it here in private. We wondered if limiting the studies and the work to anti-Communist problems would defeat the argument that it is a Federal control of education. What would be your comments on that?

Dr. NIEMEYER. I don't see this as a public education project on a large scale. I see it as a project to train and inform people who are willing or in the business of fighting communism, and it has been said before that these may be trade union officials or they may be journalists or they possibly may also be public teachers who would come there for a particular purpose.

I see it also, however, largely as a training ground for foreign students, and maybe this would turn out to be the most important function of this institution.

It has been said that citizens and functionaries, both foreign and domestic, could receive their training at the universities. Well, I am in university training and I teach a course on Communist ideology, a whole year course at Notre Dame University. I am not aware of any university where people could be trained for purposes of cold warfare and for purposes of that kind of thorough information on all aspects of the Communist enterprise that would enable them to go out and fight the cold war. There simply is no such program at any university, and I don't see that any university is set up for such a program.

(At this point, Mr. Ichord left the hearing room.)

Mr. POOL. My question is, Would you limit the purposes to research in communism and methods to fight communism?

Dr. NIEMEYER. Yes, I would, sir, because I believe this, the negative purpose is the purpose on which all people can unite. As soon as one introduces a positive purpose there indeed might be an element of indoctrination which would be dangerous.

Mr. POOL. Thank you.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I just want to thank you for a very fine statement.

Dr. NIEMEYER. Thank you, Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. The session will resume at 2 o'clock, and the hearing room will be the District of Columbia Room.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., Thursday, February 20, 1964, the committee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1964

(The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Joe R. Pool presiding.)

(Committee members present: Representatives Pool, Ichord, and Johansen.)

Mr. POOL. The committee will come to order. We will go ahead with the testimony. It is a few minutes after 2 and some of the members could not be here. But I will go ahead and start the hearing. I am sure some of the others will come in, in a moment. Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky.

Before you start, Dr. Dobriansky, I notice you have a statement about your background. If you want to enlarge on that slightly, it will be all right with me.

STATEMENT OF LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Fine. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members: My name is Lev E. Dobriansky. I am a professor of economics at Georgetown University and formerly taught at New York University. I am also privileged to serve as the president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, and as an editor of the American Security Council's *Washington Report*. I was formerly a faculty member of the National War College and have been a lecturer at many of our service schools.

At the outset of my formal statement, I express my deepest appreciation for this opportunity to testify on the five resolutions calling for the creation of a Freedom Commission and the establishment of the Freedom Academy. Both for the organizations I head and for myself, we are in complete favor of the passage of this extremely important measure that all five resolutions substantially embrace. The tremendous and pressing need for this independent agency and the special educational institution cannot be too strongly emphasized.

In order not to duplicate some of the thoughts and ideas of other proponents of the measure, I should like to develop somewhat unfamiliar avenues of reasoning that justify the existence of a Freedom Commission and Academy. For your studied consideration and also

in rational support of the affirmative position taken by us on this far-seeing measure, we offer the following concise observations, all of which can be readily and extensively documented.

THE PERMANENT COLD WAR

(1) The necessity for the passage of this measure is inextricably tied up with the basic issue of the very survival of our Nation. This statement is no exaggeration. When one soberly considers how much has been lost since World War II, he can with considerable validity caption his thoughts with the constant and foreboding question, "Who's next in the long string of captive nations—South Vietnam, Laos, Venezuela, Zanzibar?" The pessimistic overtones of this gnawing question, which will be answered in the latest chapter of our cold war failures, particularly with regard to the Russian base of global cold war operations, need not, of course, be necessarily accepted for the long future. But in our present state of free world cold war disintegration, who can reasonably deny that it rests on firm grounds of near probability?

Had we, over 10 years ago, in operating existence what is sensibly designed in these five resolutions, we as a nation would have maintained our clear-cut superiority in world leadership without the phantasms of a Soviet Russian contender. Lest we be mistaken, this is not entirely an observation from hindsight, even though such an observation should in itself draw respectful attention. The plain fact is that the fundamental nature of the imperialist Soviet Russian enemy had been clearly revealed many, many years before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Those of us who understood this then and, later at the beginning of the fifties, advocated a policy of liberation were in truth proposing the development of a cold war strategy to defeat the Russian enemy in the only area he's capable of winning, that of paramilitary conquest. Regrettably, even those who gave official lipservice to the policy of liberation failed to understand what it meant in essence and content.

Hampered by all the trimmings of a cultural lag, this measure, over 10 years later, still points to the most essential course open to us in combating successfully and decisively the propagandistic, psychopolitical, conspiratorial, and subversive inroads made by Moscow in the free world. In fact, it is hyperessential today; more than it was over a decade ago when we enjoyed complete military superiority, air supremacy, and atomic monopoly power. With the relatively declining longrun importance of military might and power as our chief source of deterrence against both the further expansion of Moscow's empire and the horrendous outbreak of a global hot war, the critical area of the foreseeable future will be that of vigorous and imaginative cold war activity. The sheer adequacy of imperial Russian arms and industrial capacity has produced a formidable power of influence that shifts the points of comparative advantage to operations within the cold war area.

Vested with complete futural significance of the most crucial sort, the measure under consideration here aims to equip us with the necessary means of coping adequately with the devious cold war operations of Moscow and now also Peiping, twin sisters in established imperio-

colonial practices. These practices include a whole range of psychopolitical infiltration and subversion, from which no sphere of human existence is excluded, even entailing "peace," "peaceful coexistence," "disarmament," "lessening of tensions," "coexistence or codestruction," and other Russian cold war shibboleths. In short, it is an illusion to believe that so long as the Russian and Chinese imperial systems continue to exist, the cold war would or could be terminated by trade, appeasement, wishful thinking about "mellowing processes," and even the self-disintegration of the captive world. The long truth is that the cold war is an institutional coefficient of these systems. The sooner we come to grips with this fundamental truth, the sooner we'll be contributing to our own survival.

THE ENEMY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(2) The passage of this measure and its full realization would make possible, at long last, concentrated studies of Russian cold war operations in terms of indispensable historical perspectives which would deepen our insights into the basic nature of the enemy. Careful analyses along these and primarily substantive lines would reveal that what we classify today as Moscow's cold war techniques and methods are essentially traditional to totalitarian Russian empire-building. Contrary to general opinion, they are not the created products of so-called Communist ideology and tactics. Except for accidental refinements and considerable technologic improvements, many of the techniques manipulated by the rulers of the present Russian empire, and also applied by their Red Chinese competitors, can be systematically traced as far back as the 16th century. Indeed, over a half century before Marx, the Russian ambassadors of Catherine the Great utilized class-division techniques to prepare for the partitions of Poland. Countless other examples of striking comparative worth and value can be cited.

In a real sense, such specialized studies conducted by an independent agency set up to concentrate on political warfare stand to have more comparative value for our national security and defense than literally the billions spent on military hardware and economic foreign aid. These fashioned techniques and methods of Moscow are relatively new to us because of our historical unfamiliarity with them. Yet, significantly, they are old and tried to all the captive nations in Eastern Europe, in the U.S.S.R., in and about the Caucasus and central Asia. In sharp contrast to the ways and means of past Western imperialism and colonialism that thrived on oversea possessions, the methods of Russian imperio-colonialism were forged to extend an overland empire, with all their borderland implications. By these methods and techniques, an unprecedented empire was built over the centuries and in 1918 revived and enormously expanded by the present Soviet Russian rulers.

Of conspicuous note concerning the past, as well as contemporary, Russian expansion in power, control, and influence is the outstanding fact that the polyglot, multinational military forces under Moscow have played essentially a secondary role. With patience and in time, the primary role has consistently been played by Russian conspiracy, propaganda, diplomatic duress, and subversion. And this includes

our latest period, from World War II to the present, with Khrushchev as the master player in this grand enterprise. Our understanding of these rulers over the centuries is indispensable to adequate preparations and ability on our part to cope with phenomena of intensive revolutions and conquests from within in independent and also emerging states and nations of the free world. Here too, in short, we are confronted by a cumulative experience not of only 47 years but rather of centuries, and the Soviet Russian heirs of this experience possess an enormous advantage that few of their predecessors had—that of technology and science. The objectives envisaged by the five resolutions point in the direction of such major study. Along these lines there is a terrible gap in our knowledge, both in the official and private sector; indeed, even rudimentary facts about the chief enemy are not properly understood or even known—again in many official and private quarters.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Will you let me interrupt at this point to ask this question so that it will be associated with this comment?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Incidentally, I am happy to see you here today, Doctor.

Would the gentleman feel that supplying of this information both to those in Government and to those who are private citizens or leaders in the private sector constitutes indoctrination?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Not at all, sir. I will come to that point if I may. I didn't have a chance to incorporate some of it—let us put it, some of the observations made by the Secretary this morning, but I will allude to them.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I won't interrupt further.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. This gap in our knowledge is an obvious, gratuitous advantage to Moscow's cold war experts.

SOME CONCRETE CASES OF WON OR LOST OPPORTUNITIES

(3) In the light of swift-moving developments in the past decade and more, this measure and its passage are actually long overdue. The essential ideas of this measure were approvingly considered by the Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression some 10 years ago. It is noteworthy that through this committee Congress made its substantial contribution to our developing knowledge of the imperialist Soviet Russian menace. It was at the initiative of, and by the vision of, Congress that this tremendous stride was made.

Now, the present resolutions in more elaborate and adequate form crystallize the thoughts and vision of the many who have given serious consideration and study to the nature and scope of cold war operations under the contrived conditions of "neither peace nor war." Based on much precedent thought and the intensive investigations of previous congressional committees, the embraced measure promises to lay the necessary foundations for us to meet intelligently and competently the cold war thrusts and maneuvers of Moscow and Peiping.

The spectrum of cold war ideas and engagement is a most extensive one. However, let me briefly cite a few concrete examples in which congressional initiative, as against routinous executive inertia or myopia, contributed to our cold war posture. One, in 1958, if Congress

hadn't acted in time, the vital VOA non-Russian language broadcasts into the Soviet Union would have been systematically eliminated, and much to the satisfaction of Moscow. Two, the passage of the Captive Nations Week Resolution in 1959 demonstrated to the world how deeply vulnerable Moscow is with regard to the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union alone. The typical, mythical image that millions throughout the world have of the Soviet Union could be easily transformed if we even began to implement that resolution. On this I should like to submit as part of my statement an article I have written on "The Next Move," which appeared in the January 6, 1964, issue of the American Security Council's *Washington Report*.

Mr. POOL. Is that just a page or two there?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes.

Mr. POOL. Without objection then it may be admitted. (See pp. 1294-1297.)

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. A third example, with which most of our people are unfamiliar, concerns Congress' passage of legislation in 1960, providing for the erection in our Capital of a statue of Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian poet and freedom fighter. The ramifications of this action would amaze any close student of cold war operations; in 1961 we thwarted Moscow's perversion of this historic figure and just a few months ago, given what they considered an opening wedge provided by several obtuse editorials of a local newspaper, Moscow and its puppets slickly attempted to destroy the project here. On this seemingly minor action I should also like to submit as part of the record this recently published booklet, *Shevchenko, A Monument to the Liberation, Freedom, and Independence of All Captive Nations*, and because of its voluminous nature, Mr. Chairman, I will just make it available to the members of the committee, then.

Mr. JOHANSEN. If I may interrupt, but the newspaper that the witness refers to is the *Washington Post*, and I would like to have it in the record that it is.

Mr. POOL. Put that in the record.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I would raise no objection to that.

Mr. POOL. We appreciate the pamphlet. We will not print it in the record.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. It is 119 pages in length and it can be supplied to each member if he is interested, as a concrete case.

But I would appreciate the printing of this material, a most interesting document distributed by the Russian Embassy to our wire services and newspapers concerning, again, this seemingly minor Shevchenko affair.

Mr. POOL. Identify it for the reporter.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. The document is a propaganda appeal with a cover letter written by Yuri I. Bobrakov of the Press Department of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. JOHANSEN. This is the Washington Embassy?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes. The matter was obviously considered in Moscow and Kiev; they got into the act. This is dated December 30, 1963.

Mr. POOL. It may be admitted without objection. (See pp. 1298-1300.)

Congress cannot, of course, be expected to take such initiative continually along the entire spectrum of commonsense cold war challenge.

Some opportunities, as those cited, have been won; there are many that have been lost. In the area of the Olympic Games, for instance, which also has cold war significance with the emerging myth of the physically supreme "Soviet man," we again have lost the opportunity of smashing this myth by not insisting that non-Russian participants from the U.S.S.R. be properly identified as representatives of their respective national republics. By no means are all the medal victors Russians. However, as in the last decade, so in this one, Congress can make a monumental contribution to our eventual victory in the cold war by passing this Freedom legislation in this session. In brief, it would be creating a sorely needed generator of ideas and proposals along the entire spectrum of the titanic cold war challenge.

INSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND STABILITY

(4) Without perhaps incurring the wrath of one of your colleagues who isn't on this committee but on the banking committee, I would say that by analogy, and a rough one at that, the existence of a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy is as necessary to our national being today as is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In like manner that the latter is purposed to achieve stability and balanced development in our economy, the former would strive to accomplish the same in our undertakings under the indefinite conditions of "neither peace nor war." It is safe to say that because our people have not, by and large, understood the nature, scope, and depth of Moscow's cold war operations, they have been constantly subjected to wide fluctuations of mood and sentiment, giving way at times to dangerous complacency and even seeming indifference toward the vital force of their treasured heritage and values and, at other times, to near hysteria.

Dispersed and much-frittered thinking, as now exists, in cold war dimensions will guarantee a continued instability in popular reactions and a safe passivity in official determinations. With the Russians and Chinese operating in virtually every quarter of the free world, even endemic developments rapidly assume a broad cold war stigma. They require continuous, studied assessment leading to recommendations for not only adequate counteraction but also an effective offensive, and this is the one place that the Russians are most vulnerable; namely, the captive non-Russian majority in the U.S.S.R. itself. The only practical apparatus for this type of concentrated and totalistic thinking is the proposed Commission and Academy, which veritably would become institutional instruments of enlightenment and stability.

ARGUMENT AND COUNTERARGUMENT

(5) The argument and counterargument on this most vital issue should receive on the part of the committee the most exacting and scrutinous type of internal analysis. I submit that upon such analysis the negative and inconsistent responses to the measures at hand from certain executive agencies constitute in themselves a negative support of the proposals. Behind the usual, verbally graced generalities they reflect an uncertainty of position, misstatement of facts, and an apparent incapacity to grasp the structure of cold war thought, which finds easy confirmation in our record of the past 20 years.

Viewing first the concise, positive arguments on the measure, I repeat that to meet satisfactorily the tasks and requirements indicated above, an independent agency devoted exclusively to the content of cold war operation is indispensable. There is no existing agency or department in our Government that is equipped by intent or resources to meet these tasks. No existing governmental body is designed to treat and study Russian cold war phenomena in all their interrelated parts and aspects. Administratively, there is no principle of coordination and integration represented by any body in this intricate and complex field. More, there is no principle of crystallization and conservation of thought represented, as one department vies with another in a "play it by ear" mood to determine whether even food has a cold war weight.

The creation of a Freedom Commission would correct these grave defects and fill in the gaps that currently exist. It would, at long last, provide us with a functioning apparatus, free of the routinous day-to-day operational responsibilities in the existing agencies, to deal with a foremost challenge in a totalistic, continuous, and coordinated way, rather than the piecemeal, sporadic, and essentially defensive ways that have prevailed up to the present. Similarly, there is no educational institution maintained by our Government or any private body that is capable of conducting these necessary and continuous studies and instruction on this new plane of comprehensive cold war thought. The intended Freedom Academy would satisfy this basic need.

MR. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, may I break my promise to ask this?

Are you in a position to comment on what resources we have in this country at the Hoover Library at Stanford? Are you familiar with that?

DR. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, I am, sir. I would say that actually you have what might be called an embryo in the field of empirical cold war research.

MR. JOHANSEN. And raw materials.

DR. DOBRIANSKY. And raw materials; but still raw materials that require a great deal of refining. Again this is in the compartment of research. It does not go into that of methodic instruction and, beyond this, in what one might call cold war operations via organizations and other media, which I shall allude to in a moment, sir.

MR. JOHANSEN. Thank you, sir.

DR. DOBRIANSKY. Now for a few negative arguments. Of course, Mr. Chairman, I did not have time to incorporate some of the things that Mr. Harriman said, although in my statement I tried to deal with all the major points that have been raised in the past.

However, I would like at this point to address myself to what I consider the verbal tactics of Mr. Harriman.

First, the matter of indoctrination. Having been a student of philosophy myself, I do not see any intellectual dirt involved in the word "indoctrination." I think he himself revealed the hollowness of his position when he practically synonymized what he meant by indoctrination with brainwashing.

There is no attempt here to brainwash anyone, let us say, in an established curriculum of the Freedom Academy and the like. The fact is that if students are studying Communist doctrine and if I were the teacher in a classroom, I would make sure that they understood that

doctrine thoroughly. Thus on a conceptual, abstractive level I would be indoctrinating them in order for them to grasp the systematic features of someone else's thought.

This does not necessarily mean that I would be imposing an acceptance on their part or an intellectual assent by them to that doctrine. So, in communicating intellectually with them, it would be not just a matter of informing, but also actually of illuminating the thought structure—the doctrinal edifice. When we deal with concepts and their interrelationships, even in economics it is necessary to build up these conceptual structures in the minds of the students and, as a consequence, you do get into the process of indoctrinating; again, for sheer, objective understanding, if nothing else.

Mr. JOHANSEN. If you were doing the same thing, either with a group of visiting foreign students or even a group of American students, and I think some of them can stand it, if you were doing it in the matter of the Constitution of the United States, you would be doing the same thing.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. That is correct. It is a matter of systematic, methodical inculcation.

Mr. POOL. Would you limit the field of research and education to communism and fighting communism?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. It is considerably more than communism. I think my subsequent remarks will show that, sir.

Mr. POOL. How far afield would you go? What I am thinking about is the argument made by Secretary Harriman this morning that this bill would tend to give Federal control over education. I am wondering, should we limit it to what we are interested in mainly, the fighting of the Communists?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, but it addresses itself not simply to communism; there are many other elements in this cold war opponent. I made reference, for example, to Russian imperio-colonialism, which is a most vulnerable point with Moscow. This could be easily documented to show the element working in combination with the ideology of communism.

Now there are proponents of the measure who feel that the enemy is purely communism. As many know, I have looked upon communism chiefly as a tool of ideologic deception. Although it is such a tool, it is nevertheless an instrumental menace because there are people who could be deceived by it and are being deceived by it in the free world, as well as some behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. POOL. Is the purpose stated in the bill too broad or should it be cut down to what we are really after?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I do not think it is broad at all. As a matter of fact, I think the "whereas" provisions afford this more expanded interpretation without misleading us into the area that Mr. Harriman and others have in mind, that is, the purely academic exercises such as we have at Georgetown and elsewhere with regard to foreign affairs.

These bills address themselves specifically to cold war thinking, political warfare, and if you will allow me to continue, you will see what I am referring to.

Another thing, of course, that Mr. Harriman brought out was the matter of classified material.

When I was in the National War College I had considerable access to such classified material. However, all I can say here is that, as a matter of fact, there is enough material with regard to the ways and means, the content, the scope of Russian political warfare that even 1 year of intensive training, whether you restrict it to Government officials or, preferably, you also invite private citizens, would not be enough actually to cover the breadth of unclassified material.

Mr. JOHANSEN. In other words, you could do a good job of re-educating the State Department totally with declassified information.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I am convinced of that, sir. This is as far as I would like to go on the subject of classified materials, although I could discuss in appropriate circumstances specific projects, including, for example, Mr. Kersten's amendment to the Mutual Security Act at the beginning of the fifties, when we attempted to set up, in implementing the Kersten amendment, free national battalions integrated into NATO. I am not impressed by what I would call the overstress of fright on this matter of classified material by Mr. Harriman.

If I may continue with the negative arguments that I have extracted from the responses of the executive agencies, over the years we have been told, (1) that confusion with and a duplication of work of existing agencies would occur; (2) that the Foreign Service Institute, the National War College, and other public and private institutions already furnish instruction on Communist strategy; (3) that a formulation of cold war strategy and tactics into an "operational science" is a delusion; (4) that training of operational elements (perhaps a dynamic Freedom Corps as against our essentially defensive Peace Corps) should not be publicized; (5) that the Russians would perhaps be disconcerted by what they may regard as a cold war institute and a training course for espionage; (6) that educational pluralism must be upheld; and (7) that we are already making positive progress in economic buildups in the underdeveloped countries and, in the fashion of a passive model, in self-improvement at home.

Taking these major counterarguments in toto, it is evident that their proponents either have no conception of total cold war or, if they do, are desperately seeking any rationalization to safeguard the sanctity of their respective jurisdictions against an inevitable subsumption to the totality of cold war thought and performance.

Their first argument is specious because there is much confusion and also frittered thought that requires integration and rounded consolidation.

The second fallaciously magnifies a dearth of study and instruction, meaning at the National War College or Foreign Service Institute or, for that matter, at any of our private institutions, and indicates, in itself, a dearth of understanding of what is involved in the Freedom proposal.

The third argument reinforces this comment. The fourth one is strange for an open society that should never cease in espousing and working for universal freedom.

The fifth borders on stupidity as to the Russians being disconcerted about this.

The sixth partakes of philosophical sophistication but, aside from our perilous gap in cold war education, one wonders what happened to pluralism with the new proposal last year of a National Academy

of Foreign Affairs, which from all indications would be an egregious and wasteful duplication of existing educational institutions, whether at Georgetown, Pennsylvania, or elsewhere.

The seventh point can best be answered by just observing the slow collapse of our policy of patched-up containment as evidenced today in Cuba, tomorrow perhaps in Venezuela, South Vietnam, Laos, or some other point on the terrain of the free world. We have a greater breed of economic determinists in Washington than one can possibly find in Moscow.

In conclusion, the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy would become valuable and highly effective media for both our public and private institutions as concerns a general enlightenment and understanding of the constant, dangerous threat that has penetrated the free world. Their very existence and work would bar indifference, complacency, naivete, or even hysteria toward this persistent, totalitarian peril which is centered in Moscow.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Insofar as there is valid criticism of the so-called extreme right in this area of communism, is this not the best antidote there is for it, this type of program? The best antidote for the excesses of extremism?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. There is no question about that. I certainly would agree with that. Having followed this, with Mr. Grant and others leading it, I would say that these people have contributed solid thought and firm support for these proposals, by and large people who have continually manifested a unique stability and a great deal of perspective when it comes to the treatment of cold war problems.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I agree with you.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. There is no doubt about it.

I would like to stress this, that total cold war thought, in our case necessarily oriented toward universal freedom, instrumentalizes everything—diplomacy, economics, science, culture, propaganda (in which we are next to pitiful), the military, even, among many other things in life, athletics—in an integrated, aggregative whole for positive action and successful performance.

Moscow has schools for this, and they haven't been established for reasons of eternal contemplation. We have no such schools, and to refer to any in this country as comparable to theirs is the height of either ignorance or reckless foolery. Consider what you will, the National War College, Harvard, Georgetown, or the Foreign Service Institute.

In short, the service of the Freedom institutions in this specialized, macro-psychopolitical field would be in fundamental service to our own survival as an independent nation.

On grounds of national survival, we cannot afford to risk the prospects of psychopolitical attrition or isolation as the dikes of patched-up containment begin to fall about the world, not to mention other paramilitary avenues of national reduction.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Ichord.

Mr. ICHORD. Yes, I wish to compliment you for a very informative statement.

It has been brought to the attention of the committee that this proposal has been opposed by the far right. Do you know the basis of that contention?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Has been opposed by the far right?

Mr. ICHORD. By the far right. The statement was made in the committee the other day by Mr. Senner, I believe, that this bill was opposed by the John Birch Society. Do you know anything about their opposition?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. No, I do not, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you know of any opposition from the far right?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I have not really come across any opposition. I am trying to recall. Of course, back in 1960 there were some who actually took the position that a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy, should they be established, would be targets of Communist infiltration and, therefore, if anything, to fill in this truly educational gap in our system, it would be better to have it, let us say, at a private university dealing with political warfare in its totality.

That is about the only type of opposition that I have heard from the far right.

My answer to this would be, then, that we might as well fold up everything if we fear Communist infiltration.

Mr. ICHORD. You heard the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Harriman, testify this morning?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, I did.

Mr. ICHORD. He is opposed to the training of large numbers of private citizens in an academy, in the Freedom Academy or the National Academy of Foreign Affairs. I would like to hear you comment upon his objection.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I listened rather closely and if I'm not mistaken, he failed to offer any justifying reasons for what appears to be simply a comment. I mean a rational feeling on his part, other than bringing up the matter of classified materials. But let me handle this matter in this fashion. It is curious to me that many of our service schools—you take, for example, the Army War College and to some degree at the National War College and I am sure even in the State Department—public seminars are conducted perhaps for an entire week and with what purpose? Whom do they bring in? They bring in movie producers, journalists, educators, people who have one degree of influence or another, let us say, in media of public opinion throughout our country. Why do they bring them in if not to some extent inform them.

Then the other curious aspect of all this is that many a commander or, let us say, a general at a given post who has been conducting the study, oftentimes expresses regret that there are not enough resources, not enough time to really impart what is necessary, not to mention the problem of incorporating many others in such undertakings.

Now the point here is that we are attempting to impress through these very meager means some of this information on people who affect public opinion in this country.

I would say that even on the level of imparted information the Freedom Academy would really overcome the limitations of these gestures, these attempts on the part of our many service institutions. When it comes to classified data, I cannot see that, let us say, a responsible editor of a newspaper, whose background has been thoroughly investigated, would necessarily be a person subject to question even for the treatment of classified material, no more or less so than anyone being in the armed services and eligible for instruction over a 10-month period at the National War College.

Mr. ICHORD. In addition to operating the Freedom Academy the Commission will also have the duty of operating the information center.

Do you think this additional duty of operating the Information Center might overburden the Commission?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. No, I do not believe that at all. I think the Freedom information center would be a very important and efficient operational instrument at the disposal of the Freedom Commission. Also, I have no fear concerning the supposed matter of indoctrination because on the basis of my own experience—lecturing at various universities, being as I indicated in these service schools—I would say that we are even pretty deficient in our rudimentary knowledge as concerns the environment, the conditions surrounding the immediate enemy.

I could go into specifics. We even have it displayed on the highest levels of Government when, for instance, the chairman of the Senate Freedom information center would be a very important and efficient sians being in the Soviet Union. I do not think I am too intellectually sensitive or picayune, but my reaction immediately is that there is some deficiency in his understanding. I could go right down the line.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Would you say why, because I would like the record to show why there is a deficiency in knowledge.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. There is this deficiency because of these points; that actually even in our private institutions—and I for one have many graduates from the Russian Centers, whether at Columbia or at Harvard—students have almost no comprehensive, historical knowledge of Eastern Europe or central Asia.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Doctor, I think you misunderstood me. You referred to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee referring to 200 million Russians.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Which there are not, even in the world at large.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I want you to state the misinformation you referred to so that it will be clear as to the point you are making.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. The point I was making is that certainly if you get this matter of political warfare, the presumption is that you are, or will quickly become, familiar with the historical background of and the conditions that prevail about your enemy.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I am not making myself clear. What is in error about the statement that there are 200 million Russians?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. The error is that, in fact, there are only about 100 million Russians in existence.

Mr. JOHANSEN. That is what I wanted in the record to buttress your point that that kind of misinformation was peddled by the chairman.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Right. We have a good deal of that. I would not want to take the time nor am I trying to put on a performance pointing out such deficiencies in our working knowledge. But I would like to say that for this kind of operation it will require a very intensive research that we have not had. Oftentimes I feel rather depressed when, as I said, I get students or address audiences who do not even have a rudimentary grasp of the data you would presume before embarking on a systematic study and instruction in what is totalistic cold war thinking.

Mr. POOL. Do you have any further questions?

Mr. JOHANSEN. Yes. On page 11, item No. 5, you cited one of these arguments that the Russians would perhaps be disconcerted by what they may regard as a cold war institute and a training course for espionage.

I did not hear the very last of the testimony of Secretary Harriman. I did not know whether you were referring to a point he had made or what the source is of that sort of suggestion.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. All seven points are actually taken from responses made over time by various agencies when this measure was considered over on the Senate side.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I would like to pursue this one just a bit more, because it goes to my belief as to one of the main sources of opposition to this, to wit, that if we have this type of program and they started peddling the facts out of this Freedom Academy that it is going to disrupt the State Department's program of not having any tensions with our enemies; that one of the main objections is that when the Department decides that we must now be on an amiable mood with them and we must underwrite wheat or we must do some other fool thing, that having a Freedom Academy saying they are still our enemies isn't going to fit in with their propaganda line.

That is the point that concerns me.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Congressman, I will agree with you that that may be the motivation, but actually in looking at this issue objectively I think that our whole attitude should be this: Whether that motivation exists or not, let us view clearly the objectives and the values of the institutions being proposed here.

Now Mr. Harriman can come before us and say that we have common objectives. But the cardinal point is this: that this whole issue, as I understand it, hasn't to do with objectives. The issue has to do really with an instrument that we want, a tool that we want. And to use the argument that because the Communists have political warfare schools, therefore we should not have them, is plainly specious. One could turn that about and say the Communists have missiles, ergo, we should not have missiles.

The chief point is that the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy would actually be institutional tools that we do not now have. I think that opponents to the measure—when they tell you that

there is sufficient instruction across the Potomac or down at Fort McNair or at any of our Russian Centers at Harvard, Fordham, Columbia, or the institution I am with, Georgetown—are attempting to hoodwink you. Either, as I stated before, they do not understand what composite cold war thinking is—where diplomacy and every other area, what USIA does, what the military has, what the State Department considers, are all looked upon as instruments in, if you will, this totalistic disposition of thought—or they are rationalizing in behalf of their respective present precincts of activity, narrow and scattered as they are in this vital field.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I have one final question, Doctor.

Do you feel there is any correlation between the reasons or alleged reasons for opposition to this program and the kind of thinking which prompted the Fulbright memorandum and prompted the curtailment of the type of activities that were being carried on by Colonel Kintner and some of the others prior to the promulgation of that nefarious document?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, you are pressing me. I would say, of course, that there is no question about it. I tried to use language here which I think is diplomatic and tactful when I spoke of them desperately seeking any rationalization to safeguard the sanctity of their respective jurisdictions against an inevitable subsumption. No question about it, they do not wish to face this kind of necessary subsumption in thought and constructive practice. I am certain that there would be a great deal of generation of imaginative and productive thought from the Freedom Academy and the Freedom Commission; and that surely would be totally in line with our whole American tradition.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Thank you.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I also wish to suggest that there are many concrete instances that could be offered along these lines.

Let me give you one experience I had—to be sure, looked upon perhaps by many as limited and many even opposed it in thought. But when Congressman Lawrence Smith of Wisconsin was alive we worked together on a concrete, cold war measure for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Byelorussia. Favorable hearings were held on this subject by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Inevitably, we were drawn into a tug of war with people on the other side of town. I mention this because it is significant for the issue at hand. When Mr. Murphy was Under Secretary of State, I met with him often on this subject and he readily admitted that they have no operational arm in the Department to consider adequately such specific, concrete projects. Now I maintain this is significant and true because our people in State don't have the time, they don't have the resources, over and beyond what we call the rituals of diplomatic concourse and foreign affairs obligations. Indeed, there isn't any precinct that can seriously attend to problems or projects or thought of this nature.

Mr. JOHANSEN. If I might make an observation, Mr. Chairman—this is not stated by our witness—there seems to be an enthusiasm on the part of the State Department for some do-it-yourself diplomacy when it comes to providing tractors or drugs for Castro but not in this issue.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a statement for the record. I disagree with my colleague, at least that was the inference that I got from the gentleman from Michigan, that this issue had to do with the sale of wheat to Russia. I disagree entirely with my colleague from Michigan on the matter of sale of wheat but, simply put, Doctor, is your position on this bill that in order to effectively fight an enemy you have to know what he thinks, how he fights, and how effectively to combat him, and that both inside and outside of Government there is no institution or place where a private citizen or even a governmental employee can go to get that type of knowledge and training?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. That is correct.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I will agree with my friend and colleague on that point.

Mr. ICHORD. I am glad we agree in that respect.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. And I might say this: The perspective that I am expressing here may perhaps be different, but the fact is that there are people in this country who are graduates of military schools in the Russian Empire under the czars.


Now, to be sure, less perfect, less refined, the type of course work that was given in these imperial Russian war colleges, whether down in the Caucasus or up in St. Petersburg, is essentially the type of course work I am speaking of here, in the modes of cold war thinking. Such thought is fundamentally not new. It is not a mode of thought that began, let us say, in 1917. But I will admit this: as I indicated in my presentation, with science, with technology there has been an enormous improvement, an enormous investment of resources in the Soviet Union in this kind of preparation. For any one to say that we have any institutions that compare in kind, I am not mincing words when I say that any such statement or utterance is simply farcical.

Mr. POOL. We certainly appreciate your appearing before the committee. Your testimony has been very thorough and has been very helpful to the committee. On behalf of the committee I want to thank you for being here.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg entered the hearing room.)

(The material submitted by Dr. Dobriansky follows:)



Washington, January 6, 1964

WR 64-1

THE NEXT MOVE

In response to the Communist "peace" offensive, we first compromised technologically in the nuclear test ban treaty; then we relented economically in the wheat deals.

What's next in the name of "peaceful coexistence"? Khrushchev now desperately wants our politico-moral acquiescence to his empire of captive nations, and he seeks to obtain it through a Soviet-styled non-aggression pact.

At the very moment of signing the test ban treaty -- significantly the Treaty of Moscow -- the Russian leader was in many ways making two points perfectly clear: (1) the cold war is a permanent enterprise and (2) a non-aggression pact is a high priority Russian objective. At that time, his U.N. spokesman, Fedorenko, was attacking Portuguese colonial policies and equating these policies with U.S. and Western European policies in an attempt to influence Africa against NATO. As to the second, shortly thereafter, at the Inter-Parliamentary Meeting in Belgrade, Khrushchev's representatives hammered away at the "need" for a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact Nations and NATO if international tensions are to be relaxed. These are just two of many examples of the Soviet Russian pattern.

In the meantime, reacting as usual to Moscow's maneuvers, we have been contenting ourselves with the mirage of "progressive steps toward a genuine peace." In government and elsewhere many believe that the next step should be a "confidence-building" non-aggression pact with the world's foremost aggressor. This brand of naive thinking is a natural offshoot of our self-defeating policy of "containment" and all its accouterments of accommodation, coexistence with totalitarian puppet and satellite regimes, and the unrealistic hope for a structural fragmentation of Moscow's colonial empire.

Editor's Note: Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky is a professor of economics at Georgetown University. He is the author of the Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 85-90) which was passed by Congress in 1959. This resolution provides that the third week of July be set aside each year to remind the world of the nations held in bondage by Russian imperialism. Dr. Dobriansky is also a member of the American Security Council's Strategy Staff.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY

Khrushchev has his troubles, of course. Contributing to his present troubles was a whole decade of unrest and uprisings among his captive nations, viz. to mention a few, Ukraine in '50-'51, Slovakia '52, East Germany '53, Turkistan '54, Georgia, Poland and Hungary '56. (Many people do not realize that nationalistic, anti-Soviet uprisings have occurred within the Soviet borders as well as within the East European satellites.) Back in 1955 the power center of the world Communist conspiracy recognized that it couldn't afford such perpetual opposition if its global cold war ambitions were to be satisfied. Moscow launched its massive campaign for "peaceful coexistence" and, profiting from the fear induced by its military and space technology from 1957 on, it has succeeded in preventing most Western governments from concentrating on the core of the world's primary problem, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.

Historically, the Russians have always been masters in capitalizing on their troubles as well as their strength. Most Americans would be horrified to learn how, both officially and materially, we have aided the Russian imperio-colonialists in recreating and expanding their empire from 1918 to the present, particularly in periods of "Russian troubles." Whereas these periods, including the present one, should have been seized as our opportunities for the advancement of world freedom and thus genuine peace, they invariably have turned into phases of Russian power consolidation.

We are going through such a phase now, abetting it, as before, with our wishful hope for fragmentation of Moscow's empire, an erosion of its totalitarian power, and the weaning of its supposedly nationalist puppet regimes. The continued absence of an affirmative cold war strategy and the succession of compromises are now being eloquently rationalized as conscientious endeavors for peace, to be balanced against the horrendous prospect of thermonuclear co-destruction. The irony of it all is that this course paves the way for the outcome we all seek to avoid. A politico-moral acquiescence to the Soviet Russian Empire will take us a long way on this disastrous course.

Aside from the sticky problem of allied NATO consent, the chances for such acquiescence via a non-aggression pact depend on two contrary forces in the United States. One is the accommodationist spirit which is growing because of the above mentioned poorly founded hope and illusions. This spirit is based on a persistent inability to profit from the lessons of history. Even on the highest levels of our government it is marked by a serious lack of understanding in regard to the empire-state nature of the Soviet Union, the long tradition of Soviet cold war policy and techniques, and the means for defeating the Soviets in the cold war without precipitating a hot one. Common expressions of this force are "don't irritate the bear," "the less said about the captive nations the better," "we must relax tensions".

If the spirit of accommodation is spread by further euphoria or plain fear, it will virtually guarantee the pact and our politico-moral acquiescence to Moscow's far-flung empire. Countering this force is a second one based on the moral objective liberating the captive nations and clear understanding of the strategic importance of these nations in the cold war.

Aiding the totalitarian overlords of these nations on the basis of a "weaning" theory fortifies the unwanted regimes, not the peoples in their struggle for freedom. Indeed, it undermines the struggle which in essence is a cold war between the people and their Communist governments. The net result is a weakening of our own posture in the cold war. A non-aggression pact would be a crushing blow to that struggle.

- The Lessons of Captive Nations Week -

On these major points, the lessons of Captive Nations Week in this country are both revealing and instructive. Millions of Americans know them; others have yet to grasp them. Many misconceptions of both the Captive Nations Week Resolution and the Week itself still circulate, but once they're dissolved the reasons why Khrushchev wants acquiescence to his empire become crystal clear. Also, it is an open secret that accommodationists seeking a pact with the constant aggressor would have the observance eliminated.

Khrushchev and his satraps have never opposed anything any more vehemently and for so long as the Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 86-90) which Congress passed in July, 1959. His unprecedented explosion at that time is a matter of historical record. Here scores of officials were bewildered by the reaction. As he testifies in his book Six Crises, former Vice President Nixon, who was then in the USSR, found the resolution to be "the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour."

Why this unusual Russian opposition to the resolution, then and since? Before 1959 our leaders had often spoken in behalf of some captive nations. Actually, there are several answers to the question. First, it was the first time that our government recognized the numerous captive non-Russian nations in the USSR itself, such as Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and others. Khrushchev instinctively understood the meaning of this for the false image of the USSR in the world at large. Second, being self-renewing annually, the resolution could always be implemented to combat Moscow's cold war operations. That this will in time be done is a source of apprehension for the Russian cold war instigators. And third, as perpetual reminders of the slave half of the world, both the resolution and the Week (3rd week in July) are stumbling blocks to Moscow's deceptive campaigns for "peaceful coexistence" and a non-aggression pact.

Just review these few highlights of Moscow's sensitivity to the law and Week. Still in 1959, Khrushchev scorned the law in his Foreign Affairs article "On Peaceful Coexistence"; at Camp David, according to Pennsylvania's Governor Scranton, "he inveighed against it at a greater rate almost daily"; in October, before the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, the Russian leader again denounced the law. In 1960, similar denunciations flowed during the Week's observance and new tactics were employed by Moscow to deflect world attention from the captive status of nations both within and outside the USSR, viz., the sudden Moscow-sponsored publication in London of pamphlets titled The Fifteen Soviet Republic, Today and Tomorrow - a "Potemkin" version of their "independence and prosperous growth" - and also Khrushchev's tirade in the U. N. against "Western colonialism." The November 20, 1960 issue

of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* gave a vivid report of how this maneuver almost backfired when Canada's John Diefenbaker broached the subject of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, even producing a furor there.

Similar evidence grows for 1961-63. In '61, for instance, Khrushchev again violently attacked the resolution in the October Communist Party Congress, using the aged Russian diplomatic gimmick of "no interference in internal affairs." Though Western diplomats fall for this gimmick, the fact that numerous non-Russian nations in the USSR itself were originally conquered by Soviet Russian imperialism reveals the myth of this argument. The Week's observance in 1962 received similar treatment. Then, in 1962, UNESCO aided Moscow's efforts immensely by publishing the fraudulent *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*. On January 23, 1963, Moscow's weekly *The New Times* asked "Is it not high time to discontinue the 'Captive Nations Week' in the United States?" On July 8, *Pravda* berated the President for proclaiming the Week and "losing his sense of reality" on July 14 *Izvestia* painted the Week as "a propagandistic trick of the American enemies of the freedom and independence of nations." There is lots more.

The 1963 Captive Nations Week observance surpassed all others. The Week's Fifth Anniversary in '64 holds high promise for both public non-acquiescence to a Russian-styled non-aggression pact, and for a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. Or, as other peoples have found to their tragic regret, would you prefer to follow Pavlovian Dr. Khrushchev's adviser: relax, be less tense about basic truths, agree with our "truth", and you'll have "peace"?

Lev E. Dobriansky

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
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PRESS DEPARTMENT

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.
1706 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C.,
DECEMBER 30, 1963.

Enclosed is a message by 36 prominent Ukrainian public figures to all Ukrainians in the U.S.A., to the Committee on the Monument to T. G. Shevchenko, received by us from the Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, U.S.S.R. It may be published as a whole or in part as you deem best.

We will appreciate your giving this consideration and, if published, giving a credit line to Novosti.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Y. Bobrakov,
YURI I. BOBRÁKOV,
Press Department.

WORTHY TRIBUTE TO GREAT POET

Message to Ukrainians, to all Ukrainians in the U.S.A., to the Committee on the Monument to T. G. Shevchenko

Dear fellow-countrymen who live outside the Motherland:

It is with a feeling of profound respect and love for the genius of the Ukrainian people, for the great poet, and revolutionary democrat Taras Grigoryevich Shevchenko that we address to you this heartfelt message from the banks of the Dnieper, from our dear Soviet Ukraine, from the sunny capital of our republic—ancient and every-young Kiev.

Mankind includes the name of the great son of the Ukraine, Taras Grigoryevich Shevchenko, among its finest names. Peoples of the world know him as an implacable fighter against slavery and injustice, against social and national oppression.

Shevchenko's strong and passionate voice has, through time and distance, found its way into the minds and hearts of millions of people in the world.

In paying tribute to Shevchenko mankind pays tribute to a great humanist, to a singer of friendship among peoples, to a champion of freedom, happiness and progress.

The significance of Shevchenko and his work in the life of our people is exceptional. The image of the poet, his titanic creative and public activity, lent inspiration in the past to generations of fighters against autocracy, his rebellious poetry called people to the barricades of revolution, his poetic and artistic heritage has become an invaluable national treasure for us. The name of Shevchenko is a symbol of honesty, truth, unflinching courage and ardent love for the working people. Even today the poet's fiery lines strike cold fear in the hearts of tyrants and butchers, holding up to shame the enslavers of every kind, and rallying millions of people to the struggle for a bright future.

A patriot and a true son of his people, Shevchenko always showed deep love and respect for other nations, being a consistent internationalist. Everyone knows of Shevchenko's dreams of "all Slavs becoming kind brothers," his friendship with the Negro, Aldridge, and with Polish progressives and his profound esteem for the men of Russian culture who bought him out of serfdom, his love and brotherly feelings for outstanding Russian revolutionary democrats.

Shevchenko devoted all his powerful talent to his people, to the struggle for their happiness. This is what makes his titanic figure still more imposing, the feat of his life still more majestic and his rich creative legacy truly inestimable. This is why he is understandable by, and dear and near to, all peoples of our multi-national motherland. In the Soviet Union there is no city, town or village where you can not hear the beautiful poetic lines of the great poet. Shevchenko celebrations have long become a notable occasion not only for the Ukrainians, but also for all Soviet peoples in our "great, free and new family."

Facts speak eloquently of the affection and admiration Soviet people feel for the great son of the Ukraine. More than a hundred monuments to the poet have been erected in the land of Soviets, and five museums have been set up. Over three hundred populated areas, nine theaters and four institutions of higher learning, including Kiev University, bear the name of Shevchenko.

His name has been given to plants, collective and state farms, palaces of culture, cinemas, stadiums, streets, parks and so on. The poet's works in our country have been printed in millions of copies. Shevchenko's poems have been

translated into all the languages of the fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union. His *Kobzar* is particularly popular. During Soviet years it has been published 53 times in the Ukraine with a total printing of about two million copies. Shevchenko's famous *Zapovit* has been printed in 45 languages of the world.

In honor of the great poet's memory, the Ukrainian Government has instituted state prizes named after Shevchenko. These are awarded every year to authors of the best works in Ukrainian literature and art, which have won wide recognition and have been highly appraised by our people.

Together with the other fraternal peoples of our country, the working people of the Soviet Ukraine are preparing widely to mark a memorable date in 1964—the 150th anniversary since the birth of Taras Grigoryevich Shevchenko. Last year a Ukrainian delegation at a UNESCO session sponsored a proposal, which was approved by the session, to commemorate that glorious anniversary throughout the entire world.

Expressing the desire of all Soviet peoples to give the great poet his due, the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has decided to erect in Moscow, the capital of our country, a monument to Shevchenko, which will be unveiled during the celebrations of his 150th birth anniversary.

Thanks to the concern shown by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, thanks to the triumph of the Leninist ideas of friendship and brotherhood, the literary and artistic heritage of Shevchenko has been made available to the entire country and has become part of the world's golden fund of culture. Just as the Dnieper carries its waters past Taras' grave into one world ocean, so do Shevchenko's creations like so many streams join the ocean of the human spirit, introducing our bold Prometheus to ever-new generations.

The poet's creative genius is so vast that not only his contemporaries, not only we, but also forthcoming generations will feel the strength of his fervent poetry. This noble influence of the great singer of the people's lot is found not only in Ukrainian literature, but also in the literature of other peoples as well. Shevchenko has become an immortal poet of freedom, a poet of world significance, an exponent of the aspirations of all peoples. In our day Shevchenko's poetry harmonizes with the desire of all oppressed and colonial peoples and calls them to struggle for liberation from the capitalist yoke. Every heart will respond to Taras' words about universal happiness and peace:

... There will be no enemy
On our renewed land.
But there will be son
and mother and people on
Earth.

Our dear fellow-countrymen in distant lands:

Any news about the memory of Taras Shevchenko being honored beyond the borders of our Motherland fills us with sincere joy as a manifestation of love of the Ukrainians abroad for their great poet.

We think that you will be pleased too at the preparations which have now begun on a wide scale in the Ukraine and the entire Soviet Union in anticipation of the 150th anniversary of his birth. It is the sacred duty of every Ukrainian, wherever he may be, to commemorate the great poet in every way and to disseminate among other peoples Shevchenko's ideas of humanism, brotherhood and friendship of peoples on earth.

We know money is being raised to erect a monument to Shevchenko in Washington, the capital of the United States of America.

We regard the erection of the monument to the great poet in Washington as proof of the esteem shown to Shevchenko by the Ukrainians who live in the USA, as a sign of profound respect on the part of the American people for the great son of the Ukraine, to the whole Ukrainian people.

It is gratifying to us men of culture of the Ukraine, to all Ukrainians in our native land, to learn that a monument will be erected to our poet in the United States of America. We want this monument to become for you, our fellow-countrymen, a piece of the Motherland. We propose to send to the American continent some sacred soil from the *Cherneckya* hill where Taras sleeps the eternal sleep. We would gladly take part in the unveiling ceremony of your monument, because Shevchenko and the Ukraine are inseparable. We favor this worthy tribute to the great poet.

But we are resolutely against the malicious attempts of the enemies of the Soviet Union to use the poet's works against our country, against the cause of all humanity—the struggle for peace. We vigorously come out against the attempts of some unprincipled people to employ his good name for their dirty po-

litical ends. Their efforts to spend the hard-earned money, collected by the Ukrainians living in the USA for a monument to Shevchenko, on propaganda against the Ukrainian people and against the Soviet Union are causing anger and indignation in us.

The working people of the Soviet Ukraine are confident that you, our distant fellow-countrymen, share our anxiety. It is clear to everybody that the erection of a monument to Taras Shevchenko on American soil must not become a means for whipping up enmity towards our country, towards our people, but most facilitate mutual understanding between peoples, the preservation and consolidation of peace throughout the world. An unbiased person will come to this conclusion.

Preparations for Shevchenko's memorable jubilee coincided with an event of great significance for the strengthening of universal peace: three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—concluded a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, a treaty which was fully supported by all peoples in the world. Already this historic document has been signed by the governments of more than a hundred countries. This fills all honest-minded people of the world with hope and optimism.

The life and works of Taras Schevchenko, a staunch advocate of unity and friendship of peoples, inspires us to struggle for peaceful coexistence, for general and complete disarmament, for lasting peace in the whole world.

Dear fellow-countrymen:

In his friendly message, "To My Fellow-countrymen in and out of the Ukraine," the great Taras solemnly bequeathed the lines:

Learn from others.
But don't forget what you have.

May Shevchenko anniversaries become days from disseminating the poet's grand ideals and promoting cultural relations between other countries and the Soviet Ukraine.

We are thoroughly convinced that by paying tribute to Shevchenko mankind pays tribute to the mighty talent and fond memory of the great poet and revolutionary democrat. We believe that Shevchenko's image will always call for sincere friendship, accord and cooperation among all nations of the globe.

M. Rylsky, P. Tychina, A. Korneichuk, B. Paton, L. Revutsky, V. Sosyura, N. Bazhan, O. Gonchar, Y. Smolich, M. Stelmakh, A. Malyshko, I. Vilde, L. Dmiterko, P. Kozlanyuk, I. Yura, N. Uzhviy, V. Kasiyan, K. Dankevich, P. Virsky, I. Bokshai, N. Tarnovsky, G. Maiboroda, B. Antonenko-Davidovich, P. Maiboroda, M. Bozhiy, E. Kirilyuk, B. Gmyrya, V. Ivchenko, D. Pavlichko, D. Gnatyuk, A. Pidukha, V. Korotich, L. Kostenko, L. Rudenko, V. Chekanyuk.

Novosti Press Agency (APN)

Mr. Pool. Representative Barry of New York.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT R. BARRY, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

Mr. BARRY. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen: Within the past month the outward calm that prevailed on the world scene was shattered in a half dozen places. Revolts or mutinies took place in Zanzibar, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Gabon. There was another coup in South Vietnam, and Castro acted up again. De Gaulle recognized the Red Chinese, and the British and ourselves agreed to disagree on trade with Cuba.

Now I do not contend that each of these events could have been prevented, nor that all disagreements with our allies are necessarily fatal. What I do say, however, is that the machinery of United States foreign policy is not geared to anticipate or prevent these outbreaks, nor to exploit them to our advantage when they do occur. You will note that as soon as this wave of mutinies hit Africa the tremor was felt throughout the West—will Africa go Communist? Yet why

should this be? If there are areas of the world that are admittedly unstable, why is it that the West, and the United States in particular, must always be on the defensive, must always display anxiety at every change in the status quo, lest it signalize a new gain for the Communists. Yet all too often these fears are justified, as seems to be the case with Zanzibar, for example.

Newspaper reports indicate that the hard core of the revolutionary military forces were Cuban-trained guerrillas, probably no more than 50 in number. Two of the leaders in the new government have long pro-Communist records and affiliations, and pro-Communist subordinates backstop the President and the Minister of Communications.

What a sad commentary this whole affair is. What a revealing light it casts on the failure of the United States to deal effectively with our Communist adversaries. Outmaneuvered once again, and not even by the Russians or Chinese, but by the Cubans.

Even a cursory study of the world Communist apparatus will reveal the reason for this. It lies in the fact that the Communists work at revolution all the time, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Political warfare is taught as a matter of course by all Communist Party schools, at all levels, both within the Soviet bloc and in the free world. Direction of all political warfare is coordinated through the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. Now, perhaps, the Chinese Communists may run a similar effort. At any rate, the Soviet Union still runs a centrally directed effort, which supervises a whole series of schools. These schools teach a party line that reflects the thinking of Communist leaders as to the best ideology to use at a particular time in a particular place. Various institutes, such as the Institute of World Economics, analyze the economic situation of foreign countries with a view to exploiting any economic difficulties for the benefit of the Communist movement. The Soviet Academy of Sciences operates directly under the Council of Ministers and is used for purposes of political warfare. All of the apparatus of Soviet scholarship is essentially an instrument of Communist political theory and political penetration. And we are all familiar with the Communist-front organizations, the peace societies, the friendship committees, the art associations, and so forth, through which the Communists seek to manipulate the gullible and convert the ignorant. Students who go to Communist countries may find themselves used as a source of intelligence. The Communists, in short, leave no stone unturned. They are masters of "conflict management." They know when to turn on trouble and how to exploit it and when to turn it off if it serves their interests.

Contrast this with the American effort. True, thousands of foreign students are in residence here. And AID trains thousands of foreign technicians, while the Defense Department does the same for thousands of foreign military personnel. But this effort, both public and private, is conducted with no real coordination from the point of view of political warfare.

Nor is it only foreign personnel who need instruction in this area. We Americans are too often found wanting when we are asked sharp questions about the defects in our own society or when we have to explain democracy. When confronted by trained Communists we are often ineffective, at times embarrassingly so.

There is one obvious remedy for this situation, one that Congress has considered before and one that deserves legislative approval. That is the Freedom Academy. What would the Freedom Academy be? It would be an institution that would offer a systematic and complete curriculum on the theory and practice of the Communist conspiracy and teach men and women how to defeat communism's destructive tactics and how to build strong, free societies. Courses on communism are offered in some universities, but many offer little or nothing in this area. If we are to conquer this enemy, we must know him.

All of the social sciences would be brought to bear in the curriculum of this Academy. A complete exposition and analysis of the Communist system would be given. Then the problems of our own society might be analyzed in equal depth, showing how we plan to make it function better. This should be particularly useful to foreign students, whose image of American democracy and free enterprise is too often colored by the most narrow and outdated misconceptions. The ethics and morality central to the democratic way of life would be studied in depth. The ideological and organizational history of the world Communist movement would be subjected to the closest scrutiny. The problems that particularly concern emerging nations would be given thorough consideration.

In addition to these theoretical studies, the Academy would be concerned with the most practical questions. There would be courses in the methods of combating international communism in the organizational sense. The use of domestic political movements for our purposes, rather than theirs, might be one subject of study. The techniques of conflict management might be another.

In short, there is no reason for us to sit back and bewail the fact that the Communists always seem to have the initiative on the world scene. We need to go out and take the initiative. One instrument for that purpose is surely the Freedom Academy. From it we should be able to send forth a stream of young men and women from the United States, from all the free world, and even (or perhaps especially) refugees from the world behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, better equipped to explain our way of life, to defend the bases of our society from intellectual attack, and, most of all, to advance the interests of freedom in a positive, vigorous manner in those areas of the world where the ultimate choice between freedom and slavery is yet to be made.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the conclusion of the remarks made in an article by Professor Hook entitled "Why The U.S. Needs a Freedom Academy," which appeared in IBM magazine called *Think*, in September 1963.

Mr. POOL. Would you just as soon insert that in the record?

Mr. BARRY. I can insert it in the record. I would like to make reference to this article for the record, that if someone who is making a further study of this issue would refer to page 10182 of the *Congressional Record* of the 1st session of the 87th Congress.

Mr. JOHANSEN. This is Sidney Hook, is it not?

Mr. BARRY. This is true.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Barry, that was put in the record by Mr. Herlong? Is that the one that you are referring to?

Mr. BARRY. It was a speech by Senator Mundt.

Mr. JOHANSEN. It has been put in the record of these hearings already by Mr. Herlong.¹

Mr. BARRY. Then my emphasis is merely to the last paragraph, but since it is already in, I think that covers it sufficiently.

Mr. JOHANSEN. For the record, Mr. Chairman, you are a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, Mr. Barry?

Mr. BARRY. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I think that is important to have as to the weight of your support of this legislation.

Mr. BARRY. Mr. Johansen, you might be interested to know that this morning there was a hearing in a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and I put to one of the Assistant Secretaries of State the question as to whether or not he felt there had been a sufficient indoctrination of State personnel in the ideological offensive that we as a people should conduct in order to win the cold war. He said that there had been some improvement made during the past few years since he had been an Assistant Secretary of State having to do with this type of thing but he wished more could be done.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I wonder if he cleared his answer with Secretary Harriman.

Mr. BARRY. I, of course, would not want to get into personalities on the matter with him. I have no knowledge whether he did or did not. I think we are going more to the substance of the situation rather than getting into any conflict, but I do think this: that from him I learned that there was a great deal of room for improvement within the State Department itself, inculcating within those people who are out fighting the cold war the need for us to have an ideological offensive which we can only achieve through a concentrated study, first, in knowing what we are up against and, secondly, establishing something ourselves which we are positive about and selling it. This is what we have to do in order to take a more aggressive role in the ideological war. We have heard of a series of schools where the Communists learn how to fight us, and we sit here without any concrete course in how to effectively fight them. You call this a cold war. We have a military establishment to train our Army. We have a military establishment to train our Navy. We have one to train our Air Force. We have nothing to train us in the field of fighting the cold war. I do not mean to demean the fine educational institutions which we have in the United States that do offer courses in explaining what communism is and in teaching what it does and how it has worked its influence over the years. There is nothing to my knowledge in the academic world that teaches a course in how to actively and successively combat communism and its encroachment upon the free societies of the world.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Barry, I wish to commend you for a very fine statement. Is the bill introduced by Mr. Hays providing for a National Academy of Foreign Affairs pending in your committee?

Mr. BARRY. I think it is, yes.

Mr. ICHORD. What is the status of that bill?

¹ See part 1, pp. 955-961.

Mr. BARRY. We haven't reported it out. It has not come before the full committee.

Mr. ICHORD. For the record, you approve of this Freedom Academy approach rather than the approach called for in the Hays bill?

Mr. BARRY. Let me say this: Since I am not on the subcommittee I have nothing to do with that bill; I only have a preliminary view which I am willing to give you now but which would not necessarily be my final view after I heard all the testimony from the subcommittee.

Mr. ICHORD. I would like to have your views on it. Really, I don't think there is too much difference in the thinking of the proponents of this bill and the thinking of the people in the State Department who are pushing the National Academy of Foreign Affairs. Secretary of State Harriman objected to the Freedom Academy on the ground that we would be training, in his words, too many private citizens. However, it was pointed out to him that private citizens could also be trained in the National Academy of Foreign Affairs. Do you think that is a valid objection?

Mr. BARRY. I would rather come forth with my own views rather than commenting upon what testimony has been given today.

Mr. ICHORD. Before this committee, just general ideas about the Freedom Academy.

Mr. BARRY. Not having heard the gentleman this morning, I prefer not to have to comment on his views, except to say this with respect to the question you posed to me: One of the basic oppositions to the formation of the Freedom Academy, as I understand it, has been that it would conflict and cut into education.

Mr. ICHORD. That is right. Overlapping duties.

Mr. BARRY. That is right. In my view, they would be nothing in comparison to what they would be like if this other bill came out.

The other bill takes in the whole spectrum of foreign policy and has that as its content. Whereas, this bill is limited at least to the creation of an Academy to combat communism rather than in the general field of foreign policy as such. To this extent, I have a preliminary view but after the analysis and report comes up from the subcommittee I feel that it may well be my considered judgment at that time.

Mr. ICHORD. What do you think about the informational center provided for in this bill?

Mr. BARRY. My view is that for this bill to succeed it should be designed to stay out of the hair of a lot of agencies and have almost a single purpose, namely, to educate people to combat communism. When you get into the business of information centers, it presupposes that it might represent the official policy of the United States and that it might therefore interfere with State Department public affairs or it might get into conflicts with CIA.

I am just not student enough of this phase of the bill to comment specifically, but I would be fearful that if too much were made over this phase of it that it would lose some of the effect that it has in being a place where public officials or those aspiring to be public officials, and especially those engaged in aid agencies, State Department or CIA or anything having to do with security or information, could go for a good, solid education in how to combat communism, how to create an ideological offensive of our own that could win the cold war.

Mr. ICHORD. Now this school could be run by the State Department, or then it could be run by an independent agency as contemplated in this bill. I take it that you are in favor of an independent agency to have the responsibility of running the Academy.

Mr. BARRY. I think that the bill would have to get further along before I would know whether it should be an independent agency or not. West Point is not an independent agency to the extent that the Department of the Army does have some say over it. I would think that this would have to be correlated to our State Department or it would have a rough time.

Mr. ICHORD. I think there is a correlation in that we have the Advisory Committee and members of the State Department or a member of the State Department can be on the Advisory Committee. There would be correlation to that extent.

Mr. BARRY. My belief is that there must be real agreement here and where you have too wide a disparity of opinion on this issue, where those who don't want it at all and those who want it very, very much, that somewhere down the middle may lie where this legislation will ultimately rest. In that vein I would like to be a proponent of a Freedom Academy to teach how to combat communism. If I had to give up part of the bill in order to please someone, it would be the information side of it that I would be willing to sacrifice. That does not mean that it does not have good features, because I know that it does.

Mr. ICHORD. That is all.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Schadeberg.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I have no questions.

Mr. POOL. Congressman Barry, we appreciate your appearing before this committee and giving us the benefit of your views. Particularly since you are a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, it is especially helpful to us.

Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a pleasure for me, and I greatly appreciate this opportunity.

Mr. POOL. Our next witness will be Dr. William Kintner.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. KINTNER

Dr. KINTNER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. POOL. Doctor, will you give us a thumbnail sketch of your background?

I believe it will be helpful for the record.

Dr. KINTNER. Thank you.

I think my background is pertinent to this investigation. I retired from the Army after 21 years service in the grade of colonel in September 1961. Prior to that time I had a range of duty both in the Army and other departments of the Government which gave me, I think, a fairly good ringside seat in how to wage the cold war. I had an opportunity to get a doctor's degree from Georgetown University in 1948, taught 2 years at Command and Staff College at Leavenworth. Subsequently I was chief planner for a major activity in the Central Intelligence Agency. I then went to the Korean war. I was infantry commander at Pork Chop Hill. Later on I was negotiator at the Panmunjon armistice negotiations after the truce was signed. I came

back to Washington and served in various capacities in the Army Staff and as a Planning Board assistant to the National Security Council.

In 1955 I was on the staff of Nelson Rockefeller when he was Special Assistant to the President of the United States. I was head of political and psychological activities in the office of Mr. Rockefeller.

Subsequently I was with the Operations Research Office, then served in France with our military headquarters—liaison with the French Government, and then came back to the Army General Staff. My last assignment was chief of long-range plans in the Office of Chief of Staff of the United States Army. I served at a fairly high level and in fairly sensitive positions under three administrations, the last 2 years of President Truman's, during President Eisenhower's, and the first year of President Kennedy's. Any remarks I am going to make are completely nonpartisan in character.

In addition to my military career, I am a writer. I have written a few books, the first is *The Front Is Everywhere*, a study of Communist organization and technology; coauthor of *Protracted Conflict*, and the recently published *New Frontiers of War*, in collaboration with Joseph Kornfedder, who is since deceased, a student at the Lenin School for 3 years from 1928 to 1931. I point this out because some people regard me as a little bit of an expert on communism. I would like to disclaim that. The work I have done has only touched the surface. I have never had the opportunity to have the type of research support and backing, the totality of information which would be needed to do the job thoroughly. I will not mention the world situation, which in my opinion is not necessarily working out to our advantage. Yet the purpose of such an Academy has to be responsive to our understanding of which way the conflict is going. There are several schools of thought: that we are on top or that the Communists are mellowing. The school of thought to which I belong contends that we have a long, tough struggle ahead of us.

As I see the proposed Freedom Academy, it serves essentially three major purposes: The first is that of research; secondly, is that of training; and, thirdly, some kind of public dissemination of its knowledge.

Now, on the research side I would like to point out and confirm what other people have suggested that it is very difficult even when you are working in a university—I am currently professor of political sciences at the University of Pennsylvania, deputy director of a research institute there—to obtain specific information on subjects that are very pertinent to what we are trying to study. How are the policies of various governments changing? What were the policies, say, of Brazil 10 years ago, what are they in '64? What are the influences that are brought to bear? One possible influence is the Communist organization in that country, to cite just one country. Do we know right now, among the 111-odd nations which have legal Communist parties, what their strengths are? What is the ratio of visits from that country to the United States or some other free world country and to, on the other hand, the Soviet Union or Communist China? This type of information is very difficult to get hold of.

The last world survey on the Communist party strength is, I think, 3 or 4 years old. It is hard to obtain this information from the Government. What is the newspaper situation on a worldwide basis? What is the line which important papers in various countries follow? What news services do they use?

For example, when Kenya became independent she subscribed to Tass, why? Because it is free for one thing—or because she wanted to get a balance between, let us say, Reuters and the British service? I don't know whether they could afford to subscribe to our two commercial news services. This type of information is very pertinent to an understanding of foreign policy and to our understanding of what actions one might take.

Let us take a look at the Cyprus development. I was in Cyprus in '57. At that time it was evident that there was some connection between the Cypriot movement and certain groups of Greek Communists who were operating there. They had control of a very powerful labor union, they also had the mayors of five major cities. The developments that have taken place in the last month or so there are not the type of developments which could have been altogether unanticipated.

I am not saying that anything could have been done better than it has been done; I appreciate the efforts of Under Secretary of State Ball to settle the issue, but there is something deeper in the Cypriot situation than merely the Greek-Turkish antagonism. And the manner in which Mr. Khrushchev has moved in on the United Nations discussions is indicative of that. The real question you have to face on research material is, Does this information exist in the Government? If so, can the private citizen obtain it if he needs it for his own purposes?

Last year, for example, I tried to find out, in this case from the State Department, a list of the training agencies of the Communist activities inside Russia, Communist China, and the satellites, the type of information which has been bandied about in this discussion. I asked a very good friend of mine there. He said frankly this information was not available in a concise form. Yet, to my mind, this is the kind of operational information that I would at least have at my fingertips if I were planning a strategy to deal with the people trained by these Communist institutions.

Mr. JOHANSEN. In other words, it wasn't unavailable because it was classified?

Mr. KINTNER. No, they just had not thought this particular type of information was particularly pertinent to their activity. They knew a number of the Communist institutions. I am not suggesting they were completely ignorant about it, but to go after this as a package of information just had not been requested by any high officials. Intelligence agencies generally respond to requests of officials whether they are in the State, CIA, or the Defense Department.

I would also suggest that the private institutions in this country really are unable to do the job.

I am fairly familiar with the university structure in this country. I am familiar with most of the so-called think centers, and this particular area, namely, studies on the cold war or the nonmilitary aspects

of our foreign policy, does not get the stress and backing that it should have.

In the first place, there is a little matter of funding and financing. Very few major foundations will put too much money into this activity. They will put it into related activity, research studies, and matters of that kind. But if you get down to saying you really want to explore the cold war it is hard to get the money. This is a point, I believe, that Mr. Harriman made, that there should be backing in the private research side.

As of now, in my opinion, the backing is inadequate. I doubt very much if the private side, however, should take the responsibility for this major area of conflict. I believe that it is interesting to note that people in the other parts of the world feel somewhat the same way.

I have here a little statement called "Principles on Which the Foreign Affairs Research Is Founded." This was published in London by a group of private citizens. They made this statement:

It is regrettable that such a highly complex and controversial subject as international political warfare should have to be left to private individuals and organizations.

Now on the research side I would like to suggest that there has been a basic need inside the Government to spend more time on what some of the issues are that we are confronted with in the cold war. There has been a reluctance sometimes to deal head on with these issues. I helped to organize the structure of the Psychological Strategy Board in 1951. I was a member of something called the ideological panel. We met for quite a long series of sessions. One project that we suggested that might be developed was a study of the life of Stalin, to show that he was pretty much the sort of person that Mr. Khrushchev told the world he was in a speech to the Presidium in 1956.

This was shot down either because it wouldn't do any good or it might be considered disruptive.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Might be disruptive?

Dr. KINTNER. Yes.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Of what?

Dr. KINTNER. Disruptive of the general approach to international communism.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Aggravate tensions, in other words.

Dr. KINTNER. That, I think, is a fair summation of it.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Thank you.

Dr. KINTNER. In the ideological panel, the issue of a positive American ideology never got off the floor. The story being that since ours is a pluralistic society, it is very difficult for us to project the range and complexity of our society. There happen to be a few principles in our pluralistic society which, in my opinion, are worthy of at least presentation to the rest of the world, the Declaration of Independence and our form of constitutional Government. Nevertheless, it is argued that it is difficult to develop a positive presentation of our ideology in words and terms that would be meaningful abroad.

On the training side of the activity, we should recognize that the Government agencies do undertake a significant amount of training. I have lectured at all the War Colleges, the National, the Industrial, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and so forth. I talked to the State Department Foreign Service Institute, including the Senior Officers

Group. There is a good deal of work which does take place in the field under discussion, but primarily these schools are designed to produce professionals in their respective areas whether it happens to be information, diplomacy, or the military arts. And what comes up in this area is often treated marginally because it is not directly germane to the central core of their activities.

I believe that was what Mr. Grant discovered when he took a look at the key Government curriculum. There is a lot of good work there, but on this particular field I would say it is relatively minimal compared to the size and scope of the problem.

Now the private sector also conducts training. Perhaps you are all familiar with the American Free Labor Institute in Washington, run by the AFL-CIO, concentrating particularly on Latin America. I happen to know the man who is running it. He is doing a first-rate job, but it is very small compared to the problem. It only touches one field of our numerous sets of relationships with Latin America. It does not touch the educational field, business field, or other activities of the private sector. There is in Costa Rica an outfit called the Institute de Educacion Politica, which was set up by Jose Figueres and supported by Betancourt. It was designed to do two things: political actions against Communist subversion and, on the positive side, the positive defense of prodemocratic principles. Some graduates of this school were very helpful in Betancourt's successful defeat of the Castro subversive terrorists during the recent election campaign.

In other countries you have the same issue. They tried to set up political warfare training in Korea and the Philippines. There is a committee on political warfare in France headed by Suzanne Labin, a very professional group with no ax to grind. Yet none of these organizations receives public or private financing from their own countries or the United States.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Would you see any objection to their receiving financial support from the United States?

Dr. KINTNER. I would see no objection whatsoever, but more important is the research support from the United States. We are dealing with a global phenomenon and the phenomena we face in Venezuela or Brazil or Zanzibar are pretty much the same. If there were one central, highly skilled, disciplined group trying to analyze this puzzle, making it available to these groups, their own work could be enhanced and we, of course, would get playback from them.

This raises the issue of the subject of training foreign personnel—I believe, as it has been presented, it is a rather false issue. We are training foreign personnel. We train them at our military schools, not at the senior War Colleges but at the command and staff schools level and down the line. These personnel do have access to classified information. We are also training under the AID program; 5,766 participants from overseas were trained by AID in the United States at the end of the last fiscal year and 2,127 were trained in the other nations.

Mr. JOHANSEN. What area was that training in?

Dr. KINTNER. In the AID program I assume. It is in economic development.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I mean the subject matter of the training.

Dr. KINTNER. The subject matter, I assume, would have something to do with irrigation projects, help to education, the secondary schools, and so forth.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Not communism?

Dr. KINTNER. No, it is not in this field. I am pointing out that we are training foreign personnel in other fields. I have been to the police academy set up in the Canal Zone, again under AID auspices, where we are training their military officers and police officers there in techniques to combat subversion that Mr. Harriman was discussing today. In certain instances if the information is not classified at least we have to tell them techniques to which we alone may be privy. So I believe if we can train foreign personnel in other activities that there perhaps is a legitimate basis for training them in an area which may be equally critical to our national survival.

Now on the public information question, there is no doubt in my mind that the Government does have an obligation to tell the citizens who are interested concerning important activities. There are handouts put out by all the Government departments and agencies—Defense Department, State Department, Agriculture Department, and what-have-you. In the foreign policy areas, I personally like to turn to the Senate and House investigations, the Foreign Relations Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee, one or the other, and the Armed Forces Committee, because I find these committees provide the most objective information you can get from the Government. The bipartisan nature of a Freedom Academy would guarantee that you would get the same degree of objectivity in the information it produced. I don't envisage a tremendous flow of handouts there, but there ought to be a place where a person who is seriously interested in the subject can go and have the information on which he places credence—just like people in the academic world place credence in the reports and findings of the congressional committees; they are highly respected. I believe the same thing should be done here.

Now another matter that is important is what the public needs to know in order to sustain the will to fight on in this very difficult conflict. When the will is lost the battle turns against you. I was reading today, for example, about the situation in Vietnam. Four years ago, according to this article, when the American soldier went out in the countryside the Vietnamese kids would wave at them and say hello. Now, according to this article, appearing in today's *Philadelphia Inquirer*, the kids sometimes turn their backs. That to my mind is a psychological setback, assuming that the article is a valid report, which is very, very disconcerting.

I would like to mention a type of problem which a Commission like this could study, namely, the meaning of the sustained 3- to 4-year campaign which the Communists have been conducting to degrade the attitude of the American people toward their security agencies. I am referring now to the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the FBI, for example. There has been a series of books, I will cite a few, on the Defense Department, the last year or so, which are rather interesting. The latest one is *Dr. Strangelove, or How to Fall in Love with the Bomb*. There are *Seven Days in May*, *Fail-Safe*, and *The Bedford Incident*. Interestingly enough, most of these books have a plot pretty much the

same. Our civilian officials are portrayed as rather psychotic and our military officials are outright barbarians. I do not know the motivation of the people who wrote the books or produced the movies, but I do know that in 1959 Mr. Khrushchev stated that "We (the Communists) will learn to use the prudent representatives of the bourgeoisie." I think with careful research one might possibly find some relationship between Mr. Khrushchev's thinking and certain of these "end products" I have mentioned. *The Worker* dated February 18, 1964, stated: "'Dr. Strangelove' Blueprints Ultras' Push to Annihilation." I do not know whether any department or agency of the Government is investigating this kind of issue. I haven't checked to find out, but if this campaign erodes the subconscious attitude of millions of American people toward the responsible security agencies of the Government we will be in trouble.

I should point out that *Seven Days in May* sold 2 million copies. That is a pretty good sale for a book. Now that the film is out, probably about 20 million Americans at least will see it. If Khrushchev's campaign does have a purpose and if this security harpooning activity does reflect his campaign, then if I were concerned with planning and the defense of the United States I would like to look into it very thoroughly. That, however, requires a very skillful type of analysis. It requires a great deal of work before you can reach an objective conclusion on the matter.

There has been discussion during these hearings on the Government attitude toward a Freedom Academy. I covered a few points of it. One is that, of course, the pluralistic society really should not engage the official instruments of Government to study something which may be very controversial. There are very controversial aspects of our attitude toward the conflict. Personally, however, I don't see how we can avoid it.

The objection has been presented that if a cold war institute were created and the Communists automatically dubbed the Freedom Academy as such, it would be very dangerous. The graduates of it would be branded as agents of the United States if they ever operated in a foreign country. But that charge is now made against almost any American-trained person if he goes back into a partially hostile environment, whether he simply went to one of our universities or whether he went to some Government-sponsored program.

The size of the program is of some interest. The State Department proposal calls for a budget of some \$6.5 million. The AID program has an annual budget of some \$40 million. Most of our big universities in this country which cover a multiplicity of subjects have budgets anywhere ranging from 35 to 40 up to 100 million dollars. What I am suggesting is that if the State Department proposal is designed to fulfill the same purpose as the Freedom Academy, the scope of the activity must be much larger than the degree of financial support requested by State.

In summation, I would like to make these points. One is that the Communist governments train operators to work in the private sectors designed to erode the support of United States or other pro-Western elements in a given country. The U.S. Government trains its own personnel almost exclusively to work at the official level. The U.S. private training in this field is, in my opinion, totally inadequate

and the United States Government up to the present time does not wish to engage in the private training.

After these general remarks I shall be very happy to respond to any questions you may care to ask.

Mr. POOL. Dr. Kintner, it has been very helpful to the committee for you to appear today. We appreciate it.

Mr. ICHORD, do you have any questions?

Mr. ICHORD. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, but I do want to commend Mr. Kintner for a very interesting and informative presentation.

Dr. KINTNER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Colonel, I have a couple of questions.

You made reference to a proposal that was offered, and you were interrupted at the time, which you said was shot down and rejected because it was felt that it might be disruptive. Is there a possibility that some of the opposition from certain quarters to this proposal, to this proposed Academy and to the information center, is that some of the information which it might promulgate might also be deemed to be disruptive?

Dr. KINTNER. I think there is a possibility of that. We have various schools of thought on how to go about waging this struggle, and there are some with genuinely good motivations who think it is best to seek, as far as they can, some *modus vivendi* with the other side. Consequently, they would not encourage any course of action which might be regarded as provocative. I am not saying that is the official position of the Government. I am merely indicating that some people in the Government may have that attitude.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Now may I ask you if by any chance you are familiar with, I think, the 1960 book, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*?

Dr. KINTNER. Who is the author of that?

Mr. JOHANSEN. Huberman and Sweezy.

Dr. KINTNER. That was not the *Reader's Digest* article?

Mr. JOHANSEN. No. A pro-Castro book.

Dr. KINTNER. I am not familiar with that.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Then I won't pursue it.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Colonel, I want to express my appreciation for your being here. I have one question.

Would it be your considered opinion that if we had the Freedom Academy that all of the agencies that would send our Government personnel from this country to other countries should have some training in the Academy?

Dr. KINTNER. I don't think all personnel. As I suggested, there is a very broad Government-wide training program for Government personnel. There is also what you might call a general orientation training for Government personnel in this field. I suspect that in view of the pipeline requirements, the people being rotated from place to place, that not all people could participate, particularly in a very long program of training. But I would suspect that a high percentage of them might attend such an Academy were it established.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. You do not have to answer it if you don't want to. Do you think our Peace Corps members, for instance, would be more adequate in their type of work if they had some sort of training and background?

Dr. KINTNER. I can't answer that question for the simple reason that I know of no comprehensive review of the Peace Corps activities. I am personally in favor of the Peace Corps idea, but I don't know of any one who has really looked into it to see whether the Peace Corps people in the field were able to handle themselves well against the type of situations they would face. This might be another field of study which an Academy such as proposed in this bill might undertake.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Naturally, I think if anyone is working they are working with people, and this might be a very helpful background for someone working intimately with them.

Dr. KINTNER. There has not been any private study that I know of attempting to evaluate the Peace Corps. Of course it is fairly young in life.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Yes, I understand that.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, without usurping your prerogatives at all I would like to offer this observation, and direct it to the staff of the committee, Mr. McNamara and the others as well as to our chairman, Mr. Willis, that I think the witnesses that have been here before this committee, almost without exception, have been the finest aggregation of authorities in this field that I have been privileged to hear in my 6 years of service on the committee.

Mr. POOL. I certainly do agree with the gentleman's observation.

Doctor, I want to thank you again for appearing here today.

Dr. KINTNER. You are entirely welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB WILSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, our colleague, Congressman Bob Wilson of California, who is a member of the Committee on Armed Services, has submitted a statement. I ask that it be incorporated at this point in the record of these hearings.

Mr. POOL. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(Congressman Wilson's statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB WILSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the committee has under consideration several proposals to establish a Freedom Academy. I endorse this idea and hope the Congress will pass the necessary legislation this session.

As you may be aware, Mr. Chairman, suggestions for a Freedom Academy were first proposed in 1959 by our former colleague, Congressman Walter Judd of Minnesota and by Congressman A. S. Herlong of Florida. Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate at that time and has been reintroduced since then.

In 1960, the Senate passed a Freedom Academy bill shortly before the adjournment of the 86th Congress. When that bill was reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee, it was enthusiastically supported by the committee, which declared in a statement at the time:

"The committee considers this bill to be one of the most important ever introduced in the Congress. This is the first measure to recognize that a concentrated development and training program must precede a significant improvement in our cold-war capabilities. The various agencies and bureaus can be shuffled and reshuffled. Advisory committees, interdepartmental committees, and coordinating agencies can be created and recreated, but until they are staffed by highly motivated personnel who have been systematically and intensively

trained in the vast and complex field of total political warfare, we can expect little improvement in our situation."

Mr. Chairman, I think that statement wraps up the need for this legislation very well and in just a few sentences. We need, in our Government, an independent, dedicated group, whose sole mission is to meet the challenge of communism head on. We do not need any more interlaced bureaucratic committees and commissions.

Unfortunately, in spite of that strong endorsement from the Judiciary Committee and in spite of the fact that the bill did pass the Senate, the Congress has yet to approve legislation for the establishment of a Freedom Academy.

I am aware that there is some opposition to this project by several of the departments and agencies of our Government. I am sorry that they feel it necessary to express their opposition. I am sorry, too, that we find it necessary here to point up the deficiencies that exist in a complete attack on the philosophy of communism. But I am convinced that there is a deficiency in our approach to this enemy and I find it hard to understand that others, in positions of responsibility, don't see it.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee of the House, I am close to much of the planning for the military defense of this country. I think, however, that there is more to our overall defense picture in these days of cold, rather than hot, war than guns and missiles. For this reason, I am anxious that this legislation be given a full and complete hearing and strongly urge the committee to send it to the floor as soon as possible.

I am sure that it will receive the support of the overwhelming majority of our colleagues at that time.

Mr. POOL. If there are no other witnesses and no other testimony, we will adjourn. This will not complete the hearings; we will probably have some hearings at a later date.

(Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., Thursday, February 20, 1964, the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368,
H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077,
AND H.R. 11718, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF A
FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY

Part 2

TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 1964

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m. in Room 304, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana; William M. Tuck, of Virginia; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; August E. Johansen, of Michigan; Donald C. Bruce, of Indiana; and Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., general counsel; and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please.

Today, the Committee on Un-American Activities resumes hearings begun on February 18 of this year on various bills to create a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy.

In my introductory remarks to the February 18 hearings, I pointed out that five such bills, H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, H.R. 8320, and H.R. 8757, introduced respectively by Representatives Herlong, Gubser, Boggs, Taft, and Schweiker, had been referred to the committee.

Since that time, three additional Freedom Academy bills have been introduced by Members of the House and referred to the committee. They are H.R. 10036, by Mr. Ashbrook, a member of this committee, introduced on February 20; H.R. 10037, by Mr. Clausen, also introduced on February 20; and H.R. 10077, by Mr. Schadeberg, also a member of this committee, on February 24.¹

Mr. Clausen's bill is substantially the same as the Boggs and Taft bills. Mr. Ashbrook's and Mr. Schadeberg's bills are identical with the Gubser bill.

The primary difference between the Boggs-Taft-Clausen and the Gubser-Ashbrook-Schadeberg bills is that while the former provide an Advisory Committee to the Freedom Commission made up of rep-

¹ For copies of above bills see Appendix A, part 1, pp. 1111-1174.

representatives of executive branch departments and agencies, the latter provide for a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee to advise and oversee the operations of the Commission.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. HILL

The CHAIRMAN. The Honorable Robert C. Hill, former Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs and also former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico, was to be the first witness this morning. Unfortunately, unforeseen business matters have made it impossible for him to be here. He has therefore written a letter to me which I will now read for the record.

The letter is dated April 3, 1964. It reads as follows:

My dear Mr. Chairman: I appreciate very much the invitation to testify before your Committee on April 7, 1964, in behalf of the important legislation which would establish a Freedom Academy. Unfortunately, since accepting your invitation, business commitments make it impossible for me to be in Washington for the hearing. I am, therefore, asking you to submit my letter to your Committee, and hope that it will be incorporated in the records of the Committee in support of the Freedom Academy.

As you may know, Mr. Chairman, I have had ten years of government service. I began in India as a Vice Consul, was later Clerk of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, and from 1953 through 1960 served as United States Ambassador to Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico, and as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. During that time, I have observed the lack of knowledge of government officials, and private citizens, with regard to understanding communism and its dangers to our democratic way of life. I have also noted the lack of understanding on how to deal with the communist problem once it has developed.

Today, four years after leaving government service, my office in New Hampshire has continuous inquiries from friends in foreign countries, as well as from private citizens in the United States, asking for advice on how to inform and prepare people for the struggle against communism. A case in point has been the recent turmoil of communist activity in Brazil, which fortunately has led to the ousting of Goulart. Recently, I made appointments for two friends of mine from Brazil to meet with Thomas Mann, the able Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. I knew that from this Foreign Service officer they would receive advice and not be brushed off or discouraged.

This is not always the case, as shown by my own experience when the Embassy in Mexico tried vainly to warn the government of the United States, from 1957 until 1960, of the dangers of Castro and his association with communism.

You may say that these two instances are far afield from the legislation before you. I do not think so. In my opinion, if the Freedom Academy had been in existence, and the opinions of experts had been used to analyze the developments in Cuba, Castro would be elsewhere today, and Goulart would have been spotted long before he assumed power in Brazil. As your Committee well knows, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had repeatedly warned the Department of State about Castro and his communist associations long before he came into power. With the support of the Freedom Academy, in alerting the United States, the present hemispheric tragedy could have been averted.

I support wholeheartedly the concepts of the Freedom Academy. I congratulate the authors of the bill, and your Committee for its continued interest in winning the struggle against communism.

Respectfully,

/s/ ROBERT C. HILL.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Chairman, I know that there has been quite a bit of favorable editorial comment in regard to the subject of our studies at this time, but there appeared an editorial favorable to the establish-

ment of a Freedom Academy in the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* of Richmond, Virginia, under date of March 25, 1964.

In view of the prominence and importance of that paper and in view of the distinction that the learned editor, Mr. Virginius Dabney, has attained in the literary world as well as in other facets of our life more important to the Nation, and in view of his high standing all over the country, I would like, if it is not inappropriate, to offer this editorial as a part of the record, and I do so offer it.

The CHAIRMAN. I read that editorial and was very much impressed with it. I am glad that you offer it for the record, and it will be received at this point.

(The editorial follows:)

[From the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 25, 1964]

TO WIN THE COLD WAR

Establishment by the federal government of a Freedom Academy which would be charged with training Americans in the vitally important non-military aspects of the cold war, thus matching the Communists at their own game, is once more a real possibility.

Legislation to set up such an institute wherein to teach the strategy of propaganda and the tactics of political warfare died in the House last year, after passing the Senate. Similar bills have recently been reintroduced in both branches.

Sponsorship of the Senate bill illustrates the nonpartisan character of those advocating a Freedom Academy. Among the conservative sponsors may be mentioned Senators Dodd, Goldwater and Lausche, while from the liberal camp come such men as Senators Douglas, Scott and Keating.

The lack of such an academy may be a major cause for the steady advance of the Communists across the face of the globe in the past few decades. The Soviets and the Red Chinese have been at the business of stimulating "nationalistic revolutions" and overthrowing governments through guerrilla warfare, rather than by frontal attack, for some 40 years.

If we are to have any real hope of checkmating them, we should embark upon some such counteroffensive as the Freedom Academy provides.

The newly introduced bill is phrased, necessarily, in fairly general terms. The title reads as follows:

"To create a Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy, to conduct research to develop an integrated body of operational knowledge in the political, psychological, economic, technological and organizational areas to increase the non-military capabilities of the United States in the global struggle between freedom and communism, to educate and train government personnel and private citizens to understand and implement this body of knowledge. . . ."

The Freedom Commission would be composed of seven full-time appointees of the President, subject to Senate confirmation. They would be charged with the duty of establishing and supervising the Freedom Academy. "Such sums as may be necessary" are authorized to be appropriated.

If we had had such an academy years ago, we might not be on the defensive today before the Communist guerrillas and saboteurs in so many areas of the world. Establishment of this institution, or something like it, would seem to be essential to final victory for the West in the desperate struggle in which it is engaged.

The CHAIRMAN. And along the same vein, the cartoon from the *New York Herald Tribune* of Wednesday, February 12, 1964, was called to my attention, and although it was not intended to have anything to do with these hearings, yet it is, I think, a good illustration of the success achieved by Communists through their political warfare schools—training in tactics, and so on.

The cartoon is titled "Hail Alma Mater." It was published at the time of the pro-Communist takeover in Zanzibar. A fire, labeled "Chaos in Africa," is portrayed as having been set in the background.

In the foreground are two men, shaking hands. One, bearded, is holding a torch that apparently was used to set the fire. He says to the man whose hand he is shaking: "I was trained in Cuba, Class of '64!" The other character, holding a suitcase of dynamite in his left hand, says about his Alma Mater: "I'm Moscow '63!"

So, here they are; they are taking credit for the chaos in Africa. That is the meaning of preparation, from their point of view and for their purposes, in agitation, and so on. We don't seem to have any active countermeasures here, or certainly no institutions where we can get expert instruction on their techniques and how to defeat them.

Would it be possible to reproduce this in the record at this point?

Mr. McNAMARA. It would, Mr. Chairman; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I offer it.

(The cartoon follows:)

Hail Alma Mater



The CHAIRMAN. Our first witness this morning is Mr. Robert F. Delaney, former USIA official.

Mr. Delaney?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Delaney, we are delighted to have you, and as the usual point of beginning, I wish you would give a thumbnail explanation of your education, your background, and your experience and employment, in a general way.

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT FINLEY DELANEY

Mr. DELANEY. I attended Dartmouth and Holy Cross Colleges, and did my graduate work at Boston University, Harvard, Catholic University, and the University of Vienna, concentrating in the fields of political sociology and international relations.

I have served in the United States Navy on active duty over a period of 6 years. I am currently a commander in the U.S. Naval Reserve.

My professional experience includes some 12 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, both within the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency.

I have served in our Embassy in Rome, Legation in Budapest, Embassies in Vienna and in El Salvador, Central America.

At the present moment, I am engaged in writing and lecturing on international affairs.

I have also served as a public affairs adviser to industry.

At the moment I am a resident of Miami, Florida, although I spend much of my time in Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have contributed to a paper *Studies in Guerilla Warfare*?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

My experience, in terms of the international Communist conspiracy, has been directed toward unconventional warfare. I have written several books that bear on this subject, among them: *This is Communist Hungary*, *The Literature of Communism in America*, *A Training Manual on Unconventional Warfare*, and *Studies in Guerilla Warfare*.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we are glad to receive your comments on the bills.

Mr. DELANEY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: I have prepared a statement this morning, which I hope will be enlarged with questions from the committee upon its completion and, if I may, I should like to read it at this time.

I appear before you today as a private citizen and ex-Government official to support passage of the Freedom Academy bill. Since 1949, I have been engaged in exposure of the Communist conspiracy, first in Europe and more recently in Latin America.

I feel a particular moral commitment to testify before this committee, since I was one of the officials in the Operations Coordinating Board who confronted Mr. Alan Grant in July 1954 and found no particular merit in his original plan.

I am here today—

The CHAIRMAN. What was that plan?

Mr. DELANEY. That was the original idea of the Freedom Academy, drawn up by the Orlando Committee, stated in 1954.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. DELANEY. I am here today to tell you that 10 years and two continents later, I urgently agree with the necessity for the establishment of an Academy dedicated to the needs of a national program in teaching, training, and research in order better to comprehend the spectrum of Communist weaponry which opposes and, seemingly, so often befuddles us.

I have served both in the public and the private sectors. I am, I believe, the first witness to testify with extensive experience in both areas. I would like this morning to limit my remarks to two principal considerations, since earlier witnesses, notably Mr. Grant and Dr. Possony of the Hoover Library, have expressed, significantly better than I, many of my present ideas drawn from my overseas experiences.

The first area I would touch on is the matter of the need for a common national institution as envisioned by this proposed legislation for a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy.

My second concern involves inclusion of the private sector in the training and research aspects of the Academy.

Permit me, gentlemen, to touch on my first point: The need for a common, umbrella-type institution. Earlier testimony has alluded to official opposition to this bill, notably from the Department of State, on the grounds that the work was being done already or that it was a dangerous initiative which might infringe on our relations in the world.

Let me be very blunt. It is my observation that the main reason for official opposition is basically jurisdictional. No official executive agency enjoys being told it is deficient. No official agency enjoys being charged with outmoded thinking. Yet, this, in effect, is what the Freedom Commission concept is suggesting. And it is correct in its assessment.

Our line agencies of foreign policy developed their methodology out of an era long departed. Communist conflict management, as Professor Possony so aptly describes the Soviet system of international relations, finds no counterpart in the conventional and formalized attitudes and techniques of our traditional service.

Nonetheless, the Department of State must, properly so, maintain its primacy, in our system, in the conduct of foreign affairs. Here is the rub. This primacy is being carried out without sufficient regard for change. We live in a revolutionary world. We deplore the ill-mannered and wholly unconventional diplomatic practices of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

But, gentlemen, as we all know, these tactics exist, and we are forced—I repeat, forced—to deal with them. It may be unfortunate, but it is true.

As a result, the primacy of State has slowly eroded over the years, since 1948. Propaganda, intelligence, narcotics, trade, fiscal manipulations, and now counterinsurgency have all entered the semantics of diplomacy. History tells us these techniques exist, but tradition tells us, “isn’t it a shame?”

Agencies have sprung up to cope with the emergencies of cold war—and properly so. They have filled a vacuum. All of these efforts represent pioneer attempts to fight the Communist threat. To these developments State has agreed, realizing its right of policy control.

Now comes another idea, fostered by the demands of the age in which we live—the Freedom Academy. The concept is practical. Let us train people in and out of Government to a fuller realization of what we are up against. Ten years ago, I thought the idea was farfetched. Today, after witnessing Hungary, Cuba, attempted coups in Latin America, and massive naivete in our own society, I plead for the Academy concept.

State, perhaps naturally, sees this idea as further erosion of its prerogatives by a group of the uninitiated. It does not wish to accept further bureaucratic encroachment. After all, do we not, as testimony has indicated, possess sufficient training academies throughout the Government? I know; I have been to most of them. I can say this: We lack coordination; we lack communality. We lack perspective and completeness.

An attaché is trained; a diplomat is schooled; a propagandist is equipped. Each in his own specialty, each as a “necessary waste of time” before proceeding to his post.

Because this field of the Communist unconventional approach happens to be my experience, I have been fortunate. But I have heard officers complain about the “cops and robbers,” waste-of-time internal security courses. I have heard diplomatic officers criticize colleagues who were trying to fight the Communists with the new techniques. I have seen our officials care more for protocol than for labor, more for form than content, and more for the system than the fight we face, unorthodox though it may be. Indeed, it may very well be that this unorthodoxy is the key. Change comes slowly to foreign policy. The “Magenot Line” mentality is comfortable, and the way up assured. But, gentlemen, the opposition thinks otherwise, and it is they, unfortunately, who force the pace.

Now, the Department feels negatively about an independent administration of this Academy. My experience has been that the strong point of the act rests in its quasi-autonomy. It will be subject, thus, to the common good of the United States, and not to the fears, negativism, and inflexibility of established, jurisdictionally minded executive agencies.

For once, gentlemen, let us take the word of the Communist movement at its worth. Let us give the American people the benefit of the doubt. Let us show our own appreciation of the Communist methodology and study it objectively and fully with this the object in view, rather than to create another watered-down monument to incomplete training for bored Government officials.

I don't mean to denigrate Government officials. On the contrary, I was a very proud member of the club myself. I am simply commenting that it is insufficient training to which they have been exposed.

My second point is this: The United States of America, not just a cadre of foreign policy officials, is in competition with the world Communist movement. In fact, the free world is its target, as the bloc so frequently and honestly indicates.

Yet for every moderately trained U.S. official conscious of the threat, there is a private-sector counterpart who, through ignorance or lack of training, often undoes the good "our man in Country X" may be attempting to accomplish.

How often have you seen or heard, Mr. Chairman, of an American teacher or an American businessman or an American expatriate abroad or, for that matter, an American official who confuses the local national with "a Commie, Socialist, pinko"? Even worse, I can relate experience upon experience of Americans abroad who hate their Embassies, who rant at U.S. policy, and who have not the vaguest idea of the *raison d'être* for the revolutionary ferment sweeping the developing nations, not to mention their simplistic views of the Communist problem.

These men are basically good Americans. They serve well and faithfully, but they need assistance. They have never been given the true opportunity quietly to listen, study, question, and read about the Communist forces at work in their world of business, commerce, entrepreneurship, or academic life.

For these men, as well as for the men coming up—the overseas-bound manager, the newly rotated expatriate, the inquisitive journalist, the international engineer—this Academy and its curriculum could be invaluable.

This country needs these men who are on the international front lines. We should not waste them. The Freedom Academy, contrary to criticism, will not breed conformity or party line in such training. Rather, it is to be hoped it will provide this country with a reservoir of intelligent, knowledgeable men who will understand the forces at work attempting to subvert and ultimately destroy the world that they, the overseas Americans, now numbering close to 2 percent of our national population, are trying to build.

Finally, may I allude briefly to examples of the unconventional techniques with which we are faced today by the Communists—techniques which would surely be included in the Academy's curriculum, as Dr. Possony outlined in his testimony.

For the past 4 years, I have lived and traveled in Latin America, a subcontinent under frantic Communist pressure.

I have seen universities completely dominated by a handful of professional Communist students, who have paralyzed the normal collegiate functions. Now, this technique, once understood, is easily countered if the university officials are fully appreciative of what is going on and what is at stake.

By the same token, I have seen U.S. Army officers trained in civic action antagonize nationalistic university officials whom they were sent to help, by inexcusable lack of tact and prudence. Proper training could have avoided this type of situation.

In Latin America today, the Communists are employing every technique possible. During the Panama riots, for example, documented evidence indicates the provocative role played by Communist street agitators, even to the apparent extreme of Panamanians shooting their fellows in order to provide a convenient, exploitable martyr who could be buried amidst suitable antigirango harangues.

Now, where do these trained Communist agents come from? We all know that Cuba, Communist China, and the Soviet satellites share

the burden. In Cuba, we have the word of an official publication, *Cuba Socialista*, which admits to more than 269 cadre training schools on that small island, designed to, in the review's words, "train technical and cultural cadres who will be with the revolution and for the revolution, all the way."

Mr. POOL. Pardon me just a second there.

How many did you say there were in Cuba? How many schools?

Mr. DELANEY. Two hundred sixty-nine.

Now, that is probably an outdated figure, but it gives you some idea of the scope and immensity of their approach.

I would like, incidentally, to submit as part of the record, if I may, Mr. Chairman, the complete article from which I extracted this information, called "Revolutionary Training Schools and the Training of Cadres," by Lionel Soto—S-o-t-o—translated from *Cuba Socialista*.

The CHAIRMAN. The document will be received for our files, and we will decide whether to incorporate it in full in the record later.¹

Mr. DELANEY. The Chinese Communists, not to be outdone, have since 1958 operated a "school for training special agents," a school, cynically enough, under control of the Minister of Social Affairs—

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that school?

Mr. DELANEY. It is located in mainland China, sir.

This school, according to U.S. Government sources, has sent three quarters of its graduates to Latin America: Havana, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

At the end of the line, the Chinese have been very carefully preparing the groundwork and have, to date, formed some 22 so-called friendship associations, which can feed potential cadre material into this revolutionary people's school system.

Now, mind you, I think one of the most interesting points is the fact that the Chinese Communists do not enjoy diplomatic relations, generally speaking, in Latin America, and yet they are able to establish this system of unconventional diplomacy, if you will, or warfare, more probably, and we are not effectively able to counter it, primarily because our approach is more formalized than our opponent's.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you two questions in one.

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Accepting, of course, the complete accuracy of your last two statements, is it an easily established fact that these schools in Cuba exist and that one in China exists?

Is that known to the Government?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes; it is known to the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. I was about to ask you the source, unless you don't want to say.

Mr. DELANEY. Perfectly free.

This is a U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Photoduplication Service of the Library of Congress, the translator and reproducer of the article.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other?

Mr. DELANEY. The other is taken from a USIA publication.

¹ For text of Soto article, see pp. 1333-1341.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, so that source is USIA?

Mr. DELANEY. For the Chinese friendship associations; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. DELANEY. I ask you to note one dominant aspect of this training in proletarian diplomacy. It is coordinated. It functions for the benefit of supporters, both public and private; and, according to Cuban Communist Lionel Soto, the author of this previously cited article, "The schools must constantly incorporate the live materials and documents that reflect our development * * *."

History in the making.

These schools are not confined to Communist-controlled countries. As far back as 1958, the Argentine police uncovered a completely equipped propaganda and subversive training academy in Buenos Aires, known as the Aurora Latin American Training School for Communist Party Cadres. This will shortly be exposed in popular print in the form of a book to be published by *Reader's Digest* Editor Gene Methvin.

Discovered in attendance at this school were Latin Americans, Italians, Spaniards, and a Pole; among them lawyers, professors, blue-collar and white-collar workers.

Now, I cite these examples not to suggest that we set up a clandestine operation. I cite these examples to bring home the necessity for a research training institute which will prepare our officials and our business and academic men in the unorthodox and unconventional methods of our enemies.

It is precisely because the Communists are nonconventional in their nonmilitary tactics that we need a high-level, nondiplomatic school.

Mr. JOHANSEN. May I interrupt you at that point?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Am I to understand that, as of now, there is no countereffort directed by our Government against these activities?

Mr. DELANEY. No, sir; there are efforts directed against these activities by the professionals within the executive branch. The information obviously collected exposing these Communist activities is generally subjected to scrutiny and analysis and, I dare say, to whatever efforts can be worked against them to blunt their effectiveness. I think that the great gap lies in the general public awareness and consciousness vis-a-vis this assault that is being directed against us.

We must not overlook the strength inherent in our own nonconventional sector—the private one. In Colombia, in Peru, in Venezuela, American businessmen today, for example, have joined together to launch community development projects, university civic action programs, and well-conceived scholarship plans designed to reach these groupings of campesino,¹ students, and intellectuals who are themselves the object of Communist subversion.

I believe that Mr. Morrison will be speaking to you a little later this morning on one other aspect of the private sector's contribution, "Operation Amigo."

By bringing individuals together into a Freedom Academy, we can increase our knowledgeable, our effectiveness, and our sense of prudent action; and I am emphasizing prudent action, because there

¹ Peasant farm laborers, nonlandowning farmers.

are many people who fear this concept of a Freedom Academy, because they think that if passed, if brought into being, it will end up as an extremist institution with everybody running off at the mouth, declaring war, or interfering in the due and orderly processes of the executive branch of Government.

Not at all. This is not the intention, as I read the bill, nor must it ever be, or we sow the seeds of our own destruction.

We do not have an across-the-board response today. Of this, there is no doubt. Creation of a well-conceived Freedom Academy would, in my opinion, be the catalyst which would restore ingenuity, inventiveness, and sense of belonging to our own efforts to cope with Communist unconventional activities.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would say you made a very splendid statement and I congratulate you.

Gentlemen?

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend Mr. Delaney for his fine statement and for the very helpful information which he has brought to the committee.

Mr. DELANEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask him one question.

In the Chinese situation, do you have any information on how many of these schools they have in China?

Mr. DELANEY. No, sir; I can't quote you an accurate figure, unfortunately. I think we can be sure that there are literally hundreds of them, however.

Mr. POOL. You have 269 schools in Cuba, and these are mainly used for training propagandists, guerrillas, agitators, and for softening up of students who, let's say, would not be called Communists as of the point they arrive on the island.

Did I understand you a while ago to say in your testimony that three fourths of the graduates of this Chinese school for training special agents that was under the Ministry of Social Affairs, that three fourths of those graduates go to South American countries? Is that what you said?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. POOL. Do you have a basis for that? Is that in this USIA report?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. POOL. You don't know the number of that, do you?

Mr. DELANEY. The only documentation-cited number that would be able to label it is USIA 1961. I suspect that this is probably the year in which this documentation was first issued.

Mr. POOL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ichord.

Mr. ICHORD. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, you say, Mr. Delaney, that you were opposed to the original concept as advanced by the Orlando Committee.

I would like to ask you whether the concept of the Orlando Committee has changed, or whether your thinking has changed?

Mr. DELANEY. My thinking, sir. I think the concept is—

Mr. ICHORD. You said "the original concept." The concept is still the same.

Mr. DELANEY. Yes; so what I actually meant was that—there have been certain details that have been modified over the years, but it is basically my own thinking that has changed, rather than that of the Orlando Committee.

Mr. ICHORD. A number of years ago, Senator Young from Ohio made a speech on the Senate floor wherein he ridiculed the Freedom Academy on the ground that we already had enough institutions teaching essentially the same thing that would be taught in this school.

Are you familiar with the speech that he made? I would like to have your comment.

Mr. DELANEY. I have no doubt but what there are sufficient schools in the Government as of the present moment that, spread out over geography and continent, at one point or another, partially cover the field. But it is fragmented and isolated, and to my knowledge the school system does not give a coherent, complete, and accurate picture, nor does it give training in depth, such as you might find in one of the service academies devoted exclusively to the staff training of military officers, where they are able to spend 6 to 9 months or more training specifically in depth for higher command.

Mr. ICHORD. How do you envisage this institution working?

Mr. DELANEY. I envision this as a graduate program of instruction—let's just confine it to instruction at the moment—whereby people may be assigned for a definite period of time, and there to study, to the exclusion of everything else, the nature, the antecedents, the techniques, and the tactics of the world Communist movement.

Mr. ICHORD. Won't they even go farther than that—and also means of combating?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir; and I would tie that aspect of the question to the research function. It is in the research function that you would develop the counter ideas, where you would develop the necessary knowledgeability for pushing expert individuals out into the mainstream of our public and private sectors to combat the enemy.

Mr. ICHORD. What is your objection to having the Academy operated by one of our existing institutions of Government, for example, the State Department? Why do you object to the State Department operating such an agency?

Mr. DELANEY. I think, basically, that the State Department, because it is the State Department and responsible for the traditional and formal channels of communication in our diplomatic sphere, would be put in an embarrassing position, in terms of the world at large, in setting up such a training academy.

Secondly, I believe that the State Department would be beset by pressures within its own organization to water down the training and the courses so offered. I think there would be a lack of, shall we say, nonconformity. I think there might be—I can conceive of situations where academic freedom might be restricted for particularly practical reasons of statecraft, and I think that, over a period of time, there would be a great deal of pulling and tugging within the executive branch for control of this or that aspect of the Academy.

What I am suggesting is that it would be easier to create an Academy outside the framework of established executive agencies. It would be a new departure and would not inherit the various difficulties, fights,

and squabbles that might very well be transplanted to an Academy in State's jurisdiction.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, this will be another executive agency. The mere fact that it is independent doesn't remove it from the executive.

Mr. DELANEY. No; that is quite true, but it will come to its functions with a clear mind and with a will to be one in terms of its legislative function, and I believe that it will have a better chance to do the job as indicated in the legislation.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask one question.

As the other side of the coin that you have just been referring to, you don't envisage, do you, that this Academy would have anything to do with, or supplant, the State Department in matters of foreign policy?

Mr. DELANEY. Not at all, sir. That would be a grievous mistake. It has no function in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, accepting that, because that is our understanding—the only acceptable function would be in that direction—would there be involved some danger that is real, that despite the fact that such would not be the objective of the Academy, that it might be portrayed as such to foreign countries and that, therefore, efforts would be made to create turmoil and quarrels between State and the agency, and could the agency survive that?

Perhaps efforts would be made in our own country to "take the side" of the Academy as against State and, therefore, even though it isn't so as a matter of law, the people would think so and, therefore, the very existence of the Academy might be used as a lever for more trouble.

What is your thought as to that?

Because I assume this is the sort of thing—and I'm attributing nothing but sincerity to people—that might be troubling the State Department in its objection to this proposal.

Mr. DELANEY. To answer your first question first, Mr. Chairman, I think that if the legislation passes and is enacted into law, we can absolutely count on a barrage of propaganda directed against its existence on the part of the Communists. You will recall that the same type of massive attack was launched against the United States escapee program when it first came into being, a program which was, through its entire history, a humanitarian effort, and yet it was subjected to the strongest possible attack by the Communists. The Communists don't want the Academy established, obviously, because it means people will be more alert.

Insofar as our own country is concerned, I am also quite sure in my own mind that it would be subject to attack, perhaps misconceived or ill-conceived, both within and outside the Government, by people fearful that it would impinge on executive authority or, conversely, would impinge on some vague idea about freedom of thought, that we would be training party-line-type individuals, which is, of course, not the intent of the act at all.

My only solution to this would be that great care would have to be exercised in the establishment of the Academy and particularly in the naming of the hierarchy, members of the Commission and the various Academy officials, because they would be expected to bear the brunt of

this attack, and much of their ability would flow from their well-established reputations and from the fact that their responses would be couched in reasonable terms, rather than extremistic terms.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Delaney, in both the bill introduced by our colleague on the committee, Mr. Ashbrook, and the bill introduced by Mr. Gubser of California, there is the provision for the establishment of a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee.

I would like to have your comments on that proposal and on the possible role of such a joint committee in helping to establish and maintain a degree of independence for the Commission.

Mr. DELANEY. Frankly, I think that the establishment of a committee with congressional representation is a terribly important consideration. I also think that such a joint committee, if at all possible—and I frankly don't know whether it would be—should include representation from the executive branch.

I say that for this reason: The presence of Congressmen on the committee can go a long way toward maintaining the balance and the integrity of the institution, from the mere fact that they are Congressmen of the United States.

The presence of the executive agency officials on such a committee or as advisers to such a committee would go a long way, it seems to me, to wear off any of the negativism or fears that might emanate from the executive departments coincidental with the creation of the Academy, that working and interrelating together, these officials and the Congressmen might very well, and indeed must, set the tone for the successful operation of this training establishment. Otherwise, I am afraid the idea might tend to be extreme.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, then, your suggestion would seem to be that rather than a separate joint congressional committee comprised exclusively of Members of Congress, there should be some type of an advisory committee to the Commission which would include congressional representation and advisers—in other words, something in the general pattern of the Hoover Commission type of setup.

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir; exactly.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Where the President or the executive designate non-congressional members, along with those selected by the Vice President from the Senate and by the Speaker from the House?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Thank you.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Delaney, may I congratulate you, first of all, upon the thoroughness of your paper.

Mr. DELANEY. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. BRUCE. May I ask you this question?

Who sets the State Department policy? Well, I mean in the final analysis?

Mr. DELANEY. In the final analysis—I will have to give you a two-part answer.

In the final analysis, the President of the United States is responsible. On the working level, policy is made in any number of ways. Today it might be a desk officer. Tomorrow, it might be a committee. The next day it might be an Embassy. It depends, really, on the specific question.

Mr. BRUCE. But in the final analysis, as far as the goals and the objectives, this rests primarily with the President of the United States.

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRUCE. Now, how would the Freedom Academy exist if its analysis and studies led them to the conclusion that there were basic errors in policy? What would happen?

Mr. DELANEY. Politically speaking, there would probably be one terrific fight, but from the point of view of how you reconcile this, I would hope, personally, that we would never reach that impasse where this sort of a situation arose, which is one reason why I would argue strongly for a high-level commission being appointed.

But if the situation should ever arise where there would be a conflict based, let's say, on the research of the Academy, which I suppose is theoretically possible, then I believe, strictly speaking, it is not the function of the Academy publicly to make an issue of this; it is not within its scope; it would be ruinous of the Academy and its future, and that if there are private misgivings, then they should be conveyed privately.

Mr. BRUCE. Well, reading one of the bills, the bill put in by Mr. Herlong, the Advisory Committee that he recommends would be the heads of the following agencies, and from officers and employees thereof: Department of State; Department of Defense; Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; CIA; FBI; ICA; and USIA.

Is it conceivable, from your experience as an official of the Federal Government in some of these areas, that this Advisory Committee would under foreseeable circumstances go contrary to the established policy in their relationship with the Freedom Academy?

Mr. DELANEY. No. Certainly my experience is such that I could say very simply "No," but I think here we have a question of just how you define the scope of the Academy.

I think, Congressman, you are perhaps suggesting that the Academy has a policymaking role, but it doesn't—or it shouldn't.

Mr. BRUCE. No; I am not suggesting that. I am suggesting that when their research reaches conclusions, such as their—that would be at variance with what appears to be established policy, that under any form of academic freedom at this point, they would be almost duty-bound in their instruction, in their training, to teach what they thought from their research was the correct analysis of the nature of the world Communist movement.

Now, if this turned out to be at variance with, for instance, State Department, how would you settle this? Or would, without some effective barriers, the executive agencies of Government at this point squash the independent research and the academic freedom, as it were, of the Freedom Academy? How would you solve this?

Mr. DELANEY. I would avoid it, if at all possible, which may not be a straightforward answer.

Mr. BRUCE. Well, realistically—

Mr. DELANEY. But it seems to me that once you get into this area, where research in the Academy is pointed at possible criticism of the Government, the executive branch of Government in the handling of its foreign affairs, you have overstepped the bounds, that this is exactly the sort of thing that the Academy must stay away from.

Mr. BRUCE. Well, now, let me give you a specific example.

Suppose a Government-financed study came up with a conclusion such as this, and I quote it: "Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the ability of the Soviet police system to keep law and order over the 200-million-odd Russians and the many additional millions in the satellite states. The breakup of the Russian Communist empire today would doubtless be conducive to freedom, but would be a good deal more catastrophic for world order than was the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918."

Now, let's assume that Dr. Possony, or whoever you had on the faculty and doing research with the Freedom Academy, would come up with something diametrically opposed to this, or diametrically opposed to the five-volume study known as the *Phoenix Papers*, would there be any liberty to teach within the Freedom Academy contrary to these things, if, by chance, these happened to be a dominant thought at State Department level?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes; I would think so. Very definitely, it is within the context of the purposes of this Academy to expound all reasonable points of view—reasonable, documented points of view.

Mr. BRUCE. Right.

Mr. DELANEY. We have that today in our various service schools, where you will find on one platform someone advocating the recognition of Red China as an argument, and someone following them denying the efficacy of this argument. I believe our people must know of the existence of these two things. One would hope that they have the good sense to make a reasonable judgment based on knowledgeability, but, as you have stated this, I see no essential conflict at that stage.

I would suggest that if a man comes up with a well-documented, interesting, provocative argument, it should be very definitely a part of the instruction.

Mr. BRUCE. Well, I don't want to belabor this, but to me it is a very important point.

How could you conceive that the Freedom Academy would remain free of coercion, when our Ambassador to Cuba under a previous administration was ignored because it was contrary to State Department policy?

Mr. DELANEY. Congressman, I would hope that you gentlemen in your foresight and wisdom would write cautions into the legislation. You, after all, are the individuals concerned with the proper assemblage of legislation for the United States; and if this is a genuine concern—and I think, perhaps, it definitely merits study and attention—then, after consideration and deliberation, something should be included to take care of these cautions, these questions, before any bill goes before the full House for passage.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. BRUCE. Yes.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Doesn't that go to the very point of the oversight role of a joint committee of Congress, either separately or as part of an Advisory Committee?

Mr. DELANEY. I would say, sir, that it certainly does, because knowing the Congress of the United States, I feel certain that if a gentleman feels so inclined to get up and criticize, he will, rightfully so, and if the situation arises, that perhaps quiet consultation with members

of the congressional commission to the Freedom Academy might smooth the way for the existence and success of the work of the school.

Mr. BRUCE. Well, I will confess, I have the same concern that you do, and we have talked before on the necessity or the need for some type of Freedom Academy, but I have to personally see clearly that it can't become just another agency, that it can't be controlled by policymakers who have their own pet theories—devoid of reality—of the nature of the world Communist movement. If it does this, it becomes a harmful thing, instead of a good creation, and I have been pondering this before I even came to the Congress, and frankly haven't come up with an answer that satisfies me. How can you create this Freedom Academy dealing with this highly controversial subject, with the President making the appointment, subject, of course, to confirmation by the Senate—such as we have in the Herlong bill—with the heads of all the executive branches, practically, on the Advisory Committee. How this can serve the function that we envisage baffles me, frankly.

Thank you very much.

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. Delaney, would you care to comment on how the recruiting is done for these schools in Cuba?

Mr. DELANEY. It takes many and varied forms, Mr. Congressman.

I have seen several of their approaches. They vary all the way from sizing up, let's say, within university context, students who seem to have a potential for leadership or for studies or seem to be embittered against society for one reason or another.

They are generally identified, first of all; watched by the professional students or other cadre members; and at some point are approached, either with a scholarship offer to study in Cuba or Moscow or Peiping, or perhaps if their assessment of the man's character is such, they will offer him a subsidy, a dole. They will put him on the payroll for a while within the university context or the local context and in this way compromise him, and, at a later date, as he is drawn slowly into the web, then they might decide this man is worth developing, this man is worth keeping, and then send him off.

Then again, they might take someone who is, let's say, socialistically inclined and hit him cold with an offer to travel.

A third type of possibility would be, within the general labor context, to pick laborers who might one day turn into labor union leaders and to, by flattery and the offer of travel, by some financial remuneration, slowly bring them in and then send them off.

Then there is also always the wild-eyed fellow who is against everything, who would snap up an opportunity like this for opportunistic reasons and move off to one of these training camps.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Are there any U.S. citizens in these schools?

Mr. DELANEY. To my knowledge, no; but it seems highly unlikely that there aren't Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. That there are not?

Mr. DELANEY. There must be Americans. It would stand to reason, within the context; but to my knowledge, I am not aware of any.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. The next question that comes to my mind is: If that is the way they are trained and recruited, how do they go through

the process of the Government, State Department, with respect to State Department, or whatever it is, the agencies, saying this is for the purpose of study?

Mr. DELANEY. No; they evade the controls, by and large.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Then it is clandestine.

Mr. DELANEY. Yes; in 9 cases out of 10, their travel is now clandestine.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Directly to the school. Not under the idea that they are trying to go and study under a university, and then take this as a side.

Mr. DELANEY. By and large, they will utilize both approaches. If the only way they can get there conveniently is by announcing, let's say, that they are going to study at the University of Paris, they will so announce, and when they get to Paris or when they get to the Continent, off they go in another direction.

Or, where they are going completely covertly, then there is obviously no need, because there is no need for documentation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Chairman, as I understand the legislation we are considering, the concept of this legislation is to make studies and to ascertain the truth, in conformity, and that the Commission would have no power to issue any orders or directives or anything else that would be binding in any way upon any of the agencies of the Government. Is that true?

Mr. DELANEY. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. TUCK. And do I understand also—and referring particularly to the Herlong bill, in which he provides for certain agencies to be represented as advisers—that they are purely advisers, or consultants, and that they would have no power under the proposal to impinge upon the liberties of the Freedom Academy or the Commission constituting that Academy? Is that correct?

Mr. DELANEY. Except as so established within the advisory framework. And I might add, Governor, cynically, I would hazard a guess and suggest that they would serve as buffers.

The CHAIRMAN. They would what?

Mr. DELANEY. Serve as buffers between the outside critics and the integrity of the institution.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I would like to just amend my comments.

When you mentioned the bills that include this joint congressional committee, that Mr. Schadeberg's also includes that provision.

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Chairman, an observation on that.

As I read the Herlong bill, I believe this committee plays a little more vital role than just that, because they are charged with review of the plans, programs, and activities, transmitting to the Commission recommendations, meet with the Commission, to consult, transmit to the President and to the Congress the report containing—I think their influence is going to be a little bit more than just sort of an advisory committee, because they apparently are part of the liaison between the executive branch and the Congress, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. He used the word "buffer."

Mr. JOHANSEN. But am I correct in the understanding that the Advisory Committee proposed in the Herlong bill does not include congressional membership?

Mr. DELANEY. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. That inclusion is contained only in what bills? Ashbrook, Schadeberg, and Gubser.

The advisory concept, I think, is included in all the bills, not only the Herlong but in the Boggs-Taft bill.

Mr. BRUCE. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Do you see any reason why there can't be a wedding of the two?

Mr. DELANEY. No, sir. My personal opinion is that I believe there should be a wedding of the two.

Mr. ICHORD. May I interrupt at that point?

And the wedding you contemplate, or you would recommend, is putting Members of Congress on this Advisory Committee?

Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. DELANEY. Thank you, sir.

(The Soto article submitted by Mr. Delaney follows:)

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REVOLUTIONARY TRAINING SCHOOLS AND THE TRAINING OF CADRES

—Cuba—

By Lionel Soto

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FOREWORD

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REVOLUTIONARY TRAINING SCHOOLS AND THE TRAINING OF CADRES

—Cuba—

[Following is the translation of an article by Lionel Soto in the Spanish-language periodical *Cuba Socialista* (Socialist Cuba), Vol. I, No. 3, Havana, November 1961, pages 28-41.]

One of the general difficulties of the Revolution is the shortage of cadres in all areas of revolutionary endeavor.

First of all, we need political cadres everywhere.

In the economy, for instance, there is a major shortage of technical cadres.

This is the legacy of our semicolonial backwardness; and this legacy is aggravated by the treason of groups of engineers, architects, and others who, because of class origin or corruption and lack of conscience, preferred the "boisterous and brutal North," as Jose Marti put it; they preferred emigration /to the U.S./ to staying in our beautiful and liberated homeland.

The selection of cadres and their theoretical training is however of truly decisive importance to the Revolution.

Our tasks here are vast:

We must train an integrated corps of revolutionary cadres, both old and young.

We must train technical and cultural cadres who will be with the Revolution and for the Revolution, all the way.

We must educate, reeducate, and win over the old intellectuals, the technical men of yesterday, the professors and teachers who do not yet understand what this is all about.

Finally, we must step up and develop revolutionary education.

Lenin taught that it is men, cadres, who decide everything, who are the pillars of the Marxist Party.

The breakup of the machinery of the bourgeois-landowner government confronts us with the necessity of filling vacant slots with tens of thousands of revolutionary men and women who are not familiar with their new functions.

Today, we have hundreds of thousands of revolutionaries, but there are far less revolutionaries who have the necessary theoretical or political training.

Revolutionaries without political and theoretical training and without technical knowledge will have to learn as they go along and they will have to learn in the schools of the Revolution.

Experience has shown that missions can be accomplished where capable and conscientious cadres are assigned.

On 2 September 1960, the people of Cuba approved the "Havana Declaration" in its National General Assembly; this is a program for national liberation and Socialism.

Following the nationalization of foreign companies, the laws on the nationalization of large domestic companies were decreed on 13 October 1960; thus our Revolution definitely entered its Socialist phase.

This created new problems for us.

One of these concerns the creation of a Socialist consciousness, without which we cannot build Socialism.

To meet this need, we have our Schools of Revolutionary Education.

Earlier Cadre Schools

Schools of this kind have glorious antecedents in Cuba. Under various forms, they have been operating since the establishment of the first Marxist-Leninist party of Cuba, the Communist Party, in 1925.

The form of these schools varied with the times, of course. Sometimes, they were located in the home of a militant; others were located in a specially selected building; at times, even prison cells served as class rooms.

The conscientious revolutionaries always paid careful attention to questions of theory, to the formation of a Socialist awareness, as a means to strengthen revolutionary action and steer it in the right direction.

In view of semicolonial, imperialist rule, the Marxist-Leninist education effort was a hard task.

Only a very small group of men and women could go through these schools. Persecutions, financial difficulties, and the environment in general constituted serious obstacles here.

During the last 5 years of tyranny,¹ for example, we operated the small, though highly important National Cadre School of the Popular Socialist Party; we were completely outlawed at the time, but for 3-4 months this school trained groups [of] 15-20 selected cadres in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. The school was a boarding school which lasted for a 3-4-month cycle; no one left the premises until the end of the course. In the specially equipped premises, students lived in cramped quarters; this required strict discipline; everyone had to talk softly and had to keep away from windows.

Despite these enormous difficulties, the school continued operating in the same locale for more than 4 years; more than 200 cadres graduated from it and its existence was never revealed; there was not the slightest carelessness or indiscretion.

We must also mention the Tumbasieta School which operated near Mayari, the center of the 2d Eastern Front "Frank Pais," founded by Major Raul Castro during the national liberation war. The Tumbasieta School was the forerunner

¹ This was during the years 1954-1959 [committee footnote].

of the ideological training effort in the schools for the comrades who were fighting in the mountains.

Long before the armed struggle against Batista was started, Fidel and Raul and their comrades, jailed for the Moncada incident, were studying the history of Cuba and the classical books of Marxism which were smuggled into the prison on Isla de Pinos [Island].

We also had various kinds of provincial schools. Also, many study circles were organized, including circles for supervised individual study.

Origin of Schools of Revolutionary Education

The system of Schools of Revolutionary Education was launched on 2 December 1960 at the meeting of the directors and assistant directors, who had been appointed for the first 12 provincial schools and the National Schools, as well as leaders of the 26 July Movement and of the Popular Socialist Party; this meeting was chaired by Fidel Castro.

The schools received instant and warm welcomes from the revolutionary administrations. However, their adequate implementation ran into two major obstacles:

- the shortage of cadres with sufficient Marxist-Leninist theoretical training, for assignment as teachers;

- the vice of practicicism, that is, the tendency toward exclusively practical work, relegating study and theory to a secondary position.

These are the obstacles the schools faced in their activities.

The schools did well in this effort and we can say that we have made great strides here.

We improved the theoretical training of thousands of cadres and activists and we now have outstanding cadres as teachers.

We have made our modest contribution to the creation of a study-fever, the fever to study the science of Marxism-Leninism, which today fires the spirit of the cadres and activists of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations—and the heat from that fire is now reaching the working people.

Of course, when the EIR (Escuelas de Instrucción Revolucionaria—Schools of Revolutionary Education) were set up, the ORI (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas—Integrated Revolutionary Organizations) did not exist as yet. This created additional obstacles in the effort of making an adequate student selection.

Besides, the system of the EIR had to concern itself with the changes required in view of the direct threats of invasion from the US in December 1960 and January 1961; the EIR had to mobilize in order to crush the counterrevolutionaries in the Escambray Mountains in February and March 1961; they had to beat back the invasion of imperialist mercenaries via Zapata Swamp on 17 April 1961; in a word, the EIR system had to help meet all the urgent needs of the Revolution.

Following a firm policy, our National Directorate successfully defended its viewpoint that classes should not be suspended on account of all this.

The official proclamation of the Socialist character of the Revolution on 16 April, on the eve of the Zapata Swamp invasion, prepared the way for the interpretation of the Revolution and for the outlining of its prospects; this is a problem of prime importance to the teaching effort in our schools.

The subsequent integration of the revolutionary movement into the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations and their affirmation that Marxism-Leninism is the ideology of the Revolution served to eliminate difficulties that had existed at the outset.

The EIR were the first officially integrated organizations of the Revolution and played an equal role in the subsequent integration.

What Is the System of Schools of Revolutionary Education?

The national system of Schools of Revolutionary Education is a school system that is relatively uniform at its various levels and that is under a National Directorate, called the National Directorate of the ORI.

In its work, the National Directorate of EIR works in close cooperation with the ORI in the provinces, on whose education and propaganda commissions it rests. The provincial officials of the EIR are the provincial leaders of the ORI.

The schools in the provinces function as study centers for the ORI.

However, overall school policy and internal regulations as well as the budget are handled by the National Directorate which works on the basis of operational experience gathered throughout the country.

The fiscal autonomy of the National Directorate enables the latter to operate with a great degree of flexibility. In addition, it can pay our all expenses for directors, teachers, officials, subordinate personnel, equipment, transportation, books, etc.; through the EIR it can also handle directly the payment of wages and salaries to students during the time they spend away from their places of work in order to attend parttime or fulltime classes.

The fulltime students can devote their time to their studies without any other preoccupation or distraction and they may continue in school only so long as they make progress in their studies.

The "Nico Lopez" National School and other national schools are directly under the National Directorate of EIR.

The EIR instruct the cadres and activists which perform their functions both in the ORI proper and in the social or mass organizations or in the government agencies.

The Teaching of Marxism-Leninism

As of now, these schools are the principal and most effective means the Revolution has for the study of Marxism-Leninism.

The fundamentals of dialectical and historical materialism and of Marxist economic theory are being studied there at various levels.

We said 'fundamentals' because Cuba has not yet arrived at a stage where it could make a scholarly, profound, and extended study of the complex science of Marxism-Leninism; this is a phase which we have set as our goal, beginning within a period of 2-3 years, with the help of the establishment of a Higher Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

For the moment, we are counting on the fraternal help of the other Socialist countries in training our higher-level cadres, our scholars of theory, who will train the instructional and research cadres at this institute and its various branches.

The schools must offer theoretical instruction, though the latter must be intimately linked with events in Cuba and the world; they must at the same time offer instruction in methods of practical leadership.

The schools must constantly incorporate the live materials and documents that reflect our development in their curricula.

For example, the draft of the CPSU program was included in the lesson plan as discussion material. The following items were similarly included: the speech of Fidel Castro on 26 July; the articles by Raul Castro on the subject of 26 July 1953 and by Blas Roca on the new ethics of the working class and the aid this class is giving to the Revolution; the documents on the progress of the economy, etc. The students also discuss the daily press in class. The magazines *Cuba Socialista* and *La Revista Internacional* (International Magazine) are highly valuable aids in this respect.

Admission to these schools is not subject to passing an entrance examination. The instructors are not the old type of professors, but revolutionary cadres. And nobody but Marxists are graduated.

The schools make men and women more aware that it is their struggle, their daily activities and practices that make them stand out, more than anything else. They do not give the students any pat formulas; they offer them guidance and open new vistas to their graduates.

Though group study in these schools is very important, we think that it cannot replace individual study, which is the most important method of learning what theory is all about.

The revolutionary must become accustomed to studying Marxism-Leninism ceaselessly; the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the books and pamphlets, the articles and theses—these are his study materials.

We salute all those who are making a determined effort to study individually. The PRI must organize assistance for those comrades.

National Schools

The "Nico Lopez" EIR has 60 students and is currently the national cadre school. It is the highest rung on the ladder of our system.

Students attend classes on a boarding-school basis for 6 months and may leave the premises once a week.

The program includes the complete study of the *Manual de Economia Politica* (Political Economy Manual) put out by the Academy of Sciences USSR; this is supplemented by references to *Capital* by Marx, and *Imperialism—Capitalism's Highest and Last Phase* by Lenin, as well as other Marxist classics and modern works.

The students also take up the essential elements of *Fundamentos de la Filosofia Marxista* (Foundations of Marxist Philosophy) published by the Academy of Sciences USSR, along with references to other classical works, especially *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* by Lenin, *On Contradiction* and *About Practice* by Mao Tse-tung, as well as the *Manual of Marxism-Leninism* by O. Kuusinen, and others.

The students furthermore study the Cuban Revolution; revolutionary organizations; the international situation; interpretation of Cuban history; the experiences of the Russian Revolution and of the Chinese Revolution, etc.

The study of economics is closely tied in with the economic history of Cuba and the economic means for the transition to Socialism.

We also set up a National Teachers School (3-month course) and we are in the process of organizing a National Labor Union School (4-month course), a National Fisheries School (60 students), and a National People's Farmer School (600 students every 3 months); all of these schools will have or now do have different levels of instruction.

The Labor Union School, for example, will operate on a provincial level and the fisheries and farmer schools will operate on the base level.

Provincial Schools and Base Schools

The provincial EIR are conceived as boarding schools for provincial, municipal, and regional cadres.

For the moment, they are teaching accelerated 3-month courses offering instruction in program that is generally the same as that of the national school, though less intensive.

As in the national schools, the nerve center of education is political economy here.

This is rooted in an undeniable fact: we are in charge of the country's economy and we are building Socialism. Economic buildup is the decisive factor in the triumph of the new social system.

On the other hand, Marxist philosophy offers general principles of life and struggle; in particular, it offers the concept of the movement, of eternal renewal, and of contradiction as the motive forces for vital processes.

Without a knowledge of the fundamentals of Marxist philosophy, one cannot gain a deep understanding of revolutionary changes.

The history of Cuba reveals the historical roots of our economy and the formative elements of our nationality, as well as the vast struggles of the Cuban people for its liberty.

Right now, the provincial EIR constitute a consolidated system of 16 schools; starting with the third cycle, on 1 September, they will have more than 1,028 students.

The Base Schools of Revolutionary Education are centers intended for the training of the revolutionary cadres at the base.

The EBIR (Escuelas Basicas de Instruccion revolucionaria—Base Schools of Revolutionary Education) are either fulltime (45-day) schools or parttime schools; in the latter case, the students work on their jobs for 4 hours a day and then attended school for 8 hours for a period of 60 days.

The EBIR are set up in big factories, sugar plantations, various industrial centers, people's farms, cooperatives, or in cities and regions. There are worker school, farmer schools, or mixed schools.

The basic program of these schools is constituted by *La historia me absolvera* (History Will Vindicate Me) by Fidel Castro and *Los Fundamentos del Socialismo en Cuba* (The Foundations of Socialism in Cuba) by Blas Roca. The curriculum also includes works on the labor movement, the agrarian revolution, and elements of political economy, as well as political materials from current national and international publications and sources.

The EBIR developed as the result of initiative from the ranks. The workers at the La Rayonera textile factory in Matanzas, in cooperation with the provincial EIR, devised this basic type. At the 3d National Conference of EIR on

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26 April, this project was launched and the program for it was worked out. The first schools opened in Havana and Oriente on 15 May. At the 4th National Conference of EIR from 21-22 July, there were 169 of these basic schools throughout the country.

This shows that this initiative was correct.

Here is the current status of the EBIR system.

	No. of Base Schools	No. of Students
Oriente.....	100	2, 976
Camaguey.....	9	540
Las Villas.....	74	2, 516
Matanzas.....	7	201
Havana.....	63	2, 835
P. del Rio.....	10	387
	263	9, 455

The EBIR are in the process of consolidation; until December 1961, they will be in the phase of planned expansion. The National Directorate of EIR is making a careful study of this new activity.

The situation will look as follows in December, on the basis of plans and budget grants.

	No. of Base Schools	No. of Students
Oriente (see Note).....	84	3, 500
Camaguey.....	10	600
Las Villas.....	110	3, 500
Matanzas.....	15	600
Havana.....	90	3, 500
P. del Rio.....	21	900
	330	12, 600

(Note. In Oriente Province, the current 100 base schools will be combined into 84 schools with greater capacity and better quality; these consolidated schools will be located in the key centers of the province.)

We want to emphasize that we have important EIR which are not directly involved in the activities of the National Directorate, though they are tied in with the latter and are under the political direction of the ORI.

The "Osvaldo Sanchez" EIR of the armed forces has just graduated 750 instructors for battalions and companies in its first training cycle.

The schools of the Association of Young Rebels teach youth cadres.

The Federation of Cuban Women is in the process of creating its own national school for women's leaders.

Similarly, we have economic cadre schools (such as the school for industrial managers) and others of various types which offer instruction on the basis of the same principles as the EIR, in conjunction with their own specialized subject matter.

Academic and Discipline Aspects of the Schools

Our program and our available resources are not enough to implement this objective. We must also take up the subject of the internal disciplinary management of the schools and their activities.

Discipline is a factor that is highly important in political success.

The external forms of discipline—e.g., military training—supplement the cadres' and militants' attitudes which are rooted in political awareness.

For the students, the decisions of the director or the executive board constitute orders to be obeyed. This does not imply a lack of democracy, since it is the students who elect their own student representatives who, in cooperation with the director and the assistant director, make up the executive board.

Class schedules and lesson plans play a major role in these schools; these schedules and plans must be followed without change once they have been approved.

The school must endeavor to stimulate Socialist conduct. It must inculcate in the student a spirit of responsibility for the collective, a spirit of concern for his comrades, a spirit of help for his slow comrades, etc.

In this respect (in addition to serious pedagogical reasons), we have a combination of formal individual study, which is the principal method, plus group study, which is handled in groups of 8-12 students in a rational and well programmed manner.

Group study serves to help the slow students and makes for group spirit.

In some schools, we have to fight hard against the lack of understanding on the part of some directors who fail to see the pedagogical advantages and moral aspects of group study.

General meetings and assemblies are called periodically or whenever a problem arises; this is a means for developing criticism and self-criticism and this in turn makes out of each school a living cell of the Revolution. Quite a few people learn in this manner the meaning of these principles of revival in Socialist thought and action.

Volunteer work inside and outside the school (on days of rest) tests the real qualities of the student. With the help of the students, schools tackle repair jobs, plant crops, take care of children in nurseries, and build. Some students fan out to the factories, people's farms, and cooperatives to volunteer their manual labor for Socialism.

Much attention is being devoted to Socialist emulation in each school and to competition between schools. In this competition, schools are graded on such points as academic class levels, qualifications, educational and practical activities, savings, cleanliness, number of graduates, fulfillment of class schedules, etc.

We must emphasize once again that the students must realize what a tremendous effort the Revolution is making in keeping so many thousands of cadres and militants out of the production process and assigning more than 500 valuable cadres to revolutionary instruction.

This effort must be repaid through the powerful and effective work of comrades who are graduated from these schools and take their place in the production effort and in political action.

Selection of Students

This is a problem of major importance.

We said often that the students must be selected from among revolutionary cadres and activists, i.e., from among those who distinguished themselves in the struggle. Of those, we now have tens of thousands and we are getting more every day.

This applies of course to selection for all types of schools we mentioned.

It is a sad error to think that a school of theory is going to "hatch" activists and cadres. This may happen in isolated cases, but it is not the rule.

We must say that, during the first cycle, a considerable proportion of students should not have been picked in the first place; but we are correcting this mistake.

Sometimes, we were able to observe that some regions and provinces did not send the best cadres with the most experience to these schools. There are two general reasons for this:

the particular cadres "cannot" be spared from their duties;

fear that the National Directorate might pick these men after graduation for assignment to different duties, thus preventing them from returning to their original duties.

This reasoning is false. The more responsibility the cadres have, the more they need to go to school. As for the transfer of cadres from one duty to another, from provincial to national duty slots, that is something that may happen in view of the great nationwide needs of the ORI and of the government for trained cadres. But to oppose this, to look out only for one's own bailiwick indicates rigidity and reveals a localist spirit among certain comrades. Everybody must understand that the Revolution is a compact whole; there is no such thing as a series of "local revolutions."

The selection process itself is a yardstick for the school and for the selection officials.

Sometimes, women are automatically barred from consideration. This happened, for instance, during the first provincial courses in the Province of Las Villas and during the second provincial course in Matanzas.

This constitutes a concession to old prejudices and, though this is not a general phenomenon, it does crop up in other places.

The failure to select women as students is an injustice and a bad mistake. The women are fighting on all fronts of the Revolution, including that front which is the toughest for them: /national/ defense. Why, then, this concession to prejudice?

The Problem of the Faculty and the Directors

The creation of a teaching body and of directors and assistant directors has been and is one of the most complicated problems we are facing in these schools.

To run classes in theory in a political cadre school, we must have teachers who not only know their textbooks but who have also been or are revolutionary cadres. This is the key point here.

In the first school cycle, the schools were run with the help of teachers drawn from the revolutionary organizations which, without cutting back on their daily work, made tremendous efforts to teach in these schools for a certain period of time each day or for a certain continued period of instruction.

The increase in the complex and urgent tasks of the Revolution as well as the rapid growth in the revolutionary schools themselves confronted us with the need for pulling out dedicated cadres and assigning them exclusively to teaching duties.

It is interesting to note that some good cadres with practical revolutionary experience but little or no prior education, were able to assimilate their Marxist texts so rapidly that they could be assigned as directors and assistant directors of provincial schools and as directors and teachers of Base Schools.

Many people are surprised that the majority of the directors and assistant directors of these schools are so young in years and that their experience in Marxist militancy is of such recent origin. We know that it takes years to master Marxist theory adequately. However, the extremely rapid advance of the Revolution and the need for cadres who are dedicated to the effort of teaching do not allow us to make any compromises here; this is indeed the only solution to our great cadre problem.

We believe that these young cadres are doing their duty with dignity and skill and that, as time goes on, they will improve their knowledge more and more.

These cadres have everything it takes to advance: intelligence, willpower, the necessary books, adequate subsistence, the vigor and courage of the Socialist Revolution and, above all, a nucleus of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries who guide and aid them.

Practical experience teaches us that this bold method of promoting cadres is correct.

We are making a major effort to group teachers, directors, and assistant directors in study circles where they can round out their knowledge.

As far as the directors and assistant directors are concerned, we have learned some interesting lessons. The director—and, in his absence, the assistant director—is the top-ranking officer of the school.

This is why we must select our directors very carefully.

Experience has shown that the director must meet the following essential requirements:

capacity for leadership, flexibility, and pleasant disposition;

knowledge of all subjects taught at the school and inclination toward study.

The director's qualities are directly reflected in the school as a whole; we must not forget that he lives together with the 60 students of his school.

The daily life of the school at times reveals difficulties arising out of subjective or objective factors.

A situation in which 60 students with differing personalities, though united by a common ideal, live closely together, is almost bound to produce occasional friction and misunderstandings. But this is no cause for despair. These incidents are opportunities for Socialist education through the exercise of criticism and self-criticism.

Directors who do not underestimate the "details" of education and daily life—such as the quality of the menu, hygiene, comportment, care of the library and of books; strict compliance with schedules, beautification and care of premises, etc.—contribute not only to the maintenance of order in the school but also contribute to the education of the comrades.

The ORI and Their Relations to the Schools

Until now, some organizations of the ORI have failed to give due consideration and attention to the provincial schools. The ORI have fallen down chiefly in the respective education and propaganda commissions.

This lack of attention is negative. We do not mean to say that the leaders of the ORI are permanent teachers, but we do believe that they should at least help present the summaries at the end of each of the most important class cycles and direct conferences and maintain lively exchange of ideas with the students at the cadre schools.

If we assume that the ORI should merely select graduates for placement in specific job slots, how could they accomplish this without close liaison with the school, without knowing all about the cadres?

Conclusions

The EIR are in full development. Some things remain to be corrected, modified, and improved within the EIR.

From the 1st National Conference, held in December 1960, to the 4th, on 21–22 July 1961, a period of about 8 months, we can register a tremendous advance in the creation of schools and in the expansion of theoretical studies.

Some 1,175 students have taken courses in the provincial schools and more than 4,000 attended the Base Schools.

The practical effect from the assignment of graduates of these schools have already made themselves felt in the work of the ORI. The results are encouraging. According to the opinions of the provincial ORI and the organization where these graduates were placed, we can say that elementary, intermediate, and higher theoretical studies have been converted into material strength.

The revolutionary enthusiasm of the students is indescribable. Each theoretical lesson acts as stimulus for their behavior and conduct. We can now see graduates of these students in many positions of responsibility. We find them in the leadership organs of the ORI, in factory managements, in farm and cooperative managements. One hundred of them are now active in the field of education and we have 100 additional directors of schools who emerged from the EIR. We also meet them in the government agencies, in the militia, and in the Rebel Army.

We can find graduates of these schools holding down responsible key jobs almost anywhere. Our front of Socialist revolutionary instruction penetrates everywhere; in production, in defense, in culture.

We have placed major emphasis on these schools. However, we are also involved in other academic initiatives.

In Havana, for instance, we now have a wide network of elementary evening schools, with 2 hours of study per day; here we have more than 7,000 students in 200 schools.

In Havana and Oriente, we have practical schools (2 or 3 weeks), run by ORI, where young cadres learn the functioning of the different sectors of labor.

And thousands of graduates are being assigned to leadership of study circles at various levels.

We cannot even begin to count all the discussion groups. The number of discussion group members has increased by thousands.

The effort of political education is very important. The Revolution requires that this effort be intensified and improved constantly.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. Stuart Morrison of the *Miami Herald*.

Mr. Morrison, we are delighted to have you. We know of your work but, for the record—this record will be printed—and would you please give us your background?

Mr. MORRISON. My personal background, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT OF H. STUART MORRISON

MR. MORRISON. Yes, sir, I have no prepared statement; I will speak for the record, but off the cuff.

Personal background is as follows: I am 38 years old, have been employed by the *Miami Herald* for the past 17 years. Initially I was a printer in the composing room and during the next 10 years of my employment worked in all phases of the mechanical and production areas of the newspaper. Since that time I have been exposed to all other areas of production and management.

I was appointed director of the Operation Amigo program in 1961 at the time of its birth.

I have four children, served in the United State Navy during World War II, attended the University of Miami at night.

Present position would be national director for Operation Amigo for the Knight, Copley, and Scripps-Howard newspapers.

Operation Amigo is a nonprofit organization established under the proper Florida statutes.

I would like to make it clear that I don't pretend to be an expert in anything other than the director of Operation Amigo.

The first time that I set foot in Latin America was approximately 3 years ago. I know how the people feel and react. I think I know their individual desires and understand what the public can do, both in the United States and in Latin America, if given the opportunity to expand their vision.

I am here to testify for the Freedom Academy bills, because in concept, as I understand it, they go into the area of research and development, of the private sector, as opposed to strictly a branch of the Government.

I think, first, we will start with Operation Amigo, and it would fall into three categories—the how, the why, and the results of it.

The previous witness testified to the actions that the Communist bloc nations are exerting in Central and South America. Amigo relates only to Central and South America. For years, especially since the war, the Communists in Latin America have had an accelerated program of indoctrination, chiefly at the youth in this hemisphere; and it was the editors of the *Miami Herald* who thought that we have not set up a defense against this, nor launched an effective counterattack against this movement.

If we in the United States believe in our way of life, then why shouldn't someone get up and fight for it?

The Communist bloc nations spend millions of dollars in Central and South America, sending propaganda to the high schools and the universities, paying professional scholars at the university level, professional students, just waiting to prey on the young students coming up from the high school level.

They are transporting, as the other witness said, students to Communist bloc nations and sending them back into Central and South America as fully fledged diplomats.

We in America, or the United States, have left the difficult art of diplomacy solely to the Government. It is a very difficult task, and we as individuals in the United States have failed in promoting ourselves as the individual diplomat.

The Communist countries have, under the significance of political warfare as opposed to hot warfare, some 40 years ago; and they are beating us, and they are beating us badly. They are unorthodox; they are effective. They are in the unions; they are in the schools; they are in the professional staffs of the universities; they are everywhere that you can conceivably think they would be.

Operation Amigo is completely subsidized through private enterprise. We thought that if we brought some of these future leaders of the Latin American countries to the United States to give them a firsthand look at the way we operate, at what makes our system tick, at our tax structure, without any whitewash at all—we attempt to show them the good and the bad—then these future leaders could go back to their local high schools and communities and tell them the truth. Jose Gonzales, who has been selected to come to the States, has seen for himself; they are going to believe Jose Gonzales and not Communist propaganda.

Operation Amigo was initiated by the *Miami Herald* 21½ years ago, and we now have the support of the Copley newspapers and the Scripps-Howard newspapers.

Operation Amigo was a giant at its start, actually. We intended to bring 40 students up in the first group, let them live with our own high school students, and send them back. In the first 3 months, we brought some eight groups up, about 300 students.

Then we said, "Well, if it works in Miami, why can't it work upstate, somewhere around Cocoa, Cape Canaveral area?"

And we sent the first group of students up to Cocoa High School—that was completely out of our jurisdiction—to see if it would work; and it did.

THE CHAIRMAN. You mean students from—

MR. MORRISON. From one of the countries in Central and South America. One of these groups of students; yes, sir.

The next year, Mr. Knight offered it to other jurisdictions, and we now find that we have sent students to Fort Worth; Houston; to Denver; to San Diego, to Santa Rosa, California; Charlotte, North Carolina; Flint, Michigan; Louisville, Kentucky; Akron, Ohio—18 States.

It has a twofold purpose.

MR. POOL. Let me interrupt right there, please, sir.

MR. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

MR. POOL. You mentioned before Houston. They are in my district.

MR. MORRISON. Sir, these boots I'm wearing are from Fort Worth, by the way.

MR. POOL. Where did you send them in Texas?

MR. MORRISON. The *Fort Worth Press*, a Scripps-Howard newspaper, with Delbert Willis, took them at the Fort Worth High School, and I frankly don't know the name of the high school; and in Houston, Texas, they went to Bel Air High School, and I believe the other high school was Lamar. What is it? Lamar? I may or may not be correct there.

MR. POOL. Do you know how many went there?

MR. MORRISON. Yes, sir; approximately 120 students have gone to the State of Texas already.

MR. POOL. Thank you.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

I will show you the clippings from the newspapers.

It has a twofold purpose. We tell our students, "Why can't you get out and do something for your country?" Well, what can they do? They can buy war bonds; they can join the Navy, as I so foolishly did 20 years ago. But, that's not the extent of it, but the Amigo program gives each and every student in the United States who participates an opportunity to appoint himself as an individual diplomat.

Now, the exposure of this doesn't only deal with the student who is involved in taking a Latin American into his home. It involves the entire school, entire school jurisdictions. It involves an entire city and entire States.

The student that is selected from Latin America is selected in this fashion, much like the Communists select their students. We go to a Latin American city and we explain the program to the principals of all the public high schools. This is where the core of the cancer lies, in the public schools, the lower income family groups. And we ask them to submit, based upon proven academic ability, those students who have excelled themselves with a fine scholastic record over the last 2 or 3 years.

We then set up a committee for the selection of the students. This committee would consist of one or two newspaper people, Rotarians, civic leaders, and an educational man, and then these students would come before this committee—and possibly at times we have had as many as 700 students apply for 30 scholarships—and, based upon questions that we ask these students, they are selected to come to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, may I ask you to clarify something for me?

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This screening process you explained—where maybe you have 700 applicants, from which you would choose 30—is it done in Central America?

Mr. MORRISON. Oh, yes, sir; in the city.

The CHAIRMAN. These leaders you are talking about are leaders there?

Mr. MORRISON. Correct; they are nationals. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And the newspaper?

Mr. MORRISON. They are national newspaper people; correct.

Mr. ICHORD. Are you confining it to students coming from lower economic levels?

Mr. MORRISON. We bring 85 percent from the public schools, 15 percent from the private schools.

Mr. ICHORD. Are you looking into their social and economic background, though, before you accept them in the program?

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir. In each and every group, we get four or five students whom you could not call Communists, but I could say that they have a tendency to lean that way. These are the students who would be most acceptable to the offers made by the university-level professional students.

They come to the United States, and we put them in school for a period of only 2 weeks. They attend classes with the local high school students, and on 4 of the 10 days, we take them out on tours to our

governmental establishments, to our Federal Housing developments, slum areas, city commission meetings, in an attempt to answer any questions that they might have had in their mind—or that they might have had put there—honestly and frankly and justly.

We send them back to the Latin American city, and this is a story again in itself that I will tell you a little later.

There is a tremendous amount of cost involved in this program, and not 1 cent has come from the Federal Government, and 50 percent of the funds that go into this program come from Latin nations. This was not true the first year, but we made them believe that we are trying to help them in their own fight against communism.

The Operation Amigo program does not stop once they go back to their own country. This is not a 2-week vacation, and what I am about to tell you is not very well known here, but I can tell you this: that the Operation Amigo program in many areas of South America has more impact than Alianza Para Progreso¹ or the Peace Corps combined. I am not attacking either one of those areas. The Peace Corps is fine. The Peace Corps has one fallacy that I know of. The hot political areas of the universities and the unions are not, to my knowledge, infiltrated by Peace Corps members. This is where your trouble is. But you take a Latin American student who has been trained in the United States, and you send him back into this area, and you have got an effective worker for our side.

Let's speak about the Operation Amigo clubs. When the students return to their own country, we don't let them sit idle. We have established Operation Amigo clubs in 14 countries. We have approximately 4,000 students. These are Latin students in Operation Amigo clubs in Central and South America.

This magazine is published in Cali, Colombia, published by Latin students, not gringos going down there showing them how to do it. Supported by private industry. This explains the program of Alianza Para Progreso.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Private industry in the Latin American country or in the United States?

Mr. MORRISON. Private industry in Latin America.

Now, let me clarify that just a minute. We have Goodyear down there and we have IBM and we have Goodrich. We don't believe that the funds for this program should come from Goodyear, U.S., and their Goodyear branch in Venezuela, for instance. The funds for the program come from Latin American industry in Central and South America.

We have 4,000 students in the clubs, in 14 to 16 countries. Now these are—in Peru alone we have 600 students, in eight of the major cities. These students hold meetings regularly; they have typing classes, political science classes; they work in the slums. The first time in the history of Peru where you get Peruvians working for Peru in the slums, not gringos going down there with dollars.

They have their own clubhouse. In many areas, we do not work with U.S. Cultural Affairs Officers in Central and South America, but with—for example—the Colombo-American school. It is divorced from the U.S. State Department. In Peru, we continued with

¹ Alliance for Progress.

our operation although at that time the United States had broken relations with Peru. We took students out of Guatemala when our own State Department told me to get out, don't take students, it would be sure death for me.

There is a tremendous potential for the training of the private individuals, lawyers, doctors, cabinetmakers, newspaper people. Incidentally, we started to bring up only school teachers as chaperones, but now we have made it a policy to bring up newspaper reporters, who maybe before were not too friendly toward the United States.

I want to show you, very briefly—and I certainly don't want to take up any more of your time—the complete acceptability of this program in Latin America, because it is aside from the U.S. Government [flipping pages of large scrapbook containing newspaper and other items]. Front page, *Novedades*; front page, Lima newspaper; front page, Tegucigalpa newspaper.

An interesting letter from Tom Mann. This is a little city outside of Bogotá, called Niacombi, where about 5,000 students paraded by that day, just to be selected.

This is interesting. This is an impact to—it is an editorial written in the *LaPrensa Grafica*, and it says:

Operation Amigo is now coming to Salvador as the rest of Latin America, and from this newspaper's viewpoint, there will be more fruits and benefits derived from Operation Amigo than the now famous and already started Alianza Para Progreso.

I have this editorial translated in English. I would like to submit it as a document.

The CHAIRMAN. You want to insert that at this point?

Mr. MORRISON. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want it inserted?

Mr. MORRISON. No, sir. These are some of the first Operation Amigo letterheads that were printed by the students in some of the countries. Nicaragua, Peru, Colombia.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Let me interrupt you at this point. As I understand it, it is a 2-week period that these students are in the United States.

Mr. MORRISON. Two to three weeks; yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. How do you overcome the language barrier problem?

Mr. MORRISON. I don't think there is much of a language barrier, sir. There is a people barrier.

I don't mean to evade the question. We find that approximately 40 percent of all Latin American students will be able to speak some English. Approximately 80 percent will be able to understand it. We do have Spanish-English dictionaries, simple phrases, that we issue to each student. Usually, you will have one or two students in the group that can act as translators.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Chairman, at this point, may I make a request that Mr. Morrison be permitted to submit to the committee, subject to the review of the committee, whatever documents he desires in support of this presentation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, following his statement.

Mr. MORRISON. Mr. Pool, are you from Texas?

Mr. POOL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRISON [still flipping scrapbook pages]. These items are from Houston. This is all Houston.

Mr. POOL. May I interrupt here? Do you have this going in Panama and Venezuela?

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir—excuse me. We have not had it in Panama. We have not had it in Chile, so far, and of course the three Guianas. It is merely because we have not had time to get around to it. We will take students from Panama this year; yes, sir. We have taken about 160 students from Venezuela.

Mr. POOL. During the crisis we had several weeks ago in Panama, did you have any students that had gone back to Panama?

Mr. MORRISON. I say we had not. Panama has not been included.

Mr. POOL. I see. It would have been quite interesting to have had a report on their activities during that crisis, if we had had them down there.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

I would like to—would you read this? This is an editorial printed in the *Occidente*, and it pretty well reflects the feeling of the newspaper and the Latin public that have been exposed to the Operation Amigo, and remember that this is printed in Colombia, please, sir.

Mr. McNAMARA [reading]. Operation Amigo, a Bulwark.

One of the fundamental aspects of good relationships among the inhabitants of the world is people-to-people contact: a friendly interest in others and the feeling of solidarity and mutual esteem that such relationships propagate.

An extraordinary cultural exchange has been taking place recently between the students of Latin America and the United States. This kind of socializing undoubtedly will have widespread influence on the future generations of all our countries.

One of the most important of these programs is the so-called Operation Amigo, which was initiated by the newspaper, the *Miami Herald*, and which today has the support and collaboration of 28 Scripps-Howard and Copley newspapers. In the development of their plans, numbers of Colombian students have visited the United States and hundreds of North American youngsters have come down to learn by direct experience about life as it is lived in Latin America.

Recently, Mr. H. Stuart Morrison, general coordinator for Latin America, returned to Cali where Operation Amigo has already found a generous and enthusiastic welcome, to organize another Colombian-American student exchange.

This strengthening of ideological and cultural ties among nations defending the same principles and belonging to the same system of free democracies is of incalculable value to us all. A brand new force thus appears on the continent to guard against the Castro-Communist avalanche trying to destroy the bonds that have been our hope for the future in our struggle for progress.

To these young students—already so well versed in objective knowledge—will fall the job of carrying on the preaching and the teaching of whatever we learn from those who join with us in the defense of the ideal of social reform in this continent.

The accomplishments of the Peace Corps, of the People-to-People campaign, of Operation Amigo and others, are the solid bulwarks on which the friendship of the nations of America rests. We need them today more than ever before as we confront the dangers that threaten the free world.

Mr. MORRISON. Mr. Pool, you asked about Venezuela. I was in Venezuela shortly before the election. We took students as far south as Puerto Ordaz, which is on the Orinoco River in the eastern part of Venezuela, Barcelona, Santa Thomas, every nook and cranny of eastern Venezuela; and the bombings that you heard about were not performed by adults. They were 16-, 17-, 18-year-old kids working in Commie cell blocs who went out and bombed the oil lines and bombed this and machinegunned trains, and then they retreat back into the universities, where they have a certain amount of immunity.

It was open season on Yankees in Venezuela. There is no question about that. But the Venezuelan people certainly are to be congratulated for going out in force and voting during that election.

It is these kids that need our help, and they were just crying for leadership, just crying for it. Won't somebody stand up and fight?

I don't know the particulars about legislation, but I do know that through private enterprise we had a theory that was reduced to practical application, without a lot of red tape, and we know it works. We are not going to stop here. I have in the other brief case a proposal to expand Operation Amigo. Right now we are working with me and a secretary. That's our staff. I expect that next year we will be able to bring up 2,000 students, with the unlimited resources that the United States has, and the unlimited cooperation that you can get in Central and South America—because we are one people in one hemisphere with a common tie; there is no doubt in my mind that news of the Freedom Academy bill will certainly help hold this hemisphere together like it should be.

I will answer any questions that I am capable of answering at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have two or three.

In 1960, or thereabouts—

Mr. MORRISON. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. In 1960 or thereabouts, the AFL-CIO created the American Institute for Free Labor Development with their own funds, with headquarters in Washington, and apparently, according to my understanding of its functions, this institute is doing the identical work that you are doing—in the labor world, I am talking about—namely, bringing labor leaders here from Latin America, teaching them free, democratic unionism and Communist strategy and tactics, and thereupon the graduates go back and, as I understand, have done a magnificent job in preventing the takeover of the unions by the Communists, and perhaps recapturing some that were seized.

Anyway, we see the parallel, and apparently the few experiments that have come to our observation are working.

Now, we have heard that the Academy concept would be better handled through these private concepts, private undertakings; then, on the other hand, we hear from the State Department that it should be left alone; and then we have heard from mighty knowledgeable people that there must be some central source, some uniform research, and studies that would be available to those engaged, such as you are, in this effort, without displacing you in any way, and it would be available also to foreign nationals, not only from Latin America but elsewhere, leaders in the labor world and business world and the management world, and so on.

Now, I wish you would address yourself to how the Academy would be useful in the areas I have described, and whether the idea of this establishment should be left alone or should be left to private enterprise or private efforts. I wish you would comment on that.

Mr. MORRISON. Well, if I understand your question, I think that the Freedom Academy should be set up separate from the State Department. What I am about to say may not be popular, but I am going to say it anyhow. There are many good people in the State Department in Central and South America, but there are many people

in the State Department who are reluctant to make a decision. I know from my own experience that, in some countries, if a person who is attached to the Embassy dares to mix with the nationals, he would be set aside by the official American colony, and this is what the people in Central and South America resent. I think that if the Freedom Academy or any institution was set up under the State Department, it would lose its effectiveness in Latin America.

Does this answer your question?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, yes, partly; but then, do you see the necessity for it?

Mr. MORRISON. For a central office? Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As distinguished from universities, and that area.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir. And again I say, I don't know the ramifications of these bills or the differences in them. I know the basic differences. Yes, there should be some central office where information could be obtained, where training and research of specific problems in a trouble area could be examined. Yes, I do; and I think that the Latin student or the Latin professional, once you establish that this office only attempts to tell the truth about the two systems or our way of life, aside from party-line policy—if this is the correct terminology—that once you establish that, then it becomes effective. And this is only based upon my experience with Operation Amigo, because when I first went to Central and South America, they thought I was an arm of the U.S. Government; they did not believe me. They thought I was another Yankee coming down there to trick them, but we have proved our point, and now they say, "Welcome home, Mr. Morrison."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, the State of Louisiana, the Legislature of Louisiana, passed a bill making it compulsory to teach a course in Democracy versus Communism. Those may not be the words, but that's about it.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that same concept has taken root in other States. In your own State of Florida.

Mr. MORRISON. Florida, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And a high school teacher testified before us, and he made it easy for me, because he said, rather than having me say, that the trouble with these courses is that there is so little known by the run-of-the-mill high school teacher as to what to teach and how to go about it, that most of the time—and that coincides with my experience—the teachers from the whole State of Louisiana, particularly from my congressional district, because I happen to be chairman of this committee, the type of information they want is a short-range, do-it-day-before-yesterday type, such as "How many Communists are there in my town, and how do we get rid of them?"

Mr. MORRISON. You don't go about it that way; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I know, but that is what convinces me or leads me to the conviction that you and the high school teacher are right; that we need some central, reliable agency that will tell the truth and make an objective judgment of what's going on.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir; that is absolutely right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how to set it up—we have not reached that yet?

Mr. MORRISON. That's your business, but what we need is that agency. The people in Latin America, as I say again, are crying for this information. I have had people say, "Well, I have written to the Cultural Affairs Officer of this Embassy. He has not gotten any action." There is evidently no central information office, and the Communists are out working day and night. This is a 24-hour job with them.

Mr. BRUCE. May I interrupt?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRUCE. I have been acquainted with what your newspapers are doing. They are doing a tremendous job.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, so have we all.

Mr. BRUCE. We have watched with great interest. Why can't the publisher's association, nationally, the newspapers, who have so much at stake, as we all do, take a cue from what you have done on your Amigo program and, on their own, establish a Freedom Academy? I am concerned. I am concerned about—frankly, I am an ex-newsman.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRUCE. And I am concerned about the lack of knowledge in the news media of the full nature of the Communist movement. I suggested to a publisher not too long ago that they could set up, working together in the newspaper alliance, whatever it is, a school, so that the men in the working press can have more than just the surface impression of a struggle between the Communist empire and the Western World, because it is much deeper than that, but nothing has happened.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir. We have—of course, I can't speak for John S. Knight nor Mr. Copley nor Charley Scripps nor Jack Howard. This would be an excellent idea, of course. I think that the newspaper industry is finally—well, let me not say "finally"—is awakening to this point and, in their own way, are trying to spread the gospel to some of our Midwestern States that sort of don't even know Cuba is down there. You know, we are 90 miles away from Communist Cuba in Florida.

Mr. BRUCE. Well, I want to amend your statement. I think the Midwestern States are quite alert to that.

Mr. MORRISON. Okay, fine.

In the *Miami Herald*, as well as other newspaper offices, they are holding seminars pertaining to the newspaper industry periodically, sir, and are attempting to get into this area.

Now, about as far as establishing a school, I can't answer that.

Mr. BRUCE. But would not this give much more freedom to the Freedom Academy if it were set up under private sponsorship with all the conflict that inevitably is going to come between the executive branch and the Freedom Academy? I just don't see how you can do this without having this impasse reached when they begin to hit pay dirt in the Freedom Academy.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes.

Mr. BRUCE. They begin to upset the status quo, then the pressures come back on, and it is an embarrassment. I just don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. May we go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, Mr. Christopher Emmet will appear. Mr. Emmet, we are glad to have you with us. And for the record, I wish you would give a thumbnail description of your background and your occupation and education, and then proceed.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER EMMET

Mr. EMMET. Well, I am very happy and honored to be allowed to give my support to the Freedom Academy bill. I have been aware and active in some way in connection with the Communist problem most of my life.

I personally first observed the diabolical treacherous nature of the Communist movement when I was a student in Germany. I saw that the Communists directed their campaign against Democrats and indirectly, and in some cases directly, helped the Nazis against the German Republic. There were certain strikes which they made in common. There were key elections where the Communists threw their votes to the same candidates as the Nazis, in their common hatred of democracy. And, of course, they hoped that the Nazis would be a passing phase.

I perhaps should have said that I am a free-lance writer, I have written on politics in many publications. I have a radio program in New York which I have been moderator of for the last 25 years, the Foreign Affairs Round Table. I have been correspondent for a German weekly newspaper in New York and I have been active in many organizations.

During the thirties, because of my experience with the Nazis in Germany and my fear that Hitler would surely go into the aggression which he did, I was active in the anti-Nazi movement. I founded one of the boycott committees, a committee called the Volunteer Christian Committee to boycott Nazi Germany, and we cooperated with Jewish boycott organizations and with the American Federation of Labor, which had a labor boycott against Nazi goods because of their oppression of the labor unions.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that during the regime of AFL President William Green?

Mr. EMMET. Yes. I then had a personal experience with Communist treachery. When the Hitler-Stalin Pact was formed, there were many anti-Nazi organizations which cooperated loosely. My committee never cooperated with any Communist committee, but secretly, there were Communists in some of the anti-Nazi committees with whom we did cooperate in connection with the boycott and in our exposures of Nazi propaganda. When the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed, immediately some of these organizations were paralyzed by key Communist personnel who had been infiltrated. There was one very big committee that was headed by the late Senator Lehman, Walter Damrosch, and other wonderful names. I think it was called the Council Against Nazi Aggression. It had large funds and was very active.

When the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed, that committee was paralyzed. They never issued another statement—and, of course, the war started right after the pact was signed. Some of the people who had been most active, most effective, most militant in the anti-Nazi organizations, and some that I personally worked with in the secretariat level, turned out to have been Communists, because they turned against

us overnight and began screaming about British colonialism in India: "Do you want us to get into a war to help enslave the Indian people?" You see, all of a sudden, from having been talking about nothing but Nazi atrocities, there was a reversal, just like that.

So although before the war I was mainly engaged in exposing the danger of Nazi and Japanese aggression, I was conscious of the Communist danger. Therefore, during the war, I headed an informal opposition to the Communist agitation for a second front. If you remember, the Communists during the war were screaming for a second front, demanding that the U.S. and Britain make a premature landing in France to take the heat off Russians, even though the American Armies and the British Armies might have been destroyed. Thus, the Communists risked a Nazi victory just to take the heat off Russia a little earlier. Stalin even attacked the British for failure to invade Europe in October 1941, which was only a few months after the fall of France. He demanded that the British invade with their wretched little army.

Then in 1943 Stalin attacked the U.S. when we invaded North Africa instead of the Continent. The Communists sucked in people like Wendell Willkie to enter this agitation, many well-meaning citizens, who said, "The brass hats, the America generals, don't want to risk their troops, so they are delaying the second front," and "the Russians are dying for us." It was an elaborate Communist operation. Well, I had my radio program and I was permitted by the station, WEVD, to combat this agitation, and I wrote letters to papers and got up a joint statement, and so on.

Then after the war, I founded the Committee Against Mass Expulsions, which attempted to publicize the mass deportations by the Communists of German-speaking people, regardless of whether they were Nazi or anti-Nazi, when they came into Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. There were large German-speaking minorities in those countries, mostly solid citizens, small businessmen, shopkeepers, skilled workers. Their deportation was part of the Communist plan to exacerbate national hatreds between Germans and Slavs and thus help them to communize the Slavs because of fear of the Germans. They also hoped that the mass of refugees would help communize Germany. So when the Russian Armies occupied all of those countries of Eastern Europe, they encouraged and forced the expulsion of every one of these German-speaking citizens. The total amounted to somewhere in the neighborhood of 14 million—if you include the German citizens in the eastern part of Germany which was taken over by Poland. There were nearly three million of them expelled from Czechoslovakia, half a million from Hungary and so on.

Because this was a neglected issue, we knew very little about it here; it was hard to get the information from behind the Russian Armies; only the churches, the Quakers, and a few relief organizations could get in, so that we formed this committee to try to publicize that monstrous Soviet crime *which was occurring at the same time as the Nuremberg trials*. While we were trying the Nazi leaders—and in my opinion, rightly so—for some of their crimes, including that of deportation, the Soviet Union was carrying out an even greater deportation than Hitler had even been able to carry out, right at that very moment.

Sidney Hook was one of the members of that committee, a professor of philosophy in New York University, a great American educator, a great American philosopher, and he was the one who inspired me and helped to organize that committee with me. He did not want to be chairman, so I was the chairman of it. Norman Thomas, Dorothy Thompson, the Reverend John Haynes Holmes, and Father John LaFarge were among its members.

Then we began to get news of the forced repatriation of DP's. This had nothing to do with the Germans. The displaced persons were defined as citizens of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union or members of the Jewish minority in Germany, who were deported from their homes and used as slave labor after the Nazi occupation of their homelands. Among them were citizens of the Baltic States—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—whose countries had been annexed by the Soviet Union and enslaved by communism. The Soviets regarded them as Soviet citizens. Other anti-Communists among the DP's who did not want to return were members of minority nationalities in Russia, such as the Ukrainians. But there were also an enormous number of Russians themselves, including soldiers who had been prisoners of the Nazis, who did not want to return.

We will never know how many were forcibly repatriated through one form of pressure or another, but we do know that thousands resisted forcibly and that there were even tragic cases of mass suicide.

Well, we formed a committee called the Refugee's Defense Committee, which General Donovan was the chairman of, and of which David Martin, who is now assistant to Senator Dodd, was the secretary. I was the treasurer of it. We tried to expose these Communist crimes which were occurring and which our Government and the Allied Governments were unconsciously collaborating with, under the momentum of the wartime alliance and agreements with Russia. Naturally the U.S. Army assumed that the Soviet DP's wanted to go home. The UNRRA organization was set up to help these people to go home, and the U.S. Army was instructed to return the prisoners of war who had been captured by the Germans, yet many of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany did not want to go back. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners of war had volunteered to join General Vlasov's army. General Vlasov had been an able Communist general, who had been captured by the Nazis. He asked the Nazis to let him raise volunteers among the Russian prisoners to fight for freedom in Russia, and Hitler originally promised to let him do that. But when Vlasov saw what the Nazis were doing in Russia, the deal was off. He did not collaborate in the Nazi crimes. Nevertheless, he and his followers were forcibly delivered to the Soviets by the U.S. Army for execution under the wartime agreements.

Then the fact that I have worked in the writing and radio fields, gives me a special interest, of course, in the question of propaganda and information. I have been warmly and enthusiastically supporting the Freedom Academy bill since I first heard of it from Mr. Alan Grant about 11 years ago. At that time, after elaborating this plan with his friends in the Orlando group and having gone to Washington with it and having run into delays in Washington, Mr. Grant came to New York. He first wrote to a number of people who were interested in the anti-Communist movement, and among others, Sidney Hook and

Leo Cherne and one other friend of mine, Arthur McDowell of the Upholsterers' Union, who is here today, and many others. We met at that time in New York in an effort to see if we could not carry out this plan on a private basis with the support of foundation money.

Congressman Bruce asked whether it would not be ideal if this Freedom Academy could be set up entirely as a private enterprise. At that time, we attempted to do that and we had the support of some very distinguished citizens, including General Clay, former Governor Dewey, and Henry Luce, of *Time-Life*, but we failed. In my opinion, the difficulties of financing an operation of this sort privately are insuperable, because of the vast area of responsibilities which private financing must take care of.

For that reason, I endorse wholeheartedly the bill introduced by Representative Boggs, and the same bill that Senator Douglas and Senator Mundt have introduced in the Senate. I am convinced that this would be a great step forward in increasing knowledge of communism and effective resistance to communism and, in my opinion, increasing American national unity.

We all know one of the problems which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman—the school principal's question: "How do we teach communism?"—which is based on the enormous complexity of the issue and the impingement of controversial questions, such as how far does communism connect with socialism or with pacifism?

The distinguished Commission of experts and authorities, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate under this bill, would undoubtedly serve to unify and reduce the areas and the confusions about this issue and to satisfy a great deal of ignorant, frustrated, and well-meaning anticommunism expressed by people who can't be expected to know. They see things going wrong, and therefore sometimes they express their anticommunism in unwise, gullible, naive, extreme forms.

Well, now, if there were an active, independent U.S. Government agency under this bill, which was promoting education and training on Communist methods of subversion, obviously the Commission would have to be very careful in its statements on current events. It would have to be unanimous in expressing statements in a controversial area. However, the mere flow of factual information from such a source, the training of people, the collecting of the real experts, of whom there are thousands in this country now on communism, from the Rand Corporation School, the universities, and the War Colleges, would be a great advance.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, assuming there is some sort of a division between the Kremlin and Peiping, that does not erase the necessity for the Academy; or does it?

Mr. EMMET. No, I don't think it does. Which isn't to say that the difference between Moscow and Peiping is not real. In the long run, it is obviously something that we should welcome, but the effect of it now, the initial effect, is simply to make us complacent for the reasons outlined in my prepared statement.

We get the picture that Khrushchev is the milder of the two great Communist leaders, that Mr. Khrushchev is being attacked by Mao Tse-tung because he is too mild. Therefore, Mr. Khrushchev is one of the good guys, and Mao Tse-tung is the bad guy. Yet this ignores

two things: It ignores the fact that Mao Tse-tung is weaker today than he was 5 years ago, when Russia was giving him aid. His military establishment has deteriorated because of the lack of Russian aid. He depends on Soviet oil. Mao Tse-tung can't fight a big war; he probably used up all his oil reserves when he attacked India in a 3-week blitz on the frontier, a bluff to make himself look great against a weak and neglected Indian Army.

Khrushchev is the man who has 1,000, 10,000 times the power of Mao. He is the man with the power, yet the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict is to make us look at Mao as if he were the only danger. Of course, he is a danger in the sense of his ability to help the Vietnamese, but it was Khrushchev who mainly contributed to the danger in Laos. Without Laos, we would not be having the trouble in Vietnam today. Day after day U.S. observation planes reported that it was the Soviet transport planes which were flying arms into Laos. Repeatedly the State Department confirmed this.

If I may, I will just read one paragraph from my prepared statement. It omits Khrushchev's bloody record as one of Stalin's most faithful henchmen, and looks only at the record *since* Khrushchev came to power. The record is more aggressive than Stalin's. I quote:

Who was the butcher of Budapest, who launched a new Soviet military invasion on November 4th after announcing that Soviet Armies would be evacuated from Hungary? Who ordered the kidnaping of General Maleter, who was negotiating with the Russians under a flag of truce, and of Premier Nagy, who was traveling under a "safe conduct" which the Communists had granted to the Yugoslav Embassy? Who launched the Berlin ultimatum in 1958 and renewed it with greater pressure in 1961, when President Kennedy had to worsen our dollar deficit by the enormous military buildup? Who broke up the Paris conference with his wild denunciation of President Eisenhower because of the U-2 flights, when the Soviet Union itself boasted that it had known about these U-2 flights for years before the Paris conference was called? Who supplied and transported the arms for Communist subversion and aggression into Laos, according to the State Department?

Who tried to put the missiles in Cuba under cover of a doublecross of President Kennedy by Khrushchev's private promises that nothing of the sort would ever be done? Who blocked the Autobahn last summer, and then lied about which side had surrendered when his bluff was called?

You remember the American businessmen and Mr. Keith Funston, president of the New York Stock Exchange, were sickened by having to listen to these Soviet lies. Yet apparently the others felt it was impolite to contradict them.

Who gave the order which led to the repeated shooting down and killing of unarmed American airmen, while the West has permitted innumerable Soviet overflights without any retaliation? Instead, we talk about punishing our own flyers for having gone astray.

The CHAIRMAN. May we go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get your views on two questions.

Our Constitution being what it is with reference to the conduct of foreign policy, do you see any objection or any wisdom in the Freedom Academy having an advisory group drawn from these agencies that were mentioned, CIA, State Department, FBI, and so on?

Mr. EMMET. No sir; I think that, as far as I am concerned, the bill seems to me to be very well thought out to deal with the problem of coordination. The independence, I approve a hundred percent, its

being an independent agency. It seems to me that the other bill proposed by Senator Symington would be totally inadequate. You know the State Department wanted control of foreign aid, they wanted control of USIA. They naturally would like to control any U.S. Government activity which affects foreign policy. Diplomats are trained to want to play their cards close to their vests, and not to complicate matters. The State Department has its own tremendous job, but psychologically, diplomats are unqualified to engage in any form of propaganda. The training of a diplomat and the training of a propagandist is a complete opposite, so I think it is simply important that the Academy should be completely independent. But there should and would be close liaison through the Advisory Committee of Government agencies provided under the bill.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Should Members of Congress be included in that Advisory Committee?

Mr. EMMET. That would be fine as far as I am concerned, if it is practicable. But in any case, the Commission, as an independent agency, would have to report to Congress as well as the President; would it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. EMMET. So that it seems to me that the plan of the bill is magnificently constructed.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johansen?

Mr. JOHANSEN. I have just one question. I don't raise this to get into a controversial area, but to try to illustrate the very realistic problems that might arise. Supposing we had a statement of the very controversial character of that of Senator Fulbright and supposing we had in existence this Freedom Academy, what contribution or what role might this Academy have in relation to statements and pronouncements of the type of Senator Fulbright's regarding the inevitability of communism and all the rest that we are going to have to live with?

Mr. EMMET. Well, it would simply reinforce the situation we have now—I mean, the Freedom Commission would not interfere with Senator Fulbright. And presumably would not assay the speech. But they would have already released information which would contradict his thesis that Castro is only a nuisance, etc., just as other U.S. Government agencies have released information which answers Senator Fulbright. For instance, Secretary Rusk has contradicted Fulbright's theory about changed Soviet intentions, as well as about Castro. Rusk and Governor Harriman have repeatedly stated that Soviet aims have not changed. Now, Senator Fulbright said Soviet intentions have changed. He also attacked U.S. policy on Panama and was answered by McGeorge Bundy. Mr. Bundy also said on Sunday he did not think anything would be more dangerous than to encourage the impression that Cuba was not a menace to the United States. If you had your Freedom Commission, you would simply have much more information which would back up that sort of thing. It would not be necessary for the Freedom Commission itself to indulge in such debates on U.S. policy, but it would provide the backup of facts.

In other words, if Fulbright was right, fine; but the facts don't indicate that he's right, and the Freedom Commission could help prove that he was not.

The CHAIRMAN. In that particular case.

Mr. EMMET. Yes, in that particular case.

The CHAIRMAN. Whereas, vis-a-vis other statements, they might prove they were right?

Mr. EMMET. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think, sir, that you have made a great contribution to these hearings.

Mr. EMMET. I think, sir, that I can submit a statement later, and then you don't need to listen to me further.

Mr. BRUCE. I commend you on your analysis of the Sino-Soviet so-called split. It is excellent, excellent.

Mr. EMMET. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

(Mr. Emmet's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER EMMET

I am happy and honored to have this opportunity to join the many distinguished men who have endorsed the Freedom Academy bill.

I have been interested in the Freedom Academy plan for 11 years, together with several close personal friends, including Leo Cherne, Professor Sidney Hook, Eugene Lyons, and Arthur McDowell of the Upholsterers' Union. At that time we and others were approached in New York by the Orlando Committee, which created the plan. Recent events in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia show that establishment of the Freedom Academy is more necessary than ever; hence, I strongly urge passage of H.R. 5368.

The basic need of the bill and the reasons for its specific provisions have all been exhaustively discussed before this committee. I do not want to take up your time by going over the ground already covered by highly qualified experts. It will be most useful, with your permission, to confine myself here to answering a few of the main arguments against it.

One argument advanced against the Freedom Academy bill suggests passing the bill for the National Academy of Foreign Affairs in its place. This proposal is thoroughly answered by Mr. Alan Grant in Supplement No. 1 to the "Green Book," which compares the two bills.

Another argument is presented by the distinguished head of the State Department Planning Section, Professor Walt Rostow, who has shown himself sympathetic to some of the objectives of the Freedom Academy bill in the past. Mr. Rostow said:

"As I read the literature and read the testimony of the Freedom Commission advocates, I sometimes feel they are somewhat out of date. Our private institutions are now committed to work abroad on a very large scale, in every quarter of the globe."

This argument has been well answered in the "Green Book" I have before me, especially pages 38-54, including the quotations from Allen Dulles, C. D. Jackson, Stefan Possony, and President Kennedy.

This argument of Professor Rostow's connects up with another argument, which is that our situation vis-a-vis communism has not only improved because of our greater present knowledge about Communist methods, but also because the Communist danger itself has been greatly weakened by developments within the Communist world—therefore, the Freedom Academy plan is no longer urgent.

It is true there has been a great and welcome increase in studies of communism over the past decade. However, university-type studies of communism and "Kremlinology" tend to focus attention on the *changes* in the Communist world and the *differences* between Communist countries, rather than on the continuation and perfection of the Communist apparatus and its subversive operations abroad.

Of course, the changes have taken place; they are important and should be studied. However, the emphasis on Communist changes, the anticipation that they will continue, and the speculation as to the effect on Soviet foreign policy all tend to obscure the record of the hard facts about the past actions of Khrushchev and Mao. Thus their effect is to substitute speculations about

changed Communist *intentions* for the study of Communist *capabilities* for subversion and aggression. Even *present* Communist operations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia tend to be obscured. This is the impact of Kremlinology. Still less is there any education or training in methods of combating Communist subversion, except in the purely military field of guerrilla warfare.

All of the above tendencies in the work of some academic experts on communism are aggravated and distorted by the attitude of the free world's press, because *novelty* has news value. Change or alleged changes and splits within the formerly monolithic Communist bloc have news value, so the press and magazines automatically play them up for the same reason they play up differences between the U.S. and its NATO allies.

Thus a new image begins to emerge of Khrushchev as an enlightened Communist, almost a friend of the West, who is threatened by the belligerent Mao. This, in turn, creates the kind of complacency and overconfidence which was expressed in Senator Fulbright's speech, in which he ridicules those who still believe in the danger from Khrushchev and from the majority of Communist countries whose policies he still largely controls.

The record of democratic alliances against aggressive states throughout history shows that complacency leads to unwillingness to continue the required sacrifices. It was so with the British-led alliances against Louis XIV and against Napoleon. It was true in the erosion of the alliance against Hitler in the 1930's, and it threatens to prove true of our alliance against Soviet and Chinese communism today.

Think of Khrushchev's actual record, shown by the hard facts of recent history, compared to the *image* of him we see today. Omitting Khrushchev's bloody record since he came to power as one of Stalin's most faithful henchmen, it is more aggressive than Stalin's. Who was the butcher of Budapest, who launched a new Soviet military invasion on November 4th after announcing that Soviet Armies would be evacuated from Hungary? Who ordered the kidnapping of General Maleter, who was negotiating with the Russians under a flag of truce, and of Premier Nagy, who was traveling under a "safe conduct" which the Communists had granted to the Yugoslav Embassy? Who launched the Berlin ultimatum in 1958 and renewed it with greater pressure in 1961, when President Kennedy had to worsen our dollar deficit by the enormous military buildup? Who broke up the Paris conference with his wild denunciation of President Eisenhower because of the U-2 flights, when the Soviet Union itself boasted that it had known about these U-2 flights for years before the Paris conference was called? Who supplied and transported the arms for Communist subversion and aggression into Laos, according to the State Department?

Who tried to put the missiles in Cuba under cover of a doublecross of President Kennedy by Khrushchev's private promises that nothing of the sort would ever be done? Who blocked the Autobahn last summer, and then lied about which side had surrendered when his bluff was called? Who gave the order which led to the repeated shooting down and killing of unarmed American airmen, while the West has permitted innumerable Soviet overflights without any retaliation? Instead, we talk about punishing our own flyers, for having gone astray.

There has been no progress in the disarmament field, despite the hopes aroused by the test ban treaty. Also, Khrushchev's efforts to divide NATO by reviving fears of German militarism have been stepped up, not diminished, in recent months. Lastly there is increasing evidence of a real and only thinly disguised anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R.

It is also worth remembering that the Castro attack on Venezuela, which has just been exposed by the Organization of American States, was only made possible by Khrushchev and that the Brazilian revolution only prevented at the last minute a Goulart dictatorship in Brazil, while Goulart had become increasingly dependent on the Communists.

The greatest danger in all this optimism about the Sino-Soviet split is that Khrushchev, who is emerging as a hero of the Western free press, is infinitely more powerful than Mao Tse-tung with his "horse and buggy" economy, his antiquated military machine, and his lack of nuclear weapons.

We must also remember that insofar as Khrushchev wishes to prevent Mao from capturing the allegiance of more Communist parties he must *compete* with Mao by proving that the Soviet method of coexistence, plus subversion, produces greater Communist advances in subverting the free world. In short, the effect

of Mao on Khrushchev, if any, must be to step up the pace of Soviet subversive activities.

As regards Khrushchev's capabilities, U.S. superiority in most nuclear weapons, plus the Soviet economic crisis, have at least temporarily reduced Khrushchev's willingness to risk nuclear war, as well as his capacity to wage aggressive economic warfare, as in his oil offensive. However, he has not given up a single power base, nor agreed to any infringement of Soviet secrecy by inspection. Yet only elaborate inspection would hamper Soviet capacity to launch a sneak attack or to resume missile-threat diplomacy.

The belief that relaxation of police-state rule in Russia and Eastern Europe weakens the Soviet capacity or desire for aggression is another fallacy. We must remember that Hitler's Nazi regime was far less totalitarian in its economic controls and general police-state control of free speech, etc., than Khrushchev's empire is today. Yet that increased rather than diminished Hitler's capacity to wage war against nearly all the world. The relaxation in Russia today, as formerly in Nazi Germany, tends to reduce hatred of the totalitarian regime and increase cooperation by scientists and military leaders with the regime, without affecting the secret decisions in the Kremlin on war or peace.

We are also told that we should be nice to Khrushchev and help him solve his economic troubles by East-West trade and credit, lest Khrushchev lose his power to allegedly more militant forces in the Kremlin, such as Marshal Malinovsky. But whether there is any such danger to Khrushchev and whether his opponents or successors would really be more militant, is wholly unproved. Even Mao has actually been more cautious than Khrushchev, in deeds though not words; and even if it is true that Khrushchev is the "best" Communist, how do we know that he will win? How do we know that we will not be solving the economic crisis for the benefit of Khrushchev's aggressive successors?

In connection with the Freedom Academy bill, it is clear that both the Soviets and the Chinese have perfected and refined their weapons of subversion and guerrilla warfare. The Viet Cong is a more efficient guerrilla operation than was ever mounted by Mao Tse-tung in China, according to experts in this field. The coup in Zanzibar, the riots in Panama, and the drift toward communism in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa, testify to the extension of Communist subversion.

We have tried to prevent the conditions which prepare the way for communism in Latin America and Africa by the Alliance for Progress, foreign aid, and the Peace Corps. But the economic difficulties in Latin America and the growing chaos in Africa show how impossible it is to get quick results by economic and humanitarian help alone, especially in view of the population explosion and the flight of capital. To gain time for economic aid and political reforms to succeed, we must be able to hold the line in the political battle with the Communists. How else can we hope to do this except by new methods of training to combat the Communist perfection of political conflict?

The emphasis placed on the training of foreign students and on American private citizens in the Freedom Academy bill would be justified by recent developments in Latin America and Africa alone. The chief Communist troublemakers there were local people, trained in Communist schools in Russia, China, Cuba, and/or the satellites. They can only be successfully blocked and exposed by local people who have been given anti-Communist training by us.

May I stress one more reason for recommending the establishment of the Freedom Academy with all possible urgency? As stressed in the text of the bill itself, everything which will be taught by the Freedom Academy must be in harmony with our Western allies. Even if we establish the Freedom Academy, the Soviets will still have many weapons which we will lack—such as their capacity to launch war of aggression by secret sneak attacks, their ability to break solemn agreements, their power to coerce their so-called allies by military and economic pressure, their ability to intimidate small countries by threatening aggression, their capacity to bribe politicians and newspaper editors on a lavish scale, their willingness to kidnap and assassinate key anti-Communist leaders where they can safely do so.

Therefore, the least we can do is to use the power of education and technical training to the greatest conceivable extent in our fight for freedom's survival.

The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess until quarter to two.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., Tuesday, April 7, 1964, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:45 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION, TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 1964

(The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Joe Pool presiding.)

(Committee members present: Representatives Pool, Ichord, Johansen, Bruce, and Schadeberg.)

Mr. POOL. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRISON, I believe some of the committee members would like to ask you some questions if you don't mind.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes.

STATEMENT OF H. STUART MORRISON—Resumed

Mr. JOHANSEN. I had one question. Did I understand correctly that this Operation Amigo is a two-way street? In other words, you are sending some United States students to Latin American countries as well as the other way around? Is that correct?

Mr. MORRISON. As it turns out, that is correct. Operation Amigo is a private organization chartered to bring Latin American students to the United States. Operation Amigo, Inc., does not sponsor directly the return of U.S. students to Latin America. However, we have seen to it that they are indirectly helped.

Now, the other portion of that question could be answered in this way. The clubs that we have established in Central and South America, to the tune of about 4,000 students, through our direction invite these students down and perform the same tasks that we do here.

Mr. JOHANSEN. That cleared up the point. That is all I have.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Bruce?

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Morrison, repeat again, if you would, the cost per student of Operation Amigo.

Mr. MORRISON. This is a little hard to determine. There are direct contribution costs. You can say it cost x-number of dollars to do this. Then there are certain donations that you can't put your finger on, such as the housing of the student by a U.S. family. It costs x-number of dollars to do this plus community response, and so forth.

The actual transportation cost could be broken down to about \$225 per student. I would say that the cost in programing this particular student through one phase of Operation Amigo would come close to approximately \$350.

Mr. BRUCE. The operation is on the basis of a tax-exempt foundation?

Mr. MORRISON. Yes.

Mr. BRUCE. How long has it been operating?

Mr. MORRISON. Since 1962.

Mr. BRUCE. How many States have you entered?

Mr. MORRISON. We now have entered approximately 16 to 18 States, but this is not a true reflection of its acceptability because we do have on file approximately 200 school jurisdictions within the United States wanting to receive students.

Mr. BRUCE. Now mainly, the direction of this has been through newspaper operation and cooperation?

Mr. MORRISON. The control of the program remains within the newspaper industry, yes. We have had, certainly, collateral participation from different civic groups, Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions, B'nai

B'rith. In fact, B'nai B'rith has adopted the program on a nationwide program. International Kiwanis wants to come into sponsoring it, International Rotary, International Lions, and the YMCA.

We have had tremendous community response.

Mr. BRUCE. As I understand your testimony earlier, the greatest value is the fact when you move into the city you do not regard it as an agent of the United States Government, but rather an interested American citizen; is this an accurate approach?

Mr. MORRISON. Correct—who has an honest intent and desire to exchange ideas on an equal basis with the countries and students of Central and South America.

Mr. BRUCE. Are you dealing in this program directly with the ideology of communism or is it more on the exposure of the free system as a counterbalance?

Mr. MORRISON. It is more on the exposure of this free system in comparison to the Communist system.

Mr. BRUCE. Do you keep in touch with the Latin American students after they go back?

Mr. MORRISON. Through these Operation Amigo clubs, yes. As a matter of fact, I told you about the committee for the selection of the students which were composed of national leaders, newspaper people, et cetera. Since the Operation Amigo clubs have been established, in order to retain their interest in the program, we also let the clubs elect a representative to sit in on the future selection of any other Latin American student.

Mr. BRUCE. How do you propose—

Mr. MORRISON. One other point while I think of it, approximately 65 percent of the students who participated in the program in 1962 and 1963 are now at the university level.

Mr. BRUCE. Where they are needed?

Mr. MORRISON. Yes.

Mr. BRUCE. How do you propose to take a successful operation like Amigo and coordinate it with a Freedom Academy, or do you?

Mr. MORRISON. I had not really seriously given any thought to this before you asked the question. It would appear to me that the Freedom Academy, if established—and I am sure that some method should be established or some area of responsibility—would first of all need students from Latin America to participate. It seems to me that Operation Amigo with its tremendous contacts in Central and South America has a readymade organization to select some of these participants from. This is my offhand opinion.

Mr. BRUCE. Now taking that, which is the point I was coming to, you point out that you think one of the great assets of Operation Amigo is its lack of a tie with an official agency.

Mr. MORRISON. Correct.

Mr. BRUCE. Would you not then blunt some of this great value you have under your present operation?

Mr. MORRISON. You mean, if you were to select some of the students in the Operation Amigo clubs; is that what you are talking about?

Mr. BRUCE. Yes.

Mr. MORRISON. I feel like I am on the proverbial spot, but this would greatly be determined by the method in which the Freedom Academy would be set up. I think it would be completely separate from any

State Department affiliation. It would be wonderful to set a Freedom Academy up, and I think it should be set up, but you would not want to spend all this money and yet have it ineffectual.

Mr. BRUCE. I am just wondering, though, if the very thing that you have found to be your great asset, the freedom of operation, would not be jeopardized somewhat by Government entering into the picture?

Mr. MORRISON. I don't know how close Government would enter into the Freedom Academy.

Mr. BRUCE. It would be a Government operation as I understand it. I think all of these bills are as a Government operation. Am I correct on that?

Mr. JOHANSEN. Yes.

Mr. BRUCE. It would be total Government, and I am just wondering if you would not perhaps blunt this great asset that you have of a free American citizen united with a Government agency projecting it?

Mr. MORRISON. Well, you might; but as you know, the politicians in Latin America are as free as the winds. There are many ways of accomplishing what you want, not necessarily to the direct approach. I think that the correct type of student could be obtained from an academy.

Mr. BRUCE. Thank you, very much. Your testimony has been excellent.

Mr. JOHANSEN. May I make this observation regarding your testimony, and I agree with my colleague that it has been excellent. One of the enigmas to me, and this applies to the Peace Corps and some of these other programs, is how we exemplify private enterprise or free enterprise, or whatever you want to call it, nongovernmental activity, in these other countries by doing it under Government sponsorship. It seems to me that is the pitfall that you avoided in this program.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I am tremendously interested and impressed with it. I don't think that whatever is Government-sponsored is necessarily automatically bad. I do think that in a mortal combat with totalitarianism if we can't be the missionaries for the nongovernmental approach, we are missing the whole point of the conflict.

Mr. MORRISON. That is right. Your Communist approach to this problem in a very logical way, their embassies, ambassadors are just as much government as yours could be only they are smart about it. They bring them to Russia and go to a particular school, but they are also sent over to this specialized school in this area and they don't come back as attached to the Russian Government, but yet they have been there and they know and they work hard when they get back.

Mr. BRUCE. May I interject here for a moment?

Don't you think the very basic difference is in goal and in method of operation? The Communist is determined to conquer the world, whether he is a Chinese Communist or a Russian Communist, operating on a clearly outlined scientific pattern, whereas the United States and the Western World in general is a polyglot without any central direction by any nature of the free society?

Mr. MORRISON. Correct.

Mr. BRUCE. Then, does it not come down to the fact that private groups basically are going to have to take the initiative?

Mr. MORRISON. I think the private groups certainly have a part, a definite part, a very decided part, and we have got to fight this communistic onslaught in the way they direct it. We have got to take the initiative and not sit back and say, "Well, everything is going to be all right."

Mr. BRUCE. Thank you.

Mr. POOL. I want to second what the gentleman said. We appreciate your testimony. It has been very excellent, and your experience has been very helpful to the committee.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I came in late. I don't know whether I followed all of the answers to Mr. Bruce's question.

Let me ask you again, How do you understand the Freedom Academy will tie in with an operation such as you are carrying on?

Mr. MORRISON. How do I understand how it could possibly tie in?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes.

Mr. MORRISON. I am not advocating it be tied in, but the question was asked. I think first you would need recruits, would you not, for the Freedom Academy?

Mr. ICHORD. Under the terms of the bills, and I presume I know, most of them have the provision that, if the Secretary of State agrees, foreign nationals may be trained in the Academy.

Mr. MORRISON. Then you would need some method of obtaining these recruits? I merely state that the Operation Amigo program has already built into it a source of recruits for the Freedom Academy if you so desired.

Mr. ICHORD. Yes, from the countries in which you have been working, but I see no way in which the Freedom Academy would infringe upon your operations except it may be that an official of your organization may want to attend the Freedom Academy to study ways and means of combating communism, how to detect it.

Mr. MORRISON. I didn't mean to imply that it would infringe upon our program.

Mr. ICHORD. I see no way that it would. I thought Mr. Bruce inferred that in the question that he asked you.

Mr. MORRISON. I didn't think that he did.

Mr. BRUCE. No; my inference was that if they merged their operation completely with the Freedom Academy, on the basis of his testimony earlier their greatest asset was to go in and say, "We have no connection with the Government agency," that this was the open door, and that if they merged with it, why then it would become, in effect, a part of a Government operation which could negate that advantage.

Mr. ICHORD. I don't see how it conflicts with his operation.

Mr. BRUCE. No, the Operation Amigo and the Freedom Academy—

Mr. JOHANSEN. But could not the Freedom Academy provide educational facilities which Operation Amigo could avail itself of?

Mr. MORRISON. Certainly.

Mr. JOHANSEN. That would be the independent operation.

Mr. MORRISON. Certainly, completely independent operation.

Mr. McNAMARA. I think from the testimony of some previous witnesses who have done a great deal of work on this bill that the setup

that might be contemplated here would be that the Operation Amigo officials would be able to contribute quite a bit to the Academy. They might well come up to give lectures at the Academy, explaining to other persons in the private sector what they can do in Asia and Africa, perhaps, based on your experiences in Latin America, and also some of the pitfalls to avoid, as well as some of the things you found most effective.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Morrison, earlier in your testimony also, I believe—I don't know whether it was your testimony or one of the other witnesses, I believe it was the previous witness—in many cases the American colony in these Latin American countries would not get out and mix with the people of the different countries.

Mr. MORRISON. I said that.

Mr. POOL. Did you say that?

Mr. MORRISON. Yes.

Mr. POOL. And that the Academy would be helpful to these, say, Government officials down there? It would be helpful to train them in knowing what they should do in the way of getting information and mixing with the people and knowing what the score was?

Mr. MORRISON. I don't mean to imply that all our personnel are that way, but it only takes one bad one out of a group of 100 to mix it up for the 100. Someone mentioned Venezuela. They are overcoming this in Venezuela in the mining companies and oil companies by having housing complexes where they put a mining man here and a nationalist here and an oil company man here and a nationalist here. There is a certain trend through the private sector to overcome this, so then why should not governmental circles overcome this too?

Mr. POOL. This Freedom Academy could be very helpful in educating the people that are going down there to take jobs?

Mr. MORRISON. I am most certain.

Before closing, I think we ought to pay tribute to those thousands of persons who have contributed to the success of the Operation Amigo program.

Special tribute should be paid to Mr. C. N. Shelton, general manager of Peruvian Airlines, who has believed in the Amigo program from its start. He was the first man to initiate special low student rates between South America and the United States. The cost item was of tremendous importance, and under his leadership we obtained the same cooperation through many Latin American carriers.

Mr. POOL. Any other questions?

Again the committee thanks you for appearing.

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Philbrick.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Should we wait for the second bell before we begin?

Mr. POOL. We will take a 20-minute recess.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

Mr. POOL. The committee will come to order.

Now, Mr. Philbrick, you go right ahead.

I believe you better give us a little background. I think most people know you, but you better put it in the record.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT PHILBRICK

Mr. PHILBRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am here today by virtue of the fact that for 9 years I was a member of the Communist Party in the United States serving, of course, as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It was through that experience inside the Communist apparatus that I learned a few things which I think have direct application to the measure being considered by the committee today.

I might add that I am pleased and honored to testify before this distinguished committee. I use the word "distinguished." Certainly this committee has been distinguished in a number of ways. It is obviously distinguished by the violence and the vehemence of the attacks against it.

I think no other committee in the Congress has suffered as much vehemence as this one, but I know the members consider this to be a badge of honor, because that attack is directed by the Communist criminal conspiracy, the international apparatus that hopes to destroy the freedom of all free nations.

The fact that this committee should be singled out by the enemies of America and of free men everywhere is indeed a mark of distinction and moot testimony to the effectiveness of this committee in combating the Communist conspiracy.

I believe sincerely that this committee is also furthermore distinguished by the fact that, not only among its members on the congressional level, but on the staff level as well, are some of the most astute and knowledgeable men we have in Washington today, not only relative to knowledge of the history and scope of Soviet activity in the United States in the past, but also relative to the tactics and strategy and goals and programs of the Communists as of this moment.

Certainly this committee, along with its counterpart in the upper House, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, has produced for the American people more factual, accurate information regarding the Communist Party than any other single source in the United States today.

In reviewing the very best books on the subject of communism, it is surprising to note in what large measure competent authors and writers in the field have depended upon this committee for their source of information and factual data.

Therefore, I can think of no better qualified committee in the House of Representatives to conduct the hearings concerning the Freedom Academy bill, H.R. 5368.

This is an extremely important measure. Its implications are far-reaching. It opens doors into a relatively unexplored area which many people today do not even know exists. Its impact in the struggle against the common enemies of freedom, if enacted, will be enormous. It is truly a revolutionary bill in that nothing else quite like the Freedom Academy now exists.

Indeed, the matter under consideration by this committee involves not only the making, but quite possibly the changing, of history. I believe that the future of the free world as we know it today may very well depend upon the decision made by this committee and by the Congress relative to the measures under discussion.

Gentlemen, we have in this country today two great bastions of freedom, two of the greatest in the world insofar as training and equipping dedicated men who are willing to devote their very lives to the defense of this country. Indeed, as we meet here today, the product of one of those training institutions is being honored and remembered by men and women and, yes, even children, all over the world. The hearts of men everywhere who love freedom and who cherish liberty are today experiencing the sad but grateful pain of grief and of proud memory of one man who contributed so much to whatever measure of freedom we enjoy today.

The man, of course, of whom I speak is the late General Douglas MacArthur, whose body will lie in the rotunda of the United States Capitol tomorrow, scarcely more than a stone's throw from the room in which we meet today. General MacArthur will always be held in the memory of men and on the pages of history as an example of what one man can do and what service he can render to his Nation and to his God, given the proper measure of instruction, background, and training to match his dedication.

I know that General MacArthur was always the first to give due credit to that background and training which he received in one of the institutions of learning I have in mind. They are, needless to say, West Point and Annapolis. General MacArthur, of course, is just one of many graduates of those schools whose names shall be engraved forever in the honor tablets and memorials which are the very building blocks which have made this Nation the greatest and the strongest in the world today.

MR. JOHANSEN. May I interrupt just to keep the witness and the committee out of trouble on the record?

I assume the witness did not deliberately omit the Air Force Academy.

MR. PHILBRICK. No, sir, that was inadvertent.

I believe it would not be an exaggeration to say that, as one reviews the history of our country over the years and as one recalls the great perils and the serious threats posed against the United States of America by the forces of despotism, one finds it very difficult to conceive that this Nation would exist at all had it not been for the training institutes of West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy.

Here were men provided with the very exacting and demanding science of military and naval warfare, and because men were provided with that highly technical knowledge to match their dedication, we have survived.

But today, gentlemen, we are involved in a new kind of war. It is an undeclared war. It is an undefined war. It is a war in a completely new dimension. As yet, we don't even have an adequate name for it. It has been called "protracted conflict." It has been called "fourth-dimensional warfare." It is often, but completely erroneously, referred to as a "cold war."

I believe, as Captain Eddy Rickenbacker stated some time ago, "There is no cold war; there is a hot war, literally as hot as the hinges of hell itself, and we are losing it because we refuse to admit we are in it."

It is unnecessary, of course, to remind this committee of the disastrous course of recent history or to recall for this committee the fact

we are losing the war. This is not a matter of opinion; it is a matter of record, and it is a record which this committee has already published in countless volumes and transcripts and reports.

The question today is not whether we are losing, but why.

One prime example we might take out of the many, perhaps because it is the closest, is the island of Cuba, which has been captured and occupied by the Communist enemy.

Now, our military might is unquestioned. We have the world's best trained and equipped Army; we have the world's toughest Marine Corps; we have the world's greatest Navy; we have the world's most powerful Air Force.

Despite all of this, the Communists captured Cuba with ease, not with third-dimensional weapons, but with fourth-dimensional weapons.

Senator Tom Dodd, speaking of this disastrous defeat for the forces of freedom, had this to say:

How were the Communists able to capture a popular revolution so quickly and so completely? Why were the Cuban people so naive about Communist operational methods? Why were the anti-Communists so disorganized and so inept when the showdown came? Why were they outthought, outplanned, out-organized, and outmaneuvered by the Communists from the very beginning? Why was the large middle class in Havana, which was solidly behind Castro, unable to cope with the Communist cadres? Where were their leaders? Why were they not better trained? To what extent was our own negligence responsible for this catastrophe?

And, said Senator Tom Dodd:

Once again I ask the question: Why must the dedication and know-how so often predominate on the Communist side? Why does it always seem to be well-trained professionals versus disorganized amateurs?

Well, gentlemen, this is the war that we are losing. I know in reading the *Congressional Record*, which I try to read faithfully, that the Members of Congress spend many, many hours discussing our military problems and our military budgets. The records of these important discussions fill many pages. Yet we could double the size of our military forces today and still lose the war we are in, because we are being outflanked.

This is the gap in our defenses that the Freedom Academy would plug. This is the vital leak in the dyke that the Freedom Academy would block.

I think it is important at this point that I should make it clear that mention of our Naval and Military and Air Force Academies does not mean that the Freedom Academy would be a "West Point in the cold war." The bill specifically sets forth, first, that the Freedom Academy would be established "to conduct research to develop an integrated body of operational knowledge in the political, psychological, economic, technological, and organizational areas * * *, to educate and train Government personnel and private citizens * * * and * * * foreign students * * *." It is important to stress that such education and training would be provided not only on an undergraduate level, as at West Point or Annapolis or the Air Force Academy, but the Commission would establish, under its supervision and control, an "advanced" research, development, and training center known as the Freedom Academy.

Hence, the Freedom Academy would not only provide basic training, but also intermediate training and advanced training, in the art and the techniques of so-called cold warfare.

The Freedom Academy bill furthermore sets forth that this shall be done not only in terms of educating and training Government personnel, but also private citizens and foreign students, as well.

Now, I cannot testify as an expert insofar as the need of the bill for Government personnel. Neither can I pretend to be an expert in the field of international relations or on the foreign level. But I certainly can testify from personal knowledge and background and experience insofar as the need for this bill in the private sector.

This has been obvious to me from the very beginning of my experiences with the Communist criminal conspiracy. I have already testified to some extent before this committee concerning some of the things I learned in those experiences. One of the things I have already testified to is the fact that I first became involved with the Communist criminal conspiracy by being trapped, by being victimized, through joining a Communist-front organization without the slightest idea that it was a Communist front. This group was the Cambridge Youth Council in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

I furthermore testified before this committee that not only myself but that over 300 young people joined that one subversive Communist-front organization. I have pointed out at some length how we were used, how we were exploited, how we performed like puppets on a string. We young people were no more equipped or prepared to cope with the Communist-trained agents than a 5-year-old boy is prepared to fly a jet airplane.

And it was not just ourselves who were not prepared, but our teachers were not prepared. They had nothing to offer. They had nowhere to go themselves to get adequate information and knowledge concerning the techniques and methods of communism.

Our textbooks were inadequate and did not provide the necessary knowledge or information. Our libraries were inadequate, and we could not turn to them at that time to find adequate information. There was no place that we could turn to or go for what we desperately needed.

Well, now, this was just my first recognition of how ill-prepared our youths were to cope with the Communist methods. As I went on through my 9 years in the Communist Party, I saw the Communists spin rings not only around young people, but adults as well.

We watched the Communists, for example, capture the political campaign of a man who was a candidate for this very Congress. I watched the Communists move into that candidate's campaign, take it over, and operate it without his knowledge that it was being done. Needless to say, he was defeated in his attempts to become a Member of Congress.

I watched the Communists move into the Progressive Party, which in its beginning was a legitimate political party. I watched the Communists destroy the Progressive Party as a legitimate political movement and I watched them destroy Vice President Henry Wallace, as well; it was a disaster.

In so many areas, I have seen the Communists move in, distort, subvert, destroy, sabotage, and get away with it. The reason they

got away with it over and over again is because they were competing with insufficient knowledge, background, and training on a part of its victims.

Now the question is, Why? Why were the Communists able to do this? Why are they still able to do it today in many areas of American life?

The reason is made plain in the Freedom Academy bill itself on page 3:

Recognizing that nonmilitary conflict makes extraordinary demands upon its practitioners, the Communists, for several decades, have intensively trained their leadership groups and cadres in an extensive network of basic, intermediate, and advanced schools.

I can certainly testify to the accuracy of that section of the bill because I myself have attended, as a student inside the Communist Party, some of these special training schools, and, believe me, these training schools are good. There is no question but that by application in this field the Reds have developed advanced techniques in fourth-dimensional warfare, for which we have not yet prepared sufficient countermeasures.

The Communists are never allowed to forget the importance of ability to wage this type of war. I am a regular reader of the *World Marxist Review*, which goes to good Communists all over the world, and *Political Affairs*, the theoretical organ of the Communist Party, U.S.A. I find that never an issue goes by that the Communists do not remind their members of the importance of skill and ability in the art of so-called cold warfare.

In July, for example, this past summer, the *World Marxist Review* had this to say to their Communists around the world:

It would be wrong to say that peaceful coexistence implies that the colonial peoples should renounce their struggle for independence or that the proletarians in the capitalistic countries and the peoples of the socialist camp should refuse to support that struggle. "The example of Cuba * * * speaks against this point of view."

* * * * *

The Central Committee denounced those who claim that the Communists in working for peaceful coexistence are ready to bargain with the class enemy * * *.

In August of last year, in *Political Affairs*, the Communists told their members why this was necessary. Again quoting from their publication:

There have been no retreats by the forces of socialism * * *. To put the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba into this category is to make a defeat out of what was actually a victory * * * it is only world imperialism that has been retreating and will be compelled to retreat further and further until it is finally driven from the world scene. * * *

So, the Communists know exactly what they intend to do.

In September of this past year, during the test ban treaty, the Communists were told this in *World Marxist Review*:

The world revolutionary process is developing today in conditions of the most complex interplay of different forces * * *. The nature and the content of this process are determined by the merging into one powerful current of the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples building socialism and communism, the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist countries, the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and the general

democratic movement. The world revolutionary process is accompanied by a bitter economic, political and ideological struggle against imperialism, and first and foremost against U.S. imperialism, the bulwark of world reaction.

Now, note that the Communists are warned that this is taking place in "the most complex interplay of different forces." This is indeed true. Indeed, this committee recently published an important volume, a report on how today the Communists are giving special attention to the interplay, the combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary methods in their war against the free nations.

Now, to meet this challenge on the private sector today, there is absolutely nothing in existence. One of the groups I work with quite closely, for example, is the All-American Conference to Combat Communism. Now, this group is composed of some 40 or more of the finest national organizations across the United States: the Lions and the Kiwanians and the Red Men and various veterans groups and organizations, civic groups. They meet together periodically to try to see what they can do as national organizations to provide some real help in this area of cold warfare. But we are inadequately financed; we don't have the proper resources; we have to get by with volunteers and part-time employees. It simply does not fill the bill, much as the various groups wish to help and despite their dedication.

Well, subsection IV of section 2 of H.R. 5368 would specifically fill that need in stating: "The private sector must understand how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner." The bill further states: "There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity, and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping to solve many of our global problems. We have hardly begun to explore the range of possibilities."

Indeed, this is true, and I can see a Freedom Academy established whereby the representatives of these various national service organizations could be provided with scholarships or with grants, could attend Freedom Academy courses, for 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 months, during which time they could be given at least a basic understanding and a good grounding in the nature of the Communist enemy, the tactics and strategy and methods of communism; provided with very real and helpful knowledge and information as to what they can do in the war in which we are engaged.

Now, I don't mind confessing before this committee that I am one of those Americans who believes that our United States Government, in some areas, has become involved in matters which do not rightfully belong within the Government province but which, in fact, should remain in the private sector.

In this instance, however, I believe wholeheartedly and thoroughly that this is one area wherein our Government does have a responsibility, where our Government can play a rightful role. Certainly it is a proper role of Government to be concerned with the national security and it is a proper role of Government to be concerned with the national defense. It is this area in which this bill would apply itself and would fill an extremely dangerous and critical gap in our national defense picture today.

I want to thank the gentlemen for this opportunity to testify before the committee.

Mr. POOL. We want to thank you for appearing. It is very wonderful to have a man of your background and character to be a citizen of the United States and to appear here and give us the benefit of your experiences.

I will ask the committee: Would you like to ask questions?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes.

Mr. Philbrick, there is one aspect of the bill that you did not comment upon and that is the provision establishing an information center.

I would like to hear what you would think about this provision of the bill.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes, sir.

As I have already indicated, at the present time, this committee as a matter of actual fact is one of the major sources of information for the people of the United States. Certainly, this committee knows this from the number of requests for information coming to you constantly and continuously; but I am also sure you are aware this is not enough.

For example, I think it ridiculous that Herb Philbrick should have been retained by the Department of Education for the State of New Jersey to speak to every teachers' college in the State of New Jersey on the subject of communism, to give the teachers in training a mere 1-hour lecture on communism. This is ridiculous. The Department of Education in the State of New Jersey should have a known source of high-caliber, well-prepared, well-thought-out information that in turn could be used effectively in the State of New Jersey. Right now, they knew not where else to turn so they hired Herb Philbrick to come up there.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Did I understand that was for 1 hour only?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That's all, plus a question-and-answer period. The question-and-answer period went on for 2 or 3 hours. These young people who were training to be teachers wanted information, but they knew not where to turn, you see. There is a serious lack of adequate textbooks to use in our schools and colleges right now.

Now, why that should be, I don't know, but I can testify to the fact.

Three years ago, I spoke in the State of Iowa to the State Teachers Convention. There were 12,000 teachers there at that State Teachers Convention; and after I had finished my talk on communism, I don't know how many teachers came up to me to the platform and said: "Do you know that in the entire State of Iowa we teachers do not have a single, solitary textbook to use in our schools to teach our children anything about communism?"

The teachers at that time told me that on their own, using their own meager resources and on their own time, they went out scrambling about, picking up whatever they could bring in to their students; but they confessed they knew it was not adequate to do the job that they wanted to do.

So, yes, indeed, preparing a library of information would be enormously valuable for schools, for colleges, as well as for other groups, as a continuing source of information.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Johansen.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I am not sure whether you were here this morning or not, Mr. Philbrick.

Mr. PHILBRICK. I missed most of the testimony this morning.

Mr. JOHANSEN. The reason I mention that, I think most of the witnesses have been questioned on the point and I would like your comment as to the desirability or value—and I hope the answer will be frank and not of the type that I might be seeming to invite—as to the desirability and importance, or otherwise, of an Advisory Committee or some type of setup in which representatives of the Congress, as well as other related agencies of the executive branch, would be members who occupy an oversight role or a liaison role between the Freedom Academy and the executive and legislative branches of the Government.

I wonder if you would comment on that.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes.

I am familiar with section 13 of H.R. 5368 which, in its present form, establishes an Advisory Committee. I am also aware of the fact that, as the bill is now written, this Advisory Committee would include representatives only from the Department of State; from the Department of Defense; from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; from the CIA; from the FBI; from the AID; and from the United States Information Agency.

Mr. JOHANSEN. May I interrupt right there to say, however, in the Schadeberg and Ashbrook and Gubser bills there is a provision for a congressional committee to act at least in an advisory, if not an oversight, role?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes, sir; and I believe that would be valuable—to include such a provision. Indeed, I am not quite certain whether any one of these bills as they are now written, as they are now formed, would be quite that which this committee might want to bring before the Congress.

I think there are many questions which need to be raised and discussed. There may be some improvements that can be made in the way the measure has been formulated and written. I do believe that that would be one of the improvements.

Because of the fact that both the House and the Senate already have done exploratory work, have done much of the vanguard work in obtaining knowledge and information about the Communist activities, I believe that representatives from the House and the Senate should be part of the Advisory Committee.

Mr. ICHORD. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. JOHANSEN. Yes.

Mr. ICHORD. I believe the Schadeberg bill and the Ashbrook bill and the Gubser bill omit the Advisory Committee altogether from the executive branch, do they not?

Mr. JOHANSEN. I think so.

Mr. ICHORD. And substitute therefor a Senate-House watchdog committee.

Mr. JOHANSEN. As I suggested this morning, it may be that the answer would be a wedding of the two—for want of a better comparison, of the Hoover Commission type of setup, which represented the two Houses and the executive branch or the public.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes. Yes; I had previously jotted down in my notes a reminder to mention the Hoover Commission; I had that very much in mind. The Hoover Commission arrangement might very well serve as a prototype for the Freedom Academy.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Now, the one concern that we have is how do we develop this program under the Freedom Academy in a way that it will be an objective presentation of the facts both as to the nature of the enemy and the methods of combating him and what it is we are fighting for and, at the same time, obviate the objection which Secretary Harriman made, and which I challenged somewhat severely and which I reject at least from that source, that this would be a program of indoctrination in an objectionable sense?

Mr. PHILBRICK. No. I think that all precautions should be taken, that in no sense would the Freedom Academy be involved at all in indoctrination in an objectionable sense, but that it be strictly proscribed and limited to providing information; that, insofar as indoctrination is concerned, the only commonly held goal and purpose and aim of the Freedom Academy would be to help peoples to establish freedom and to maintain freedom.

I think that insofar as being indoctrinated, yes, we would want to make it clear that freedom would be the aim and purpose and goal, but beyond that it should be strictly for the purposes of information and not for indoctrination.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Before I yield, I want to express my appreciation of having you here and having your excellent testimony with the background that you have, sir.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Bruce.

Mr. BRUCE. First, I would like to take this opportunity on the record to commend Mr. Philbrick for his services to this country, for the risks that you took for a period of 9 years, and I suspect in some degree have taken even greater risks since in your efforts to speak the truth as you know it to be.

I gathered from one of your remarks that you might have some other suggestions that might be incorporated in this bill. Do you?

Mr. PHILBRICK. No; I have no further suggestions as such except to give emphasis to one section of the bill which is included in H.R. 5368.

In H.R. 5368, on page 17, there is included a section 11, subsection (3), "To conduct such research, studies, and surveys as the Commission may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."

I would certainly want to emphasize that section. It must be admitted that there is a great deal today that we need to know that we don't know. It must be admitted that we are years behind the Communists in developing techniques in this kind of warfare.

So I would hope that whatever measure is finally enacted, and let us hope one will be enacted, that it would include a strong provision for a great deal of research and study to develop the necessary tools and weapons and background knowledge and information we need in the war in which we are involved. Today, we simply have not begun to tackle this subject.

Mr. BRUCE. I am still somewhat baffled as to how a Government agency is going to establish a Freedom Academy with the design of education, training, providing information on how to win the cold war—and in essence I believe this is the purpose.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Right.

Mr. BRUCE. Some members of the committee undoubtedly will challenge this, perhaps rightly so, but I have yet to see a determination of

policy on the part of the Government to try to win the cold war. I mean I can't get through my head how we are going to set up a Freedom Academy with this goal under Government sponsorship which negates policy. This just baffles me. I am all for it, but I don't know how we are going to do it.

I am a minority of one almost on this, I guess, but it just completely baffles me. I mean it seems to me that our priority is a goal of policy and the other things fall into line.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Well, it may be a question of which comes first, the hen or the egg. It may be that at least embarking upon a program—as stated in H.R. 5368—a program of research and development toward “preventing Communist penetration while seeking to build viable, free, and independent nations”—possibly just the very business of discussing this and working on it will have its salutary effect in other areas of the Government. I would hope so.

Mr. BRUCE. I would hope so, too.

I thank you very much.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Philbrick, a while ago I think you testified that we could double our Armed Forces and still lose the cold war, or the hot war, I believe you described it. I agreed with you.

Also, isn't this statement also true, that if we don't do something in this area of propaganda and political warfare that we are going to lose the war anyhow?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I am convinced of that entirely, sir; yes.

Mr. POOL. So this Congress and men here have a real responsibility to do something and try to do the right thing; and even if we don't come up with the right idea, at least we can make an effort to come up with the proper vehicle and then we can change it if it does not work out perfectly?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I believe so. I believe that we must enter into this field admitting that there is a lot we don't know and confessing that in the beginning it may not be quite what we would want in the end. But at least some place we have to make a start. Yes, I believe that a very grave responsibility rests with this committee and with the Congress to at least make the initial move; to arrive at a starting point, and then from that time on, and here again confirming your view, that there should be a congressional watchdog committee, together with the other advisers, to make sure that the Freedom Academy does precisely what we want it to do. And that is to provide information about the nature of the enemy, the methods and tactics used by the enemy, and to provide the necessary countermeasures and counterweapons, to seek not only to preserve the freedom of our Nation but to seek in the long run to reestablish freedom in so many areas of the world today which are enslaved.

Mr. POOL. We have a great product to sell. We have the greatest system of government that has ever been devised. There is no reason why we cannot do it if we work at it and come up with the right idea.

Mr. PHILBRICK. I agree.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Philbrick, I would like to take advantage of your presence here to make an observation regarding the growing impression I have and then ask you to comment on it.

I noticed in the testimony, particularly of witnesses who deal with the anti-Communists or countermeasures in Latin America, for instance, I notice in the statements even of some of our officials in the State Department and in Government, the frank acknowledgment of the factor, the frank acknowledgment of subversion as a fact of life in Latin America, for example, and in these other countries.

Yet, I have a feeling that there is a sort of schizophrenia—a paradox—and I am not referring now to the witnesses who have been before the committee, but some of those who do acknowledge the fact of subversion in Latin America belittle and tag as McCarthyism, or whatever bad name they want to use, any recognition of subversion of the domestic variety.

Now, am I wrong that there is sometimes a seeming contradiction in that respect? Out of your own experience is subversion at least as a potential any less real in the United States than it is in these other countries? I say as a potential at least?

MR. PHILBRICK. No, indeed, internal subversion is not any less real. There is a great deal of confusion in this area, I agree, and why some people in America should be so confused is beyond me.

I know there are those who say, "Well, communism may be a danger in China or it may be a danger in Vietnam or it may be a danger conveniently a good many thousand miles away, but communism is no danger here in the United States." Well, I simply cannot understand how anyone can be that ill-informed or misinformed, particularly when it should be quite obvious that, first of all, there is no such thing, technically speaking, as an external danger separated from or different from or isolated from an internal danger; it is all part of the same package.

There is only one Communist International; there is only one Communist apparatus; there is only one Communist aim and goal and purpose, and that is to ultimately destroy the United States. So, by that token, the danger of communism internally to the people of the United States is just as dangerous as the Communist International is to the people of the United States.

So, from a purely technical point of view, you cannot say it is of no danger here; it is very grave danger and is becoming more so every day.

Another area that we did not touch on—you spoke of this strange schizophrenia. This is true. Congressman Bruce has already commented concerning the seeming lack of goal or purpose or aim to win the cold war. There are many contradictions today, contradictions in our State Department.

For example, one of the texts I quote quite frequently in my lectures on communism is an excellent State Department document, State Department Publication 6777. This was published in March of 1959 concerning *The Communist Economic Threat*. In the opening paragraph of this document, the United States State Department says:

International communism—inspired, spearheaded, and financed by Moscow—persists in wanting to communize the world.

By use of bluster, subversion, blackmail, brainwashing, military force, and the threat of using such force, Communists have taken control of one-quarter of the world's land surface and about one-half of the world's population.

* * * * *

It is important for Americans to know of the new and subtle device which the Communists are employing, in addition to their other tactics, in attempting to achieve their goal of world domination. This new weapon is *economic penetration*. And it can be the most dangerous of all the weapons in the Communists' varied arsenal.

Well, in the light of this statement and in the light of much that we are doing and not doing in the field of economic warfare, we find some incredible contradictions.

Again, a very important part, it seems to me, of the Freedom Academy would be to come up with accurate information and study and knowledge of the Communist use of economic warfare. Certainly many of our leading businessmen, especially those dealing with foreign trade, should have that kind of information so that they know what kind of a ball game they are playing in. It is a dangerous business.

MR. JOHANSEN. I expressed just recently some misgivings as to how much enlightenment and factual information the Soviet Ambassador to the United States gave the Economic Club of Detroit, where he spoke last month, and I have been severely criticized for raising the question. I am not just sure how well equipped some of that audience was to recognize what they are getting.

MR. PHILBRICK. My guess is that many of our leading, foremost, most successful businessmen in this country today are very poorly equipped to cope with the Communist economic threat. This alone could spell disaster for our country in the long run. This is almost as though we were to take a nice, pipe-smoking, slippered, smoking-jacket-robed, poker player and sit him down at a card table with a bunch of dishonest, shrewd, conniving cardsharks. Now, he is going to lose his shirt. By the same token, some of our businessmen today simply do not begin to understand the criminal minds, the criminal intent, and the criminal purpose of those Communists with whom they are dealing.

MR. BRUCE. When we pass legislation which finances a fight against the Communists and helps to finance their internal problem—I am talking about the foreign aid bill, I mean both sides are aided here. I mean I cannot just quite comprehend this.

MR. PHILBRICK. This is wherein I believe the Freedom Academy can provide a great service in developing the kind of factual information which even Congressmen and Members of the Senate can use to great advantage before casting their very important votes on legislative matters before the Congress.

MR. POOL. No other questions?

MR. ICHORD. I have one more question.

MR. POOL. All right.

MR. ICHORD. Well, now, the Freedom Academy is not necessarily going to be advancing the immediate objectives of freedom in several instances, as I understand it. Certainly, the subversion of the Communists in this country will take a different form than the subversion in a poor, undeveloped country, say in South America, living under a dictatorship.

MR. PHILBRICK. True.

MR. ICHORD. Now, there your Freedom Academy is going to be training people how to check communism—that is the immediate objective, stop it.

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is true.

Mr. ICHORD. You are certainly going to fight it differently there than you would here.

Mr. PHILBROOK. Yes, this is indeed true. This is an element of political warfare I learned in my own experience in the Communist training cadres here in the United States. We were told over and over and over again that although we operated, as Communists, under the general overall broad direction and control of Moscow, and although all Communists throughout the world had the same objectives in mind, that the specific tactics we would use in any given circumstance would depend, number 1, on the time; number 2, on the place; and, number 3, on the circumstance.

We were to very carefully analyze and weigh each situation in each area before determining the very best thing we could do to strengthen the Soviet Union and the very best we could do ultimately to weaken and, we hoped, ultimately destroy the United States. "The time, the conditions, and the place." Over and over again, the Communists pointed that out to us.

Mr. ICHORD. The people of Cuba were comparing Castro with Batista, not Cuba with what we have to offer.

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right; and, by the same token, in developing countermeasures, you see, we must also in time take into consideration very carefully the circumstances, the background, the history of the people, the terrain, the economy, and all the rest before we can come up with any effective answers. In every instance we would have to determine what measures would most effectively strengthen the forces of freedom and weaken the forces of communism.

Mr. BRUCE. If the gentleman will yield.

Isn't the first and the major step in anything like this a complete, thorough understanding of dialectical and historical materialism? Isn't this the right foundation?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. BRUCE. Before we can understand the techniques of a play in the United States or in different countries, we must understand that foundation first.

Mr. PHILBRICK. We must understand the theory first; yes.

Mr. BRUCE. And then the faith.

Mr. PHILBRICK. And then the faith and then from that go on to understand how the theory is actually put into practice.

Mr. BRUCE. The application varies.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes.

Mr. BRUCE. But the basic premise is the same.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Always.

Mr. POOL. Any other questions?

We certainly thank you for appearing and answering our questions and supplying us with the information you have.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Olson, director of the American Legion's National Legislative Commission, will introduce our next witness, Dan O'Connor of the American Legion.

Mr. Olson.

STATEMENT OF CLARENCE H. OLSON

Mr. OLSON. My name is Clarence H. Olson. I am director of The American Legion's National Legislative Commission.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I sat back here and listened to the gentleman who preceded us (Mr. Philbrick) and I agree that it is most fortunate that we have such a man in our country who is willing and able to participate in this great fight against the communistic conspiracy.

I would also like the record to show that I share with him the great regard he has expressed for the late General MacArthur, with whom I had the pleasure of serving in the southwest Pacific during World War II. His passing is a great loss to our country; he has left a mark that I doubt will ever be equaled by another military leader.

Mr. POOL. I think the members of the committee would also like to join you in that remark.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I have a brief introductory statement which I would like to make. I regret that I am one of the great many in this country who know very little about communism. Consequently, I am not qualified to discuss it in any detail. I see it only on the surface as you will understand.

Before presenting our principal witness, Mr. O'Connor, I wish to thank this committee for the courtesy shown The American Legion by permitting its representatives to come before you today in support of legislation proposing the creation of a Freedom Academy and the establishment of a Freedom Commission. We favor the bills introduced by Messrs. Boggs and Taft; that is, H.R. 5368 and H.R. 8320, respectively.

Why does the American Legion believe such a Commission and Academy are necessary? Because it fears the encroachment of communism and we believe that, for the most part, our soldiers of freedom, active and potential, are not sufficiently knowledgeable in the area of political warfare and all that it entails to effectively thwart the Communist conspiracy. We have too many voices in the wilderness, without concert or direction, that need orientation and knowledge such as contemplated in the preambles to the bills cited earlier.

The destructive force of subversion must be met with knowledgeable, steadfast determination equal to the requisites for successful military operations. A Freedom Academy, as we see it, would be the nucleus of a force for freedom, the fountainhead of knowledge that would inspire its activity. At a time when political wars destroy the will and minds of men, it seems only logical that we have a Freedom Academy to support this new arm of defense to serve as a corollary to our service academies.

I am privileged, Mr. Chairman, to be associated today with the chairman of The American Legion's National Americanism Commission, Mr. Daniel J. O'Connor, whose official address is 50 Pine Street, New York City. Dan has an illustrious background in his chosen profession, the law. He is presently secretary of the New York City Department of Investigation. During the years 1954 to 1959 he was counsel of the Bureau of Internal Security of New York City. He received his A.B. and LL.B. from Fordham University and his LL.M.

from New York Law School. He is a veteran of World War II and the Korean war, having served as enlisted man and an officer. I feel sure he is qualified to testify before your committee, Mr. Chairman.

I am proud indeed to introduce Mr. Daniel J. O'Connor.

Mr. POOL. Thank you, Mr. Olson. We are glad to have you both here.

Mr. O'Connor, we turn it over to you now.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL J. O'CONNOR

Mr. O'CONNOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: As the distinguished members of this committee know, The American Legion has, since its very beginning, been cognizant of the Communist menace. In fact, the militancy of Americanism expressed by the founders and early organizers of The American Legion drew such wrath from the advance guard of communism in this country—the Industrial Workers of the World—that the latter shot down, in cold blood, American Legionnaires marching in the first Armistice Day parade in Centralia, Washington. That was in 1919, even as the young American Legion was perfecting its organization at its first National Convention in Minneapolis, Minnesota, November 10–12, 1919.

Forty-five years ago the basic tenets of communism may have been generally understood by a considerable portion of our population. Today, however, the complexities of Communist plans and activities have grown to such proportions that scarcely one in a thousand Americans have a mental grasp of Communist machinations. Of course, all of us, through the news media of the Nation, are familiar with the known Communist successes, such as in Cuba and elsewhere. But how to thwart communistic encroachments, before the fact, is a problem which we seem unable to solve.

While I feel certain the members of this committee recognize the long hard-fought battle which The American Legion has waged against communism since the Centralia massacre, there can be no denial that there have been changes in the techniques of political and psychological warfare. Centuries ago a question was posed to the brilliant scholar, Francis Xavier, namely: "What doth it profit a man if he gains the whole world and suffers the loss of his own soul?" Might I paraphrase that question in pointing to the tremendous armed might of our country, the greatest Nation on earth, and say, "What doth it profit the United States of America to have the greatest atomic power for both peace and war if the United States of America is robbed of its own soul?"

In the past 17 years, millions have been encircled and their lives regimented under the yoke of Moscow or Peiping because of a poison that has been administered in slow, measured, but lethal, doses to humankind in all part of the globe. The incontrovertible but sad reality is that, without firing a single weapon, the masters of Communist propaganda have been proliferate not only in the Far East, but in our own hemisphere.

There is no committee of the Congress that has performed a greater public service than the House Committee on Un-American Activities in marshaling the various sources of information reflecting the pat-

tern of infiltration not only in Latin America, Panama, and Cuba, but also within the confines of our own geography. There is no task more painstaking or more difficult than the burden shouldered by this committee in probing the influence of communism in our own society. Your committee and staff labor under constant threat of liquidation, not by members of the Communist Party alone, but by Americans who recognize the congressional power of inquiry for every subject under the sun except the exposé of the Communist conspiracy. What I would like you to understand and appreciate is that we in The American Legion, who have consistently supported the creation of a Freedom Academy, have also supported the duly constituted committees of the Congress whose findings and publications serve to spotlight the uncanny aggressors for the minds of men.

In giving our wholehearted support for the creation of the Freedom Academy, we cannot help but emphasize that the greatest care must be exercised that this new beacon of liberty shall never become, in even the smallest part, a haven for anyone who professes a belief in our way of life and yet performs brilliantly for the proponents of world socialism.

Lest you think for one moment that I have introduced a strange note amid splendid testimony offered to your committee by the Honorable Hale Boggs, majority whip from Louisiana; Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, Georgetown University professor; and many other distinguished Americans, please understand that we in The American Legion share the dismay and disappointment of many who believe the cold war has achieved some measure of success in the United States.

We have also witnessed the replacement of a program dedicated to the men of our Armed Forces on Veterans Day 1962 with comment and appraisal by a convicted perjurer, passing judgment on the political fortunes of a man who served as United States Senator and Vice President of the United States. While the producers of the program are not accused of having Communist sympathies, leftwing leanings, and so forth, there can be no question about the bad taste exercised in that decision. Why do things like this happen? Why was America's fighting man relegated to oblivion?

What is there on the American scene which causes the cancellation of a tribute to the American fighting man and substitutes instead an attack on a war veteran who held high public office by a perjurer who is given a television podium in a vain effort to restore his respectability. This is only one example of the erosion of patriotism. Only last week at a public school in East Williston, Long Island, American boys and girls from upper middle-class families refused to salute the flag of the United States. No accusation is made against the faculty of the school, but what has happened in the fabric of American education which causes this debasement of our traditional salute to the flag and our love for that for which it stands? Perhaps the "cross-fertilization of ideas" pursued in a division of research for the private sector of our society will, in the Freedom Academy, give some clue to the problem.

In my experience as a lawyer who handled the security-risk inquiry in the city of New York, I feel that I can make a personal observation on this program that terminated about 6 years ago. If it was shocking to learn that engineers and others educated in our colleges

and universities had joined the apparatus of the Communist Party and their activities remained undetected for years, then is it not of paramount importance that the greatest possible security measures be taken to insure against the possibility of the Freedom Academy itself being infiltrated by anyone tutored by the great masters of deceit? In Congressman Boggs' presentation, he pointed out, quite properly, that the work of the Freedom Academy in no way preempts the work of the FBI or the CIA. He stated that what is intended is the "use affirmatively of the great reservoir of talent that we have in the United States to show what the free system and what a free society can do," but also remarked, "I have no preconceived notions of how this Academy should be set up." Concededly, however, this is a most important corollary to the passage of this legislation, namely, the staffing of the Academy.

While The American Legion is deeply concerned about the competence of Americans who officially represent the United States, both here and abroad, our support of the Freedom Academy would also embrace the area of research for the vast sector of Americans engaged in the war of ideas who are not on the public payroll. We believe the many who are engaged in stemming the tide of Communist propaganda which has poured into this country by the ton must be encouraged, enlightened, and strengthened. Finally, we commend the Freedom Academy to your consideration. We believe its success will be measured by its service to God and country in a recognition of the basic discipline and spiritual values which have made the United States the greatest nation on earth.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I ask that the attached American Legion 1963 Convention Resolution, No. 178, be made a part of the record following my statement.

Mr. POOL. That may be done.

Mr. O'CONNOR. In behalf of the American Legion, and myself personally, I thank you for the opportunity given us today.

(The resolution follows:)

FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, SEPTEMBER 10-12, 1963

RESOLUTION No. 178

COMMITTEE: Americanism.

SUBJECT: Supports establishment of the Freedom Academy.

Whereas, The time has come to acknowledge the need of an institution to prepare Americans to wage the kind of non-military warfare at which the Communists excell, in that they have long been experts in using political, psychological, economic, and technological weapons in their ambitious plan for world conquest; and

Whereas, In the strictly military field our resources are superior and greater to theirs, though in non-military areas they have a network of organizations and tactics that have been active for years; and

Whereas, It is necessary that we mobilize ourselves more effectively the need for which is increasing every year to meet the many pronged challenge of Soviet political warfare, and calling for more effective techniques to combat this Soviet menace; and

Whereas, The State Department and the present administration has recognized the deficiency in governmental training programs for personnel who must deal with the Communists and formulate our policies toward them; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, By The American Legion, in National Convention assembled in Miami Beach, Florida, September 10-12, 1963, that The American Legion support and favor legislation seeking the establishment of a government institution to be known as The Freedom Academy, to help Americans, primarily government employees, to develop the professional competence and experience necessary to combat the extraordinary variety of techniques employed by the Communists throughout the world.

Mr. POOL. Questions?

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

The incident, Mr. O'Connor, in East Williston, Long Island, was not reported in the Midwest newspapers last week, or at least I did not catch it. Could you elaborate on what happened in East Williston?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Well, in a school in East Williston, Long Island, which I believe is called the Wheaton School, there were approximately 20 students who indicated to the headmaster or the principal of the school that they would not salute the flag of the United States. The State commander of The American Legion protested this course of conduct and even went so far to recommend that those students be expelled, in a television interview.

Mr. ICHORD. Are these children members of a certain religious denomination?

Mr. ICHORD. No; I would say they were of different religious denominations. This is a public school, as I understand it, open to anyone regardless of race, color, or creed. The objection to salute the flag was not based upon religious grounds such as that, for example, you have in the case of Jehovah's Witnesses. This was based upon a belief that we should salute a United Nations flag.

The principal (in answering Mr. Goddard, I believe was the TV interviewer) stated that he thought that we should not take any hasty action on a situation such as this, but that we ought to give the students a chance to reevaluate their conclusions and perhaps give them a chance to see that they might be in error. He did not go as far as I have quoted, but I think that is what he meant.

Mr. ICHORD. Was this a public high school?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. How many students were enrolled in the school?

Mr. O'CONNOR. They did not indicate, but looking at the school on the TV program I would say that it would probably have a capacity of 500.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Just so even the most obtuse cannot have any doubts as to what the gentleman is talking about in his very fine statement, the reference made previously to the "convicted perjurer" is of course a reference to Alger Hiss; is that not correct?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Bruce.

Mr. BRUCE. All I can say is I share your determination to be sure that the faculty of the Freedom Academy be free of the background or the indoctrination about which you expressed concern here, too. It is one of the reservations I have pending in the final version of the bill. I want to be sure that in our determination to do something good and helpful that we do not create a monster that can come back upon us. I am for the idea, but I think that the proper safeguards have to be written in specifically and categorically so that the control is clear.

Mr. O'CONNOR. On that score, Congressman, I would just like to remark that I feel, and I know Mr. Olson feels with me wholeheartedly, that a concept of an Advisory Committee from both Houses of Congress should replace an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives who are under the jurisdiction of an administrative officer.

Mr. BRUCE. I concur.

Mr. O'CONNOR. I think it would be more responsive to the people and to the Congress of the United States.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Schadeberg.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I have no questions.

Mr. POOL. No questions.

I want to say this, that I am a member of The American Legion and have been since I was a veteran in World War II. I have been very proud to be a member of it because they have always been for America, and their patriotic programs have helped a great deal in defending this country against communism and other ideologies that are alien to our philosophy.

I want to thank both of you for appearing here today as the members of a great organization.

Mr. JOHANSEN. If the gentleman will yield, before we excuse the witnesses, as a nonmember of the American Legion for chronological reasons—I was not a veteran—I want to express my admiration for the organization and particularly the pride I have in the fact that one of your past national commanders, Judge Addington Wagner, comes from my hometown.

Mr. POOL. I was talking to one of the organizers of the American Legion the other day, a very patriotic man from my hometown.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. POOL. Thank you.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. POOL. The committee will recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow when we will have other witnesses here.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., Tuesday, April 7, 1964, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, April 8, 1964.)

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368,
H.R. 8320, AND H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R.
10077, AND H.R. 11718, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF
A FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY

Part 2

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1964

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 304, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana; William M. Tuck, of Virginia; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; August E. Johansen, of Michigan; and Henry C. Schadeberg of Wisconsin.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Alfred M. Nittle, counsel; and Donald T. Appell, investigator.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Our first witness this morning is Dr. Michael C. Conley. Doctor, we are glad to have you.

For the record, please identify yourself and give a short resume of your background, education, and experience, as a basis for your qualification in making a case for or against the pending legislation.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. CONLEY

Dr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, I would be pleased to.

I was born in 1926 in Dayton, Ohio; went to the public schools there and to the north in Sidney, Ohio; served 2 years in the Army from 1944 to 1946; and thereafter attended Ohio State University, receiving all of my degrees from that university, my B.A. in 1950, my M.A. in 1951, and my doctorate in 1960.

My inclinations during my university days were a bit exotic. I wrote my master's thesis on Egyptian History, my dissertation for my doctorate on Dutch Colonial Policy in the 19th Century.

I have taught for the University of Maryland's Overseas Program for over 2 years, in Germany and France, and I have visited just about every significant city and nation in Europe, including Berlin, and I spent a month sojourning in Yugoslavia.

I joined the Intelligence Department of what was known, at that time, as the United States Army's Military Police Intelligence and Special Weapons School in Oberammergau—joined that department in 1957—and was concerned with strategic intelligence until 1961—'57 to '61. I was responsible for extensive lectures on Russian history, East European history and Balkan history, surveys of Soviet foreign policy in western Central Europe and South and Southeast Asia, and I have lectured for a number of years on Communist ideology.

In 1961, when the United States Army in Europe decided to begin a program of counterinsurgency training in Europe, I was designated by the commander of the United States Army School, Europe, in Oberammergau, southern Germany, to draw up a table of organization for a unit to teach counterinsurgency and to prepare a program of instruction for such a unit—that coming after 3 years of experience in the Intelligence Department, where I concerned myself broadly with the nature of communism and the foreign policies of the Soviet Union.

I have been intimately and very closely attached to this general business of counterinsurgency from the summer of 1961. Then, and I indeed, perhaps more than any other person in Oberammergau, was responsible for the kind of product that came out, the course of instruction that we give there, and the philosophy, in which lies the crux of what we are doing there. We from the very outset defined counterinsurgency and insurgency in very broad terms, so as to permit us to examine many of the nontraditional areas in which conflict is taking place.

I also had a great deal to do with the fact that the department was so organized that perhaps 50 to 55 percent of our personnel were not American, but were selected from all over the world for their ability to provide us with specialized knowledge in this or that area. I saw to it, as an example, that we had a fluent Chinese researcher available, an Iraqi—that was by chance, but we needed someone from the Middle East who could use Arabic, in several dialects, preferably. I saw to it that one with Russian experience in the Second World War period, a Yugoslav, was provided, and a multiplicity of other people, including Turks, Iranians, and what-have-you. I wanted that department to have the capacity to draw upon an unlimited amount of information, irrespective of language source, with no problem of language. And I think with this kind of an organization behind us, it was possible for us to develop and find out information which is, for the most part, not well known in the United States. I would like to present in the course of my testimony some of the information which we came up with.

This has been my impassioned concern: this general field of irregular warfare for 3 years, the general field of the Communist phenomenon for something like 6 years.

Does this provide you with adequate background?

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, fine. Proceed.

DR. CONLEY. Shall I turn, then, to the material I have?

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

DR. CONLEY. All right, thank you.

Let me identify myself here at the outset as belonging to the most fervent supporters of the proposed Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. My studies, to which I have just made reference, have led

me to believe very strongly that we have neither the know-how nor the doctrine for the type of organization necessary to respond effectively to the form of irregular warfare in which we are involved.

I have concerned myself, together with a research staff that works under me, with the nature of this phenomenon, and we are now hesitantly, as time permits us, concerning ourselves with what kind of things we have to do to respond effectively to the insurgent specifically, to the cold war in general. But to put my understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency in its proper perspective, I would like, if I could for just a moment, to give you my personal views on what the cold war is.

I think I can best provide you with a precept of what I mean by cold war if I draw a contrast between the thing we faced in Stalin's time and the thing we face now under Krushchev. I am concerned then with the period 1945 to 1955, let us say, or '54, as opposed to the period from 1954 to the present.

Now, what was the situation when Stalin was in the seat of power in the Soviet Union? He relied in the post-World War II period primarily upon his international party organization and, through it, he carried out that portion of his foreign policy which was most important to him. He supported the activities of this international party organization, which was essentially a covert and subversive organization, with a limited exploitation of the official machinery of the Soviet Government. In Mr. Stalin's time, the primary areas in which the official government of the Soviet Union expressed itself were in the areas of traditional diplomacy and in the areas of limited trade with the free world, at least the non-Communist bloc world.

All right, now what happens after 1954, particularly after 1956? Mr. Krushchev has retained every trick in the book written by Lenin and Stalin. As in Stalin's time, the party apparatus and the provocative techniques available to it still provide the Kremlin with a powerful base from which to conduct the subversion of other countries. But Mr. Krushchev is conducting his foreign activities much more effectively than did Stalin before him, because he does not rely exclusively upon party channels and, secondly, has adjusted his policies to take full advantage of the situation in the world in which we are confronted with a multiplicity of new countries with inexperienced administrators, no historical traditions, and no balanced budgets.

Aside from the party apparatus, which is still operative and which still plays the game the way it did in Stalin's time, you now have coming out of the Soviet Union a stepped-up trade and aid program, a rapid expansion of diplomatic relations with other countries around the world, a technical assistance effort, a foreign student training program, a grossly expanded foreign military aid support, and a cultural offensive that ranges from everything from ballet and orchestra to astronauts and trade union delegations.

Mr. Krushchev has exploited to the fullest every conceivable development that can be played through the official government of his country, and thus what you have today is—as I would understand cold war—is this: the combined, integrated, external activities of the two channels, party and state. And this is what we are concerned with. Cold war is what you get when you play to the maximum everything you can get out of state channels and party channels.

Now, I would say that cold war, if it is understood in this sense, has two portions. Wars of national liberation, or what we call insurgency movements, are the ultimate produce of what comes when you work through party channels, and "peaceful coexistence" is what happens when you work through state channels. Cold war, then, is a combination of insurgency and peaceful coexistence. Insurgency, work through a clandestine apparatus of disciplined subversives; peaceful coexistence, the combination of programs that proceed through the official government of that country.

You see, then, that I have cut out from this field with which I have directly and immediately concerned myself for the last years one half of the total spectrum of activities. Insurgency has nothing to do with guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a line on a spectrum; insurgency is half of the spectrum, and the other half of the spectrum is there to provide a cover for the subversive activities that proceed through party channels and also, where possible, to set up possible third countries from which insurgent activities can be more effectively carried out.

Now, this is the context, then, in which I would like to examine the subject of insurgency proper. But before I go to that point, I would like to present you with a chart that I prepared—unfortunately quite hurriedly last week—to point up the relationship between this total offensive of the Soviet Union and its bloc allies and our response to it. May I, Mr. Chairman, give you copies of this?

There are copies of this attached to the back of the paper you have, sir. This should also be added. The second page which you are receiving should be placed beneath the first page. When properly placed together—and I am only too ready to admit that this is an imperfect training aid—you should have a diagram something like this [indicating].

The sheet that says "Organized Religion" up in the corner should be the second of the two sheets. It should be actually a single continuous chart, starting with "Diplomacy" at the top, and ending with "Coordinated Militant Subversion" at the bottom.


The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(See "Chart A," opposite this page.)

Dr. CONLEY. Now, what I have done on the left-hand side is to list as on a spectrum, in which intensity increases toward the bottom, all of the principal areas in which the Soviet Union expresses itself internally, that is, through its formal government and through its subversive apparatus. And, on the opposite side, I have listed those areas in which American foreign policy and foreign activities respond. Now, I think a moment's glance at this chart points up the inadequacy of our response. The width and the length of the arrows is determined by objective information which is available. This is no attempt to force the facts, but to represent statistical norms.

I would like to make this point. On the Soviet side, in the activities they are involved in, from diplomacy and trade through technical training, organized religion, mass organizations, external cadre organizations, and down to coordinated militant subversion, you will notice that there is only a single break—that is to say, there is only one point where the lines are not contiguous one to the next, and that is following the politico-military bloc item. But, otherwise, the Soviet offensive,

CHART A



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from top to bottom, is an integrated phenomenon, totally opportunistic, but totally integrated. Our response to it, you will see, is full of holes. In many of the areas in which we are being challenged, we are not responding at all, and in other areas, we are responding weakly, imperfectly.

This chart suggests that there is a need for a response at every level. Either we must have a program equally as good as the Soviets or we must have a program to thwart their efforts in that particular area, and we also need integration. We need a program that is integrated, balanced, and total.

Now, one half of the things with which the Soviet Union is concerned here, and which I attempt to represent by diagramming, are directly related to the question of insurgency proper. And it is in this framework that I would like to turn, then, to the question of insurgency itself, seeing it by my definition as one half of the total foreign activities of the Soviet Union.

All right. Now, in Oberammergau, where we are concerned with this question of insurgency, we are primarily preoccupied with two periods in the development of an insurgent movement, which we call respectively the clandestine and the military operational phases. These correspond to what the special group counterinsurgency under the President would call Phase One and Two programs in insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Now, we would define the clandestine phase as having its beginning at that point when organizational work begins; when the first party cadre arrives in virgin territory and begins organizational work, the clandestine phase of insurgency has begun.

The ultimate mission of the clandestine phase is a power seizure through means short of the use of military force. That is to say, ideally, where possible, the seizure of power would come through a coup d'etat or an election victory in which the party works behind a front federation that actively engages in open politics.

Now, if it is not possible to seize power in this fashion, then you may resort to what we can call protracted revolutionary warfare, or the military operational phase of insurgency movements. If possible, they would prefer to take over through clandestine means alone, simply because it is cheaper and it requires less discipline; but they have shown themselves admirably capable of resorting to protracted techniques involving military units, and I would like to turn my attention here primarily to that second period, when the guerrilla appears.

Now, we in the West have been so impressed with the fighting capacity of the guerrilla that we have tended to overlook the fact that he is only one small part of the phenomenon of insurgency, which is a much greater story. I would like to examine what, in fact, happens when a country like South Vietnam finds itself gradually drawn into a period of military operational insurgency. The story starts, of course, back in the clandestine period. Imagine, if you will, a party organization, Communist party organization in a country—the Politburo at the top supported by a central committee of executors and supervisors, and a national organization proceeding down through the provinces to the regions, to the districts, and to local units, between which the agglomerate of cells are organized.

One other body I might mention at this point would be attached at the local or district level of the party organization, the so-called strong-arm squads. Now, these groups may have any of a variety of names, depending upon the country in which they are operating. They can be called, as an example, the Vanguard of the People, the People's Peace Corps, or any of a number of names, but their function is to provide the tacticians who know how to redirect a street demonstration until it ends up in front of the America house. Included here would be the ones who employ physical persuasion where ideological persuasion proves not to be enough. These would be strong-arm groups in the lower reaches of the party in the country in question.

All right. Now, once it has been decided that the party will participate in subversive insurgency movement, the Politburo at the top of the party organization will send mobilization orders down through its party structure from the province to the region to the district, and the local district party organization will receive the order, "Send 'Actives' out into rural areas where adverse terrain exists."

Now, the "Active" will be a group of 6, 7, 10 people. These will be highly select party members who are thoroughly experienced in one or another form of irregular activity. There will be a man who is an expert on political work, on ideological training, on youth groups, and so on. This will be a small, compact group of men sent out into a rural area. They will constitute the nucleus of a future regional force and also, at the same time, the command structure for a regional force.

Once the "Active" is in the countryside, well placed, then there will be a call on the party organization in that district of the country to provide volunteers to work under the "Active," and at least a portion of the people who will join the "Active" now will be members of strong-arm groups and will come out of urban areas.

Gradually, under the direction of that "Active," a force of perhaps 50 men will develop out there, which will receive military training and which will be capable of military action, such as raiding isolated police posts and the like.

When that force, which we will call regional, is operational and the party organization has decided that it is indeed time to go into the military operational phase of their instructions, then the following things will happen.

First off, the political base of the Politburo organization will rename itself "Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army." Now, this is a critical juncture. The Communist knows that he will not be able to rouse up popular support among the population at large if he fights in the name of communism. But if he fights as the liberator from this, that, or the other thing, you can draw support, so the members of the Politburo simply rename themselves "Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army"; and the party apparatus below it—provincial, regional, district, local level—renames itself "Territorial Military Organization of the Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army."

That is to say, the Communist stops calling himself a Communist and adopts an alias. The regional forces come under the control of the Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army, which is the Politburo, but operate functionally at the regional level with the

party organization, and the regional party organization becomes the Regional Territorial Military Organization headquarters.

Now, this does not in any way constitute a subordination of the political leadership of the party to military leadership—not one bit. It is simply a change of name for tactical and psychological purposes.

Now at that stage, then, two things begin. The regional force, an organization of 50, possibly 60 or 70 men—depending upon how fast they have effected their work there—begins small unit action. But concurrent with this, the “Active” starts sending organizers out to the villages.

Now the Communist has a comprehensive doctrine, step by step, on what you do to the village population. And, if I may, I would like to submit to you here this following chart.

(See “Chart B,” p. 1392.)

Dr. CONLEY. Sir, I am just beginning an examination of the precise step-by-step procedures employed by the Communist when he has become militarily operational in an insurgency movement to organize village population, to mobilize them. You will see up in the upper left-hand corner, “District Committee” of the party organization, which is now operating under the name, “Territorial Military Organization,” the TMO.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, may I interrupt you? As I understand, you are presenting your personal views.

Dr. CONLEY. What I am presenting here now is not a personal view, but documented information.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but there is none of the information you use as the basis of the testimony which carries a classification?

Dr. CONLEY. Oh, no, sir. No. I might—indeed, sir, thank you for this point. There are two things I should stress here: First, that I am speaking as a private citizen—

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

Dr. CONLEY. —and secondly, that I am using exclusively unclassified materials.

The CHAIRMAN. As an individual, you have presented documented evidence, but it is your individual belief.


Dr. CONLEY. Yes, indeed; and it is exclusively drawn from unclassified materials.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Dr. CONLEY. Now associated with the District Committee, which is the TMO here, is the regional unit of 50 or 60 persons who developed out of the “Active” sent to the countryside in the clandestine phase, and then you see immediately below it two organizers who are sent out to the villages.

If I may, let me concern you with the material in the very middle of the diagram, first off. The organizers appear in a village area, let us say a village of 500 persons to a thousand persons or a group of hamlets closely associated. Using persuasion, in which they are well schooled, plus the terrorism implicit in the fact that a regional unit is not too far off, they will organize the peasant population into what I would call functional groups, that is to say, they will organize them according to sex, age, occupation. The peasants will be grouped together into a mass functional organization, the women, the children, the youth. Over each of these elements of the rural population, a secretary will

CHART B



be designated, and the number of these organizations will be expanded as the possibility arises and as the organizational work begins.

Once the peasantry has been duly organized into mass organizations, or functional groups, the two organizers will then see to it that elections occur among the village population. Now the Communist is very effective in using the devices of Western democracies in a perverted form. The election phenomenon which is to take place now in a rural area is for this purpose. The Communist would see to it that, by voting, the rural population commits an act of symbolic and de facto revolt, sedition, against the government of their country. By conducting independent elections locally without the slightest reference to the formally established government of the country, they have in fact rebelled. It is an act of sedition, and they compromise themselves to that extent. Now out of the elections that come, there develops two bodies: a Peoples' Court, supposedly elected—

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, let me ask you this question: Thus far, apparently, nothing has happened in the local machinery of government, there has been no enactment of authority through municipal action, state action, district action of the existing regime—

Dr. CONLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN—authorizing the election? I mean, what has happened, meantime? Is somebody dissatisfied that an election is being called contrary to, or not in accordance with, local machinery for conducting the government? Or will you develop that later?

Dr. CONLEY. Well, no. First, I would say this: there are many areas of the earth's surface where there is no local machinery of government, or it is so ineffective that it does not have a meaningful purpose in the daily life of the peasant. There are areas—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, maybe that is my difficulty. Things such as you are describing would hardly happen overnight here.

Dr. CONLEY. In the United States, you mean. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It would require legislative action to conduct the election, but you are talking about other areas.

Dr. CONLEY. Yes, sir; that is true. My remarks are primarily directed toward the situation in the so-called modernizing countries of the earth.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Dr. CONLEY. And then, of course, in other areas of the earth where a government of sorts does exist at the local level, it will be the function of the regional unit to see to it that it disappears. This itself is an alternate. The regional unit has primarily not a military but a political function. It provides the organizer, who is mobilizing the village population, with the potential of terror and the fact of liquidation where it is necessary; and it is a force which, also on the side, involves itself in small unit actions against military forces, but its essential purpose is political and not military.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Dr. CONLEY. Now you develop a Peoples' Court, five- or six-man body, on the one hand, and you develop a Peoples' Liberation Committee or Council on the other hand. Now the court will be a small body, five or six persons, possibly; the committee, a large body, will represent supposedly the traditions of legislative as opposed to judicial powers, and one person will be picked out as a secretary to head up the

Peoples' Liberation Committee, representing in Western tradition an executive authority.

Now that is the situation that is shown on the chart that I have just provided you, the third chart I have given you there.

(See "Chart C," p. 1395.)

Dr. CONLEY. The facade presented by the organizers, now working in the name of the Territorial Military Organization, is that the people now have taken their future in their own hands and are acting "democratically." In fact, however, it rapidly develops that the two organizers have seen to it that they become, respectively, the president of the Peoples' Court and the associate justice. They also see to it that the supervision of all future elections is a function of the Peoples' Court and they very quickly call under their own de facto control the Village Guard, which is theoretically attached to the secretary of the council. That is to say, that the Peoples' Court, including the two organizers, assumes control over election procedures and control over the armed force locally available, with which enemies of the people are to be executed. Now, he who controls these two powers in society is indeed the leader of society. There is your source of executive authority in society, he who controls these powers. Consequently, the diagram which I have given you is not in itself the end; it must be reorganized. This is the facade that that Communist will use in his propaganda. This diagram represents de facto authority and power.

Now in an attempt to represent functional channels, I put the president of the Peoples' Court at the top of the chart. He, in fact, calls the shots; and he is functionally, now, the man who has moved the Territorial Military Organization into the village, to the grass-roots level. Beneath him function two men, his associate justice and the secretary of the PLC. The secretary of the PLC and the Liberation Committee—


The CHAIRMAN. What is PLC?

Dr. CONLEY. Peoples' Liberation Committee. The secretary of the PLC and the PLC itself, the Peoples' Liberation Committee, are the rubberstamp legislature, which is effectively controlled through the president of the People's Court. The associate justice controls the rest of the justices in the court system, plus the Village Guard. There is the situation that actually develops in a country like, let us say, Vietnam today. The names used have nothing to do with the function fulfilled. The facade of direct democratic action by the people is kept, but the fact of party control under assumed names is there.

Now, it is interesting to note, gentlemen, that this kind of organizational step requires only two men, the two organizers who are sent in, plus the general knowledge of the population that not too far off, 5, 10 miles away, is a regional unit. And when elections are held, of course, there will always be a provision that those members of the regional units who came from that particular area where the election is to be held will return home to participate in the election—carrying rifle over shoulder, of course.

Now, imagine this kind of a department, step by step, in many districts in the country, not in just one, with many organizers going out to one village after the other and creating that farcical process of so-called democratic election. If you use this technique long enough and

CHART C



broadly enough, you can produce out of it a new government in the country at large, which is in open rebellion and conflict against the duly constituted government.

Let me give you the last of my diagrams, after which I will not bother you with additional paper here.

(See "Chart D," p. 1397.)

Dr. CONLEY. This last diagram which I give you attempts to represent the tragedy of what is happening in too many countries in the world today in which insurgencies are in process. You see on this chart three parallel echelons, all of them proceeding down from the Politbureau of the party organization. In the center of the chart is the party organization itself, which now operates under the name of the Territorial Military Organization, as we referred to it before, and which has available to it, where it faces severe opposition, a regional unit, capable of terror and liquidation. This party organization does not work in the name of the party any longer, but in the name of "liberation."


To the left of the party organization, you will see the Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army—which is the Politbureau, once again, by a different name, under which regular units develop. As you make this process work more and more effectively, you draw out of your regional units, where you have men with field experience, increasing numbers of persons for the kind of training you need to produce a more or less quasi-regular military organization.

And to the right-hand center of our diagram, you see the system of Peoples' Liberation Committees developing, now, from the village, which we have talked about, to the national level—the top, the Executive Committee of the Peoples' Liberation Front, which is controlled by the Politbureau, but under still another name. The election process, as indicated here, is controlled by the TMO, through commissions that operate at the village and higher levels. The list of names put up by the commission is also approved by the villagers in question, since they know that behind the commission there stands the power of the party, and behind the power of the party stands the regional unit. You can see, then, the very strong political content of the activities of that unit.

Now gentlemen, I have been very brief here; I have attempted to be as brief as I can. In the prepared statement I have brought with me there is a bit more information on this. But I would say this about this thing, however. This way in which to go about, step by step, rationally and by preconception, organizing the population for subversive warfare—this concept was fully organizational and well known among international Communist leaders at the latest by 1939—that is to say, before World War II began.

The original work in the direction of developing this comprehensive doctrine on how to give the appearance to the outside world that a spontaneous democratic process is taking place—the original work began about 1900 by Lenin himself. By 1939, all of the techniques necessary to conduct this form of active war had been developed. And during the World War II period and the immediate post-World War II period, we see this practice, which I have briefly outlined here, repeated time and time again. There is no meaningful difference between what happens in my diagram here and what happened under

CHART D



Tito in Yugoslavia, what happened under Mao Tse-tung in China, what happened in the Philippines with the Hukbalahaps, what happened in Greece in the immediate post-World War II period. All of these movements were conducted almost with slavish adherence to the simple procedure that I have outlined here.

In principle, the Communist is certain how to do this. He has been able to modify his material on the basis of practical experience. Thus, to the techniques I have previously discussed here, you can add the technique of the infiltrated terrorist unit, which was developed by the Soviet Union on the basis of her World War II guerrilla experience; and then with this modified form, these techniques are again used in the era of the 1950's and 1960's.

The warfare with which we are confronted today in South Vietnam is developed essentially in accordance with these principles, and every one of the organizational blocs indicated on the last of the four charts I have given you can be identified in Vietnam. The whole thing is there and functioning exactly in accordance with the procedures I have suggested.

Thus far, I have attempted to do two things: One is to give you a concept of a personal view of what cold war is, the combining of the state and party channels, and secondly, more specifically, what an insurgency movement is, subversive style. It is one half of the total picture and it is developed and escalated according to precalculated organizational plans, which combine terrorism with military acts and military acts with politics and sociology.

Now how do we go about responding effectively on the total level and on the specific level to the subversive insurgent movement? Can we go to the various agencies of our Government and tell them that they should step up their activity, that each of them should expand its operations, be more original in its thinking?

I don't think this is an answer. I think that to fill in the gaps that appear on the chart here and respond to the political organizational work of the insurgent in countries like South Vietnam, we need a kind of response and an approach which is comprehensive. To tell each agency of Government independently, "Well, do something more about it," is in my mind an unprofessional approach to the question. I think that to tell each agency of the Government to act independently in its own sphere is like telling a division commander that each of his battalions should work out its own independent plan for its participation in the divisional effort to take hill 201. The only conditions under which the division commander might be tempted to relinquish control in favor of his battalion commanders is when his forces are hopelessly encircled and he can think of nothing but retreat.

Why doesn't the division commander surrender control to his battalion commanders? Well, for several reasons: First, from the very beginning of his professional career, he has been taught that the effective orchestration of his operation is more than half of the battle in itself. Now, obviously, he won't use the word "orchestration," but what he is thinking about is that ingenious integration of the total resources and effectiveness of each of the multiple battalions under him. The fact that he is able to meaningfully and artistically integrate the roles of the representative battalions, is in itself a substantial improvement of his chances of winning, so he is an orches-

trator, but he is something else too. He is a man who can rely upon a detailed, articulated doctrine which provides him with guidelines on what are the best possibilities under these given circumstances. These are doctrines, and he also has available to him men who have been trained in discipline, who have specialized knowledge and physical capacities. The commander, then, of the division is an orchestrator, conscious of the capabilities of his trained specialists, who operates in accordance with a doctrine.

Now in the context of the total cold war situation, the problem facing the commander, namely, the President of the United States, is decidedly more complex than that of the division commander. But, nevertheless, I would suggest that these three factors still are definitive: the ability to orchestrate, to use disciplined and trained personnel, and to work in accordance with doctrine.

Now in the United States, the concept of orchestrating is widely acknowledged today. Within the various agencies of our Government, we also have highly trained, responsible, and disciplined staffs. They are encouraged to think somewhat narrowly in terms of the interests of their agencies of Government, but still, they are a cadre. What we don't have is the doctrine. Think of the range of techniques—psychological, terroristic, political, military—that figure in the organization of a village, that figure in the organization of this comprehensive national apparatus, and think of all the gaps in the first two diagrams I gave you, where we don't respond.

Now we have to have answers; we have to have written, black on white answers, on what to do about the insurgents' activities at stage one, stage two, stage three, and we have to fill in all the gaps on our chart here. We are not responding politically to the offensive against us. We have got to fill those gaps in with our own positive programs, where our Christian ethics permit it, and we have got to work out other programs that thwart the activities of the Communists where our Christian ethics won't allow us to be dragged down into the muck from which they operate.

We need, with respect to this specific question of insurgency and with regard to the broad subject of the cold war in general, comprehensive doctrine which provides us with a basis for integration, balance, and totality in our response.

Now just to give you an example of some of the things we don't know, let me mention some of the areas in which we can't respond to this thing as yet.

We don't have a doctrine on how to proceed from an information program to an organizational program. Let me say this: Not to attempt to convince other peoples of the righteousness of the stands we take, not to do that would be treachery, but to do it, and then not provide the local people with the means through which they can organizationally express themselves and participate in this effort, that is to be an amateur. We must have some way whereby we can proceed from programs in which we convince people to programs in which they are provided with organizational means of expressing their convictions.

Another thing: This is a crying necessity today that the free world be provided with a vocabulary of terms to replace the ones the Communists have fabricated for us. On the psychological level, we allow

the Communist victory too cheaply, and this is indeed morally reprehensible, because we let him win by default. How strong can our position be in the eyes of the Vietnamese citizenry when we refer to guerrilla base areas of the Viet Cong as "liberated zones?"

We need to develop a doctrine. It must be a conscious program. We need a vocabulary which is distributed to every newspaper, every magazine and radio station in the United States, for their use as they so desire. More technically, we need a doctrine on how to integrate military and police functions. We do not have a comprehensive doctrine on the relative function, the representative functions of police and military groups, as they are blended together for a response in an insurgent situation. We need a careful reexamination of our AID program in the light of its psychological content and we have to consider the possibility of supporting it with a political aid program, not only an economic aid program.

We need, as an example, a doctrine on how to motivate, on the formulation of a mission, and the assignment of command responsibility over paramilitary forces of a civilian part-time character, which we don't have. We do not have a doctrine on how to handle paramilitary forces, part-time civilian soldiers, in a counterinsurgency situation.

We need a doctrine on how to offset the subversive propaganda content of the Soviet Union's economic and technical training programs in modernizing countries which pollute the atmosphere in such countries and make positive work difficult.

We need a doctrine on precisely how to make a system of civil-military counterinsurgency councils at all levels of government work.

Now these are only a few of the many areas in which we need fundamental doctrinal statements. Now, can we farm out these questions to the agencies of Government which come closest to the area we are concerned with, and let them answer them? I would say no. I say that it would be unprofessional. If you want answers to questions like this, which are essential to fight, then you turn this whole problem over to a Freedom Academy, and you provide that body with every conceivable assistance possible, so that it can begin its work at the earliest possible moment.

If you turn this kind of question over to an established agency of Government, then they will answer the questions in terms of their specialized knowledge and their current operational capacities. If you turn these kinds of questions over to a Freedom Academy, they will answer in terms of the totality of the cold war and they will turn the question of implementation over to the President.

While the knowledge of every agency of Government should be available to the research and instructing staff of this organization, it should not be subordinated to any of them. We want answers to the totality of the threat before us today, which is real and urgent. We need not more specialized thinking in areas that are not integrated.

Let me add just one last word here, in reference to that matter of making the specialist's knowledge available to the Freedom Academy.

Now in much of the literature of the friends of the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy, there are references to the necessity of studying the nonmilitary aspects of this global conflict. I would just like to add a word about this. I think I understand what the

friends of this bill mean by this, and if I might permit myself, I suggest they mean this: When they talk about the nonmilitary aspects of the conflict, they are talking about those areas and activities not traditionally considered relevant to the principal mission assigned to professional armed forces in Western countries.

Now if we can live with that definition, then I would say that the United States Army, as an example, is very much concerned with the nonmilitary part of the global conflict. If you think for a moment about organization of a village—what part of that is a military effort and what part of that is a nonmilitary effort? And can you meaningfully separate these things?

I think not. And since the Army must fight at that level, it must concern itself, then, with nonmilitary aspects of the global conflict. The Army can't solve this problem by itself. But I would also suggest that to exclude the Army from the faculty of the Freedom Academy would be to read ourselves out of the problem. If the Army can't solve the problem by itself, then I would suggest that it is still true that the problem is insolvable without the Army. So preoccupation with nonmilitary aspects of the global conflict is not the same thing as preoccupation with programs in which the Army is not involved.

Gentlemen, I don't know how successful I have been, but I hope that I have brought to your attention some facts that may not have concerned you previously about the nature of the conflict in its totality and our response to it and, more in detail at the grassroots level, the nature of what happens in a little village, stuck up on the hills of the central Annamite areas of South Vietnam or in the back woods of Venezuela or in the mountainous areas of eastern Colombia or in a multitude of other countries where the same thing is being done again with such absolute conformity to pattern that it is not really interesting to investigate new cases any more. We know in such detail what they do the first month, the second month, the third month. What we don't know is what to do about them, but these are questions and problems that are amenable to rational solution. All we have to do is provide a place and an atmosphere and a context conducive to approaching the totality of the problem rather than its bits and pieces, and that's the Freedom Academy. This would be a major breakthrough of the most urgent necessity.

Let me read you here very briefly something that Mr. Lenin once wrote:

A man who is weak and vacillating on theoretical questions, who has a narrow outlook, who makes excuses for his own slackness on the ground that the masses are awakening spontaneously * * * who is unable to conceive a broad and bold plan, who is incapable of inspiring even his enemies with respect for himself, and who is inexperienced and clumsy in his own professional art * * * such a man is * * * a hopeless amateur.

Gentlemen, to strengthen the territorial integrity of the United States and the free world is a moral act. To abstain from performing this act is not to rise to a higher ethical level, in which you place a code of morality above your personal security. Not to do this is to surrender the battlefield to immorality by default.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think we might have time for a few questions.

I appreciate your very penetrating discussion of the cold war and actual operations in areas, foreign areas with which you are familiar, and that is the area I know you expected to cover.

Coming to the operation and effectiveness of the proposed Academy, as it would apply—but first I should say that the facilities of the Academy would be used, utilized, in the areas that you have described in many ways, through foreign nationals who would be attending it. But how do you visualize the usefulness of the Academy, the Commission, which is the thing we have to sell to the Congress, as it affects not these villages you are talking about—because it is incomprehensible to many people, unfortunately, that it could happen here—how would you visualize the usefulness of the Academy to people right here at home—people in labor, in management, in all segments of our society?

Dr. CONLEY. Well, sir, I would say, first of all, it could happen here—I profoundly believe.

Secondly, it seems to me that the essence of the form of government we have is that the programs we conduct in the foreign policy area be supported by a consensus of public opinion which is well over 50 percent. We must make available to the general public the knowledge that would convince it of the correctness of foreign policy, and I don't see how else we can do it. It strikes me as being perfectly logical that you take what our psychological operations officers would call the key communicator from the labor union, from the women's group, from the Aquinases, and what-have-you, and make available to him a course of instruction—a few weeks, a couple of months, it depends—simply make the information available to him. I think that to know is to be motivated, and it seems to me that this is precisely the technique for producing that groundswell of support behind an aggressive foreign policy, which is the crying necessity of our period. I consider—I say, myself—I consider absolutely indispensable that this Academy teach the civil population of the United States, the professional Government employee in every service, and foreign students; to exclude any of these three groups, in my mind, would be to misunderstand the intent of the whole program. What you would expect from the foreign student would be different from what you would expect from the American civilian, but both of them need to be informed. One of them to provide that support in the population of the United States; the other, the know-how of what to do next. I think there must be this. To exclude any of these three categories is to misunderstand its intent.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, we don't mean to exclude.

Dr. CONLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You are arguing for it?

Dr. CONLEY. Oh, very strongly. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I was referring to practical operations and usefulness from the point of view of internal security here, applicable now. People expect more of this phase of the bill, I suspect, than of the other phases of it because, you must understand, foreign policy under our Constitution is left up to the executive department, the President and the Secretary of State, through their vast operations. But certainly, if this Academy were required to make foreign policy, I am afraid that you just couldn't sell it.

Dr. CONLEY. Yes, sir. May I add this word here?

I would draw a very sharp distinction between doctrine and policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. CONLEY. Whether you attack bill 201 is policy. That group of techniques which are most likely to produce a successful operation, should you attack, is doctrine.

Now policy is the selection of one of a series of alternate courses of action which are possible in any situation. Such a decision is exclusively a matter of the State Department, and not of the Freedom Academy. The Freedom Academy is to provide a comprehensive doctrine on what are the alternatives available, what courses of action are possible, what blending, what weapons systems may be used.

Mr. TUCK. That is the third bell.

Mr. POOL. I have one question.

Quickly answer this, if you can.

You mentioned terror in the regional units. Do you have hopes that we can counteract that by some doctrine or some policy?

Dr. CONLEY. Yes, very definitely, sir.

Mr. POOL. We don't go for that ourselves, so what would you say? Have you got an idea on that?

Dr. CONLEY. Well, very quickly, yes, I have a couple of ideas. But secondly, it is precisely these kinds of questions—How do we counteract this without doing simply the same things ourselves?—it is precisely these kinds of questions on which we must have an exhaustive examination. The fact that there is no answer to that is a reason for the Freedom Academy.

Myself, I would suggest very briefly that one of the responses to it is through the use of paramilitary forces. If you can convince the people that you are right, organize them so that they can express themselves, and then put them to some task, you can generate a reaction against this kind of activity of a terroristic nature. I think there are definitely alternate programs, but we need someone who will sit down and work this out.

Mr. POOL. That is encouraging. I thank you.

Dr. CONLEY. I most definitely think there is an answer, yes.

(Dr. Conley's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. CONLEY

Gentlemen, to identify myself at the outset, I belong among the most fervent supporters of the proposed Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. My studies in the field of Soviet history and politics and the international Communist apparatus during the last 6 years have made increasingly apparent to me that we have neither the know-how nor the organizational means to stop the further encroachments of the Communist bloc, let alone initiating an offensive "rollback". I have been strengthened in this conviction by the somewhat more specialized studies I have conducted or directed during the past 3 years, specifically in the field of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

In the Paramilitary Actions Department of U.S. Army School, Europe, in Oberammergau, I have associated myself with a unique group of persons, and together with them we have been able to identify in detail the manner in which Mr. Khrushchev's "Wars of Liberation" are unloosed upon one country after the other about the globe. To the extent that our means permit, we are now grappling with the construction of an integrated doctrine on what we must be realistically capable of doing in order to thwart the calculated designs which we have identified. I should like to turn my attention to the facts we have established regarding the insurgent, and then—in the light of my findings—take a second look at why it is that the present procedures followed by our Government—even

with the improvements from the period of the Kennedy administration—still remain inadequate in the face of the challenge that faces us.

But first, I would like to put this matter of Communist-inspired subversive insurgency in context by briefly giving you a personal view of the essential features of what we call cold war. I believe we can most readily grasp the nature of the current cold war by contrasting the foreign activities of the post-World War II Stalin era, from 1945 to 1953, with the Khrushchev-Mao Tse-tung epoch after 1954.

In carrying out his external policies, Stalin relied primarily upon the CPSU and the system of so-called national Communist parties about the world, embraced in his international Communist apparatus. He supported the efforts of this organization, which were essentially covert and subversive, with the tools of diplomacy and limited international trade. For the rest, the official machinery of his government was not significantly utilized to support the foreign policies implemented through party channels. His approach was—in terms of the current situation—crude, unimaginative. His stratagems were readily identifiable. His efforts frequently counterproductive.

Now what happens after 1954, particularly after 1956? Khrushchev has retained every trick in the Lenin-Stalin book of subversion. As in Stalin's time, the party apparatus and the provocative techniques of international communism still provide the Kremlin with a base from which the subversion of other countries is commenced. But Khrushchev is conducting this program with inestimably greater professional competence for two reasons. First, he does not make Stalin's mistake of relying almost exclusively on party channels. Secondly, he has realistically oriented his strategy to exploit to the fullest the distinctive situation which has developed in the post-World War II world. He, unlike Stalin, realizes the potentials consequent upon the appearance of a vast number of new countries without experienced administrators, historical traditions, or balanced budgets.

Alongside the international party apparatus, he pushes a grossly expanded public program, implemented through official government channels. Khrushchev, much the better strategist, has combined party and state channels. And to an unprecedented effect! Let us look for a moment at what he has done through the agency of the Soviet Government.

He has expanded the number of countries with which the Soviet Union has diplomatic relations. The U.S.S.R. is now engaged in a stepped-up trade program with non-Communist countries. It has undertaken an expansive aid program, a farflung technical assistance effort, and a relentless cultural offensive, ranging from ballet and orchestra to astronauts and trade union delegations. The result? The legitimate presence of large numbers of Soviet citizens in a majority of nations of the world has provided the subversive apparatus with vantage points from which to undertake operations previously denied it, while the successes of the party's activity are opening ever-new fields for penetration via the agencies of the U.S.S.R.'s formal government facade. By integrating party and state, Khrushchev has grossly expanded his fields of operation and the likelihood of the success of his endeavors.

The cold war in which we today are engaged is to be understood in this frame of reference. It is made up, broadly, of two elements: subversive insurgency movements, handled through party channels, and "peaceful coexistence," the program conducted through the governmental agencies of the bloc countries and which embraces diplomacy (to include military assistance), trade, aid, technical assistance, foreign student programs, and cultural exchanges.

If we think in terms of this conceptual framework and consider the cold war as the sum total of the external activities conducted through the combined resources of party and government framework, we are justified already at the outset of our investigation in drawing certain conclusions regarding the competence of the United States currently to respond to the challenge. Let me turn your attention to the first of the charts which have been distributed to you. It attempts to identify the essential multiple elements in the U.S.S.R.'s foreign activities and contrasts them with our appropriate responses. You will notice that the weapons systems available to Khrushchev constitute, with one exception, a continuous band of instruments for an integrated offensive. The length of the several arrows indicates the relative strength of the respective efforts. The American response, as is immediately apparent, is sporadic, piecemeal, and lacks integration. The only areas in which we are producing a superior effort are the military and economic sectors, but the lack of thoroughgoing integra-

tion means that we must necessarily blunt the effectiveness of such major positive operations as we do conduct.

It is in this context that I would have you view what I now wish to say about subversive insurgency. On the one hand, I claim a very important place in the sun for the business with which I have concerned myself for some 3 years. It's not just one of the lines on the spectrum of techniques available to the Communist in the cold war; it is one half of the total offensive. For this reason, I would suggest that there is a world of difference between a subversive insurgent and a guerrilla. One half of all the foreign activities listed on the Soviet side of the chart are directly relevant to insurgency, and the other half provide such subversion with the prerequisite of a favorable international climate of opinion and third-country bases for support, whether official or unofficial.

On the other hand, I would alert you as to the weakness of our response to the totality of the cold war before I proceed to examine our more specific inadequacies with respect to subversive insurgency.

Having said this, let me now analyze some of the central elements of subversive insurgency, stressing its organizational aspects. We in Oberammergau concentrate our attention on two periods in the development of a subversive insurgency movement which we identify, respectively, as the clandestine phase and the military operational phase and which correspond with what Special Group (CI) identifies as Phase One and Two. We recognize no sharp demarcation between these periods, teaching that subversive insurgency is a consciously preconceived and directed cumulative phenomenon which intensifies step by step. It progresses from activities below the level of detection to operations beyond the indigenous government's capacity to control. During both periods a multiplicity of highly sophisticated techniques and procedures are employed.

The clandestine phase commences when party members begin their first organizational work within the population of a country. At this point, there is no blaze of battle, no guerrillas, and even street demonstrations will commence only sometime after organizational work is well under way. The goal of this phase is the seizure of power by means other than the resort to protracted military force. It may consequently be successfully concluded with a coup d'etat or an election victory carried by a front federation which is effectively under party control. This is the preferred plan since it costs the least and involves a minimum of coordination and discipline.

But today, gentlemen, I would like to concentrate our attention on the less understood second phase during which the guerrilla does put in his appearance. We in the West have been impressed with the fighting ability of this chap so long that we have not fully appreciated that he is only a small part of the effort which unfolds in the course of revolutionary warfare during its military operational phase. Let me try to give you a feel for the bigger story.

We begin with the Communist party organization, which was developed during the clandestine phase of activities. At its top is a Politburo of national party policymakers headed by a general secretary. This body is assisted by a larger central committee of hard-core party members. And beneath this level, the organization stretches out across the country through provincial, regional, district, and local committees with their subordinated conglomerate of 3 to 20 men cells. Within these committees are the men who will take over the country's administration and government if their efforts are successful. In other words, they constitute a shadow government. At the local level the party will also organize specialized strong-arm squads which may be identified for tactical reasons with any of a number of names. They organize crowds, protest meetings, and demonstrations and also deal physically with opposition.

Once it has been decided to enter into open armed conflict, the Politbureau of the central committee will send mobilization directives through the party organization down to district committees, instructing them to select party members to form "Actives." An "Active" will consist of some 8 to 10 people, highly specialized in one or more fields. They will locate in a region of adverse terrain and begin the training of individuals, at least partially drawn from the strong-arm squads. The preparations in the countryside will be supported by stepped-up mass demonstrations, riots, strikes, and violence against the police in urban centers.

At this juncture, if the party considers the situation to be favorable, it will take on a new nomenclature to give itself a military "look." Aware that many people who would not fight for communism will indeed support "liberators," the

Politburo now calls itself the Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army. The provincial and lower bodies, in turn, identify themselves as the various levels of authority in the Territorial Military Organization. But it is important to keep this matter clear: The change in name is no subjugation to military leadership. The change is a tactical step calculated for psychological and propaganda purposes.

Once the "Active" has organized a group of up to 50 effective fighters, it undertakes two programs: it begins to attack, isolated police stations, and it sends out organizers with the mission of mobilizing rural villagers to support the regional units. It is to this latter phenomenon that I would turn my attention.

For a village or collection of hamlets of 500 to a thousand persons, the party sends two mobilizers. Relying upon persuasion and the intimidation provided by the presence of the regional force, they will organize the rural inhabitants into functional groups according to age, sex, occupation, or education. As they achieve control, they expand the number of these mass organizations and see to the appointment of secretaries for each group. The organizers will work diligently to see to it that the various groups are constantly occupied in fulfilling some specifically assigned mission and that every spare moment of each member of a mass organization is completely taken up in group activities. In this fashion, propaganda of the word is transformed into propaganda of the deed.

Once this activity is well underway, the organizers will arrange for local "democratic" elections intended to establish two "popular" bodies: a "Peoples' Liberation Council" and a "Peoples' Court," the first body with a strength of possibly 20 persons, the second to have around 5 or 6 members. Both bodies are advertised as coequal, representing, respectively, legislative and judicial functions.

Wishing to remain out of the limelight, the organizers will arrange to be elected to the "Peoples' Court," not to the more attention-gathering "Liberation Council" with its "Peoples' Secretary." They will occupy the offices respectively of president and associate justice of the Peoples' Court. They will see to it that the secretary of the PLC is a pliable individual whom they can easily control.

To further guarantee control, the organizers will arrange that the peasantry do not determine which candidate will head up each of the elected bodies, but that they leave this matter to be decided among those elected after the voting has been finished. In this fashion, the population, organized in a series of mass organizations, will select persons who will occupy legislative offices.

Now the conduct of these elections is the decisive, the all-critical step in the process of building control over the peasantry in any given area. To participate in the elections is ipso facto an act of both symbolic and de facto rebellion against the duly constituted government of the country. While the peasantry is politically unsophisticated and quite possibly naive as to the direction in which they are being led by the organizers, still resistance may well be expected at this point by the organizers, and they may call upon the assistance of the regional units, locally deployed, to intimidate as needed and eliminate the "enemies of the people" among the peasantry.

What appears superficially as a federation of three different echelons of authority, becomes in fact a control apparatus of the organizers. The lasting control of these bodies and of future elections—which may be held as often as every 3 or 4 months to keep the population constantly engaged and participating, i.e., to make them accomplices to the crime—is assured by the ruling that a committee of the Peoples' Court will superintend all elections.

A second power which is very quickly assumed by the court is that of de facto control over the Village Guard, supposedly controlled by the secretary of the PLC. The fact of village organization becomes quite unlike the fiction of democratic determination once the organizers are provided with control of (1) election procedures and (2) the armed element of the village population. They now use this authority to establish a local insurgent commissariat.

Ever anxious to give the semblance of legality and uniform popular support to each new policy as it is announced, the organizers will arrange to have it adopted by the PLC, a rubberstamp legislature. The recalcitrant, the maverick is no longer a problem, and the party is not dependent upon spontaneous or voluntary support from the peasantry, for the rural population is under comprehensive police control.

At this juncture, our district representative is in a position to provide both the "regional" and the later "regular" units of the Peoples' Liberation Army with all of the support services essential to military operations; i.e., food, recruits, and intelligence.

Reflecting the technique of provoking cooperation and support via compromise, the village priest or teacher—a key communicator—will be co-opted into the "Judicial" system as "Clerk of the Court," on the pretext that since he is one of the few literate persons in the village his services are needed by "the people." Thereafter he is quickly identified in the eyes of the peasantry with the court; he becomes an "accomplice" to the decisions of the Peoples' Court and finds himself obliged to defend its policy decisions.

For all practical purposes, at this juncture the president of the Peoples Court has become the local commander of the TMO, and the District Party Committee—which also refers to itself as an element in the TMO—has embedded its authority at the grassroots. It did this by (1) organizing a regional guerrilla unit and (2) sending out mobilizers among the rural peasantry.

By continuing such political organizational work, while building larger and more numerous regional units, the Communist Party can gradually set up a complete new state in the state. It will contain three distinct echelons of authority: (1) The party organizations operating as the TMO and supported at the subprovincial level by regional forces; (2) the system of Peoples' Liberation Committees building up from the village level where it is supported by the technique of Village Guards (identified in Chart D as "Popular Units"); (3) Regular Army Units drawn from the regional forces, given more thorough training and commanded by party personnel with extensive experience in irregular warfare.

The technique for the building of the higher offices in the Peoples' Liberation Committee system is worthy of attention. The "Peoples' Court," or TMO, appoint a commission which in turn prepares a list of candidates, drawing upon those local inhabitants who have proven to be the most responsive during the preceding months. Once the list has been set up, a conference of the village population is called together to vote. Since everyone knows that the commission is backed up by the TMO and that the TMO is backed up by the regional unit, whose local members are required to be on hand for the elections, no one will dare suggest an alternate list. The same process is then repeated at the next highest level and so on up to the "roof" on the PLC system in the form of a "front." This latter body will play a major role in the effort to get the subversive insurgency legitimized by seeking diplomatic recognition from other countries.

But we should not overlook the decisive role played by the PLC system inside the country. The organization of the PLC's should be considered as the positive side of revolutionary warfare. While the party, with the PLA/TMO organization, has the task to destroy the old administration, the old political, economic, and social structure, the task of the PLC's is to build a new one. For the accomplishment of this task, the PLC's will act in three different ways:

1. **PSYCHOLOGICALLY.** The PLC's must be an evident sign for all the population that the old governmental administration will be replaced by a new, revolutionary one. The sole presence of the PLC's on controlled and marginal territory will have a tremendous psychological and propaganda impact on the population.

2. **POLITICALLY.** The PLC's must be largely represented bodies. On all administrative levels, from the villages up to the provinces or state level, the members of the PLC's will be selected so as to represent multiple social, ethnic, religious, and political groups. By bringing persons from many walks of life together in the PLC's, the impression is created that a large part of the population is behind the Peoples' Liberation Army and the revolutionary struggle, not only the Communist Party. International public opinion and foreign powers will believe the same or, even better, the national leaders of other countries will conclude that the liberation army and the revolutionary struggle are elements in a democratic movement simply because of carefully organized, quasi-democratic elections for the PLC's.

3. **ORGANIZATIONALLY.** In fact the PLC's are the nucleus of a future, revolutionary government. And this nucleus, from the outset, will act as a de facto government. The PLC will build up an administration, primitive of course, but very efficient. In insurgent-controlled territory, it will take over all of the functions and activities which fall within the competence of any normal govern-

mental administration. It will organize and control economic production, trade, education, medical care, traffic, collection of money and food for the PLA. For the execution of all these tasks, the PLC's can call upon the Village Guard, made up of part-time PLA insurgents. Of course, the PLA will be continually subject to strict control by the party or TMO in conducting these multitudinous tasks.

With this brief sketch, gentlemen, I have attempted to indicate the skillful blending of destructive and creative operations which come into play wherever subversive insurgency reaches the Phase Two level of intensity. I think you will agree that in this context it is quite difficult to separate the political/sociological strains from the military/terroristic ones. For the Communist, this is no recent innovation. Work to the end of achieving this synthesis was begun at the turn of the century by Lenin. Essentially every step in the process was elaborated before the beginning of World War II in Europe. And by then the kind of cadre needed to implement these tactics had been developed. Today that cadre has some 50 years of experience behind it!

The revolutionary wars in China, Yugoslavia, Greece, Indochina, and the Philippines (i.e. Hukbalahaps) were conducted with almost slavish adherence to this plan. But the Communist has shown himself capable of modifying this scheme in points of detail on the basis of his World War II and immediate post-World War II experience. The Soviet-developed infiltration and terrorist units for operations among indifferent or hostile rural populations, which time does not permit me to describe in detail here, are a case in point. And with such alterations, the plan is now being implemented in South Vietnam—where warfare is approaching a Phase Three level—in Venezuela and in a number of other countries. This is indeed a concept of operations well calculated to test our individual and national staying powers!

We are, under the present rules of the game which the Communists have imposed and we have accepted, extremely vulnerable to strategic attrition. Strategic attrition of not only material resources but something much more important—strategic attrition of will.

To illustrate my point with unofficial figures provided me by my research staff: The French during the period of 1950 to 1962 suffered 94,000 French forces killed *during peace time*, fighting Communist influenced or directed insurgency. This figure, gentlemen, is 14% of the entire civilian and military deaths suffered by the French during the entire period of World War II. During the period 1946 to 1956, France spent \$11 billion and the U.S. \$5 billion in trying to cope with wars of national liberation. Gentlemen, the issue was not decided by military means as we know them in WW II . . . the lives were sacrificed and the money was sacrificed to TOTAL WAR AS WE HAVE NEVER KNOWN IT.

Fighting insurgency is not a question of spectacular defeats or campaigns—it is not essentially military. We teach our students that insurgency is 70% political (as testified to by the insurgent) and only 30% military. We document this ratio with testimony from insurgent leadership and with case histories. The student then asks, "WHAT ARE WE DOING ABOUT THIS 70% OF THE THREAT?" Gentlemen, I must say that we have a difficult time telling them. In the fall of 1961, the late President Kennedy stated to Mr. Alsop words to the effect that what they were doing at Ft. Bragg, i.e., the Special Warfare Center, was really great, but that what was needed in the final analysis was a political effort. But this observation applies not alone to our Armed Forces. We teach people how to be administrators, how to rotate crops, and even how to use modern weapons, BUT GENTLEMEN WE COMPLETELY FALL SHORT IN THE AREA OF TEACHING PEOPLE HOW TO FACE THEIR POLITICAL PROBLEM—WE IGNORE THE PEOPLE WHO MAKE THE VALUE DECISIONS—WE IGNORE THE POLITICAL ORGANIZERS—WE FAIL TO HELP THESE PEOPLE FIND THEIR POLITICAL IDENTITY IN A WORLD WHICH THEY HAD LITTLE PART IN CREATING. WE TEACH THE DOERS BUT NOT THE ONES WHO DECIDE WHAT THE DOERS ARE TO DO.

When you can get an adversary to commit 20, 30, or even 50 resource units, be they dollars or men, to your one, you are in a most favorable position—you can afford to drag the battle out indefinitely, and indeed quick victory may even be less desirable than a long, protracted war.

How do we resolve this situation? Can we meet the threat by demanding from each agency of Government that it step up its activity, expand its operations, be more original? No! this is no answer. This would be about as

unprofessional as a division commander telling each of the battalions under his command to work out its own independent plan for its participation in the divisional effort to take possession of hill 201. The only condition under which a division commander might be tempted to relinquish control in favor of his battalion commanders is when his forces are hopelessly encircled and can think of nothing but retreat.

What keeps the division commander from allowing the success of his operation to depend upon the independent spontaneity of his several battalions? From the very beginning of his professional career, he has been taught that the effective orchestration of his operation is more than half of the battle. He may not use this word to express himself, but he is talking about the same thing. However, there are two additional factors here which not only encourage him to retain direction over the course of events, but also give him an odds-on likelihood of being able to carry it off. The division commander can rely on (1) a detailed, carefully articulated doctrine which provides him with guidelines, and (2) he knows that beneath him are men who have been trained and disciplined. The commander, then, is an orchestrator, conscious of the capabilities of his highly trained, specialized units, who operates in accordance with a doctrine.

Confronted with the totality of the cold war, it must be granted that the problem of the commander, i.e., the President of the United States, is decidedly more complex. Nevertheless, these three factors remain imperatives inherent to the solution of the problem.

The concept of "orchestrating the offensive" is widely acknowledged today among responsible American policymakers. Within the various agencies of Government we also have highly trained, responsible, and disciplined staffs of specialists. They are encouraged to think narrowly in terms of their own agency's interests, but even so, they do provide us with a cadre.

What we do not have is a comprehensive doctrine! Think of the range of techniques employed by the subversive insurgent in organizing a rural village or building a national political and military organization. Think of the chart to which I referred at the outset of my statement, which pointedly indicates areas in which our response either falls short of the enemy's threat or is totally missing. We must fill in those gaps, where Christian ethics indicate, with positive programs as effective as those of international communism. And to prevent ourselves from eventually being compromised and drawn down into the quagmire of the Communist's immorality, we must devise means of thwarting his remaining efforts. To fight the cold war, we need a doctrine which will give us: *Integration, balance, and totality*.

More specifically, with respect to the inseparable political content of revolutionary warfare, we must develop a doctrine which stops this snowball from rolling and then goes on to dry it up. To indicate some of the areas in which answers must be provided posthaste, we need to know:

1. The objective steps which can be taken to maximize our international information program by following up our efforts to convince people with steps to provide them with organization. To have convinced others of the propriety of our policies and the righteousness of our stand is no end in itself. We must make it possible for the advocates of our cause to do something about it—and that is possible only through organization—yet we have no policy, no operational procedures to be followed. Not to attempt to convince is treachery, but to convince and not organize is to be an amateur.

2. A crying necessity is the provisioning of the free world with a new vocabulary of terms to replace the ones which the Communists have fabricated for us and which we use unthinkingly with heavy cost to ourselves. In the psychological field we allow them their victories too cheaply, and this is morally reprehensible because they win by our default. How strong is our position in the eyes of the Vietnamese peasantry when we employ the Viet Cong's term "liberated zones" in referring to their guerrilla base areas? With a free world vocabulary developed, we should turn to all the media of mass communication—newspapers, magazines, radio—with a petition that they employ it.

3. We need a doctrine for the integration of military and police functions.

4. We must undertake a penetrating study into the philosophy behind our U.S. AID programs and consider the feasibility of supporting programs of economic investment with complementary efforts to help free world policymakers find their political identity.

5. A doctrine must be evolved on the motivation, mission, and assignment of command responsibility for paramilitary (part-time civilian) forces during Phase One insurgency, during Phase Two insurgency.

6. A most painstaking study must be made of the techniques and principles required to implement systems of civil/military counterinsurgency councils at all levels of government in countries threatened by Phase Two insurgency. In this crucial area—to which the matter of paramilitary forces is also closely tied—we must develop operational doctrine which pays due attention to ethnic, geographic, and political variations from one region of the globe to another.

7. A set of operational principles is also needed to liquidate the subversive content of bloc economic and technical assistance programs which, together with the system of friendship societies organized by every Soviet Embassy through its VOKS organization, pollute the social atmosphere in modernizing countries.

8. To the end of generating an eventual Western offensive in the cold war, we must be provided with weapons systems and doctrine with which to inhibit and collapse the system of Communist-dominated international mass organizations, replacing them with new associations of global significance, organized around the achievement of positive goals. We need an Internal Bank of Construction and Rehabilitation for the masses. The subversive Afro-Asian Solidarity Union, as an example, which is currently training insurgents, should be forced to compete with a Western-oriented organization in seeking the allegiance of the peoples in modernizing countries.

9. The system of civil/military counterinsurgency councils is once again important to us in developing the intelligence collection and processing capability of battalion-size military units confronted with insurgency situations.

10. There must be a close reexamination of the format and reasoning process which determines the content and organization of an "Internal Defense Plan," the "IDP," which represents our Government's best efforts to date on a conceptual plane to integrate our total resources in a third country for a response to subversion.

11. We must develop a system of political advisers at grassroots level in countries faced with revolutionary warfare to parallel and complement our U.S. standard operating procedure of assigning military advisers to units which occasionally may even be smaller than company size.

Who is to answer these questions and still many more? Shall we farm them out to the most appropriate agencies of Government, acknowledging that in several cases the problems raised fall outside of the recognized traditional jurisdiction of any one specific agency? No! We turn the whole problem over to the Freedom Academy, and we provide that body with every conceivable assistance so that it can begin to work at the earliest possible moment.

An established agency of Government will answer questions in the context of its own specialized knowledge and its current operational capabilities.

The Freedom Academy will answer in terms of the totality of the cold war and will turn over to the President the issue of implementation. But of greater importance, the Freedom Academy's bias will be simply the desire to win. While the knowledge of every agency of Government will be available to it, it will be subordinated to none of them.

Regarding this matter of making the specialist's knowledge available, I would like to add a word on the contribution to be made by the military. In the literature of the friends of the Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy bill, there is frequent reference to the "nonmilitary aspects of the global conflict." I would add a word of caution.

By "nonmilitary," I trust that the authors of the bill and its friends mean: *Areas and activities not traditionally considered relevant to the principal missions assigned professional Armed Forces in Western societies.*

If this is what is intended, then, it must be asserted that the U.S. Army, as an example, is directly engaged in the "nonmilitary part of the global struggle" at the present day and will *have* to remain directly concerned. Given the nature of the threat I sketched previously, one simply cannot separate out military and nonmilitary aspects for independent examination.

If we exclude traditional military concerns, we do not consequently exclude our modern American Military Establishment. It cannot be expected to solve the problem alone. But to exclude members of the professional Army from the research faculty of the Freedom Academy is to read ourselves out of the problem. If the U.S. Army is not enough by itself, then it is still true that the problem is insolvable without the Army. If we place the emphasis on the nonmilitary factors, then this cannot mean that we are turning away from those aspects of the problem which concern the U.S. Army.

I hope, at this juncture, that I have provided the committee with some compelling reasons for favorably endorsing the passage of the Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy bill. I have attempted to indicate the nature of our failings with respects to both the cold war, in general, and subversive insurgency in particular. Before us there is much work to be done. But the problem is amenable to rational solution. We need not be advocates of what Lenin contemptuously identified as Khvostism, Tailism.

I would call your attention to some very important words that Lenin wrote in his pamphlet, *What is to be done*:

"A man who is weak and vacillating on theoretical questions, who has a narrow outlook, who makes excuses for his own slackness on the ground that the masses are awakening spontaneously * * * who is unable to conceive a broad and bold plan, who is incapable of inspiring even his enemies with respect for himself, and who is inexperienced and clumsy in his own professional art * * * such a man is * * * a hopeless amateur!"

Gentlemen, strengthening the territorial integrity of the United States and the free world is a moral act. To abstain from or oppose the unavoidable investigation which must be undertaken, on the grounds that our national ethics might be compromised, is no appeal to a higher code of morality which places righteousness above personal security, rather such a stand leads to our surrender of the battlefield to immorality by default.

The CHAIRMAN. We are being called. I suppose we will be back in about 15 minutes.

(Whereupon at 11:15 a.m., a short recess was taken.)

(The committee reconvened at 11:56 a.m. Present at time of reconvening: Representatives Willis and Pool.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have our colleague, Mr. Gubser, who I remember asked to be heard at this time. We are glad to have you, Mr. Gubser. You are an author of one of the bills.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES S. GUBSER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA

Mr. GUBSER. Yes; I am an author of H.R. 1617. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, I will read my short statement and ask that it be included as presented in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. GUBSER. I deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to testify in behalf of my bill, H.R. 1617.

There is no doubt that communism is spreading and that the territory of this planet which remains exclusively dedicated to freedom is diminishing. Though wishful thinkers may say to themselves that test ban treaties, wheat sales, and other apparent improvements in East-West relations signal a permanent thaw in the cold war, a simple look around the globe reveals otherwise. The truth is that we are losing the cold war.

On December 18, 1963, I inserted a chart into the *Congressional Record* which I had prepared with the cooperation of the Library of Congress. The chart shows that in 1917, 10.1 percent of the world's population lived in 8,603,000 square miles of Communist territory. The growth and spread of communism has been gradual since that time, until today 34.99 percent of the world's population (1,109,500,000 people) lives in a Communist world which includes 13,761,000 square miles. I will submit this chart for inclusion in the record at the end of my testimony.¹

¹ See p. 1415.

The world map is a seething blot of Communist-inspired trouble. Laos is lost, casualties mount in Vietnam, Americans are thrown out of Cambodia and Zanzibar; Cuba and Panama are festering, Venezuela reels before Castro terrorists, Tanganyika wavers, so does Kenya, and the Congo seems ready to boil again.

The Chinese are building new roads in North Korea, undoubtedly for the purpose of moving troops southward. Japan's Ikeda moves closer to trade with Red China, and Italian President Segni drafts new oil contracts with Russia.

De Gaulle recognizes Red China, and Britain sells buses to Cuba. Sukarno unleashes his guerrillas against Malaysia. Our trusted friend Ayub of Pakistan moves closer to Red China. We retreat from our hard-and-fast decision to sell wheat to Russia for cash only, while she sends cash to support Castro's communism in our backyard. Even while President Lopez Mateos of Mexico chats amiably with our President, he works closely with Castro and prevents concerted action against him.

Can any rational man look at the globe and say we are not losing the cold war?

In searching for a reason, it is easy to fall into the trap of oversimplification. Undoubtedly there are many reasons, but certainly one of the most significant is our failure to win the war of propaganda. Time after time the free world has responded with military action to combat communism. But almost always the forces of subversion have done their work so effectively that military action has come almost too late.

Southeast Asia is the perfect example. Laos' fall to the forces of subversion gained such a head start that the military response has been placed at almost an impossible disadvantage. The same thing is happening in Cambodia, Malaysia, Africa, Venezuela, and other points in the Western Hemisphere.

It should be obvious by now that the Communist system of subversion is working and that our response has been of the wrong kind and is too late. In the battle for men's minds an initial advantage is frequently decisive, particularly in backward and impoverished areas.

In view of our consistent failure to match Communist propaganda, does it not seem wise that we take stock of what has produced the success of our enemies and meet it on the ground of that success?

When Lenin and his followers captured Russia, they established a training system that has grown to 6,000 special schools which teach the tactics of espionage, subversion, infiltration, agitation, and propaganda.

Admittedly, this is not a proper free world tactic, nor would we want it to become our practice. The basis of freedom is freedom of choice, and we do not wish to impose our choice upon others. To do so would be to defile the very essence of freedom. But to allow a vacuum into which Communist propaganda can move is to create an environment where the Communist way can win without opposition. This is not freedom of choice.

Our State Department hastily employs the cliché of "indoctrination" to indict any suggestion from non-State Department sources favoring a propaganda effort to influence people in favor of freedom as opposed to communism. This reaction is a carryover from the modern intellectual's proper and justified respect for "academic freedom." But it employs a basic fallacy.

Academic freedom exists in an academic environment where knowledge is freely available. But in the target areas for Communist propaganda, only Communist knowledge is available unless we present the other side. It is not indoctrination when one side presents its case, knowing full well that the other side will do likewise. To reject our propaganda mission, then, is to promote indoctrination rather than renounce it.

Our long and consistent record of failures to meet the Communist propaganda offensive proves that it is time to break the diplomatic monopoly which seems to consider any public relations or educational program that it does not suggest and control as "indoctrination."

Psychological warfare, public relations, propaganda, or whatever you choose to call it, is a science and a definite technique which must be learned through specialized instruction. Our diplomats have failed because they have not been trained in a highly skilled technique. It is time we recognize that Communist propagandists have filled the vacuum caused by the inactivity of freedom's proponents and are winning the war for men's minds.

The purpose of my bill is to fill this vacuum and give our overseas personnel the training which will enable them to recognize Communist propaganda for what it is and resist it on the spot. By so doing I am convinced we can avoid the inevitable military action which always comes too late.

Mr. Chairman, there are other features of my bill which could be discussed, for example, the provision for training foreign nationals. But the basic argument for this important provision is the same. We must recognize the fact that the Communist propagandist is succeeding because he is allowed to operate in a vacuum and we must present a counterforce which denies him his advantage.

This legislation is certainly not perfect and perhaps needs amendment. Perhaps an entirely new bill needs to be written. But the basic idea that we need a Freedom Academy is a sound recognition of the reality that freedom is losing to slavery and there is no present indication that the trend will change.

I thank the chairman and I would be delighted to try and answer any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I just have one or two questions. As I recall, your bill would provide an advisory committee or group composed of Members of Congress, rather than composed of heads of agencies—State, FBI, CIA, and so on.

Mr. GUBSER. That is correct, the presumption being that heads of agencies would of course be consulted.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, and that unquestionably will cause some concern to the committee. Would the answer possibly be—you may answer now if you wish—some of both?

Mr. GUBSER. Yes, it could possibly be, Mr. Chairman, and with all due respect to the good intentions of many people in our departments, the main thrust and the main effort of my bill is to inject something new into this system which has consistently failed.

They say you can't argue with success. I think, by the same token, you can't argue with failure, and we have failed.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to see that attitude on your part. If we start with the premise that something needs to be done, it would be unfortunate if we couldn't find ways to accommodate varying views and approaches.

Mr. GUBSER. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. And of course we will wrestle with that question. Mr. Pool?

Mr. POOL. I just want to say about the same thing that you said, Mr. Chairman. I think, in view of the testimony we have had so far, there is a great necessity that we do have people on the Advisory Committee who are representative of the various departments as well as Members of Congress. I think that they can all be helpful being on the Committee. I have come to the conclusion we are going to have to do something like that to have a successful and a practical Freedom Academy.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. I am not convinced either way, but I can see trouble——

Mr. GUBSER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. —or disadvantage or perhaps embarrassment in having Members of Congress on it. I have come to no conclusion, but it is a question.

Mr. GUBSER. It would be a hot potato, there is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Not for the Members, but perhaps for the Congress, the right to inquire, be on the sideline, but we certainly will give that very careful consideration.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, as I stated in the last paragraph of my statement, undoubtedly a brandnew bill has to be written. The only thing I hope, and I hope this with all the sincerity in my being, is that you do report out a bill for a Freedom Academy. I don't know what it has to be or what it should be, but I think this is the most imperative need in the fight for freedom.

The CHAIRMAN. If we do report one out, we will solicit your views and we are glad to know we have your aid.

Mr. GUBSER. I will speak for you or against you, whichever will help the most. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The chart submitted by Mr. Gubser follows:)

Communist expansion since 1917

Date ¹	Country	At time of communi- zation ²		Mid-1963 ³		Area in square miles (1963) ⁴
		Population ⁵	Percent of world total ⁶	Population	Percent of world total	
Nov. 7, 1917	U.S.S.R.	182,182,000	10.1	224,700,000	7.1	8,503,000
Nov. 26, 1924	Mongolia	647,000	.03	1,000,000	.03	614,000
Aug. 3, 1940	Lithuania.....	2,879,000	.12	(?)	(?)	(?)
Aug. 5, 1940	Latvia	1,950,000	.10	(?)	(?)	(?)
Aug. 6, 1940	Estonia	1,126,000	.05	(?)	(?)	(?)
Nov. 29, 1945	Yugoslavia.....	15,600,000	.64	19,000,000	.60	99,000
Jan. 10, 1946	Albania	1,125,000	.04	1,800,000	.06	11,099
Sept. 15, 1946	Bulgaria	6,963,000	.30	8,100,000	.25	43,000
Dec. 30, 1947	Rumania	16,520,000	.70	18,990,000	.50	92,000
June 9, 1948	Czechoslovakia..	12,339,000	.50	14,600,000	.44	49,000
Sept. 12, 1948	Korea (Democratic People's Re- public).....	9,291,000	.37	8,900,000	.30	48,000
Aug. 20, 1949	Hungary	9,247,000	.36	10,100,000	.31	26,600
Sept. 21, 1949	China (People's Republic).....	463,493,000	18.47	730,800,000	23.00	3,897,000
Oct. 7, 1949	Germany (Democratic Republic).....	17,638,000	.70	17,200,000	.54	42,000
Apr. 19, 1950	Poland	24,977,000	1.00	30,800,000	1.00	120,000
Dec. 20, 1954	Vietnam (Democratic Republic).....	16,632,000	.60	17,000,000	.53	63,000
Dec. 2, 1961	Cuba	6,933,000	.22	7,200,000	.23	44,000
Total.....				1,109,500,000	34.99	12,731,000

¹ Date given is that on which the country declared itself a People's Republic, was incorporated into the U.S.S.R. (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) or, as in the case of Cuba, when Castro announced he would lead Cuba "to a people's democracy." East Germany excludes Berlin in all columns.

² Because it is extremely difficult to obtain reliable demographic data for the years prior to 1955, most of the population statistics has been synthesized from the following sources: "Statesman's Yearbook," 1917, 1940, 1941; "U.N. Demographic Yearbook," 1955, 7th issue, table 3, pp. 117-127; "U.N. Demographic Yearbook," 1962, 14th issue, "World Summary," p. 124.

³ In most cases the population given is quite close to the date of communization. In certain cases, however, the data available was several years distant from the date of communization.

⁴ The availability of world total population upon which the percentages must be based is even more difficult to obtain. The following world figures taken from U.N. sources were used: 1920, 1,811,000,000; 1930, 2,015,000,000; 1940, 2,249,000,000; 1945, 2,423,000,000; 1950, 2,599,000,000; 1955, 2,750,000,000; 1960, 3,008,000,000; 1961, 3,069,000,000.

⁵ "World Population, 1963," Population Bulletin, vol. XIX, No. 6, October 1963. (Percentage for 1963 based on world total of 3,180,000,000 persons.)

⁶ Total world area, excluding Antarctica: 52,409,000 square miles. Communist nations constitute 26.25 percent of this figure.

⁷ 1915.

⁸ 1939.

⁹ Presently included in all U.S.S.R. statistics.

¹⁰ 1935.

¹¹ 1934.

¹² 26.25 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., Wednesday, April 8, 1964, the committee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1964

(The committee reconvened at 2:10 p.m., Hon. Joe R. Pool presiding.)

(Committee members present: Representatives Pool and Ichord.)

Mr. Pool. The meeting is called to order, and I believe the witness we had, Mr. Walter Joyce, has been delayed, I suppose on account of bad weather. Due to the fact that there are no other witnesses, the meeting will be recessed, subject to call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 2:16 p.m., Wednesday, April 8, 1964, the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

**HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368,
H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077,
AND H.R. 11718, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF A
FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY**

Part 2

TUESDAY, MAY 19, 1964

**UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
*Washington, D.C.***

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 10:15 a.m. in the Caucus room, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; August E. Johansen, of Michigan; and Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank S. Tavenner, general counsel; Alfred M. Nittle and William Hitz, counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. Today the Committee on Un-American Activities resumes hearings begun on February 18 of this year on eight bills which have been referred to it, which would create a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM FLORIDA**

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, I insert in the record the statement of our colleague, Congressman Dante B. Fascell, of Florida, in support of the legislation.

(Congressman Fascell's statement follows:)

**STATEMENT OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM FLORIDA**

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

Ever since 1959 we have been trying to establish the Freedom Academy. Nearly a dozen bills have been debated over that span of time, but none has ever passed both Houses in the same session. Now we have another chance to adopt this legislation.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements and as onetime sponsor of a bill to establish a University of the Americas, I have been greatly concerned with what one writer has labeled "the propaganda gap." In the relentless struggle which goes on with the Communist world behind the facade of peaceful coexistence, the United States has held its own in the military and economic spheres. Our deterrent nuclear power has prevented a major Communist thrust in the West, and our economic assistance not only has been instrumental in restoring Europe to booming economic health, but also in launching and sustaining the economic advance of many of the world's underdeveloped nations—some of them a good deal less than friendly.

But in the nonmilitary and noneconomic spheres, the realm of ideas, something is lacking. The American message doesn't get across with the kind of hard-hitting impact it ought to have. All too often we get caught off guard by unexpected developments on the world scene and appear to flounder. All too often we permit the Communists to convert some meaningless catch phrase, like "general and complete disarmament," into the kind of propaganda weapon that achieves a bloodless victory.

In a way it is not surprising that the United States should have considerable difficulty in these nonmilitary confrontations with the Communist bloc, for our Communist antagonists have made a science of revolutionary strategy and tactics for over 40 years. The Soviet Government alone devotes something like \$5 billion a year—that's 5 billion—to operate approximately 6,000 schools which train members of the Russian Communist Party, as well as Communist activists from around the world, in the techniques of infiltration, subversion, sabotage, agitation, and propaganda. When these agents return to their home countries, or in the case of Soviet nationals when they are sent abroad, they are fully trained and prepared to exploit any opening for revolutionary activity. These opportunities are plentiful, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of the world, where the people are new to self-government, where the leadership class is often ill-trained, and where economic conditions are frequently chaotic.

But the United States, and indeed the entire free world, has no similar apparatus. We have no central agency for the coordination of anti-Communist strategy and tactics. We have no facility where our Government officials and private citizens and their counterparts from other non-Communist countries can receive a thorough exposure to the types of nonmilitary techniques—to the political and economic methods which can be used to counter the Soviet and the Red Chinese campaign to undermine both the free nations and the uncommitted world. And make no mistake about it. The Soviet Union and Communist China may be seriously, even bitterly, divided at this time, but their basic hostility to free institutions is implacable. We must better equip the United States, and indeed the entire free world, to cope with, and successfully counter, the cut and thrust of the world Communist movement in the field of political and psychological warfare.

A thoroughgoing analysis of Communist techniques can be made from open sources. Furthermore pro-Americans in any country run the risk of being called "Yankee stooges" especially by those whose first allegiance is to communism. We should not let that deter us at all. As for the publication of materials by the Freedom Commission, I notice that this is not a feature of H.R. 8320, nor of some of the other bills under consideration.

In espousing the Freedom Academy, I do not mean to suggest for a moment that we should in any way curtail the public and private exchanges under which more than 50,000 foreign students enroll annually at American universities. In the main these exchanges have been most valuable in presenting a true picture of America. By putting freedom on display, by affording these students the opportunity to see how Americans live, to hear how Americans debate, to comprehend what Americans value, we unquestionably deepen their understanding of us and their attachment to free institutions. Nor do I suggest that we should not take any other action to upgrade the knowledge and education of our State Department personnel.

But the question remains—Is this enough? Are all our activities in the field of psychological persuasion enough? Certainly those efforts can go for naught if they are not coupled with a tightly formulated and broadly coordinated cold war strategy. Our friends abroad need more than assurances of American sympathy and support when they are faced by trained agents of Communist revolution. They need to know how these agents think, what tactics they will

employ, and how to exploit the vulnerabilities which our opponents possess as well as ourselves.

This is supremely important, for if we are ever to win through in the relentless struggle with world communism—win through in the nonmilitary sphere—we and our followers must be able not only to meet and defeat the psychological offensives of communism, but we must be able to put forward and implement positive democratic proposals of our own.

STATEMENT OF JOHN RICHARDSON, JR.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement of the president of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., Mr. John Richardson, Jr., favoring this proposal, will also be incorporated in the record at this point.

(Mr. Richardson's statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF JOHN RICHARDSON, JR.

FREEDOM ACADEMY BILL—H.R. 5368; H.R. 8320

For the past 3 years I have been president and a member of the board of directors of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., a private organization which engages in communications activities designed to promote the cause of individual freedom and national self-determination. The primary focus of our efforts is on the Communist-ruled countries of East-Central Europe. The committee's most important instrument is Radio Free Europe.

Prior to assuming my present responsibility and following active service in Europe in World War II as a junior officer in the Parachute Artillery, I practiced law in New York with the firm of Sullivan & Cromwell and thereafter entered the field of investment banking, becoming a general partner in the firm of Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis in New York. For many years I have had an active interest in world affairs, and especially in the problems of the cold war. My experience prior to coming to the Free Europe Committee included five trips to East Europe in connection with a medical relief program in Poland which I organized. I am also a former president and director of the International Rescue Committee (a private organization which provides resettlement and other assistance to political refugees), a director of the Foreign Policy Association, a director of Freedom House, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The following are my individual views with respect to the Freedom Academy bill; they do not necessarily represent the views of the Free Europe Committee or of its board of directors:

This legislation promises a major increase in the effectiveness of our efforts to build a more peaceful world.

Its most important result would be the development of a body of knowledge, expertise, and doctrine in the fields of political persuasion and political development abroad. It is a tragedy that no such body of knowledge, expertise, and doctrine exists today anywhere in the free world. The failure so far to organize the necessary research and the dissemination of the fruits thereof are in my opinion at the root of most of our failures in planning and carrying out foreign operations, including enormous waste of human and material resources.

The graduates of the Freedom Academy, as envisaged in this legislation, could be expected at the very minimum to increase rapidly and significantly the efficiency and effectiveness of the foreign operations of existing governmental and private instrumentalities. They would be trained not only in a knowledge of historical and existing conditions abroad, as at present, but also in the knowledge of how the processes of political change abroad can be influenced by a free country utilizing honorable means. No such training is available today. And yet peace can be secured ultimately only through the responsible actions of responsible governments in many areas of the world where they do not now exist.

The arguments that such matters cannot be usefully researched, studied, and taught are reminiscent of the attitude many businessmen once had toward the first business schools in this country. Their attitude is different today.

I am convinced that passage of the Freedom Academy legislation is the most important step that can be taken to increase the capacity of the United States to influence events abroad. Both freedom and peace may well depend on that capacity.

RESOLUTION OF RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. We will also incorporate in the record the resolution of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, also in support of these bills.

(The resolution follows:)

RESOLUTION OF RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

THE FREEDOM COMMISSION ACT

Whereas, Reserve Officers Association of the United States recognizes that the Communist nations are waging a total political war against the United States of America and against the peoples and the governments of all other nations of the free world; and

Whereas, Communist conspirators are invariably more dedicated, better trained and have more operational "know-how" than their opponents, and taking full advantage of this, have influenced a series of political warfare defeats on the free world, the total sum of which amounts to new disaster for the United States and other countries of the free world; and

Whereas, if the present trend continues there is grave peril that the United States of America will stand substantially alone in a world that has become Communist or pro-Communist neutral; and

Whereas, in order to turn the tide in the cold war it is essential that we develop counteraction to the international Communist conspiracy into an operational science that bespeaks and benefits the values and methods of free men and that we train men and women in large numbers who can combat the Communist conspiracy with an equal or greater degree of "know-how" and dedication; and

Whereas, there have been introduced in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States by A. S. Herlong, Jr., of Florida, and Walter Judd, of Minnesota, a bill (H.R. 3880) and in the Senate by Karl Mundt, of South Dakota, and Paul Douglas, of Illinois, a bill (S. 1689), entitled "The Freedom Commission Act," which this association believes set forth the training and development program necessary to insure the long-term survival of this Nation and the other nations of the free world;

Now, therefore, be it resolved, that the Reserve Officers Association of the United States go on record as endorsing the passage of The Freedom Commission Act.

Adopted, 34th National Convention New York City, 1 July 1960.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee is indeed honored to welcome Arleigh A. Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, as the lead witness of this morning's session.

Admiral, we are always glad to have you with us, and I don't suppose there is anybody who does not know you, and it is rather odd to ask you to give any part of your background, all of which is good. But in an effort to relate it to your interest in this bill or what experience prompts you to favor it, as a beginning in your presentation, we will be very gratified to receive a brief resumé of your background.

Admiral BURKE. Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ARLEIGH A. BURKE, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED), FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to state that I appreciate very much appearing before this distinguished Committee on Un-American Activities on these bills. I have no written statement, but I do have some notes that I would like to speak from.

You asked about my background. My background in connection with this activity, or with communism, started seriously during the Korean war.

At the beginning of the Korean war, I was ordered by Admiral Sherman, as soon as the war started, to go to the staff of Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. When it looked like it was possible to negotiate an armistice, I was appointed to the Armistice Negotiating Commission.

We had about 10 days in which to prepare ourselves to negotiate with the Communists. During those 10 days, we picked up every book that we could get in the libraries in Japan and in our armed services there, to determine how the Communists negotiated, what they might do, and I might say that the books that we were able to get were very few. There was only one good one. I think it was *Operations of the Politbureau* or something like that.

When we started negotiating with the Communists, it became very apparent in the first few minutes that they were taking advantage of us. They were skillful propagandists. They were using the occasion to show the whole world that we had been defeated.

For example, there was preliminary negotiation as to where the negotiations would be held, and it was finally determined that they would be held in Kaesong, and our team, five of us, went up to Kaesong in helicopters. We landed at the Missionary Field of the Methodist University, which had been destroyed.

We were met by North Korean and Chinese troops, and there was a thick cordon of troops around the landing field, white flags all over it. We were put in jeeps, and the jeep that I was assigned to was a captured American jeep, as they all were; a bullet hole through the windshield, blood on the seat, the name "Lucy" on the jeep.

I don't know whether this was American blood or not, but it was quite obvious that the impression they wanted to give was that they had captured this jeep, killed the driver, and it was their jeep. A great big white flag—no other identification—a great big white flag on the front of the jeep, and we went up with an escort, a military escort of the Communists, through, again, a cordon of troops clear to the negotiating building, which was a teahouse in Kaesong.

When we arrived there, we had to walk perhaps a hundred yards, again through a cordon of troops, with submachineguns following each man as we came up, and, for example, one young Korean was standing in front of a bush, and he had to be out in the path a little bit. He was perhaps 15 or 16 years old, and as I was walking up there, he put the machinegun muzzle in my stomach. It was just a little bit more than I could take at that time, because I was fed up with this, and I took the machinegun away from him and handed it back to him, which was a foolish thing to do, but fortunately, his finger wasn't on the trigger or his automatic reaction would have been bad for me.

But this was an example of the propaganda—movie cameras grinding all the time, with Americans coming up to surrender at this negotiation.

During the negotiations, we soon found that the Communists could lie, did lie, and it did not bother them a bit. They could be caught in lies and they could pass probably a polygraph test, because they

didn't feel guilty about anything, about lying. It is something that an American just can't realize, that there is no moral base to negotiate on—with people like that.

And this was when I first decided that we had to do a tremendous amount of studying. We sent back for books and data from which to study past negotiations. We got a big pile of data, but very little data which would do us any good.

Well, the results of those negotiations are well known.

Mr. JOHANSEN. May I interrupt at that point, Admiral? What was the date of this episode you have just described?

Admiral BURKE. I believe it was July 10, 1951.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Thank you.

Admiral BURKE. The next thing that concerned me, again the result of the Korean war, was our prisoners. When they returned, we found that a few of our troops had accommodated themselves to communism in the prison camps, and a very few of them had sold their brother soldiers' lives for a cigarette or for special treatment. This was, of course, a shock to all of us in the military services, and we started to examine why.

Later, I was Chief of Naval Operations, and as soon as I became Chief of Naval Operations, I asked for an examination of our recruits to determine what their moral standards were, and it was a surprising thing that we found that a great many of our recruits didn't have any moral standards.

They weren't unmoral, they were just amoral. They had no convictions concerning their God or their church or their community or their State or their school or anything. Nothing meant very much to some of these boys. Their standard was "what is good for me."

Now this wasn't because these youngsters were bad youngsters. They weren't, and they very eagerly picked up the instruction that we gave them on what this United States stands for, what God stands for, and various simple things, and these lads eagerly picked up that instruction. They just simply hadn't been instructed before. This was a shock.

Later on, as Chief of Naval Operations, I had a great deal to do for 6 years with operations against the Communists or operations which were the result of Communist actions. When I retired from the Navy, I wanted to do something that might help my country a little bit, so I decided that I would like to become associated with three general types of activities. One is energy, because the Communists, or any nation that wants to become powerful, must have sources of energy. And without sources of energy, it is so dependent upon other countries that it probably will never become a really powerful nation.

And the next one was communications. Communications and transportation, the whole communication bit; and the third one is education. And those generally are the areas of the commercial companies with which I am now associated, and it is true that I have found since retirement, as well as before, that the Communists are working to try to get control of communications, to try to get control of energy, and, above all, to try to get control of education; and it is the educational part that is important here, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. How long did you serve, Admiral, in the United States Navy?

Admiral BURKE. 42 years, sir. And would it be all right for me to read my notes?

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Admiral BURKE. The first point that I would like to make, sir, is that of all the people in the United States, this committee, you yourselves are probably the most familiar with the Communist goals and objectives and their past actions, the Communist intentions, the Communist techniques, and their falsehoods, their lies.

You know, I don't want to repeat the Communist intentions, but certainly it is true, because they have said so over and over and over again, that they intend to dominate the world, and every action that they have taken, even the backward steps that they have had to take sometimes, have had that goal in mind, and they never deviate from that goal. This is true with all the Communists in every area. They have a clear outline. Every Communist has a clear outline of where the Communists intend to go and, in general, how to get there, and the Communists are well trained.

Now, there is no such clear outline of our intentions. Sometimes, the reactions of this country and other free world countries are very forceful, and sometimes we act as if we were powerless and helpless.

There has been a cold war ever since World War II. It is unconventional, it is psychological, it is subversive, it is political, and it is propaganda warfare; and we seem never to realize that this is a continuous proposition. We take action when things appear to be bad, and when things appear to slacken off, then we forget all about it. And we don't take action in all the fields, even when we do take action.

The Communists use every means that they possibly can to get support for their ideas, and particularly ideas which will weaken our moral stamina, which will weaken our will to resist, and which will weaken such things as our belief in God, our beliefs in our Government. There are quite a few innocent, gullible people in the United States who are led to support causes which further the undermining of our character. They do this, unknowingly, for the benefit of communism.

The Communists know what they are doing. They are well trained. There are many schools in many Communist countries to train thousands of people, and they have trained thousands of people in political warfare, in journalism, in ideology, and guerrilla warfare, in all the aspects of the power play that the Communists are putting on. Of course this started with the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow many years ago.

And our people are not trained. The best trained people in the United States are self-trained people, and as a result of our lack of training, even though we act with the utmost goodwill, we frequently act without any very clear idea of what the Communists may be trying to accomplish or how they are trying to accomplish it.

Our actions are unconcerted. We don't act in all areas, and we don't act in all fields toward a single goal. Because of this, we frequently play into the enemy's hands. In other words, we are amateurs, and the Communists are professionals.

But in spite of this, I would like to pay tribute to those amateurs. There are a lot of them. There are academicians in many universities and colleges who have devoted, when they once became aware of the danger, a great deal of time to studying the problem, and they are doing quite a bit of good.

There are labor unions who are taking the lead, because of all the classes of people in this country who understand communism the best, it is probably the labor people, because they have gone into foreign countries they realize what has happened in foreign countries. They know that there is no such thing as a labor movement in any Communist country, and they have taken some very laudable action.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you mentioned that, Admiral, and on this point, I was pleased to be advised quite some time ago that the AFL-CIO, through George Meany, at its own expense, had created an Institute for Free Labor Development here in Washington to fight communism.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they have students from Latin America who come here to learn about free trade unionism and also communism. Some of them have gone back home to Latin America and disseminated the information they have gathered here and have averted Communist takeovers of the unions and, in some instances, regained control of unions from the Communists. I am glad of the compliment you have paid to the free labor movement.

Admiral BURKE. That is a very laudable thing, sir, and they are trying very hard, but even the people who are teaching here are themselves self-taught.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are absolutely right, and to put it in a different way—the way I frequently put it in connection with what you said to the effect that we act when things are hot, and relax when they cool off—we have tended too long to fight the cold war on the basis of instinct and emotion rather than knowledge, and what we are trying to do here is to have an institute with knowledge about these things which you have experienced over your long career.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Particularly in connection with your negotiations in Korea.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. The fact of the matter is—and I think I have mentioned this on the record before—but probably the first documentation of Communist infiltration, of the attempt to take over in this country was made in the labor field.

That first documentation was made under Mr. William Green, back in 1933, as I recall it, at the time that the recognition of Soviet Russia was being considered.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; that is, of course, the first thing; the first institutions the Communists want to try to infiltrate are the labor and educational institutions. And they do a very good job at it.

And then there are a lot of industrialists, particularly the big concerns, who have realized what happens to a country when it becomes Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. You are so right, Admiral—and we don't want to interrupt you—you have put your finger on it. It is the fact that although they make laudable and noble efforts, they are so scattered in this country. There is no central area where people in labor, Government, business, foreign countries, can come and get a working knowledge of the techniques, ideology, doctrines, and tactics, all the machinations of the Communist conspiracy. And they haven't done too badly, have they, the Communists, along the line of attempted domination? In the short space of my and your generation, we have seen them take over and dominate maybe one third of the land mass of the earth and one fourth of the population of the world, and that's not too bad.

Admiral BURKE. No, sir. Well, in spite of the efforts, sir, of individuals, there are a lot of people in this country—the fact is, I suppose, most of the people in this country—who don't really realize the danger of communism at all. There is a great deal of apathy, and most of this apathy is caused because people don't know.

They think the Government will take care of it. The Government hasn't informed them, and so they don't know very much about it. People have not been told by the Government as much about communism as a farmer is told about how to fatten a beef or the dangers of a boll weevil.

A person can obtain from the Government a great deal of information about the dangers from insects, but he can't obtain from the Government very much about the dangers from communism, even though the FBI does try mightily.

Our people, including people in Government positions, are not well informed and they are not knowledgeable on Communist procedures or techniques, or even the differences in the meaning of the words when they are used by the Communists and when they are used by us. I am sure that there is a need for an educational institution similar to the one that is proposed in these bills, and particularly in the ones that Mr. Boggs and Mr. Taft sponsored.

There is need for such an institution to conduct research on Communist techniques, to instruct, and to inform. Private institutions can't do it, although there are a lot of private institutions which are trying; they can help. The reason is largely that a policy must be clearly approved by the Government—and one is not clearly approved now—and it must also be clearly understood that this is the intent of Congress, and this is not clear now, either.

In addition to that, there are many Government officials who need training which a private institution would not be able to give. There are foreign people who should have access to the leadership of the leader of the free world, and now there is no place for them to go, as you pointed out a moment ago.

Then it takes time for a private institution to get these things started, lots of time, and I don't think we have that kind of time left anymore.

It has also been proposed that perhaps the State Department could expand their schools, and this would have been possible. But if the State Department had intended to expand their schools, it would have been done a long time ago, and it hasn't been done, so I don't think that they could take it over.

I favor H.R. 5368, and if I were permitted to make some comments on the bill, I would like to make—

The CHAIRMAN. We would like very much to have the benefit of your material. This bill may not be final. It is subject to improvement.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. In this bill, there is a Committee, an Advisory Committee to advise the Commission, and I would suggest that that Committee should meet at least monthly. The reason for that is that this Committee must know thoroughly what is being done by the Commission and within this institution.

It must assist the Commission. The Commission is going to be under fire. It is going to be a most difficult job to be on that Commission, and this Committee can help the Commissioners a great deal, if it really knows what is involved. The Committee members must know intimately the status of the research, the type of teaching, the quality of the teachers, and everything there is about the school.

This is particularly true because once such an institution is established and if it starts to function well, it will certainly, itself, be a prime target for subversion and distortion. It will be viciously attacked, and there will be attempts to discredit the institution and the Commission. The Government, and especially the Congress, will need to rely on people who are not in the direct management of the institution, but people who nevertheless are thoroughly familiar with all the aspects of the institution and the personnel connected with it, and who are charged by the Congress to keep Congress informed of the possible difficulties which the institution may have before those difficulties become acute, or become insurmountable, as they might.

And perhaps even monthly meetings are not enough. This institution is of sufficient importance to warrant careful and continuous appraisal.

I would like to go back a moment, sir, to training. And I have here two recent newspaper articles. One of them was written for the *New York Times* on 31 March; the other, for the *Washington Post* on May 16, 1964. They are about South Vietnam. The *Times* article says:

The South Vietnamese Government started today an emergency training program for young army officers who have the task of bringing effective government to the people of the villages.

Special courses for the country's district chiefs marked an important first step * * *.

I would like to insert these two articles in the record, if I might, sir, because it is about starting today, and then—

The CHAIRMAN. The articles will be incorporated in the record. (See pp. 1439-1441.)

The CHAIRMAN. At that point, do you find that whatever effort is being made in Vietnam and elsewhere places sufficient, or too much, or not enough, reliance on people themselves, the villages, and so on?

Admiral BURKE. Well, I have been in the Orient quite a bit in my life, sir, and the people in the Orient, the villages, are very poor people, and they are very simple people and they are also very gullible people in lots of ways. They have been misruled sometimes, sometimes for generations in the past, so that the instruction that has to be given to them has to be started from the ground up—in sympathy with their conditions and trying to help them out, but at the same time, the most

important thing that any man can have, whether he is rich or poor, is a philosophy, is an ideology, and something in which to believe, something that he can do about what he believes, and this is what I think is mostly lacking in our training. We don't convince.

We help them out materially and we show them how, sometimes, to grow better crops, but we don't furnish them a belief, a conviction, which the Communists do.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, it has been expressed as a theory, and let's assume it to be completely sincere, always—that is my approach, anyway—that the establishment of this Commission outside of the State Department might place these problems in the hands of amateurs who are liable to want to indoctrinate, and so on.

What are your views on that? Don't you think the Commission, assuming the appointment of outstanding men, will certainly have sense enough to operate within our Constitution? With respect to the proposition that the State Department, with its constitutional foreign policy prerogatives, might not like every part of what the Academy teaches, and the fact that the President must determine foreign policy—can't all this be done without injecting the Academy into the field of foreign policy, keeping it aside of that, clear of that, even while it provides knowledge?

Do you fear indoctrination, amateurism, and all that stuff?

Admiral BURKE. No, sir.

(At this point Mr. Pool entered the hearing room.)

Admiral BURKE. In the first place, this institution is an educational institution. It is not an operating institution and it doesn't determine policies.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you said that. It needed to be said, to remove honest fear.

Admiral BURKE. And there are many institutions that do indoctrination. A church does indoctrination. The State Department itself does indoctrination. The Executive of the United States indoctrinates. Political parties do indoctrination. There are hundreds of groups in this country who indoctrinate for one thing or another.

A farmer, who is in an agricultural school, is indoctrinated in the advantages of farming. He is proud of being a farmer.

This is true in everything, but what is needed here is knowledge of communism. The greatest danger that faces this country is the Communist danger, now, and we don't have the knowledge, and where are we going to get that knowledge? We don't have any institutions. A lot of institutions are trying very hard to give a little bit of knowledge.

They are insufficient. They are inadequate. They certainly can't train governmental officials, they can't train foreign officials, they can't instruct them. There is no information that comes from the Government on a continuing basis, or that is very deep. When an academician wants to start a course on communism there is no place he can write to in the Government and get such data. He can get data on how to grow wheat, but he can't get it on communism.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I would like the benefit of your experience and views and for you to pass judgment—without any sense of castigating or criticizing what we have today—on these courses we are all familiar with, for officers, and so on. Are they thorough enough?

Admiral BURKE. In Government, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. In Government. In other words, we would have to face the fact that it would be said that we are making a finding, whether we are making it or not, that what we have is not sufficient.

Admiral BURKE. Then the finding, I think, would be correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would like to have you say a few words about that, because the opposition, such as it is, to the bill says we already have that, and that if we need something more, then there is the counterproposal, countering our thinking on the possibility of passage of this bill, that we should instead have a school of foreign—what is the name of the proposal?

Mr. McNAMARA. National Academy of Foreign Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. A National Academy of Foreign Affairs within the State Department as a substitute or counter to this proposal.

Admiral BURKE. In the first place, sir, I would like to—

The CHAIRMAN. So we can't avoid talking about what we have to face.

Admiral BURKE. To start with the military. I am on the advisory board of the National War College and I am fairly familiar, even since I have been retired, with what the other War Colleges do, and they give a few courses on communism. They are not exactly superficial courses, but they do not really explain Communist techniques. They make the students aware that there are techniques, that there is such a thing as propaganda, and they teach them a little bit about semantics, but the courses are not in depth at all.

It is even less than that, unless they have changed a great deal in the last year or so, in the Foreign Service's school. There are a few lectures, and those lectures are not coordinated. There is no real instruction, not nearly as much instruction in the Foreign Service's school as there is in the War Colleges, but the War Colleges are extremely inadequate.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had testimony based on teaching experience here—and on my own, I have always said that I am glad somebody else said this, rather than myself, because some State legislatures, including my own, in Louisiana, by statute, require a course on Communism versus Democracy—but the testimony indicates that the trouble in these courses is that there is so little knowledge on the part of the public school teacher as to what to teach, what to say, and their source material is so scanty.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very discouraging.

Admiral BURKE. That is true. I have been asked by Florida and by other States to help them in their curricula. A little bit I have been able to do, not very much, but when they ask me, I am an amateur. There is nobody, or very few people in this country who have really studied this in depth.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, taking you at your humble word, would your "amateur" experience in this area be available to the Commission?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; anything that the Government wants me to do, I do, because I came into the service for a lifetime and I haven't quite expended it yet, sir. This training that we have, compared to the techniques of the Communists, is really fantastically poor, sir. I have here an article that is called "Population Control Techniques of Communist Insurgents." It appeared in the *Australian*

Army Journal, in January of 1964, and it explains in detail how a few Communists, two or three Communists, come into a village and work with that village, never saying anything about communism until they get the villagers' confidence and support.

They help the villagers. Later on they organize a few people, two or three people, and then later on, they take over, and that village, then, is a Communist village. It became that way because it was instructed.

It was instructed by Communists, and we have no counterpart to that. We have nobody who knows how to do that, and the techniques are different for each country. This is the reason why the Communists have hundreds of different schools, or lots of different schools, to train different people in different techniques in different countries, but all for the same goal.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that article be available for the record?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The article will be inserted following your testimony. (See pp. 1442-1449.)

(At this point Mr. Willis left the hearing room.)

Mr. POOL (presiding). Proceed, Admiral.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I don't think the Admiral had finished his statement, had he?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. POOL. Let me ask you, Admiral, you are familiar with the national defense budgets, and do you think that maybe a staggering sum would be needed to accomplish this job that the Freedom Academy encompasses? Do you think that the money would be well spent?

Admiral BURKE. It will take quite a bit of money, sir, because it will be started late, and the buildings will have to go up, should go up, fairly fast, so I should imagine that it would probably be in the neighborhood of \$30 or \$40 million.

Mr. POOL. You think that that would be money well spent?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir, because the Communists have made inroads in all parts of the world. We have not. The expansion has been on the Communist side, not on our side, so something is wrong with our instruction. We are not convincing people, and I believe our system of government, our social order, our whole concept of civilization is good, and I think the Communist concept is evil, but we aren't instructing people about what is good.

Mr. POOL. The work that this Academy would accomplish, would be almost as important as the work that is accomplished by the Naval Academy and West Point and things like that?

Admiral BURKE. I think at that stage of the game, sir, it would be even more important, because there is a big lack in such education now, and I don't mean to decry my Naval Academy or the other service academies, either.

Mr. POOL. Well, I wasn't pinpointing any particular academy.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. POOL. It is just as important, then, as the other schools. In fact, in your opinion, it is more important at this stage.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. POOL. I agree with you. And I thank you, sir.

Mr. Ichord?

Mr. ICHORD. Admiral, the function of the Commission is threefold: To conduct research into communism, how it operates, how it fights, and how you can best combat it; to train Government personnel, private citizens, and foreign citizens at the institution; and also to operate the information center.

The State Department has criticized the bill on the ground that the Freedom Academy will here be functioning as an overt institution, while it should operate as a covert institution. Do you feel that criticism is well founded?

Admiral BURKE. No, sir. I think that what is needed—

Mr. ICHORD. Would you elaborate upon that, sir?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. What is needed most is an overt operation. This, so that our people and the Communists and everybody knows that this is the way the Communists operate. This is what they do, these are the proofs. This is what happened in Zanzibar. This is the way they handle the press in various countries. This is the line that they start in Moscow or Peking, and this is the trace of that line of propaganda, from one position to another, until finally, its origin is lost, and it is repeated in free world countries as honest news. These things are very important.

Now there should also be some covert operating institution that trains people not only to study the techniques, but to train people in the countertechniques, but that would be an operations school. This is not an operations institution. The Communists themselves have a great many overt schools and a great many covert schools, and sometimes they have elements in the same school in which one is overt and one is covert, but I think this overt school is needed first.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you think that it is necessary to train private citizens at this institution?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; not every private citizen, of course, but certainly it is necessary to train academicians who are teaching in universities, the social sciences, for example. It is important they know the techniques of communism and to give them a source of information.

It is necessary to give, and they should have, a very thorough course. They should have thorough knowledge of these data. It is necessary, also, for industrialists, for example, to come down and get a short course in aspects which will affect them and which they can do something about. It is necessary that the labor unions, labor people, be instructed so that workers know what they are up against, what this country is up against. It is extremely necessary.

There are three types of people who need the instruction. There is the private citizen, the governmental officials, and foreigners. Perhaps the instruction might be a little different for the three, but much of the instruction should be similar or identical.

Mr. ICHORD. How do you feel we can go about selecting foreign citizens for training at the Academy?

Admiral BURKE. It is going to be very difficult, sir, and you will certainly get some Communists in here, no matter what you do. I mean, the Communists will try to penetrate this school, this institution, every way that they possibly can, and one of the ways is to send Communist students so that they can get as much information as they

possibly can in order to sabotage the school. The best way of getting people is on the recommendation of their own government, and we know a lot of foreign people, too, who can check.

I mean, there are foreign people who are mature, who are usually pretty well known by some Americans, or at least, for example, a Frenchman is known to other Frenchmen whom Americans know, and his reputation will be pretty well known. But certainly there will be some Communists that will go through the school.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Johansen?

Mr. JOHANSEN. I am going to yield for a moment to Mr. Schadeberg, and then I will come back.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Thank you.

Admiral, you don't have to answer this if you don't wish to, and you may not want to. If our foreign policy should be, either now or at some future date, that we must not do anything to create tensions between ourselves and the Soviets, and this Academy might be interpreted as creating such a tension, what would be the argument that we could use then?

Admiral BURKE. The truth. The first thing that should be taught in this institution is the truth. If the Communists object to the truth, let them. If they say, "This is not true," let them try to disprove it. For example, after this institution was started, and they say, "This teaches that we do so and so, and that's not true," and we will say, "Well, these are the facts. What's wrong with those facts?" And if the truth hurts, if an institution is going to be objected to because it teaches the truth, then we are in a very bad way indeed.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I agree with you in that, but the question that might be involved is that we are working at odds and at ends with our State Department policy, if such a policy were stated.

Admiral BURKE. Well, if two commercial concerns want to better their relationships for any reason at all, maybe to have a merger, the first thing that each concern has to do, is to look at the books and to find out what are the facts, and then you have to confront the management of the other concern and say, "These are the facts," and "This is what I believe the facts to be."

And those facts never hurt anybody. Because if you don't base a relationship upon facts, upon what is true, then your relationship is very tenuous, and so the Communists would have no grounds for objection, and should have no objection, to the teaching of facts.

Now there is another aspect of this. Certainly in all of their schools—they have hundreds of schools which teach wrong things that are absolutely false about our institutions, about what we do.

They teach the destruction of our social order and how to do us in. If it is important that we have a detente with the Soviets or with the Communists, then it is also important that they stop teaching what is not true, before we stop teaching what is true. In other words, the onus is on them, not on us.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. There I agree with you. I have a suspicion that if we ever had the Academy, we probably would never arrive at a position in which we had that policy.

Admiral BURKE. Well, perhaps not, sir.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Thank you.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Admiral, there is some degree of parallel between what is proposed in this Commission and the Freedom Academy and some of the things that were attempted some years back in the Armed Forces in the way of instruction regarding communism and Communist activities.

And isn't it true that a great many of those efforts, following the Fulbright memorandum, were suspended so far as the military is concerned?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. And it is true this would be very similar in some respects to that instruction given to the military services, but the primary emphasis in the military services was on what this country stood for, upon our traditions, and what it took to be a good United States citizen. There was a lot of instruction on what you do to support this man alongside of you, so that when you find yourself in a foxhole and the going gets pretty rough, you can depend upon him staying there. You have no fear deep down in your heart that he is going to do what they call in Korea "bug out on you" and leave you there to face a bayonet charge, or whatever, all by yourself. He is going to be there. You can depend on him. Those are the things that we primarily try to teach in the military services. Now also, there are things such as good citizenship, that you work for your community, that you work for your country.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, am I correct in the impression that, unfortunately, a great deal of that type of activity has been suspended or terminated?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. That is true, but in fairness to the people who had it stopped, there were times when people went too far. I mean, when they said things which were not quite correct, and that will always have to be watched in any institution; but, in general, it seems a very sad thing to me when you can't teach that our history is a glorious thing and that the people who went before us and who created this country did some pretty good things in their lives, and that we are up against an enemy who says, and says repeatedly, and have throughout their entire existence, that they intend to destroy us and that they intend to destroy us not just by war, but by every other means, and that they subvert.

We have many examples every year of subversion and attempts at subversion. Every 2 or 3 months we go through another lesson, and it is very important, I think, that our people know this and know where it stems from.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, it seems to me that the fact that this program in the military ran into difficulty is all the more reason why we need the type of program contemplated in the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; and this institution would give instruction in much greater detail and real depth, which they could not possibly do in the military.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, now, we had testimony before this committee by a very high-ranking spokesman of the State Department, who expressed unqualified opposition to it. He said that it involved, or implied that it involved, instilling into the people who were brought to the Academy preconceived ideas, that it involved indoctrination, that it involved employing the very methods of totalitarianism.

I happen to disagree very strongly about that, but it is a matter of great concern to me that there is opposition from some spokesmen, at least, in the State Department on these flimsy and, I think, invalid grounds.

Now what happens to this Commission and to the Academy and its program if the official policy of the United States Government as expressed by the State Department, is that all communism isn't alike, that communism in Soviet Russia is getting more and more mellow, that the real objectives of world conquest are being modified, and as my colleague said, on top of that, we must not say or do anything that creates tension?

My great concern is, if we have that kind of a conflict between the facts as developed in the Academy and the official policy of the State Department, what happens to the Academy and to its program?

Admiral BURKE. It will never be built, sir. It will never be built, or if it is built, then it won't function.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And then we are in deep trouble.

Admiral BURKE. Then eventually, if you have an aggressive hard-hitting, dedicated enemy, and he intends to do you in, and you don't intend to resist and to fight back, then eventually he will get you. And in this case, if it is that we believe that the Communists are changing, and they are, in fact, not changing, and they mislead us, and we don't do anything to resist their attacks, we will eventually succumb. We will eventually become a Communist state.

Now, I don't think that that is what they mean. What some people believe is that the Communists are going to become mellow and not try to dominate the world. But a man can't be a Communist and follow the Communist doctrine unless he intends to have communism take control of the world, to dominate the world. That is their belief—their creed—their doctrine.

But there is evidence in the Soviet Union that there are a lot of people who do not believe in communism, and that is true. I mean, there are farmers in Kazakstan, for example, who sabotaged a tremendous amount of fertilizer. They didn't grow the wheat that they should have grown—some of it due to nature, but a lot of it also due to sabotage by Soviet farmers.

Now these people, some day, if there are enough of them and if there is enough conviction, may destroy communism within Russia, but it won't be that the Communists have changed. It will be successors to the Communists who will have revolted against communism. It won't be the softening of the Communists or the changing of ideas of the Communists, it will be the changing of the ideas of the Russian people who will overthrow communism. This is possible but not very probable.

Mr. JOHANSEN. But in essence, they, therefore, would be anti-Communists.

Admiral BURKE. Exactly.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And it is not moderating of communism, it is an offsetting of communism.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. So that is why they had purges in Kazakstan in the last year or so. Why the Kremlin sent troops in to control these elements.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, I couldn't agree with the argument more, the statement he has made.

Mr. POOL. I have one other question. Do you think that our position in South Vietnam would be better today if we had had this Academy 10 years ago?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; I think so, because I think that we would have understood thoroughly the techniques of the Communists in saying, "Let us have a peaceful coexistence in this particular area, and let us get along together"—until they build their cadres in various villages and take over, as in Laos. Instead, we didn't understand. We didn't know that we were being conned. We took them at their word, and now we are in a very bad shape, because they have built their strength up in southeast Asia, and we have not.

We haven't been able to convince enough people in South Vietnam or Laos or Cambodia that their freedom is important to them and to us.

Mr. POOL. This Academy—we can envision that it would have taught the Communist technique; therefore, we would have been alert and we would have the intelligence and also the antidote for their propaganda, if we had had an Academy like this.

Admiral BURKE. I think so, yes, sir, although there would have to be additional schools in addition to this Academy for the operating people, and that would have to be under some governmental department.

Mr. JOHANSEN. One further question, Mr. Chairman.

Against the background of your military career and your service as Chief of Naval Operations, would you envision the military utilizing and benefiting from the facilities of this Freedom Academy?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And in what way, just for the record?

Admiral BURKE. Well, I believe that there should be some military people who would go through this Academy to become knowledgeable, thoroughly knowledgeable, but that there wouldn't be a large number of military people who would take the course. It would be similar to the reason why I took courses in and became a chemical engineer, so that I could operate as a liaison officer between the chemical engineering profession and the Navy.

I knew what the chemical engineers were talking about and I could explain to my associates in the Navy what was meant, what this new explosive was, how it was built, and what the advantages and disadvantages of it were. The same thing would be true with this Academy, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. In other words, hoping that we don't have any further repetitions of the experience you described in connection with the Korean armistice, but in any situation of that kind, involving deals with the Communists, you would not have to be prowling through limited libraries in Japan, you would have access to the information and material that would make persons in that situation knowledgeable before they went into them. Isn't that correct?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; and there would also have been staff people who could be sent out—like lawyers, for example, are available when legal problems arise. You can't conduct any sort of a legal proceeding without a lawyer being there, an expert, and he is at your

hand to advise you on what to do, and the same thing could be true in dealing with or negotiating with Communists.

(At this point Mr. Pool left the hearing room.)

Mr. JOHANSEN. One final question. Recognizing that—and I am paraphrasing the statement of Churchill's that weakness is not treason, but it can be just as fatal, isn't it true that lack of knowledge and lack of skill and lack of know-how, which leads to ineptness and blunders and mistakes, however well intentioned, can be just as fatal as disloyalty?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And that that's the very reason we need the kind of training for persons in key positions in education or business or labor or Government, who will know the nature of the enemy that we are confronted with?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. You are exactly correct, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Thank you.

Mr. ICHORD (presiding). Admiral, Mr. Grant, the founder of the Orlando Committee which originated this idea, testified before the committee and made some very serious charges concerning the inadequacy of the training offered along this line by the existing institutions. We gave the State Department an opportunity to answer those charges. However, I don't think there is anything in the record refuting the charges that he did make.

You are, of course, familiar with the War College. What was your comment about the courses offered at the War College?

Admiral BURKE. Well, the War College courses are good, but they aren't very thorough and they are not very deep. They are not superficial, either, they are of value, but there are just a few weeks spent on this subject, and you can't learn this in a few weeks.

(At this point Mr. Pool returned to the hearing room.)

Admiral BURKE. You can't learn anything that is important and complex in a few weeks. It takes months and months of study, and they simply can't devote the time to that. There are a great many people in the State Department, I am sure, who have studied this themselves and who realize the tremendous effort it takes to get a knowledge of communism and Communist techniques.

But there is no formal education, there is no formal way of getting anything real. If somebody from, say a commercial concern, feels that perhaps he would like to put a plant, say, in Chile, at the moment, and he knows that there is a big Communist element in Chile and he wants to know as much as he can about the Communist techniques, where does he go to get it?

He has got to read a tremendous number of books and put a couple of staff people on that for a long time before he gets those techniques.

Mr. ICHORD. The reports of the State Department in the committee files all state that the objectives of this legislation are praiseworthy and laudable in their words, but they are all opposed to the establishment of the Academy, and I might point out that the committee has developed that President Kennedy was very interested in this proposal of the Orlando Committee and prompted the State Department to move in regard to it, and they, in turn, came forth with the National Academy of Foreign Affairs as a substitute for this measure. I think

their main objection to the bill is that it will get over into the jurisdiction of the State Department.

Do you think that this institution can function and give us something that we do need without conflicting too greatly with State Department work?

Admiral BURKE. I don't think it will conflict at all with the State Department work so long as this institution stays out of operations, and it is not the intent of the institution to be in operations.

The State Department controls our foreign policy, or the President, and they do the operating. They take the results; they take the product of this institution, or some of the product of this institution, and use those people, but they direct their operations, not this Freedom Academy.

Mr. ICHORD. In that respect, then, the Academy would work pretty much like Annapolis or West Point or the Air Force.

Admiral BURKE. Or like the National War College. The State Department sends a great number of people, and is very eager to get more people, into the National War College. It has no control over the National War College at all, except there is one member of the State Department on the National War College advisory board. Those people get very good training in the overall things that are given to the military, and it is very important to them. People who have graduated from the National War College find that it is extremely useful, because they have greater knowledge of what the military aspects are.

Well, what they need in addition to that is greater knowledge of what the Communist techniques are, and many of them do not have this.

Mr. ICHORD. Admiral, this concept has been opposed by both the extreme right and the extreme left. Some of the extreme right seem to think that this Academy might fall into the wrong hands, and some of the extreme left apparently think that this might be too bold a step.

I would like for you to comment on that rather strange opposition coming from those two quarters.

Admiral BURKE. Well, that is not unnatural, sir, because the far left and the far right have very many similar characteristics. They are convinced that their extreme views are absolutely correct and they listen to nothing that doesn't accord with their views.

And this is true with both sides. Now there is a possibility, of course, that the Communists will try to subvert this place. They certainly will try. They will try to get people in, both as instructors and as students. There will be heavy attacks on this Academy—not seemingly stemming from the Communists, but still against the Academy, to soften its curriculum, to change its curriculum, all sorts of things.

So it is possible, of course, that this Academy can be taken over either by a Communist group or by people who advocate that all we need to do is to just stand fast on everything.

There is that possibility, but it is not more great a danger than in any other institution being taken over by a group of people who would really work to destroy the effectiveness of the institution, and that,

as I understand it, is why you have established, or why this bill establishes, a Committee to help the Commission to make certain that this institution is run in accordance with the intent of Congress, and not to get distorted and not to be taken over.

I don't think there is a very great chance of it, if you have a Committee that is active and knowledgeable and works at the job and if the Congress itself continues to take an interest in it.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you have any further questions?

Mr. JOHANSEN. What would be your feeling as to either representation of the Congress on this Committee or some type of oversight relation on the part of Congress for the Commission?

Admiral BURKE. Well, Mr. Johansen, first, I would not have a Committee that is composed solely of Congressmen. The reason for that is that Congressmen are very busy. You have very many jobs and you can't tend to all of these jobs now and, in many of them, you have got to make choices as to which is most important to do, and some of them you have got to let go and rely on somebody else advising you what to do, and you follow his advice pretty blindly, sometimes, and that is necessary.

Mr. JOHANSEN. The Admiral has a very discerning knowledge of the problems of Congress, I will say.

Admiral BURKE. I have been on the other end of it a pretty long time, sir. But a Congressman wouldn't have time enough to study the problems thoroughly enough if the board were composed solely of Congressmen. But several Congressmen on such a board would be very good, perhaps a couple of Senators and a couple of Congressmen, who could devote some time to it and who could know the rest of the Committee and know who is expert on this particular aspect and who is not, and who not only know the Committee, but the Commission. I think it would be a good thing. Also, it would show that the Congress does have a great interest in this.

Mr. ICHORD. The proposed legislation establishes an independent Commission, consisting of six members and a chairman, and then an Advisory Committee consisting of State Department; Defense Department; Health, Education, and Welfare; Central Intelligence Agency; and other agencies of the Government. Do you think, then, that that is a pretty good way to handle that problem?

Admiral BURKE. That is sound, sir. I think it would be helpful, perhaps, if some Congressmen were on it, and perhaps people who were not directly connected with the Government. It might. I don't think that is nearly so important as having two to four Congressmen on it.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, the Congress will have control of it, through the appropriation process. They will have to come before the Congress each year to get their appropriation.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; but once a year is not going to be often enough, I am afraid. I think the Committee is going to have to have intimate knowledge of this whole institution, not to interfere with the management of it, but just like a board of directors in a commercial concern, to know what happens.

Quite a few commercial concerns have gotten themselves into serious trouble when things happened that were done by the management which the board of directors did not know about, and finally the company finds itself in extremis, and then the board of directors has to step in fast and learn very fast and take very drastic action, usually cleaning out the old management and putting in new management. This is something that is avoided when the board of directors knows what is going on, but still keeps itself out of any direct management.

Mr. ICHORD. You feel, then, that Congress should be represented on this Advisory Committee?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; I think it would be advisable.

Mr. ICHORD. Both from the House and the Senate?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; I don't think it is necessary. I think it would be advisable.

(At this point Mr. Pool left the hearing room.)

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I have no further questions.

Mr. ICHORD. Any further questions?

Mr. JOHANSEN. Nothing further.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, Admiral, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you for your appearance before the committee today. All Americans, of course, are aware of your great and your tremendous service to your country. I was talking to you prior to the committee meeting, and I am very happy to hear as an American that you are still offering your very competent and devoted service to your country.

Admiral BURKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Ichord.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I want to associate myself with the chairman's statement, just 100 percent.

Admiral BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Johansen.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Very nice to have you, sir.

Admiral BURKE. Thank you, sir.

(The material submitted by Admiral Burke follows:)

[New York Times, Mar. 31, 1964, pp. 1, 15]

Vietnam Starting to Train Men to Govern Districts

Forty Officers Begin Course to Learn How to Keep Recaptured Areas—Lodge Praises People's 'Servants'

By **PETER GROSE**

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 30 — The South Vietnamese Government started today an emergency training program for young army officers who have the task of bringing effective government to the people of the villages.

Special courses for the country's district chiefs marked an important first step in Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh's "clear and hold" program to wipe out Communist insurgency.

Strongly endorsed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in his recent visit, the strategy calls for efficient administrators in the areas cleared of guerrillas by military action.

"You are the 'hold' in 'clear and hold,'" Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge told the opening-day classes.

The Ambassador addressed 40 military district chiefs who will attend the two-week course.

"You epitomize the idea of government as the servant of the people," Ambassador Lodge said. "The old idea of the arrogant official, looking down on

the people, is a thing of the past. You should be trusted and loved.

"After the enemy have been driven out, it is up to you to govern the community with the help of the local militia so that the Vietcong won't come right back."

In Vietnamese governmental structure, the country's 237 districts constitute the first level of the central government above the village level. For military reasons, the district chiefs are army officers from lieutenant to major who may have had no experience in civilian administration.

The training program includes courses in the conduct of local elections, finance and accounting, district economic and social development and local political activity.

A major recommendation made by Secretary McNamara in his report to President Johnson was that the local government administration should be strengthened to make the central authority more real and beneficial to the people of the Vietnamese countryside. In many parts of the country now it is Vietcong guerrillas that

seem to be the government with the Saigon forces and representatives the intruders.

Ambassador Lodge told the assembled district chiefs, "It is up to you to create a civilized human community where the people have security and can sleep at night, where their children can be educated, where their health can be cared for, where they are kept informed, where they can own their own land.

"It is up to you to bring about the social revolution which the people want. Do not let the Communists bring about the social revolution. You must do it."

To Be Repeated for All

The training program, being given at Saigon's National Institute of Administration, is to be repeated at monthly intervals until all country's district chiefs have passed through.

Under consideration for three months, the training plan was given impetus by Premier Khanh's national pacification plan and the McNamara visit.

Similar training will also be given to 800 graduates of South Vietnam's Reserve Officers' Training School, thereby supplying a pool from which future district chiefs may be chosen.

A third step taken by Premier Khanh to bolster the district administration is assignment of an entire graduating class from the National Institute of Administration — about 70 — to jobs as deputy district chiefs.

After their three-year course in the national institute, the graduates should be able to handle most of civil administration in difficult districts, freeing the district chiefs for more specific military responsibilities.

[From the Washington Post, May 16, 1964, p. A-1]

U.S. to Rush Training Of Viet Administrators

By John Maffre

The Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, May 15—The first group of 15 South Vietnamese will begin training next month in the United States and Canada in an effort to meet the desperate shortage of civil administrators in rural Viet-Nam.

The introductory part of the 3½-month course—taught in French—will be offered in Washington's U.S. Agency for International Development Center starting in mid-June. Then the group will take field training in French-speaking communities in northern New England and in the province of Quebec, which is 85 per cent French-speaking.

The course was planned months ago by AID. It was expedited following the just-ended visit of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, after critical reports that the rural pacification plan was bogging down because of chaotic administration and shortages of trained personnel.

Usually, U.S.-bound trainees are given English training before departure but because of the urgency this was bypassed.

Candidates are mostly deputy provincial chiefs of administration with some experience under the bygone French colonial regime.

French remains the major European language of this group, although English is growing in importance among younger officials.

It is expected that two other groups of 15 will follow the first in what sources admitted was a "crash program."

One senior Vietnamese official acknowledged recently that "90 per cent of the local administrators do not know how to do their jobs."

Training also has been stepped up at Saigon's National Institute of Administration to produce officials competent in the basics of village administration. It is hoped that over 100,000 will be trained at the lower echelons this year.

One official said the objective is shirtsleeve workers capable of dealing with local problems rather than "white-coated Saigon bureaucrats who talk at people instead of with them."

[From Australian Army Journal, No. 176, January 1964, pp. 12-18]

POPULATION CONTROL TECHNIQUES OF COMMUNIST INSURGENTS

A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Franklin Mark Osanka

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IT IS NOW generally recognised that guerillas cannot operate nor exist for long without the active support of a small portion of the population and the passive indifference of a large portion of the population. It is also recognised that the guerillas actually represent only a small segment of the insurgents. The larger segment consists of a covert underground apparatus within the civilian population. In brief, the guerillas carry out overt actions on the basis of timely intelligence information from the population about the movements of government forces. The population further aids the guerillas by providing food, shelter, medical care, labour and recruits. Most importantly, the population under insurgent control denies information to the counter-insurgency forces concerning the hideouts of the guerillas and the identities of underground apparatus personnel within the population.

The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the control measures employed at the village level by Communist insurgents to ensure population loyalty during the pre-guerilla and early-guerilla stages of insurgency. This paper does not pretend to cover all the factors involved nor does it address itself to any specific past or current insurgency. However, it should be noted that it is the author's contention that Chinese-Communist-style insurgency is the archetype for most insurgencies in the under-developed areas of the world, and that insurgency is the principal export item of Red China.

Insurgent's Operational Environment

It is dangerous to generalise about geographic areas, but it is now commonly recognised that most rural areas of the under-developed nations manifest certain environmental characteristics which insurgents can ex-

plot in order to achieve their own ends. In many of these rural areas, living conditions are intolerable: illiteracy, disease, hunger, poverty, inadequate housing, a low crude-birth rate, a high early death rate, definite levels of social stratification, and tribal animosities are the rule rather than the exception. The peasants are usually a simple people, primarily farmers, who do not own the land they (as have 'probably their fathers before them) have worked all

their lives and who are frequently exploited by the land owners. They are often mistreated by the representatives of the government that they encounter (e.g., security forces and tax collectors) and as a result are extremely suspicious of all strangers. Probably their greatest desire is to own their own land.


They are politically unsophisticated and their opinions and attitudes are formed on the basis of what they see and hear in

Franklin Mark Osanka, Special Warfare Consultant, Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, holds both a B.S. in Ed., and M.A. in Sociology/Anthropology from Northern Illinois University. He has held several U.S. university positions. He served with the U.S. Marine Corps special "Force Recon" companies, For the last ten years he has been actively engaged in both research and operational aspects of special warfare. His formal special warfare training includes completing the U.S. Army's "Airborne and Jump Master", "Special Forces Officers'", and "Counter-insurgency Officers'" courses, the U.S. Navy's "SCUBA" school, the U.S. Marine Corps' "Communist Guerilla Warfare" and "Amphibious Reconnaissance" courses, the U.S. Information Agency's "Counter-insurgency" orientation, and U.S. Air Force Air University "Counter-insurgency" courses. He has served as a lecturer and/or consultant for most of these as well as many other civilian and military schools and agencies.

His written works have appeared in both military and civilian publication. His book, Modern Guerilla Warfare, (reviewed in Australian Army Journal, July 1962), is considered to be the international standard text and reference work on the subject. He is currently working on a manuscript entitled "Revolutionary Guerilla Warfare" which will be published in the new International Encyclopaedia Of The Social Sciences.

This study is based on the author's analysis of unclassified documents and diaries captured during the Chinese Civil War, the French Indo-China War, the current struggle in Viet-Nam, and discussions with veterans of these three conflicts.

COMMUNIST INSURGENT PARTY STRUCTURE (SCHEMATIC)



Communist insurgents penetrate all institutions of society. This chart shows the place of the Peasant Organizer in the overall underground apparatus.

their own immediate area rather than being influenced by mass media.¹ Communications from the ruling class (which is traditionally located in the urban areas) is usually poor at best. The ruling powers seldom view the peasants as an important or powerful political threat. Insurgents, and particularly Communist insurgents, take the opposite view!

The Insurgent Organisers

Long before the first insurgency shot is heard, Communist Insurgent Organisers (hereafter mentioned as Organisers), infiltrate the sparsely populated regions of the target country. These men are natives of the target country and very often were born in or near the area they have been assigned to control. They speak the local dialect, are of the same ethnic origin, and blend easily into the population.

The organisers have had at least three years of intensive revolutionary training in a communist country with heavy emphasis on the political-military doctrine as expressed in Selected Works by Mao Tse-tung.² Although the organisers are dogmatic in purpose, they are extremely practical and flexible operationally. They realise that each target area has its own social dynamics and that they must adapt their methods according to the norms, folkways and mores of the region. They are hard-core communists who sincerely believe that their creed is just.

They believe, as do their Chinese Communist mentors,

that thought determines action. Therefore, if one can control the thoughts of people, one can dictate the actions of the people. Their mission is to establish an effective underground apparatus, and they are prepared to die rather than fail. Their method of area penetration will follow three phases: identification, propagation, organisation.

Identification Phase

A team of two organisers enters a village and requests an audience with the village leader. The organisers are very polite and humble men. They say, "We have come to tell you of the things that we have seen. But first, as we can see that it is harvest time, we would like to help you gather in your life-sustaining crops. We shall have plenty of time to talk later." The organisers labour in the field and continually talk to the villagers. In the evening, the organisers entertain the villagers with folk-songs and stories of the wonderful countries they have seen. Countries where "everyone" owns land; all farmers have a good mule and a fine house; where children wear fine clothes and go to fine schools and live a long life; where no one is ever hungry because the people work together for the benefit of all; and where the government's function is to serve the people.

The organisers never mention communism nor the pending insurgency. Political terminology

¹ For an illuminating view of one peasant's outlook see: Pierre Marchant, "A Columbian Peon Tells His Moving Story", *Realities*, September 1962, pp. 65-68.

² The five volumes are published in the United States by International Publishers, New York, 1954.

is avoided, "plain talk" is the vogue. The organisers' songs, folk-tales, and conversations are always designed to have some meaning to the immediate lives of the villagers. The objectives of the identification phase are to: establish rapport by identifying with the lives of the villagers; determine the basic needs and aspirations of the villagers; discover the weaknesses of the social norms that dictate the accepted reaction to problems; and slowly plant the seeds of rebellion.

Propagation Phase

The propagation process is both destructive and constructive in nature. Destructively, the organisers must aggravate all the existing social ills and raise them to the surface, then transfer the cause of the ills to the existing government. Constructively, the organisers must convince the villagers that through co-operation, united action, and loyalty to each other, all social ills can be eliminated and individual aspirations can be realised. Sociologically, the process is one of inducing an awareness of definite in-group/out-group relationships, the in-group being the people and the out-group being the government. The organisers know that stories of the corruptness of the ruling group in the capital city will have little impression on the villagers. In many cases the villagers do not realise there is a capital city, much less an established government. To establish credibility and meaning to their propaganda theme, that government is the source of

all social ills, the organisers most often use the indirect approach.

The organisers' propaganda as transmitted in folk-tales, songs, and conversations all has the same general theme: "the rich get richer while the poor get poorer." For example, a conversation with a tenant farmer might sound like this: "You have been working this same plot of land for 20 years. Before you, your father worked it and before him, his father worked it. And what, my friend, do you have to show for an accumulated 70 years of sweat and labour? Of the seven children you have created, four died at birth, two never lived to enjoy their second birthday, and one has survived to do what you, your father, and his father have done — sweat and labour so that the landlord can live in comfort in his fine house and watch his healthy children grow up to exploit your son. Is that right? Is that just? The answer, of course, is that it is not just. Did God create some men to live in comfort by the sweat of other men? The answer is no! How then has it occurred that a small minority of men can legally exploit the larger majority of men? The answer is organisation. Many years ago, a small group of men discovered that by working together and co-operating with each other, they could enjoy the fruits of the peoples' labour. Using various devious methods, they acquired all of the land. They knew that in order to rule they would need a permanent police force and an army, otherwise the people would take back the land. So you see, my friend, your landlord is the

grandson of one of these men who originally stole the land. He is able to exploit your labours because he has organised a police force and an army in order to suppress the peoples' ability to acquire what is justly theirs anyway.

"How then can the people attain what is legally and morally theirs? The answer, my friend, is organisation. The minority can exploit the majority because they are organised. Does it not follow then that if the people who are the majority organise, they will be stronger than the minority landlords? All over this country, the people are beginning to organise. Men like yourself are preparing to acquire what is justly theirs. These men know that some will die but they say, 'Is it not better to die quickly and honourably for one's rights than to suffer a living slow death at the hands of the exploiters?'"

Perhaps Roucek best sums up the propagation phase when he writes, "At the core of their activities lies the argument that the . . . oppressor has no legal or moral right to exercise power . . . and that the members and leaders of the secret societies are the expression of the 'legal' will of the . . . people. The leaders must generate in their followers a readiness to die and a proclivity for united action."³

Organisation Phase

Once three villagers have been won over, the organisers can establish the first cell of the underground organisation within the village. As more recruits join the organisers, they are sent off

to previously established training camps. Here their training is 75% ideological and 25% military. Most of these individuals return to their village and form the nucleus of the underground apparatus, and can serve as a reserve force for the guerillas. Others receive further military training and later form into small bands which will establish camps in rugged areas near the village. A few receive further ideological training and serve as assistant organisers to penetrate other villages in the area. One or two will be sent to a communist country for a year and undergo intensified ideological and military training.

The organisers encourage and direct the establishment of a village medical clinic as well as an elementary school. A variety of civic activities are performed by the underground organisation. The organisers' purpose here is to enhance village solidarity behind the insurgents. Tactically, the village medical clinic will prove useful once the guerilla stage of the insurgency is under way. Psychologically, the school provides the organisers an additional opportunity to propagandise the young. If the government troops, in an effort to weaken the insurgents' organisation, requisition the medicines of the clinic and outlaw the school, the insurgents have won a psychological victory. The organisers can attribute the government's action to a desire to suppress the people by keeping them ignorant and weak with

³ Joseph S. Roucek, "Sociology of Secret Societies", *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 19, No. 2, January 1960, p. 164.

diseases. The organisers' propaganda theme will be, "the government knows that an educated and healthy people cannot be exploited!"

Insurgency Population Control

The successful completion of the identification, propagation, and organisation phases at the village level, results in four principal conditions of control. They are: in-group loyalty, insurgent terror tactics, personal commitment, and government terror tactics.

The in-group loyalty condition is the result of acceptance by the majority of the villagers, of the idea that the insurgent activities are just and that the government is unjust. Insurgent terror tactics are directly related to the in-group loyalty condition. Those who aid the enemy are traitors and harmful to the people and, therefore, must be eliminated. The penalty for traitors, while not often quick, is final. Here, the in-group loyalty condition is reinforced by the underground's spy system which keeps the organisers informed of everything that is happening in the village.

Personal commitment is probably the most effective condition of control. The organisers make every effort to involve in one way or another, a member of every family. Consequently, families are reluctant to betray the insurgency thereby directly or indirectly increasing the possibility of prison, and most likely death, for a member of their family. The personal commitment condition is also

operating in those individuals who have made large contributions to the insurgency and expect to be rewarded when the insurgents win.

Being unable to locate and annihilate the guerilla forces, many governments have resorted to terroristic methods in an attempt to secure the support of the population. Government terror tactics such as burning villages, slaughtering innocent people, and generally mistreating the population, are well-documented in the annals of guerilla warfare history. It is equally well documented that such tactics tend to reinforce the solidarity of the people behind the insurgents. The communist insurgents are well aware of the population's reaction to such action and very often provoke the government into committing drastic actions. Indeed, one noted specialist maintains that, "the greatest contribution of guerillas and saboteurs lies in catalysing and intensifying counter - terror which further alienates the government from the local population."¹

Conclusion

What has been discussed occurs during the pre-violence stage and the early stage of guerilla action in an insurgency. As the insurgency escalates into country-wide guerilla warfare, and later regular warfare, new population control conditions are born. These new conditions can be favourable to either the insur-

¹ J. K. Zawodny. "Unconventional Warfare", *The American Scholar*, Vol. 31, No. 3, Summer 1962, p. 292.

gents or counter-insurgents, depending primarily upon the actions and attitudes of the counter-insurgents. If the counter-insurgents react to the wide-spread guerilla violence solely with traditional military and police repressive measures, they will simply reinforce the validity of the insurgent propaganda and insure continual population support to the insurgents. If, on the other hand, the counter-insurgents incorporate into their pacification programme at the village level, the "psychological action", "civic action", and "population security" principles pioneered primarily by the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs and Special Warfare Schools, they will destroy the very foundation on which the insurgency rests. For it is only when the counter-insurgents

demonstrate by attitude and action their desire and ability to eliminate the basic social ills and legitimate personal grievances, as well as to protect the people from the insurgents, will the population transfer its loyalty. As the insurgents lose the support of the population, they will be forced to depend solely upon increased terroristic methods of population control and then it is only a matter of time before the insurgents are either eliminated or rendered ineffectual.

When the immediate threat of the insurgency is eliminated, and a positive "nation-building" programme is implemented, the country can be on its way to a state of socio-political stability which greatly reduces the possibility of the recurrence of insurgency.

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Col. E.G.Keogh, Editor, AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL, Army Headquarters, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, Australia

Major Jim Ewan (The Black Watch), was back in peace-time Scotland applying for the job of Recruiting Officer in Dundee. He was called to Highland House in Perth for interview by the GOC Highland District — General Colville at the time. "Now, Jim," said the General, "if I were to come as a potential recruit into your Dundee office and say I wanted to join the Seaforths — what would you do?"

"I'd say 'Right laddie, I'll fix you up'," replied Jim.

"But remember Jim," the General went on, "you are in Dundee and in the heart of The Black Watch recruiting area."

"Ay sir — but I'd still do as he asked."

"Why that?" said the General searchingly.

"I didna like his face," came the reply.

— From "*The Red Hackle*"

Mr. ICHORD. The next witness to be heard is our colleague, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Congressman John Marsh.

Congressman Marsh, the committee is very happy to have you appear before our committee in the interests of this legislation. I know that you have a very great interest in the Freedom Academy, and we will be very glad to hear you at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN O. MARSH, JR., U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA

Mr. MARSH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and appear in support of the legislation envisioned along the lines of the Freedom Academy bill. I have a statement, if I might read it.

As we move rapidly through the last half of the 20th century, the present decade takes on ominous proportions. Truly a decade of challenge, it is even more a decade of decision. The die for the image of society when we close the second millennium might well be cast in the sixties.

Caught up in the revolutionary times in which we live, America has yet to bring to bear the full resources of its society to the problems of a changing world. Far surpassing the early patriot's dream in either its material wealth or institutions of freedom, America seems at times to be swept along in the currents of a changing world rather than directing them. Yet, we are the true revolutionaries. Communism is reactionary—not revolutionary. It is feudalism at its worst. The feudal lord was master of all he could rule or defend with the sword, and within that domain his will was law. To him belonged man's labor and its fruits. Today in the Sino-Soviet empire we find not a change in the system, but in the methods of operation. Scientific and technological advances in communications and weaponry have for the feudal lord's counterpart in the Kremlin extended the domain—the present-day fiefs, Hungary, Poland, are simply larger.

If there is anything revolutionary in communism, it is the manner in which is waged a total conflict—militarily, economically, psychologically, and politically in a never-ending struggle to enslave man. Through careful coordinated control by brute force and terror of the governmental, economic, and social resources of a nation, the regime is able to launch its devastating thrusts. A coordinated thrust must be met by a coordinated response, and in this we have largely failed. Particularly when the thrust comes in an area of our society that is beyond the scope of governmental endeavor. The dynamics of American society thus far has not included the mechanics to incorporate into national strategy the skills, talents, and abilities of our citizens, as well as our economic wealth, to defend, perpetuate, and enlarge our way of life.

Within the broad framework of American institutions, we must formulate new strategic concepts based on a voluntary cooperative effort between governmental and nongovernmental areas. The proper effort must combine leadership and local action. At the higher levels of society there must be the type of leadership that not only will cause our people to shake off apathy and complacency,

but will insure their efforts are properly directed. Also, in policy echelons, particularly governmental, there must be greater receptivity to local ideas originating either within or without the governmental structure—a willingness to experiment in a search for new approaches. Frequently, there is a tendency on the part of individuals in the power structure of any organization, because of experience, better sources of information, and technical knowledge, to treat rather lightly effort originating either at a lower level in the structure or outside the structure entirely.

The most priceless thing that we can give our country and mankind in this decade is our time, our skill, our energy, our talents. Not only do these next few fateful years require it—but duty demands it. This contribution to the national effort must not be limited to only a few people, but must give an opportunity to incorporate into such effort the vast skills and talents available in our society in the private sector.

What are some of the broad purposes that might be accomplished in the national effort by an institution such as you are considering today? To list some, I would set out:

1. To provide better coordination and communication between the public and the private sector to meet the challenges of the cold war.
2. To better utilize in the national effort the skill, talents, and resources of a free citizenry.
3. To encourage private cooperative endeavor in the national defense.
4. To create a new dimension in the strategy of a free people.

As I view the establishment of such an institution, I am not thinking in terms of an Academy in the nature of one of our service academies, but rather of a training institution whose student body would be composed principally of individuals who have already completed certain educational requirements and who now occupy positions of authority and responsibility who might be able to implement into those positions new insights derived from the training they might receive.

I might point out that an objection made to the Freedom Academy is that such an institute should be limited to the governmental sector, rather than the private sector, because of the use of classified materials, intelligence reports, and related data. However, a great deal of the type of material that I would envision to be considered at such an institute is predominantly unclassified.

The writings of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and analyses of them, are clearly in the purview of unclassified documents. Many case studies of the methods of operation of the Communist apparatus are matters of current events and historical record which can be gleaned by the careful reader or listener from radio, news, and other sources of public information.

Many of the lecturers at such institutions as the National War College, the Army War College, the Foreign Service Institute, and other centers of learning are recognized scholars in the field of national security. The books, articles, and other treatises of these individuals have been widely published and disseminated at home and abroad. Their subjects cover the entire spectrum of the cold war conflict which some have described as the “protracted conflict.”

The pronouncements and statements of such individuals as Khrushchev, Kadar, Gomulka, and Mao, as well as Tass dispatches and such publications as *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, are not only unclassified but are available to the free world.

Finally, in summary, in appearing here in support of legislation of this type, I think it is well to point out the broad spectrum of support that it enjoys on the domestic political scene, with sponsors and spokesmen who represent a broad cross section of American political and economic thought. Individuals who on the domestic scene are frequently at loggerheads on national domestic policy have joined ranks without regard to the arbitrary classification of "conservative" or "liberal" because of their recognition of a problem that must be met in a nonpartisan sense in what is really a search for common ground. There is a need to search for this common ground in our efforts to come to grips with the problems that confront us in a changing world and the threat that is posed to the institutions of this Republic by the ideology and aggressive actions of the Communist states.

In the final analysis, notwithstanding our differences, the things which unite us are far greater than the things which divide us.

That concludes the written statement.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you, Congressman Marsh.

Mr. Johansen?

Mr. JOHANSEN. I appreciate having your statement very much. I understand you have a constituent here, a counsel of this committee, Mr. Tavenner.

Mr. MARSH. He is one of the most distinguished constituents not only in the 7th District, but indeed, in our State of Virginia.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I congratulate you on your constituent, and he on his Representative.

Mr. MARSH. I think that I am benefited more by my associations with him than he by his associations with me.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I will stay neutral on that issue.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Schadeberg, do you have some questions?

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I just want to state that I appreciate the fact that you have taken the time to come and testify. I appreciate having you here.

Mr. MARSH. I appreciate the opportunity, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Marsh, I have one question. You were a little hesitant about training private citizens along with the governmental personnel, as I understand.

Mr. MARSH. I didn't mean to give that impression. I think that the private sector must be incorporated into this effort. The point I was trying to make is that in some previous testimony here in opposition to this type of legislation the point has been made that you can't bring the private sector in because of the use of classified materials, which I do not think is a valid argument, because much of the subject matter and the courses that would be taught would be taught from what are substantially unclassified sources, either to governmental or to private sector.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, the classes would be separated, or else the private citizen could be approved for viewing classified material.

Mr. MARSH. Exactly. There would be certain subcourses or advanced courses or several separate hours of instruction for those that

enjoy sensitive positions in Government that they could attend, and members of the private sector would not attend.

Probably in all events this information would not even be helpful on a "need to know" basis to members from the private sector, but I think the private sector is the area where we must do our greatest work, and I think in the mechanics of training there are several precedents that the committee might well look at in the field of management training.

For example, the very fine courses in the American Management Association, which are designed to reach and train middle management—and it is this middle management who are the people that we need here, because they are in positions of policy and influence in the private sector—in the corporations, and what has been done by the American management in a series of seminars and training institutes, it would seem to me, would offer certain guidelines.

Mr. ICHORD. It would also be very valuable to train private citizens who are going overseas and have overseas business.

Mr. MARSH. Exactly. And high school teachers and others who would be engaged in teaching. The American Bar Association has made some great strides in this field of instruction in the high schools on the difference between totalitarianism, as represented in the Soviet State and, of course, the Chinese state, as compared with the democratic society, with institutions of government that are representative of the Western World.

There is an excellent example in what has been done at the National War College in the summer session, where individuals not in Government and from the private sector come in for a training program.

I would see that a beginning might well be perhaps the use of some of these facilities during times that they are not being used, to begin with a modest effort. I do not see the 4-year type of Academy, but perhaps the use of other facilities that are now available during the summertime and at other periods, as a beginning.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Would you feel that the private sector also should be included in the governing board of directors?

Mr. MARSH. I think that there are individuals in the private sector that should be represented there. I think we have gone out on many other governmental institutions and selected people from the private sector to serve on commissions and boards. There are many people, for example, Admiral Burke is now in the private sector, and he would be an individual I think would be extremely well qualified to serve on such a board.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. That is all.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you very much, Congressman Marsh. I appreciate your very valuable contribution to the committee.

The next witness is Mr. Paul Jones. Mr. Jones, it is a pleasure to have you with us today. I might state for the record that Mr. Paul Jones is a columnist for the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, a former professor of history and a former employee of the Office of War Information. He has spent some time in South Vietnam several years ago and, at that time, did forecast some of the events that have since taken place in South Vietnam.

I think, for the record, Mr. Jones, before you get into your testimony, we would appreciate some elaboration upon your background.

STATEMENT OF PAUL JONES

Mr. JONES. Well, actually, I was not with OWI. I was with the Office of Inter-American Affairs, which performed the function of OWI in Latin America. OWI did not operate in that area. I took my three degrees at the University of Pennsylvania. I taught there for 8 years and then I resigned to do magazine writing.

For the past 25 years, I have been a columnist and editorial writer for the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*. In that capacity, I went out to Saigon as an exchange journalist and lectured on journalism to Vietnamese newspapermen. I speak French well enough to lecture in French, and that was a prerequisite.

I have also worked as a correspondent in South America, in Chile and Brazil, in almost every country in South America, and in Mexico. My chief interest is in seeing something like the Freedom Academy established for the private sector, particularly teachers and newspapermen who get assignments abroad. My first experience abroad was in Chile in 1941, which was just at the time when the popular front, a Communist-Socialist-Radical coalition, was collapsing, and I found it very difficult to understand just what the political picture was within Chile.

Now I think it is fair to say that the Embassy and our own office, the OIAA, and the various operational agencies there were only too anxious to help, but they are busy people. They can't devote the time to briefing thoroughly every newspaperman that comes into a country. It seems to me that if a course of a month or 6 weeks, which would bring together all the information, let us say, that this committee and the Senate committee in the same area has amassed over more than 25 years, if that could be concentrated and an idea given to the newspapermen going abroad or to the teachers, particularly in this country, that things are not always what they seem and that, let us say, a cry for land reform doesn't necessarily mean merely a liberal or an agrarian reformer. In other words, to give them some kind of sophisticated attitude.

I think that to a large degree, the reports that we—and when I say “we,” I speak as a newspaperman who has worked abroad—that what we send back has often a capital influence on public opinion, and frequently, from the more remote areas, it is the only information that comes. Knowing a great many of my colleagues, I haven't the slightest idea that they are infiltrated, or I don't deny that some of them may be, but in the large degree, it is due to ignorance.

I don't mean that they are ignorant men in the sense of general information, but they are ignorant of the sophisticated process of Communist management in politics within the teachers' unions, within the students' unions, within the labor unions, in government itself, in politics, sometimes infiltrating even the church, in some of these areas.

Now this is my chief interest. Obviously, I am in the private sector, and we have made some mistakes. We made one very bad mistake in Cuba. I think we made, in my opinion, another very bad one in Saigon, largely because the reporters who were out there weren't sophisticated enough to go behind the outward appearances and penetrate to the actual inspirers of these movements.

Mr. JOHANSEN. May I interrupt?

Mr. JONES. Certainly.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Wasn't that also the case with regard to China and the agrarian reformers?

Mr. JONES. Yes, it certainly was.

Mr. JOHANSEN. A great deal of the so-called journalistic reporting that came out of there?

Mr. JONES. I agree. It was really a kind of naivete which made the even perfectly honest reporters, with very few exceptions, take at face value the statements of a Chou En-lai or around the press headquarters in Chungking. That is basically my point, of course, and in this country, it is equally important, I think, for teachers to be aware actually how these things operate.

For many years, I have read the printed hearings of this committee, for example, and the amount of information actually buried in your publications is astounding, if it could only be brought together and simply presented for the information of teachers, newspapermen, businessmen, people who go abroad, even missionaries would benefit. I think, in some cases, not by indoctrination, but by information. Just as you have to take an anticholera shot, I think it is a good idea to learn something about what you are bound to come up against.

Mr. ICHORD. What years were you in South Vietnam, sir?

Mr. JONES. I was there in 1959. There was bad trouble then, but it really didn't begin to heat up until the beginning of 1961, or the middle of 1961.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, what do you think the reporters could have done, or should have been doing, or what did they do over there that could have been improved upon?

Mr. JONES. There were two classes of reports from Vietnam. Saigon is not a very attractive post. It is not very easy to get in and out of. Hence the veteran correspondents, some of whom, like Keyes Beech and Margaret Higgins, had gone through Korea and, before that, had been in China, were sophisticated enough not to take at face value the idea that a simple Buddhist monk would have the battery of mimeograph machines and the facilities for public relations that had never been seen in Vietnam before.

When they came down from Tokyo or Hong Kong, where they made their base, their stories were not quite the same as those of the young reporters who were in Saigon. That is, I would say this: That the experienced reporters who came in suggested more of what was actually revealed by the printed testimony of the U.N. Commission, the fact-finding commission that went out there to Vietnam. Of course its report came after the coup d'etat, but reading that testimony, it seemed to me perfectly clear that it was a managed thing. I am frankly imperfectly acquainted myself with this whole New Buddhism operation of the Communists in the Far East. I am partially acquainted with it, as far as I can get hold of the information, but it is obviously a very potent weapon.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you feel, then, that it would be very valuable for all of the newspapers to send their war correspondents for training such as this, to recognize?

Mr. JONES. I think so. Of course, it would be on a voluntary basis, but I would think that the publishers or the heads of the organizations involved would be only too glad to send their men, rather than just

plunge them, without any background whatever, into very complex situations in remote areas of the world—which, of course, is precisely where the Communists are making their best time.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Johansen?

Mr. JOHANSEN. I have no further questions, but I think you have testified to a very practical potential value and a very practical need for this type of institution.

Mr. JONES. I certainly think so.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Schadeberg?

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Would you care to comment by saying that perhaps the difference between the Freedom Academy as suggested to be set up and the academy that would be set up in the State Department, the National Academy of Foreign Affairs, is that one would address itself to the pure facts and research and the other would apply to foreign policy?

Mr. JONES. Yes, I would say so. From reading the testimony, I am aware that the State Department believes that they can cover this through their Foreign Service Institute or Foreign Affairs Academy. Certainly, speaking as a private citizen, I welcome the idea that State would improve its own institute, as it seems to feel the need to do, but I don't think that an operational agency like State or CIA or USIA or AID, that that is the proper place for a general Freedom Academy open to the private citizen.

(At this point, Mr. Willis returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. SCHADEBERG. It wouldn't address itself to the same end. Thank you.

That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you feel, then, Mr. Jones, that the nature of the reporting that comes out of a given foreign country might be more influential upon the course of events than even some of the operations of the State Department people?

Mr. JONES. That is entirely possible. In certain critical situations, yes.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Particularly, if I might interject, particularly when, as evidently was the case, State Department people were instructed to get their background training in regard to Cuba and Castro from the newspapers.

Mr. JONES. Yes, that was a reversal. That is just the reverse of what I had in mind.

The CHAIRMAN (presiding). Thank you very much sir.

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., Tuesday, May 19, 1964, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, May 20, 1964.)

**HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368,
H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077,
AND H.R. 11715, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF A
FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY**

Part 2

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 1964

**UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
*Washington, D.C.***

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 10:25 a.m., in the Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; August E. Johansen, of Michigan; and Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank S. Tavenner, general counsel; and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel.

Mr. JOHANSEN (presiding). The committee will come to order.

Today the Committee on Un-American Activities continues hearings on eight bills which have been referred to it and which would create a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. We are very happy to welcome as the first witness this morning, our colleague from California, Congressman D. H. Clausen.

Mr. Clausen, you may proceed as you wish.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DON H. CLAUSEN, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA**

Mr. CLAUSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be able to appear before your committee on a subject that is of great interest to myself, and I am sure to the Nation as well. It is conceivable that these hearings will bring forth a program that could change the tide of history.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before your committee in support of the Freedom Academy concept. Your committee is to be complimented for initiating these hearings in the interest of developing interest and testimony on behalf of a program urgently needed to combat the well-organized economic, political, and ideological offensive of the Soviet Union and other advocates of the Communist doctrine.

In my judgment, the salvation of our system of government, our American way of life, the hopes of and aspirations of people throughout the world who desire to be or remain free could rest on the decision this committee makes with respect to this legislative recommendation.

(At this point Mr. Willis entered the hearing room.)

Mr. CLAUSEN. It is my personal opinion that the Freedom Academy should be sponsored, staffed, and guided by the leadership of the private sector of our system. Cooperation with the executive branch, State Department and other agencies, is absolutely essential to maintain the necessary security provisions. However, I do believe the Congress, the legislative branch, which is the most responsive to the electorate, must establish full control of the program—offering the necessary guarantee of liaison between Government and the private sector. The Freedom Academy must, at all times, have as its major objective the full development and utilization of people familiar with the workings of our private enterprise system.

Further, I want to recommend vigorously recognition of the vital role cities, towns, counties, school districts, and special service district organizations will play in offering a guideline to developing countries throughout the world interested in the adoption of our Federal system. Should the Freedom Academy and the Commission be established, I would recommend early consultation with organizations such as we have in California—the League of California Cities, the County Supervisors Association of California—and other municipal organizations throughout the country. The National Association of County Officials has an outstanding action program through their recently formed “Home Rule Congress.” The overwhelming demand for political stability requires our giving prompt attention to these important factors. Additionally, we in the United States must strive to retain the basic concept of our three levels (local, State, and Federal) of government, assuring that each level has clearly defined areas of responsibility and the available tax sources to meet demands for service responsively and responsibly.

In the April 17 issue of *Life* magazine, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge set forth, in a very forthright and provocative article, a detailed analysis of the problems facing the United States in Vietnam. It is timely, and I would recommend the article to anyone desirous of factual information on the world’s “hot spot.” All Americans should be familiar with the Ambassador’s comments because Vietnam is the only place in the world where Americans are under fire from Communist guns.

Mr. Lodge has offered some very significant points that I believe to be worthy of note, and I quote:

South Vietnam is a keystone for all of Southeast Asia, the hub of an area which is bounded on the northeast and east by Formosa and the Philippines, on the south by Indonesia and on the west by Burma. Control of South Vietnam would put the Communists squarely into the middle of Southeast Asia—whence they could radiate all over.

* * * * *

The conquest of South Vietnam would immediately disturb Cambodia and Laos, and bring strong repercussions farther west in Thailand and Burma. It would shake Malaysia to the south. It would surely threaten Indonesia. Then, if Indonesia were unable or unwilling to resist, the Chinese Communists would be

on the doorstep of Australia. Finally, eastward, the repercussions for the Philippines and for Formosa would be severe.

Therefore, when we speak of Southeast Asia, we are not talking of some small neck of the woods but of an area about 2,300 miles long from north to south and 3,000 miles wide from east to west—with about 240 million people.

Mr. Lodge continues:

There is vivid recognition that the Vietcong campaign is, above all, a political affair; that we must organize for the political conflict as carefully as we have organized for military success; and that there must be a true civil-political organization to go hand in hand with the military.

In this paragraph, I believe we have a briefly defined statement of foreign policy recommendations that will be required now and long into the future, as we continue the struggle between freedom and communism. It is to this end that I shall address my remarks.

The cold war is not merely a confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as Soviet propagandists would have the world believe. It is a war between communism and every nation outside the Red bloc. It is a war that must be fought by citizens of all nations of the free world who desire to remain free.

The so-called cold war should be properly recognized as political war. The battlefronts are many and varied and will continue to be so as the Soviets create chaos and controversy in the many corners of the world—most of which stem from the well-organized activities of the nearly 300,000 trained subversive agents operating in the free world. The arms race, the competition in space and trade, are all part of the Marxist master plan. However, the political battlefronts are the most serious, because they are the ones on which the Communists pin their greatest hopes for world domination.

Unfortunately, it is on the political fronts that they are the strongest and we are the weakest.

On November 13 of last year, during the debate on the Peace Corps, I submitted remarks which, in view of Mr. Lodge's comments, you may find interesting. These remarks, I believe, Mr. Chairman, were made a part of my February 18 testimony before this committee. (See part 1, p. 1032.)

During this past year, I have attended the regular State Department briefings available to Members of Congress. I studied all available material that I could get my hands on; I participated in study groups with some of my colleagues; I interviewed and exchanged ideas with people considered to be experts in their fields, including diplomats, ambassadors, military men, international lawyers, bankers, labor leaders, and economists, missionary volunteers, as they returned from such stations as Laos, India, the Congo, Borneo, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Central America—to name a few.

With this background of information, I have joined some of my colleagues in promoting the Freedom Academy concept—a concept with a sole objective of winning the cold war—designed to take advantage of the unlimited material and human resources available in the private sector. A plan that places more emphasis in the private sector and less emphasis in the public sector—as we advance this proven concept of foreign policy.

The United States Government, in its efforts to stem the Communist tide, has poured billions of dollars annually in military, economic,

and technical aid to foreign nations. Anyone who has followed international problems closely will immediately conclude that the fundamental problem is a lack of political stability brought about primarily, in my judgment, by inadequate systems of government. Compare any of these to the system of government we have been able to enjoy under this great Constitution of ours. A Federal system that provides a maximum opportunity for political participation by its electorate—a system that only functions at the will of the people or by consent of the governed.

Without question, these nations' greatest need is political aid—we must export knowledge and know-how in this vital field. This type of political aid could be made available to the present and future leaders of those nations who are currently living under the "umbrella" of our military and economic security.

A Freedom Academy could train such leaders in techniques for counteracting the propaganda of the Communists. These same leaders could be trained on how to transmit knowledge in behalf of legitimate constitutional government, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of economic opportunity, the right to assemble peaceably, full religious liberty, and other basics of the free society—as opposed to the totalitarian state.

In California, much to our credit, the County Supervisors Association has initiated an intern fellowship training program, financed through private capital, for young men interested in local government. With local government being virtually nonexistent in many countries, thereby restricting participation in a unit of government close to the people, I would urgently recommend that this program be expanded in our own country and further be included in the curriculum of the Freedom Academy. Consultation with our city, county, and school district organizations throughout this great Nation would provide a large pool of information urgently needed in these developing nations.

As previously stated, in this rapidly changing world, a defense posture by itself is not enough. Many of you in this room, I am sure, are former athletes. Let me ask you, "How many ball games did you win by devoting all of your time and attention to defense strategy?" Let's face it, you didn't win unless you had a better offense.

The challenge to America and indeed the free world is really the development of an ideological offensive of our own. Some of this is already going on, but not enough.

In its endeavors to penetrate the West, the Soviet Union's hierarchy is constantly preoccupied with stratagems designed to exploit the contradictions in Western society. This required the utilization of elements which, although non-Communist, are ideologically at odds with the open society. These include the more doctrinaire Socialists, statist-liberals, pacifists, extreme rightwing conservatives, and some of the nationalists in underdeveloped countries.

A primary justification for large Soviet Embassies in many countries of the free world is the alleged possibility of Soviet trade. The possibilities could be immense if trade with the Soviets were not conducted by government monopoly and determined largely by political consideration.

The Kremlin does not buy what the people need or want, but rather what is essential from the point of view of building its power ma-

chine, mostly industrial capital goods and essential raw materials. As these needs are satisfied, trade declines. Thus, we have the phenomenon that as the Soviet empire grows, the area under its jurisdiction is increasingly withdrawn from existing world trade.

Soviet trade and their tactics in political warfare is one of the chief weapons in the arsenal. Their economic offensive is being felt in all quarters of the world. The newspapers are filled with their activities—the most recent of which were Algeria and Egypt.

We, in America, must step up our offensive. The question arises—How? Should the Government do this? In my judgment, the Government is the least equipped to carry out a successful program because of limitations placed on it.

Government-to-government programs have failed miserably in foreign aid. The major talents of this country lie in the private sector.

We must step up the people-to-people effort—an expansion designed to promote the joint-venture concept between investors of our country and investors of interested developing nations.

We must rededicate ourselves to capitalist principles. Private enterprise is substantially better qualified than Government to sell capitalism abroad. Acts, not words, will counter communism. Many of our economic ideas and ideals can be exported.

One of our major problems is, of course, the problem of education. Many of our schools of business and public administration can help. The Agricultural Extension Service, which has worked so successfully in this country, could be implemented as we work to raise their educational facilities and their literacy rate.

The correspondence school idea should certainly be recommended as a program to promote worldwide education.

The many great service clubs operating internationally, such as the Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions, can and must expand their sphere of influence.

The Boy and Girl Scouts of America, the 4-H Clubs and the various church missionary volunteer programs are but a few of our great voluntary organizations dedicated to the improvement of our fellow man.

I spoke recently in Fort Worth, Texas, before the Junior Chamber of Commerce. I observed the great effort over the weekend of the Sonoma County Junior Chamber people in an outstanding community promotional effort. These young men can change the world if we have the program to properly channel their efforts.

There are four forms of American activity—cooperatives, small business, trade unions, and voluntary agencies—that can hold the key to solving the problem of how and what to communicate to others, the things that brought America to its position of leadership and greatness.

The cooperative, the nonprofit corporate association, as it is used in North America, is something that fascinates overseas leaders. To name a few of the corporations who provide service without entit^y profit, but with profit to the members who use and own it—the Associated Press, Sunkist, Railway Express Agency, our large mutual insurance companies, credit union finance companies, and agricultural purchasing associations, and so forth.

Small business is a facet of American life that is devastating to the promoters of Soviet communism. The word "capitalism" is under worldwide attack. The words "small business" are the end of the rainbow for many millions of people. The fact that we, as a nation, have recognized small businesses as a vital part of our economic life and have shown governmental interest in them is revolutionary to the thinking of those who have condemned America as being materialistic and dominated by big business.

Nothing will appeal to people in distant lands more than to be brought face to face with the fact that small business is a vital part of America. We have an "atomic bomb" here in the world of ideas that for some reason has never really been tried. Nothing is more American than private small business.

Labor unions, through their free labor movement, have done a better job of interpreting America overseas than has business.

Highly organized American labor is part and parcel of our present-day capitalistic society. Our laborers are in many cases stockholders. Together with business and agriculture, labor has made possible the great revolution of the past 50 years, whereby we have achieved universal participation in capitalism by all segments of our society.

The fact is that they, as free trade unionists, believe enough in our system to fight for it. If the trade associations of the companies for which labor works expand their interest in this international program, we can turn the tide of history—this, we can and must do.

Voluntary agencies are as representative of American capitalism as any other contemporary institution. There are hundreds of trade associations here that might well apportion a part of their income to send true businessmen abroad, without Government subsidy, to do a better job of interpreting America.

There are many examples of voluntary agencies—from profit-entity business, the supermarket organizations, nonprofit corporate associations, savings and loan associations, finance and managerial organizations are just a few examples of what can be done.

If just a few more organizations would light their own candles, study the situation, and find where their members' particular talents and resources fit, world tensions would be considerably eased.

Again quoting Ambassador Lodge:

We should also be sure that we are making full use of the things in which we excel and in which the Communists are deficient. For example, we probably cannot, as a general rule, surpass a young Oriental guerrilla fighter, who doesn't mind the heat, who can get along on a daily handful of rice, and who can lie under water for hours at a time breathing through a straw. But we can do better in other things, such as: the use of airplanes, the art of medicine, improved farming and education, the development of an energetic political system based on justice.

I believe those last few recommendations, Mr. Chairman, are certainly to be considered as we develop this Freedom Academy concept. I think they are fundamental, they are something that can work in these foreign lands, and I have been in these areas and worked with these very fundamentals in mind.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for letting me appear before you.

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly are grateful to you, sir, for your splendid presentation.

Now I have just compared your bill, H.R. 10037, with the Boggs and Taft bills, and I find that they are almost word for word identical; are they not?

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. When this was initially set up, I wanted to join in this effort. In the matter of finance, however, it is up to the committee, I think, to evaluate the testimony. I tend to lean toward establishing the private-finance concept.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. But I want to follow the structure of your bill.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is exactly like the Taft bill and with one exception, identical to the Boggs bill.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes. That is correct. And my reason for this, Mr. Chairman—at the time that I introduced the bill, I visited with Mr. Grant and some of the other fellows who had done substantial research. I found no great difference in our mutual objectives. So I used the same language suggested by these gentlemen to fulfill the objectives. The only thing that I am concerned about, of course, is how we would finance this. It is possible we will have to amend the original bill as it applies to financing the program.

Some people have said that it can't be financed in the private sector. I am personally not convinced that everything has been done that could have been done, because I think that we have experienced great change in our times. I think there is more emphasis and more consideration being given to this concept now than in any previous time in history, and I do know this, that the gentlemen who worked on this legislation at the outset felt in their own minds that they would rather have it financed through the private sector, so that they could control it, but here again I am not concerned about the method of finance for the moment. I think we need to have a strong endorsement of the concept, and then it is up to you gentlemen to decide where we should place our emphasis on finance before the final draft of the bill is voted on.

Tax incentives, however, could be a very important vehicle to promote the concept.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, under the structure of your bill, the financing end is the same as the other bills.

Mr. CLAUSEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And by the way, along your thoughts, although this—or to start with, anyway—would be a Government-financed operation, at least your bill and the Boggs and Taft bills do provide for authority to receive loans, gifts, and so on. And there would be an avenue of soliciting private financing.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But the availability of private financing is within the structure of your bill.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Through that provision, as it is through the provision, the similar provision of the Boggs-Taft bill.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes. This is correct, Mr. Chairman.

As we progress, I would think at the proper time I would be inclined to offer amendments to this end, but without the full benefit of testimony such as you gentlemen have heard before your commit-

tee, I wouldn't feel as though I were as qualified to advocate such amendments, as would the committee. However, I am convinced in my own mind, with the integrity of this great committee, that you will be evaluating that possibility, because I have talked to you individually and I am convinced that you yourselves want to make sure that we retain the control in the Congress. Also, control, if it is at all possible, by the private sector.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Am I correct in my understanding, Mr. Clausen, that you have put rather more emphasis on the private sector than possibly some of the other proposals do?

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; and as a source, now that I have had an opportunity to study this, I would recommend, for instance, that the gentlemen on this committee call together some of the leaders of our foundations; call together the leadership of our labor organizations and some of our major trade associations, the U.S. Chamber, some of these people, and put the recommendation flat on the table and say, "Gentlemen, can you meet this responsibility? Will you get behind us? Will you help to publicize this concept, if the committee comes forth with a strong recommendation? Let's see if we can't come up with a method of finance alternatives to the Federal financing first."

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, that leads to my next question. The major difference in the legislation you would recommend, between what you do recommend and what is in the other approaches, would be in this area of nongovernmental financing. Is that correct?

Mr. CLAUSEN. That is correct. And I am sure that, down deep inside, each and every one of us would agree that our major problem here in advancing this concept is going to be one of finance. The only reason, I am sure, that the members of the committee that have worked on this for a long period of time are even considering Government is because they are not certain whether or not they can raise the money in the private sector.

Well, here again, I would like to see a major concentration of effort in this field, because more people are thinking this way. Just recently in the *Wall Street Journal*, for instance, there was an article that expressed this very point of view, that there is information now an executive, private peace corps. I think you could bring in a number of our leaders of the various international church missionary volunteer programs. They could give you some ideas in this area.

I think the most important thing that I could recommend to this committee is that you vigorously endorse this Freedom Academy concept. Whether it be by concurrent resolution or whether it be by a bill, this is up to you to decide, but here again, there are two fundamental points that I am concerned about.

One, I don't have quite the confidence in what the State Department has been doing internationally, so I therefore would like to have some agency that is concerned about international problems be responsive to the Congress, to the legislative branch, if it is at all possible, and in the matter of finance, I say again, we must convince the leadership of our private sector that they have a new role in helping to provide for our security, as we continue the economic and political warfare with the Soviet Union. The Congress might consider broadening tax incentives to motivate this effort.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I believe in Admiral Burke's testimony yesterday he stated that there would, of course, be an effort to infiltrate this type of organization, Commission or Academy. Would you feel that—if this is a fair question—that the hazards of such infiltration would be greater if it were strictly under Government auspices or greater if it were under private auspices?

Mr. CLAUSEN. Well, there is no question in my mind but that it would be greater if it were financed by Government. This is the reason that I placed this emphasis in the private sector. I think that we again could go out and experiment. We would have a lot more flexibility if it were financed and promoted by the private sector, but our key to this, Mr. Johansen, is to motivate the private sector to recognize that they have a new responsibility for providing for our security.

We have reached this point of no return in the so-called nuclear stalemate and, in my judgment, we have to educate these people to the fact that they have an entirely new responsibility. These people are the only ones that are familiar with the private enterprise system. These are the only ones that can actually sell the American private enterprise system overseas.

I would not want to see them inhibited by a Government organization.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I have no questions. I just want to thank you. Don, for coming.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Thank you.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. And giving your testimony, and certainly we will be discussing it often.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Berle with us?

We are delighted to have you, sir. We know of your service to Government in the past, but for the record, I wish you would give us a capsule résumé of your background and your experience.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADOLF A. BERLE

Mr. BERLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to appear here. My name is Adolf A. Berle. I am a lawyer practicing in New York. I am professor emeritus and also lecturer in law at the Law School of Columbia University, and I have a variety of other connections which perhaps are less interesting here.

I was on the expert staff of the American commission to negotiate peace with Germany in 1918-1919 and first encountered the Soviet thrust then.

Later, I was on various diplomatic missions for the United States from 1933 on. From 1938 through 1944, I was Assistant Secretary of State, and at various times Acting Under Secretary of State and Acting Secretary of State during World War II.

Thereafter I was Ambassador to Brazil. More recently, I served a turn in the Department of State in 1961 as head of President Kennedy's task force on Latin America. I have maintained my contacts with two areas, notably the groups proceeding out of the Iron Curtain countries in Eastern Europe, and in Latin America, connections which continue up to as late as last night.

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg left the hearing room.)

Mr. BERLE. I have prepared a statement here, which, if the committee will permit, I will not read, but merely put into the record. I don't think that you need it read.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is always more desirable to us, if satisfactory to the person making a presentation, to have him talk from rather than read a statement, so that would be fine, but you may do either one.

Mr. BERLE. No, I should rather talk from it, if I may, and offer this statement into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement will be included in the record. (See pp. 1480-1483.)

Mr. BERLE. The statement, I may add, was prepared, so far as the textual comments are concerned, with relation to the old bill, the 1961 bill, the Herlong bill, so-called. Some of the comments which I make in this statement have already been taken care of in the Taft-Boggs bill and in Representative Clausen's bill, so that perhaps we can talk more generally about the conception, and if some of the textual comments here are inapposite, it is because the recent redrafting of the bill makes them now unnecessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have been partly responsible for the new draftsmanship at this time.

Mr. BERLE. I am very much aware of that and, may I add, I think that the revised bills are a great improvement over the old bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Incidentally, with great humility, Sid Herlong, Congressman Herlong, said the same thing—that he preferred the Boggs-Taft draft.

Mr. BERLE. Well, I am very sure of that, because many of the changes result from a change in the international and diplomatic situation since 1961. In fact, it is to that that I want to address a few remarks.

At the time when we began considering the conception of the Freedom Academy, there was a single, united Communist push. It was described as "the international Communist conspiracy." I have never liked the word, because what really existed was an undeclared war, carried on without bothering to declare it in a great many parts of the world. But today there is no longer a single Communist conspiracy, nor even a single undeclared war.

In the past year, some of the forecasts many of us had made were fulfilled. The Soviet-Chinese break became not only complete but probably, for the time being, irreparable, so that the Communist drive split into two parts, and they are different.

In addition to that, there were a couple of smaller dissident elements, notably the Titoist movement, which now emerges as a third force. Let me give, if I may, a specific illustration which isn't contained in my statement.

Six weeks ago, actually on March 31 of this year, there was a revolution in Brazil. This happens to be a subject which I have the pleasure of knowing something about. Specifically, there were three distinct Communist movements mixed up in the attempt to create a dictatorship behind the facade of the Goulart government. One of them was Nationalist-Titoist. This was relatively small in power—largely a group of intellectuals plus some politicians who thought they could make profit out of it.

There was a second, which was much more powerful, though gradualist. This was the Soviet Communist group. There was a third, highly activist, the Chinese Communist group, which was pushing for an immediate takeover. It was that last push, I think, that caused the then President Goulart to undertake a series of measures looking towards making him a variety of Brazilian Castro. It was at that point that Brazil, 90 percent of which wanted no part of any of this, pulled itself together, changed its government, and got away on a new tack, a tack which I personally think is very much more hopeful. There had been, you see, two main Communist movements and a third dissident element, all working somewhat at cross-purposes. However, they were all against the United States and all for a temporary Goulart dictatorship, all against democracy as we know it in Brazil.

I happened to have followed the progress both of the Communist plans and of the proposal to resist them, for a good many months prior to the time when the climax came on March 31.

Splitting up the Communist movement means that your Freedom Academy no longer would be working out a strategy against a single master plan, which was the phrase Representative Clausen used, but must meet a variety of shifting situations with all kinds of cross-alliances. Its problem will be infinitely more complex, even, than the older one. Whether more or less dangerous, I don't know.

Mr. JOHANSEN. May I interrupt just at that point?

Mr. BERLE. By all means.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Just to ask you: In your judgment, is the fact of this diversity and even conflict within the Communist world—

Mr. BERLE. It is a real conflict, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Yes, but is that a source of potential advantage or comfort or benefit to us? Does it make the Communist threat any less critical?

Mr. BERLE. No; it may make it more dangerous. It will depend, now, on the area in which each situation happens to emerge. I mean by that, in some places, the movements may paralyze each other. In still others, it may mean that the intensity of competition between them will force more drastic action. In certain areas where one or the other group has the complete mastery of the situation, it may make the difficulties for us more intense.

I think you can't answer that question in general, Mr. Congressman. I should like to give one, but I have been too long in this to think that there are easy answers. Perhaps that is the best I can do.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, then, it would be at least an attempt at an easy answer to assume that it is automatically beneficial to us?

Mr. BERLE. That is entirely too easy an answer. In point of fact, I think that the actual dangers from the situation as they are looming up are probably greater than they were before, though I hope they are not. That may be the technical answer. I hope that the phrase will not be used, "Communist conspiracy," nor the "Communist master plan," but use what is the fact, "Communist imperialism," or "imperialist communism."

Let me say something here that I hope will not shock the committee unduly. If a country, of its own accord and minding its own business, decides to build a situation not based on private property and not unfriendly to the United States, I do not think the United States

would have any real right to object, nor perhaps should it object. We may take a pretty dim view of the success of such an experiment, but if internally a country of its own free will decides to try something of that nature, and I think it may be tried in Latin America in one country, I personally wouldn't see that it made any particular difference to us.

It is when these movements first have as their primary objective enmity to the United States and, second, to conquer their neighbors, that we get into the act.

I spoke of one country in Latin America. I was thinking particularly of Bolivia. That is a 95 percent Guarani and Aymaya Indian country, where the tribes have never had private property in our sense of the term. Their property, as they know it, is primarily owned by Indian villages. And indeed, in some parts, a he-man does not interest himself in private property; that is for women and children. In other words, they have the tribal conception, and if they have to build on that conception instead of on ours, this is perfectly all right with me, and I think with most Americans. This is their privilege, if they want to try it. We may not think that it will be very successful in the modern world, but that is their affair. For that reason, I suggest that we are not fighting to impose a system we have on someone else, but to try to prevent the conquest of perfectly peaceful countries by imperialism, using a Communist idea as their primary point of attack.

I trust that point of view does not shock the committee. There are people who feel they want to fight socialism anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all.

Mr. BERLE. And I personally have no interest at all in fighting it, providing it minds its own business, observes international law, can be reasonably friendly to the United States, and does not undertake to conquer its neighbors.

Now the situation is a little more complex, even, than we made out here, and I am glad to see that the Taft-Boggs bill recognizes that fact.

Senator Fulbright recently made a widely publicized speech, and he suggested that the world was no longer polarized into two blocs. Of course he was right about that. I could not agree with him that Cuba was a nuisance, rather than a menace. The fact is that as long as Cuba is held by a major overseas Communist imperialist power, it will be a menace, and nobody can make it anything else. Qua Cuba, he is right. But if, and as long as, it is held by Russian troops—Soviet troops, I should say—and influenced primarily by Soviet political initiative and is an instrument of the Soviet Union in its imperialism, it is a menace, and we can't make it anything else.

At the moment, my information is that the intrigues are beginning as between the Soviet group and the Chinese group in Cuba. The arrangements, tacit or otherwise, arranged after the confrontation of 1962, have never been published. I have no knowledge, and could not have any knowledge, of the arrangements on the balance, at least, worked out between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time that the missiles were supposedly removed.

But even without them, as long as Cuba remains in control of an overseas imperialist power, there is no question that there is a menace there.

Where Senator Fulbright was everlastingly right, however, was in pointing out that no longer was it a two-sided operation. The Soviet bloc has broken up, as we have seen. One of their objectives, unquestionably, the objectives of both Soviet and Chinese Communist political strategy, would be to break up the Western bloc. They will intrigue with any member of the NATO bloc that is willing to work with them. President de Gaulle, indeed, had a flirtation with Communist China a while ago. We don't know where that will wind up.

It would be logical for the Soviet Union to attempt a similar flirtation, if it could possibly find an opening with some other member of NATO. Meanwhile, we have dissident Communist countries in between, who will be vibrating backwards and forwards. Both the Chinese bloc and the Soviet bloc will be endeavoring to absorb weakly held territory wherever they can, notably in Africa and in Latin America—Latin America, at the moment, is as it seems to me the major theater—and we are thus really back to a situation of fluid diplomacy.

This means in substance that we shall be in a situation very like that in which we were just prior to World War I. Then, as you will recall, there were alliances and counteralliances, balance-of-power politics, leading to a point at which a tiny incident (in that case the murder of an archduke) blew up the whole situation. We are not too far from that now, in my judgment, as witness the growing danger of a tiny affair in Cyprus. Of itself, this affair is of no great importance, but is intentionally used by the Soviet Union (as witness a speech of Mr. Khrushchev only 3 days ago) to create as much tension as possible between the Greeks and the Turks. These are two NATO countries, and there is possibility that we might have an explosion there, just as before World War I the Balkan tensions were used to create the situation that finally led to World War I.

I suggest, therefore, that the task of this Freedom Academy must be more positive than negative. That is to say, its primary task is to lay out a standard of possible organization and action and social approach to which the countries and the populations of the world can repair, rather than merely undertaking to say, "We are fighting the Communist bloc," there being no single Communist bloc to fight.

I would like, if the committee will permit me, to tell one story, which perhaps indicates the possibilities of this sort of a situation.

For some 10 years, beginning in 1948, there was in Europe what was called the *Collège de l'Europe Libre*, the Free Europe College. This was established by Americans, and was—

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that located?

Mr. BERLE. That was located near Strasbourg, in France. It had an old chateau outside of Strasbourg. There we tried to educate the young sons and daughters of the exiles from the Iron Curtain countries who had been displaced when the Russians seized those countries at the close of World War II.

In 1956, the Hungarian revolution came along, and we picked up a couple of hundred of the students that had been forced out of Hungary as a result of the Soviet occupation of that country. We didn't try to do the whole job, and maybe the Freedom Academy, when constituted, can use this technique.

We gave them some short orientation courses and a permanent home in Europe. Then we arranged fellowships for them to be educated at various European universities, they coming back to spend their summer.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will pardon me, didn't we have a witness who testified on this bill who was familiar with that very institution?

Mr. McNAMARA. I don't recall that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BERLE. I think I can claim to be familiar with it, because I was chairman of the board of trustees of that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am told it is a different school.

Mr. BERLE. I was chairman of the board of trustees of this one. I think that Mr. Christopher Emmet, who may have testified before this committee, may have talked about it himself.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. BERLE. Well, what happened—the reason for telling is merely to show the possibilities of such an Academy. We took these Hungarian students. These were boys who had never known anything except Communist training, the youngsters, but they had revolted against the Communist regime. Through our school, one of them got his training in economics. Thereafter, he had to get a job and obviously couldn't get one in Hungary. He got a job teaching economics at the former French school in French Congo, what is now the state of the Congo. Thereafter, came the Congolese revolution, and he stayed there.

The Congolese state pulled itself together, after a fashion, in due time, and was admitted to the United Nations. Exactly 6 years after we had picked him up, without a shirt on his back and given him a start at the College de l'Europe Libre, he turned up as the economic adviser to the Congolese delegation in the United Nations and was, perhaps, as sound and as effective a cooperating influence as one could have in a difficult situation.

I could duplicate that story 20 times, but this perhaps gives you the possibilities of the situation.

My first suggestion, therefore, is that we can use this institution to train the endless numbers of foreign boys who want to find out what the United States is all about—how it works, why it is successful, how far our methods can be adapted to theirs, and to establish those contacts and connections by which they can be useful to their own countries.

Now, of those students, there are a great many. There are a great number of young men who talk to me when I am in Latin America, as I am, usually, once or twice a year. These boys, if they were pro-Communist, would have no difficulty in getting their training at once. There is always a quiet individual from the Russian Embassy, where there is one, or a Cuban Embassy, or the like, who will pick him up, even in the late high school stage. He can then, after a reasonable application, be sent to some institution—the Lenin Institute, if he is pretty well up. The Friendship University in Moscow, which is not, I believe, quite as successful at it, but still is very active. There are similar institutions with which I am not equally familiar in Peking.

These young men would like to know what makes the Communist system tick, how it is done, how you work it out, and there is no difficulty in getting an immediate arrangement where they can go and

get trained. One of my worries today—this is off our line of march—is that a number of those men have been regularly going from parts of Central America, through Cuba, to Moscow, and now they are coming back. A contingent of about 30 will be coming into Haiti. May I say this is not classified information. I don't have any. Sometimes I am not sure that my own information in the areas I do know about isn't a little better than the classified information the administration may get here, though this may be vanity on my part. Thirty such men are said to be returning to Haiti in about a month, and those are men who have been educated at the Moscow universities.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were from Cuba?

Mr. BERLE. From Haiti.

The CHAIRMAN. From Haiti. They are coming back.

Mr. BERLE. They were taken, and now they are coming back. Now I surmise that those men will be heard from later.

But if a boy wants to come to the United States, the best we can do is to arrange a scholarship for him, bring him to the United States, say, "Here is a great, wide, beautiful country. Go ahead and rove." Which is not bad as far as it goes, but it would be a great deal better if you could take him, put him in some one place, give him whatever turned out to be the necessary period of orientation and training, so that he knew what to look for, he knew how the system was run, what we were all about, and then, if he wants to go to some other college and take a course or to do some observation or something of the kind, we can do a very useful job. But if we toss a man whose language is different, with only a minor knowledge of English, into an American institution and say, "Here is all of Columbia University; it is a splendid university but it does not do orientation; it is not there for that," and add, "Help yourself," he is apt to be, unless he is very brilliant, rather a confused man. He wastes a lot of time and at the end he will come back to some of us whom he happens to know and say, "Now, will you please give me a short course in what this is all about?"

For that reason, I do suggest that a Freedom Academy would have, on the foreign side, a very real role to play.

Finally—and then I will quiet down—the Americans who go abroad need a good deal of orientation themselves. I am not talking about the State Department men. They have their Foreign Service Institute, for one thing, and if they don't find that sufficient, they have a variety of excellent technical organizations in foreign affairs, including the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, down here, another excellent Institute of International Relations at Columbia, as well as the Fletcher School of Diplomacy near Cambridge, and three or four others around the United States.

But the men who go abroad on foreign aid projects or for the Alliance for Progress in Latin America or who take technical assignments here, there, and elsewhere, and (as Congressman Clausen said a moment ago) a good many businessmen who go abroad, have to learn as best they can. They learn on the job. It is a good way of learning, but it takes a long time, and they may make some mistakes.

I think if this orientation had been done, we would have avoided some of the mistakes that the United States Government made. Let me take two.

As you are aware, we had a disaster at the Bay of Pigs. Parenthetically, I myself think it was in some respects not as disastrous as people suppose. If we had not reacted then, I think the United States would have been fighting on the mainland in the Caribbean area now. I think that the Bay of Pigs made possible the later confrontation in 1962.

(At this point, Mr. Schadeberg returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. BERLE. But let us leave that aside. After that, the Communist push was centered on Venezuela, as I think you know. This was not merely ideological, though it was that. It was strategic, and the Cuban and Soviet propaganda made no bones about it. They said, "If we are able to take that piece of territory with its resources of oil, steel, and developed wealth, we will be able to conquer Latin America." I am not sure that they weren't right.

The man who really defended the country was President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, a very old and dear friend of mine. Earlier he had been systematically hunted out of the hemisphere by the United States Government as a Communist or an ex-Communist, during the days of the Venezuelan dictatorship, Perez Jimenez. At one time, I think I am right in saying that there was no house in the United States to which he could come, except mine. I happened to know him from the old days. He had been a student, had joined a Communist club in the University of Costa Rica when he was in exile there, had learned the game, disliked it, resigned and got out. And knowing what they were up to, knowing what the Communist attackers wanted, he was able to score the greatest single victory we have had in Latin America—unless the Brazilian victory may be equal—up to now.

If we had been well enough instructed in these matters as we should be, we never would have made the mistake of systematically trying to hunt Betancourt out of the hemisphere. We should not have relied only on a few private American friends to see that he got asylum, which he finally got in Puerto Rico. There he and Munoz Marin worked out the social plans which have made Venezuela the most brilliant social, economic, and political victory in this hemisphere.

I think perhaps that is enough, together with my statement, and perhaps I have talked too long already. It is time to stop telling stories.

The CHAIRMAN. Please go on and tell us some more.

Mr. BERLE. Well, I will tell you another one. Pepe Figueres, Jose Figueres, fought the first war against the Communists in Latin America. This was in 1947, in Costa Rica. Then an invasion force—backed first by the then dictator of Nicaragua, Luis Somoza, and second, by the Communist organization in Costa Rica—it seems like an odd combination, but these little Hitler-Stalin pacts are quite usual in Latin America—endeavored to displace the duly elected Costa Rican President, a man named Ulate.

Jose Figueres decided that he would resist this movement, which he did. It finally climaxed, after a 6 weeks' small war, in a pitched battle on the plains behind Cartago—and Jose Figueres won it. The armistice was dictated on a drumhead. The provisional government which was organized then reestablished the duly elected President of Costa Rica. In the election which came a few years later, Figueres

presented himself and became President of Costa Rica. But during that period, every kind of propaganda was made against him up here, and it was a very difficult period for him.

He also was attacked as a Communist. Actually, he was the best friend we have had in Central America. It was he who kept Betancourt's head above water when he was exiled from Venezuela. Later, Figueres gave asylum to Ramon Villeda Morales, also a good friend of the United States and of his own country, who later became President of Honduras. I resented the fact, gentlemen, that there were only a few of us, and we private men—I was not at the time in public life—who were endeavoring to hold together the best elements in the situation and who were accused of communism by people who didn't know the difference between a Communist and an honest-to-God reformer. We were under attack because we said, "That man claims to be a social reformer. He is really in Communist pay."

The United States can't afford that kind of foolishness, and there ought to be some place in the country where they really know the difference.

I think perhaps I have said enough to indicate that while I feel that Freedom Academy has a place, both for training Americans and for training foreigners, I rather feel, possibly in opposition to Mr. Clausen, that it would have to be financed by the Government. I am rather doubtful as to whether private financing would work in this. I think if you are going to do this job, it ought to be well done.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have received testimony from quite a few witnesses along that line, who, while agreeing with Congressman Clausen as to the major role that the private sector must make, yet concluded that this must be financed by the Government, that no single college, university, combination of them, is big enough and equipped well enough to handle this, and it must be through the vehicle of this bill.

Mr. BERLE. Besides which, they have their own job to do. The universities are pretty well taxed now and are going to be worse taxed next year. I have had a full schedule at Columbia this year and will next, so I know this of my own knowledge. I really feel that if this task is to be done, it will have to be done with Government financing.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, may I ask a question at this time?

Mr. BERLE. Please.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring to such facilities as we have now, the War College, and so on, in what way do you think that—I wouldn't say they are deficient, but not well enough equipped or not broad enough—why can't they do the job? We have to make a record along that line, we must demonstrate it. We would like your comments on that.

Mr. BERLE. I do not wish to criticize the War Colleges. For one thing, I am a lecturer at the Air War College and occasionally at the National War College, myself, but these institutions are primarily to train professionals in some particular specialized aspect.

At the Air War College, they are training professional officers in the Air Force. At the National War College, they are training professional officers for foreign assignment. This means, and should mean, high emphasis on military technique and on politics only as an adjunct to it.

This is one thing. It is right, and it is proper that they should. But we do not expect Army officers to make political policy abroad. We have always had the civil arm as prevalent. Unless he is detached from the Army and becomes either the head of an occupying force or a quasi-diplomat, the Army officer does not have primary political jurisdiction. He needs to have political orientation, but the work of these institutions is highly professional, as indeed it should be. It would not do for nonprofessional officers.

I speak from some experience, 15 years' experience or more, as lecturer at the Air War College.

Again the Foreign Service Institute is primarily professional training for diplomats. I think some of them could have benefited by the possibilities of an institution like the Freedom Academy, but most of them have had a great deal of experience themselves and perhaps don't need it. That question I respectfully refer to my former colleagues in the Department of State.

We are thinking here, I believe, of two levels. First, there is need of a variety of intellectual general staff in this problem, which I hope the Freedom Academy men could furnish. This would mean men who knew various areas. For example, men who knew the Middle East and knew the interrelation of the Soviet imperialist drive with this, that, or the other of the Arab movements; men who knew Latin America and knew the impact of this, that, or the other group on specific parties or groups in the various 20-odd countries. (I say "odd" because there are a few more about to come in; there are actually 20 independent countries in Latin America now.) These men could, therefore, explain the lines and the methods of attack used in these various countries. This is on the intellectual side.

Second, when men come in for training, planning to go to one or another part of the world, the trainees could have both the general orientation and some immediate knowledge of who meant what in the area to which they were going. This is the knowledge that some of us have accumulated in various areas through a lifetime of experience. This is hard to get and hard to learn on the ground.

We are thinking, therefore, of this double stratum of a Freedom Academy faculty, if you wish to call it that, and of men who go there for orientation training. There you have, perhaps, the picture. No institution now offers that anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Now there is some honest, sincere feeling of misunderstanding, and I suppose I must use the word "suspicion," that this institution could on the one hand be dominated—and that is a strong word—by the State Department or, on the other hand, could interfere with the State Department's proper conduct of foreign affairs. I personally think that both can be avoided. What are your views on that? Can we have both an independent, effective Academy and an independent, effective State Department?

Mr. BERLE. I share your feeling. I think those evils can be avoided. I can perfectly understand, having spent many years of my life in the Department of State, the dislike of the State Department to have other groups barging in where they have the primary responsibility. That is perfectly understandable.

On the other hand, I can't feel that the technical diplomatic approach is the primary approach or even the only approach in these

matters. The State Department does not have control over the United States Information Agency. It does not have primary control over the Army. The centralized control ought to be a matter of policy, which should, of course, be centered in the White House. There is no other place that I know of that it can be.

The views of the State Department as to what ought to be done at any given moment of time are one thing. The view as to the overall, continuing intellectual, and may I use an old-fashioned word, "spiritual" drive, is something else. That can never be the property either of the State Department or of the War College or, for that matter, of the Freedom Academy. But the attempt to state what is the national point of view, or at least the national consensus, I think, has to lie outside any department that I know yet.

I do not mean that there are not men in the State Department who could do it; there are. I do not mean that there are not men in the Army who could do it; there are. Or any of the other agencies. But when it comes to meeting issues, the State Department primarily is the avenue of contact with other governments. They have a terrible time when the government to which their Ambassador is accredited and which they recognize is intriguing with, let us say, a Communist power, and they can't, within diplomatic proprieties, state a point of view to the people of the country, because that would be improper diplomatic intervention. That has to be done outside formal diplomacy.

You see, this is the great beauty of the Communist system. They have embassies which may, perhaps, be as correct as you could possibly imagine. Somewhere else in the country they have different institutions which operate outside the whole diplomatic milieu. Now your diplomat is always unhappy when anything interrupts his contact with the palace. He is right about that. It's his business to get what he can through that kind of contact. Building up of ideological pressure or, if you choose, outside influence, is not his business, as a general rule. Occasionally, an extremely able Ambassador can do that, but the Foreign Service diplomats are rather trained not to do it. It is not often that we get men as brilliant as, let us say, my friend Kenneth Galbraith, formerly Ambassador to India, who was able to go outside diplomatic channels and appeal to public opinion in India. He could do so largely because he was a professor even more than he was an Ambassador. Though this happens from time to time, it is rare. And even when a diplomat does make the attempt, he is entitled to some help from somewhere, and that kind of work really falls outside the technical diplomatic area. It is primarily educational in its main aspect.

The CHAIRMAN. Another question that I would like the benefit of your mature judgment on is this: There has been some expression, minority expression, before this committee—for these hearings have been going on for some time—to the effect that the kind of an institution the bill envisages would engage in "indoctrination," and so on, and that would be dangerous.

I have never been able to completely understand the argument. What are your views on that?

Mr. BERLE. Well, I am not quite sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I can't explain it better, because I am afraid he didn't make it very clear—the witness I refer to, without naming names.

Mr. BERLE. I share your confusion. I can understand this: There is always a fear that indoctrination will be used to try to induce agreement with some single ideological system in our own country, which may not be the whole story.

There are many who believe as I do in free enterprise, but many who also believe that any governmentally owned enterprise is automatically bad. Therefore, the fear is that indoctrination might be used, let us say, to influence men against, well, the Tennessee Valley Authority in our own country or the possible establishment of equivalent experiments abroad. Yet there are many countries abroad where that kind of operation is the only way the job is likely ever to be done. We have to be flexible about economic method.

I think there is a fear lest indoctrination would commit the institution, the Government, and the men trained by it to some unduly narrow form of approach. Given the kind of world we have—I have lost count now, but I think there are 125 governments in the world, and more coming up, with every kind of a social situation from that of semi-primitive tribes to highly developed countries of great capacity—clearly our doctrine can't exclude the kind of approach which in certain areas would be the only approach possible.

I have thought, therefore, there might be danger that indoctrination might lead to commitment to too narrow a doctrine.

Actually, there is a common denominator behind all American thinking. Indoctrination in that might be a good idea.

We do believe in personal freedom. We do believe in the significance of the individual. We don't like the police states and miscellaneous killing and attempts to enslave whole populations. We don't believe in it, whether done in the name of "people's states" by Communists or in the name of pure, personal dictatorships like the kind that made Trujillo, prior to his assassination, one of the richest men in the world. Neither can it be squared with American doctrine. All Americans do agree on the general premise of freedom. We do agree on governments responsive to the will of their peoples, primarily aimed to serve their peoples and primarily aimed at doing so without that continuous invasion of human rights that is gradually accomplishing the failure of the Communist and Fascist experiments.

I personally don't feel that we need to be afraid of indoctrination in its real sense. I can, of course, see the possibilities of abuse.

The CHAIRMAN. Two more questions, and the first might lead to the second. What are some of the provisions in the Taft-Boggs bill that improved the Herlong bill, and then, after you answer that, would you have any further recommendations to make?

Mr. BERLE. I would want to study a little more than I have the Taft-Boggs bill and the Clausen bill, which appear to me on a very casual go-over as about the same, barring the question of financing.

A good many of my textual quarrels—I won't say "quarrels," but "suggestions"—with relation to the old Herlong bill seem to have been clarified or cleaned up.

I think, for example, that the phrase "international Communist conspiracy" has generally been eliminated right through. I am not sure it has not already been done.

I should like, if I may, perhaps to save the time of the committee, a chance to go over the bills more closely textually.

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate that.

Mr. BERLE. If I have any bright ideas as to the text, I would be glad to send them to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be valuable, not now, if you wish, but in the same paper, if further improvements come to your mind, I wish you would set them out.

Mr. BERLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have assumed that the Taft-Boggs bills had carried forward a good deal of the thinking of the various men who worked on it, and perhaps of this committee as well, and that the ultimate form of this bill will be drafted in committee on this base. I assume the bill isn't frozen, so that anyone could say, "Because I want this changed, I am against the bill."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we want as much in the record for that purpose as we can, if you will give some thoughts to that.

Mr. BERLE. I will be glad to do so. I don't consider myself adequately prepared to make a textual comment on H.R. 10037, which is the Clausen bill, or H.R. 8320, which is the Taft bill and, I gather, the same as the Boggs bill; and if I may, I will submit any textual suggestions that occur to me.

The CHAIRMAN. I should have said the Taft-Boggs-Clausen bill.

Mr. BERLE. They are substantially the same. They are an improvement, in my judgment, of the original Herlong bill.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Berle, I would like to ask a question or two that may seem afield from the subject that you are testifying to, but I think I can relate it in a moment, and this is said to lay the background.

Am I correct in my understanding that Mr. Herbert Matthews of the *New York Times* was a leader in developing not only certain public impressions with regard to Castro and his regime in Cuba, but was also a source, by instruction, of certain guidance or misguidance of the State Department in the early stages of that takeover?

Mr. BERLE. As to the first, you are right. As to the second, I happen to know the facts, and I think that that is somewhat of a misunderstanding.

Mr. Matthews had visited Castro when he was starting his revolution in the Sierra Maestra and had returned to New York. An Ambassador-designate of the United States was going to Havana. My former public relations officer, who has been very unjustly accused in this business, Mr. William A. Wieland, was then in charge of Cuban affairs. He was asked by a famous United States Senator to direct the new Ambassador to New York and to suggest that he talk with Mr. Matthews. Mr. Wieland passed on that suggestion.

May I add the Senator in question was perfectly honest in doing it: so was Mr. Wieland. Further, it was a perfectly intelligent thing to do. If you are going to a country, and there is a revolution, to talk to the man who has firsthand knowledge of that revolution, before you get there, is a perfectly sane, sensible thing to do.

Wieland did not ask the Ambassador to agree with Mr. Matthews or to accept his estimate or his views or anything else, but merely to inform himself about the situation. Ambassadors, before they go to their country, commonly do connect with the individuals in the United States who know most about it, as a part of their briefing.

That, I think, is all that happened.

Later, an attempt was made—first, let me add that, in my judgment, Mr. Matthews, whom I know and whom I believe to be a perfectly honest man, was entirely deceived as to the real nature of the Castro revolution. I think he was honestly deceived, in his defense. Though I have no call to defend him, I may add that a great many first-rate Cubans who were associated with Castro were equally deceived. If Mr. Matthews got it wrong, so did a great many Cubans as well. In fairness to Mr. Matthews, with whose views I do not agree, I think that ought to be stated. I see absolutely nothing improper in suggesting to an American Ambassador about to go down there that he talk to the last man on the ground. It is an Ambassador's business to make up his own mind.

To represent this as a plot to try to steer an American Ambassador into the Castro movement, I think is unjust to everybody concerned. These are my own views on the matter.

It is true that Mr. Castro turned out to be, if not a member of the Communist Party, at least for all practical purposes, a Communist agent. It is true that he claims now that he was so all along and that that perhaps should have been discovered at the time.

May I add that I speak here with a clear record myself. In early 1959, I thought the Communists were taking over Cuba and I wrote an article for *The Reporter* magazine in which I said so. In 1960, I wrote a very careful article in the *Foreign Affairs*, which is a rather blue-ribbon journal of foreign affairs, saying that I thought Cuba was already a Soviet satellite.

By consequence in defending anyone who was deceived, I do so although I held a contrary view at the time, and the record is there to show it.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Now, my purpose in raising these questions was not to pillory Mr. Matthews.

Mr. BERLE. I want to say something about Mr. Wieland, because he got the roughest ride and the rawest deal of any man I know. He was my public relations man when we had a similar situation in Brazil. There couldn't have been a more loyal opposition to Communist attacks on the United States than Bill Wieland. His career was wrecked by the attacks on him, and I would like to put into this record an honorable attempt to set the record straight.

Excuse me.

Mr. JOHANSEN. That is all right. My purpose in raising the question, and for the sake of developing my point, let us assume that Mr. Matthews was perfectly honest in his intentions, there was no sinister motive or purpose in his advocacy, but the question that I am coming to is: To what extent might there be a danger that, either through honest error or through sinister design, the Freedom Academy might become the vector for misinformation or misguidance or misinterpretation of current developments in this whole vast area, complex area of Communist imperialism?

Mr. BERLE. There is a certain danger in it. I do not consider the danger great. The difficulty in the Cuban situation was the fact that there was not enough coverage, whereas the Freedom Academy is proposing more coverage. One of the great difficulties in Latin America is that there have been only two or three sources of journalistic information and opinion in the entire United States.

The *New York Times* is one of them. *Time* magazine is another one. I think there are two or three others now. When there is so slender coverage as that, the honest mistake or, as you say, possibly the sinister design of any one source of information can make an immense amount of trouble.

One of my hopes is that the Freedom Academy would spread out the amount of information we have, so that the mistake of any single source, be it of news or opinion, could be corrected.

Obviously, if the Freedom Academy undertook to centralize all of them, the danger of abuse would be greater.

As it is set up here, I do not think that the danger of abuse is very great. Clearly, if you assume that any Government mechanism can be subverted, you assume danger. But I think we all of us know that while this possibility exists, and always has existed since spies were first sent into Canaan by Joshua, it also corrects itself rather rapidly in our system. I am certain that correction would be prompt in the Freedom Academy.

One of the reasons why I believe in a free press is that the widest possible coverage, with all its difficulties and disadvantages, is the best corrective.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Because it tends to be self-correcting?

Mr. BERLE. Yes.

Mr. JOHANSEN. To what extent—and I ask this final question in view of the opinion expressed by Admiral Burke yesterday—to what extent would you feel that the Freedom Academy would be a target of attempted infiltration, exploitation, and abuse by sinister forces?

Mr. BERLE. Well, I think it would, but then I think everyone and every agency who stands up for a free government is going to be the target of abuse, possibly infiltration, by the forces in opposition.

I think all of us have, at one time or another, either been approached or have been abused—in my case, both have happened—by someone who thinks that some tiny fragment of influence can be absorbed, abused, or removed, as the case may be.

That is part of our times. That is what a cold war is. I concede the danger, but I think that the same danger probably attaches to any position of influence, whether it is a job on the *New York Times* or a job in the Department of State or in the United States Army or on a congressional committee. That is exactly what this kind of situation implies. So, while I think Burke is perfectly right in what he said, I don't consider the danger here any greater than it is in another key spot in the United States administration.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I have no questions.

I would just like to apologize for having had to be absent for the first part of your testimony. I would have liked to have been here, and I am sorry that I had to leave.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, I simply wonder if I could be afforded the same privilege of offering some possible recommended changes on my bill.

THE CHAIRMAN. Surely.

Thank you very much, Mr. Berle. We are very appreciative of your willingness to cooperate.

MR. BERLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(At this point Mr. Willis left the hearing room.)

MR. BERLE. No more questions?

I apologize for having taken up so much time.

MR. JOHANSEN (presiding). We solicited it, Mr. Berle.

(Mr. Berle's formal statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. ADOLF A. BERLE

I appear in favor of the bill to create a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy. It has been before the 87th Congress as H.R. 8935. It requires modification in the light of present conditions, but the proposed institution can serve a very useful purpose. Since the bill was introduced in 1961 the international scene has altered. I think the congressional findings embodied in section 2 were a not unfair statement of matters as they stood in 1961, but the situation has now altered.

The organized international Communist movement was in unity in 1961. Now it is split into a number of opposed factions. The two principal sectors are, respectively, the Communist movement as promoted by the Soviet Union on the one hand, and a more extreme version of it promoted by the Communist regime in mainland China. In addition to these, there are smaller dissident fragments, one of which is sponsored by the Government of Yugoslavia, and a second which may be in formation, revolving around attempts by Rumania partially to detach herself from the Soviet bloc and become, if not neutral, at least mediator between the Chinese and Soviet blocs. The final lineup is not yet fixed though it may occur if, as is discussed, a world Communist Congress is called by the Soviet Union or Red China this year.

Each of the two principal Communist factions—that sponsored by the Soviet Union and that of Communist China—is, I think, less doctrinaire than straight nationalist-imperialist. In each case, the real objective appears to be that of bringing additional territories under the conquest of, or within the political or military sphere of influence of, the sponsoring power—China or the Soviet Union, as the case may be. Properly speaking, they thus are “imperialist,” and their ideological objectives are subordinated to nationalist and expansionist goals of the two powers. Instead, therefore, of calling this “the international Communist conspiracy”—the phrase used in the bill—I should recommend abandoning the phrase and using consistently the phrase, “imperialist communism.”

Senator Fulbright, in a recent widely publicized speech, suggested that the world was no longer polarized between the Communist bloc and the free world bloc and that the United States should recognize that fact. I think he was right in that respect, though I did not agree with his belief that Cuba was a nuisance, rather than a menace. The implications of this breakup, however, are not happy. We may be coming into a very fluid diplomatic situation.

Each of the two major Communist powers will be seeking alliances and counteralliances against each other—and, of course, against the United States. Either one may develop an interest in bringing about a state of war between the United States and the other Communist power, leaving itself “neutral,” intending to pick up diplomatic plunder at the close. This was what Stalin intended in 1939 by making the famous Hitler-Stalin Pact, and what he did do later with some effectiveness as the United States and Japan fought out the war in the Far East. The Soviet Union could profit by war between the United States and Communist China; Communist China could profit by war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Meantime, both will endeavor to work out alliances, counteralliances, and balance-of-power politics, combined with attempts to absorb weakly held territory—as, apparently, the Chinese are endeavoring to do in Africa today and as the Soviet Union has been attempting to do in the Caribbean up to a few

months ago, if indeed she is not still attempting to do so. And, of course, either side will make as much capital as they can out of any opening they may find for alliance or counteralliance in Western Europe or the Middle East.

This resembles the situation before World War I. It will be a period of very complex and very uneasy diplomacy and will be intensely difficult to meet. It will not be, as the language of the bill under review here says, a "carefully patterned total aggression * * * of the Communist bloc." It is more likely to be a shifting collection of major and minor Communist-imperialist diplomatic moves, chiefly inspired by opportunism.

Obviously one objective will be the weakening of the United States and of the NATO combination, wherever and whenever possible.

This means that the central conception of the Freedom Academy must be positive rather than negative—must build around the objectives, ideals, capacities, and goals of the United States, rather than merely opposition to a central Communist plan.

Let me add that I do not relish the emerging diplomatic pattern. It will be difficult at best and dangerous all the time.

My own interest in an institution of this sort comes from two sources. I have been active in the Free Europe Committee and, among other things, in the attempt to rescue the young men and women exiled from the Iron Curtain countries after World War II. I have also been deeply interested, as well as involved, in the endless struggle for progress in Latin America. As you are aware, Latin America is a major theater in the cold war. This is also the area in which the United States is most steadily and most bitterly attacked. Perhaps that would have been true in any case. But with the seizure of the Cuban bridgehead a readymade staging ground fell into Russian Communist hands, though there is reason to believe Chinese Communists are intriguing to secure control of it now. From this bridgehead, not only political warfare but paramilitary and direct military actions have been launched and in greater or less degree are progressing now despite the major defense victory in Venezuela. As Secretary Rusk observed the other day, several Latin American countries are in direct line of fire at the moment.

Many of my Latin American friends ask me where in the United States they can go to have concise, direct instruction as to how the American system works—and why it works—and what it has achieved—and how far it can be adapted to the customs of other countries. I know of no such place. Yet the embassy of any Communist country knows exactly where to send its friends. There is the Lenin Institute and the Friendship University in Moscow, and reportedly there are training centers in Cuba. There are equivalent institutions in Communist China. About all the United States can do is to invite students here, give them liberty to rove the vast United States, and find out what they can.

Actually, the American system is a highly integrated combination of ideas on the one hand and direct government machinery on the other. I endeavored to describe it last year in a book entitled *The American Economic Republic*, a copy of which I now offer to this committee as an exhibit. I hope it is merely the outline of more serious studies to be made later on. In any case, it ought to be possible for a competent group to take men, Americans and foreigners, and explain with reasonable clarity how the United States works and why it has been, everything considered, one of the most successful forms of government in the world. It ought to be possible to explain how this form of government has produced brilliant results within the ambit of our economic system—as in Puerto Rico—and how cooperation with it has assisted other countries as in Venezuela. It ought to be increasingly possible to work out means by which American methods can be adapted to conditions in other countries though of course these are usually different from ours.

It ought also to be possible to enable men to see almost at a glance what social movements are sincerely intended to benefit the less fortunate members of society and what movements are merely intended to use grievances—perhaps legitimate grievances—as a means of recruiting personnel for Communist imperialist purposes. Those of us who have lived with this problem a long time—I myself have since the time of the Treaty of Versailles—have learned the technique, and the technique of involving perfectly innocent people with tainted movements. Organizations are produced in which entirely loyal citizens can enroll to right social wrongs. The tainted organizations conceal the fact that their real intent is not to redress social wrongs, but to build subversive

movements, subversive propaganda, sometimes even guerrilla force, all directed by some Communist imperialist intelligence or political warfare chief. Americans as well as foreigners ought to learn how to protect themselves against this sort of thing.

Finally, the object of a Freedom Academy of this kind need not and cannot be merely defensive. We are beginning to know a good deal about the technique of redressing social wrongs—as well as a good deal about the failures of the Communist system in this regard.

The United States Government has recently proposed, and in the next decade will carry through, an antipoverty campaign. It will succeed in this campaign—as nearly as it is possible to succeed, given the frailties and inequalities of human beings. It should be possible to adapt the ideals and the methods used in this campaign so that they can be opposed, as an alternative, to programs put forward whose ultimate result seems merely an extension of imperialist communism with very little advantage to the poor, the underprivileged, and the workers.

The kind of institution envisaged by this bill ought to begin rather modestly, dealing with specific situations, and should not endeavor to cover the entire wide world in its first activities. It should build its theoretical and its practical side soundly and well, and expand as experience shows it is useful.

If, in any country, communism were not imperialist—if it did not seek to conquer, seize, or draw into its orbit other countries—necessity for a Freedom Academy would be far less. Countries do have a right to endeavor to build a civilization not based on private property—if that is what their people want. As long as they observe international law, mind their own business, and do not seek to conquer or subvert other countries, the United States has not, I think, any real reason to object—though we may take a dim view of the success of these experiments. When, however, they finance, first, subversive propaganda, then guerrilla movements, and finally build up and foment civil wars in other countries, aiming to take over power themselves, we do have a right to object and, of course, doubly so when attempt is made to attack the United States abroad or to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States. It is the linking of the Communist propaganda organization and arms with imperialism in the true sense of that term—an endeavor to seize power over other countries—that endangers world peace, as well as the lives and welfare of many millions of people who are involved.

I venture to suggest some textual revision.

I suggest the change, throughout, of the words “international Communist conspiracy” to “imperialist communism.”

Section 2 ought to be revised in the light of current developments in the diplomatic world.

Paragraph 3 of the findings ought now to be deleted. A couple of “neutralist Communist parties” are emerging whose ideology does envisage “neutrals” in the struggle between capitalism and communism.

I oppose inclusion of subparagraph (4) of the findings. We did suffer defeats in the cold war, and we all know it. More recently we have scored a couple of notable victories, albeit defensive. I would mention particularly the brilliant success of free democratic government in Venezuela under the presidency of Romulo Betancourt and the defeat by Venezuela of a Russian-supported attempt to seize that country by Castro terrorist and guerrilla attack. Also I believe the events of April 1964 in Brazil represented a wholesale resistance by that great country against the intrigues both of the Soviet Union and of Communist China looking toward seizure of the Brazilian Government. Communist efforts in Brazil were not, however, united. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China wished to increase their power over Brazil. But their organizations were also maneuvering against each other and apparently still are though my own information on the subject is incomplete. Both, however, were defeated, and I see no reason why we should insist on the finding of disaster in paragraph (4). History is moving too fast.

Some textual changes can be made in paragraph 5.

I should advocate striking out paragraph 6, or rephrasing it by striking out the first full sentence in that paragraph and rephrasing the second sentence.

I do not see the necessity of maintaining subparagraph (c) of paragraph 7. The need that Federal officials engaged in foreign affairs should understand the problem should, I think, be taken for granted without putting it in a legislative finding.

I should likewise delete subparagraph 8 of this section. The objectives unhappily will not be accomplished by a crash program. This is going to be a long pull as President Kennedy repeatedly observed.

In section 6 I suggest some minor changes in phraseology. Subparagraph (1) of that section could be improved.

Brought up to date, I believe this bill offers a useful addition to the American collection of foreign policy tools.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mrs. Chapelle. We are happy to have you here. Before we proceed, the staff has handed me two biographical and informational items regarding the witness, in the *New York Times* of February 1, 1962, and April 14, 1962, and without objection, we will incorporate them in the record.

(The two newspaper articles follow:)

[The *New York Times*, Thursday, February 1, 1962]

BOOKS OF THE TIMES

(By Charles Poore)

Women are decidedly men's equals. We all know that—vive though we may the differences. Also, they come under the infinite province of Orwell's Law: many women are much, much equaler than others.

As prime example we have today Dickey Chapelle's exuberant new book, "What's a Woman Doing Here?"* the story of her adventures as a combat reporter in our feverishly truculent world. Put it on your reading list now.

Mrs. Chapelle deplores war. Yet she feels that if sheltered people are going to spend so much time talking about it some of them should go out and see how it is conducted.

Those who write current history have an obligation, in particular, to do original research from time to time—an arduous discipline, no doubt, and not one that will commend itself irresistibly to pundits who from prudent distances become authorities on the havoc of carnage. Yet Mrs. Chapelle has followed it from World War II in the Pacific to Algeria, Hungary, Cuba, and, among other places, Vietnam.

She went mainly to take pictures of men in battle. Her photos are splendid. So is her capacity to supplement them with words.

ARGUMENT IS REVERSED

In fact, she occasionally reverses the weary argument about words versus pictures with considerable force. How many photographs, for example, do you suppose it would take to equal her analysis of Fidel Castro, based on his first sweep to power? These are the crucial sentences:

"The overwhelming fault in his character was plain to see even then. This was his inability to tolerate the absence of an enemy; he had to stand—or better, rant and shout—against some challenge every waking moment."

However, I suppose we should give the picture advocates their due in this case. Much of the ranting and shouting these days comes to us from performances before television cameras of what history may identify as the first dictator completely wired for pictures as well as sound. One of the first, anyway. And on the threshold of being presented in vivid color.

Mrs. Chapelle is a Milwaukee girl who arrived on the photographic scene long after the camera's widest-angle-giving tripod—the airplane—had proved it was here to stay. Her interest in taking pictures developed from an early passion for airplanes. Late in the Nineteen Thirties she worked for barnstorming aerobatics shows. Today, while she is not one of our foremost pilots, she is a parachute jumper of exceptional daring.

You can usually tell that a war is either under way or about to start whenever she comes down from some moving point in the sky.

*WHAT'S A WOMAN DOING HERE? By Dickey Chapelle, Illustrated with photographs by the author. 285 pages. Morrow. \$5.

The most searing ordeal in her book is her account of being held incommunicado in a Hungarian prison. She had gone to report the attempted delivery of medical supplies to Hungary's heroic young rebels behind the Iron Curtain.

The secret police caught her. In their cells she half froze, half starved and was completely surrounded by terror. Death stalked the cells, death lay behind her interrogators' endless, numbing questions. "We will not hang you today. The papers in your case are not complete," she would be told. She was threatened with several kinds of torture.

REDS' AIMS DESCRIBED

"What the Reds were trying to do," she says with amazing fortitude, "was to peel back my will like the layers of an onion. My will was to go on being a woman journalist from America named Chapelle, a member of a loving family, above all a human being. Their will was that I become a tool and nothing more."

Nothing more? Only those who have endured such an ordeal without breaking have won the right to judge. She fought hard enough to win. And, she says, "if you fought hard enough, whatever was left of you afterward would not be found stripped of honor."

[The New York Times, April 14, 1962]

WOMAN HONORED FOR WAR REPORTS—OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB GIVES ANNUAL NEWS AWARDS

Dickey Chapelle, a freelance correspondent, received the highest award of the Overseas Press Club of America last night for her reports on the fighting in Vietnam.

At the club's annual awards dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel she received the \$500 George Polk Memorial Award, named in honor of George Polk, the Columbia Broadcasting System correspondent who was slain in Greece in 1948.

Miss Chapelle, the second woman to get the award, covered Vietnam on assignment for Reader's Digest. She wrote a book on her experiences entitled, "What's A Woman Doing Here?"

Others receiving annual awards and citations for achievements in reporting or interpreting foreign news in 1961 were:

Robert Considine, Hearst Headline Service, award for his series, "We Will Bury You, Mr. K." Sydney Gruson of The New York Times and Gaston Coblenz of The New York Herald Tribune, citations for reporting from Berlin.

Marvin Kalb, Columbia Broadcasting System, award for his radio reports from Moscow. Joseph C. Harsch, National Broadcasting Company, citation.

Helen G. Rogers and William Hartigan, American Broadcasting Company, award for their television program, "The Remarkable Comrades." Robert Young and Charles Dorkins, National Broadcasting Company, citations.

Peter Leibing, Associated Press, award for his photograph, "Leap to Freedom."

Leonard Stark and Nobuo Hoshi, National Broadcasting Company, award for film report, "Japan—East is West." William K. McClure, Columbia Broadcasting System, citation.

Charles J. V. Murphy, Fortune magazine, award for his article, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight." Robert S. Elegant, Newsweek, citation.

Phil Newsom, United Press International, award for "best consistent interpretation of foreign news developments." George Chaplin, the Honolulu Advertiser, citation.

Howard K. Smith, American Broadcasting Company, award for "best radio interpretation of foreign affairs." Phil C. Clarke, Mutual Broadcasting System, citation.

David Schoenbrun and George Vicas, Columbia Broadcasting System award for the program, "The Trials of Charles de Gaulle." Eric Sevareid and Stephen Fleischman, Columbia Broadcasting System, citations.

John Toland, award for "best book on foreign affairs," "But Not In Shame." Maurice Hindus, citation.

Juan de Onis, The New York Times, the \$500 Ed Stout Award for "best article on Latin America." Robert Hartman, the Los Angeles Times, citation.

Edwin L. Dale, Jr., The New York Times, the \$500 E. W. Fairchild Award for "best business news reporting from abroad."

The awards were presented by William L. Laurence, science editor of The New York Times. Edward R. Murrow, director of the United States Information Agency, spoke.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And you may proceed now as you wish.

STATEMENT OF DICKEY CHAPELLE

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Thank you, sir. I am very honored to be here today.

It is as a proponent of this legislation that I speak, and further to the point that its passage is critically long overdue.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Before you proceed, Mrs. Chapelle, and although we have it in this written record, will you just give us a little background on yourself and your own experience?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. I think that is the next paragraph, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Fine, then you proceed.

Mrs. CHAPELLE. It has been my privilege to serve as a reporter and photographer for American news media, most recently *The Reader's Digest* and *The National Geographic* magazine, in areas of conflict overseas for most of the 20-odd years since, in May of 1942, I was first recognized by the then War Department as a war correspondent.

In the past 8 years, I have been a professional eyewitness to the uses of force over the intermittent no man's lands between Communist and free world fighting men in Hungary, Algeria, Lebanon, Cuba, Korea, Formosa, India, Laos, South Vietnam, and the Straits of Florida.

Each time I have reported how I saw our side lose—that is, emerge from the crisis weaker, smaller, or denigrated with an according increase in the strength, size, or potential of the Communist side. Yet the reasons obvious to me for our astonishingly poor performance in our own defense have not been combatant failures. They have been failures of extramilitary elements, primarily, in my judgment, of the will at the supporting and diplomatic levels.

As an example, I would cite the fighting I saw in Laos.

The scores of superbly trained military personnel with whom I was privileged to live and work as an observer on several active fronts for 38 days had been ordered to advise Royal Laotian troops on how to fight the Communist Pathet Lao armies. They obeyed those orders effectively. Where they were enabled to remain on duty long enough to perform in their assigned role, I saw the troops under their practical leadership repeatedly win local actions. This was accomplished in spite of the equipment with which the United States had furnished them—mortars dating from the First World War and aircraft obsolete during the Second.

Yet, as you recall, these American personnel shortly were withdrawn on the excuse that military victory was impossible because "the Laos just won't fight." Today, as you know, the Pathet Lao troops, ably led by personnel from the Communist country of North Vietnam, are macerating the Royal Lao armies and, incidentally—since 9 out of 10 of the Pathet Lao are Laotians—disproving the claim that people of this nationality won't fight. Obviously, under motivated leadership, they can be and are being victorious combatants.

Thus I judge the free world failure in Laos not as a military one, but in large part due to the tardy emplacement and hasty withdrawal of too few U.S. advisers—a failure at the supporting and diplomatic levels.

In the case of Laos, I reported that the objectives of the Departments of State and Defense appeared almost mutually exclusive; while one was trying to conciliate Reds, the other was trying to kill them. Both efforts failed and even the simple will to destroy a Communist threat was negated by the resultant confusion.

Other failures of the non-Communist world—paralysis in the face of the Hungarian revolution, apathy toward the tragedy of Algeria, ignorance about pre-Red Cuba, to name three—have, in my judgment, rested on similar confusions of intent.

The free world simply does not possess a body of leadership personnel prepared, committed, and working to counter the Communist effort to take over the earth by means other than all-out war.

Parenthetically, the fact that the Communist leaders have been forced to use means other than ultimate violence in this effort should reassure us that our capability for victory by this method is conceded by the Communists. But I believe they are winning by thoughtfully chosen alternate means, simply because we have no command group to direct the countering of these alternate efforts; we lack even strategic and tactical know-how to counter the “war of liberation” and other extramilitary gambits. Lacking the know-how or even a legislative machinery to try to learn its harsh arts, we lack confidence and, increasingly, even the will to struggle.

The greatest single step proposed, of which I am aware, is the creation of the Freedom Commission with its concomitant Academy to develop the body of knowledge and leadership from which a victorious extramilitary capability can be forged.

MR. JOHANSEN. Thank you very much.

MRS. CHAPELLE. Yes, sir.

MR. JOHANSEN. Has your experience, particularly as it relates to Cuba, given you personal knowledge of the Communist counterpart of training activities in that system?

MRS. CHAPELLE. Yes, sir; on two occasions. In 1958, when I was the last of the 13 American correspondents to go through Batista's lines to eyewitness the fighting under Castro's leadership, I spent 3 days in a building being used as a headquarters for teachers, victims of the Batista terrorism who had fled out there to the mountains.

This was commanded by a major known as Red Beard, and I understand Pineiro is his name. Much of the talk at that time among that group of people was about a higher degree of government control of education than you would normally encounter in a democratic society. But they did not, at that time, use any of the Communist jargon. Perhaps I didn't recognize it.

On the other hand, in the institution in Havana—which I have identified in the course of my coverage for the article I was finally expelled from Cuba for writing—it was headed by Major Pineiro, and at the time that it had emerged there, there seemed to be very little doubt that this was the stepchild, so to speak, of the institution—well, not institution, the gathering of people that I had originally known during the fighting.

The second time that I thought that I had some personal knowledge of this matter was most recently. I have worked for the past 8 months with the refugees—exiled freedom fighters in Miami. Much of that work has included interviews with people who have just come from Cuba. The statement I am about to make is based on face-to-face interviews with two men recently from Cuba. I can give you their code names. I do not know, nor have I ever known, their correct identification, I am sure for reasons you will understand.

Both of these men claim to have been at one time the number two individual in a Communist subversive training institution in Cuba. They have stated—and as a reporter I would have no hesitation to put my name on this report; I find it completely plausible in the light of what I know—that there are now 19 training bases or ports of embarkation for subversive agents leaving for various parts of Latin America. (Zanzibar was a surprise to me. I had not heard about that until it broke from the news.) Through those institutions 9,300 people had passed as of, let's see—the boat got blown up January 5—it must have been Christmas of 1963.

Mr. JOHANSEN. As a result of your travels and observation and experience, do you have personal knowledge of the need of Government personnel for the type of training envisioned in the Freedom Academy?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. I would say that I have observed a very great need. I think I am doing no injustice to the personnel, either military or diplomatic, with whom I worked overseas to say that my profession, the press, would be in a difficult position were we to depend on official briefings. The material that I was given—to give a specific example, I remember being officially briefed, in this city of course, for a visit that I was making to India—by a very earnest young man from one of the departments, wearing a uniform, who assured me that, within the same gross national product, it was going to be necessary for the Indians to increase their industrial potential and to push China off their soil.

I would certainly suggest that as a simple proposition of logic, this sort of thing, there is no point in wasting anybody's time on it, not a reporter's nor the briefing officer's. I think we have also been misled at times, abroad, and it would be my hope that the Freedom Academy would produce people with whom those of us who go overseas to deal with information would not be either wasting their time or subjecting themselves to misleading and coercive statements of that kind. I don't think we would have any trouble in getting the press to say, "Yes, we need a Freedom Academy."

Mr. JOHANSEN. Has your experience in South Vietnam led to the same conclusion as to the need on the part of our personnel?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. I think my experiences in every country would lead me to that conclusion, but I would cite particularly the Laotian misadventure that I referred to in my prepared statement, and I would say that the generalization that it was very difficult to get information from official sources in Laos would certainly apply over to Vietnam. I cannot imagine that, in the presence of a Freedom Academy, reporters would be as misled and misadvised by intent and design as we have been.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Would you feel that this need is also substantial with respect to foreign personnel, particularly in this country? Visitors in this country?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. It has been my privilege to know a great many, probably 50, personnel, both military and diplomatic, whose passports are different from mine, who have come to this country for military training. I knew some of them at Ft. Bragg and at Ft. Campbell. I knew some of them abroad. I think if you gentleman were privileged to eavesdrop on their private conversations—and because I have been parachute jumping with them, I think the conversations are conversations of great confidence—I think you would be interested to know what they talk about.

They talk about how we eat; they talk about how we live physically; and they find it very, very difficult to understand when I tell them that if I go back to Washington, and I am privileged as I am today, it will probably be possible for me to appear here and speak to you without any particular fear of being called anything but a fool. These are the conversations that they have around the campfires in Vietnam, as well as on our field problems in their training.

The degree of curiosity, the degree of interest, the degree of a genuine desire to identify, not with us, but with the freedoms that we enjoy, is tremendous, and we are not exploiting it.

I would answer on behalf of my South Vietnamese and Laotian doughboy buddies—yes, the need is there, and the rewards could be accordingly very great.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I may have some further questions in a moment.

Mr. Schadeberg?

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Well, first of all, I would like to say I appreciate, and it is a privilege to have you here to give us the benefit of your experience, and it is certainly appreciated by me and I know the rest of the committee.

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Coming back to this country itself, do you have any personal knowledge of the need for training of the private sector of our citizenship?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. With your permission, sir, I would like to answer that in terms of my own profession. Correspondents are being sent abroad in multiples, perhaps even of a different magnitude than they were being sent abroad before. The age of the correspondent who should at this time, I think, particularly in covering armed conflict, be of great concern to us is—it is not the old retreads from World War II, of which I am one. It is not even the correspondents particularly who covered the Korean action. We are sending, because there has not been a great deal of armed conflict to cover, people who have not had the experience of covering combat before.

Some of the consequences of sending younger people without experience in the harsh realities of combat have resulted in situations that are primarily ridiculous. They are funny. I did not believe that any correspondent had actually sent a wire to Saigon, and I insisted on being shown a wire, which read: "Arrive 10 tomorrow morning. Please arrange battle."

Mr. JOHANSEN. Arrange what?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. "Please arrange battle."

This is not a joke. I laugh, but I would prefer not to believe it, and yet I assure you it is true. I don't know that the youth and relative inexperience of some of the correspondents who are being sent on foreign assignments result in quite such funny questions in diplomatic conferences as the attitude or such a tragic attitude as the one that I cited to you, but I think it represents a tremendous problem. I am speaking in sympathy with those younger correspondents. I am not speaking in criticism of them.

I think it is a tremendous problem for a young person to undertake the interpretation of news from a distant country with the 30 minutes. "Hey, boys, are your shots and passports in order? You are heading for Timbuktu." that is a fact of life with our profession; and I interpret the Freedom Academy, potentially, as a situation where we will be helped with solving our problems, or when we get overseas, at least, there will be better trained people to help us solve them.

I would certainly say that the information media would stand solidly behind an educational principle on the simple grounds that we both need it. I mean, both sides need it; yes.

Mr. SCHLADEBERG. Fine. Do you have anything in your personal knowledge that would lead you to believe, for instance, that the U.S. press has been influenced by the Reds? Or rather, manipulated. I don't mean influenced.

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Right. I think, again, if I may, I would like to cite the situation in Laos. With your indulgence, I would like to pretend for the moment that I am the Communist person in charge of planning what can be done in Laos. I think what I would have said to myself is, "Above all, we don't want to trigger a Korea-like reaction in the United States. Now how can we take over this country by military or other methods without triggering that reaction? Well, obviously that reaction would be triggered only by the press. How can we make sure they don't get in the act?"

I would have said to myself, "Let's see. That's not much of a problem. Most of the people of Laos live beyond the jeepable trail. Most of the people of Laos live beyond the end of the telegraph wire. Therefore, if it is my job to take over the country, those are the people whom I would control. That is the ground I want to walk over.

"And yet, because there is such tremendously little interest in the United States about Laos—well, Laos is as far from the United States as you can get"—you are even on geographically sound ground there—"it happens that Laos is not of very much interest to the American, is not very important to him. There are probably not ever going to be more than, or until things get very, very hot, there won't be more than three or four correspondents that will be covering it, and most of these people have the handicap that they have to report every 24 hours. That's just fine. We can win the war, as long as we fight it beyond the jeep trail, beyond the end of the telegraph wire, and for the American people, it will be like a hand before their face, because it simply won't be physically possible for them to see. Eyewitness coverage of what we are doing simply will not be physically possible. The disinterest of the American people cuts down the number of people available in this country, and those people obviously have to report."

I don't think we have been manipulated directly to anywhere near the extent that I have heard, including here. No, I don't; but cer-

tainly in a case where part of one of the Communist conspiracies looks to how we can be used or how the gaps in our coverage can be used to serve their ends, they have been manipulating it very cleverly.

May I suggest that there are weaknesses in the Communist information system, but because there isn't any Freedom Commission and there isn't any Freedom Academy, we are not only not exploiting those, but we cannot even imagine them, and again I would like to turn that into an answer.

Their information system is much worse than ours. If we are going to talk about how to exploit the weaknesses of an information system, for goodness' sakes, let's find out what the weaknesses of their information system are and manipulate them on those weaknesses.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. My next question doesn't sound like it is too much related to it, but it actually is. We hear reports—at least I do, of course—that those who visit—you were in Vietnam, were you not?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. That those who visit in Vietnam, official visitors, not necessarily Government, but perhaps some Government and others—and this would go for the reporters as well—

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHADEBERG—have a sort of a lack of communication with the people of South Vietnam, and that seems to be one of the difficulties. The Communists, because of the type of war in which they are engaged, have this communication. Do you think that the Freedom Academy, for instance, would make up, at least in part, for this lack?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Well, I suggest that you put your finger most nearly on the reason why I think we are sustaining the tremendous list of losses that I said that I have seen. Yes, they do have communication. No, we do not have communication, and if you have to make it a "yes" or "no" business—which is not a proper answer in either case—it would be that way.

Let me point out some of the difficulties of communication. Let's say you come into Saigon with a great desire for communication with the people of South Vietnam. And let's assume that you are not satisfied that your taxi driver, your press officer, your postal clerk, the people that you run into, are in communication with the Vietnamese people. Were you to move—and it has been my privilege to spend—well, I have covered 19 ambushes between Laos and Vietnam, so I think it has been *my* privilege to do this, but the minute you propose moving to where the people of Vietnam live, the villagers, way beyond the end of the jeep trail or the telegraph line, the minute you propose that, the first place you have to sell on the idea is the Government of the United States. Because, obviously, the Government of the United States is going to say, "Well, gee whiz, it isn't safe out there." Well, it sure isn't.

And the second point is, whether this is a reporter or a representative of a private concern, what are we doing to control this? We can't get you out. Obviously, they don't like to say that, and yet in the 5 weeks that I spent 40 miles beyond the Communist lines, in the village of Binh Hung, I can understand what they mean. If there is combat and the Communists are winning, they have to say, no, you can't get that American out. If the village falls, obviously, the American life is forfeit, the same as any other free world life on a fighting line.

Whether or not, when you asked how is the Freedom Academy going to help, that depends on the composition. That depends, I would think, on the orders from the Freedom Commission, and certainly, if I had anything to do with those orders, to those that go, I would say, "If you want communication with them, you have to share their danger." If you do share their danger, your presence will be ultimately convincing that you really meant it, you really wanted that communication.

But the people who go out there under the kind of orders which frequently civilians, and even until the past year military personnel, were under were unable by the nature of their orders to establish communication.

At the time that I was jumping with the Vietnamese airborne, there were four American advisers and myself doing it. I made six jumps with them, and that was one year when I really felt that I had earned my right to carry that wonderful passport that I carry—not because of the work that I was doing as a reporter; sure, I was proud of it; but simply because my country had been saying, "We are backing you in the fighting," and nothing in the world had convinced the paratroops that we meant it. Not their parachutes which were marked "Made in U.S.A." and not their equipment which was marked "Made in U.S.A.," but the fact that there were five of us who were jumping with them. This was the thing that made the difference, all the difference in the world.

They then felt that our country, that our communication with them was on a practical human being to human being level, and that our country's pledge could be honored, and I might add that not any of those jumps were as hairy as some that I made in training or even one that I made a year ago on a training maneuver here.

The fact remains that communication is a problem and that the way to do it, I say, must be a primary concern of the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy. We have to sum up the objective, how could we attain communication with these people, and that ought to be it.

MR. SCHADEBERG. One other question, and this may not warrant an answer. In regard to the military personnel, do you think that they might be—I don't know whether there is any lack of understanding for the reason for being there, and so forth, but do you think that if military personnel were trained, somewhat, through this type of Freedom Academy before they were sent in a situation like this, in this case it isn't really a declared war, that there might be a better understanding of the commission and a better understanding of what really is involved?

MRS. CHAPELLE. I would like to qualify the witness in this case before I answer the question. There is probably no area of war corresponding that has interested me more than the coverage of the training of American personnel in uniform. I have spent at least, I mean, more time in the last 20 years on that subject than on any other single one.

Less than a year ago, it was my privilege to jump, to which I referred a minute ago, on Exercise Water Moccasin, which I am sure you gentlemen know is the final examination for military personnel who will bear abroad the really vast responsibility of being com-

pletely cut off from any physical support and advising, and I say in practice, leading—and I am proud of them when they do this, as I say, this is no apology—foreign troops.

It is not my feeling that the increase in training, the most obvious point to invest in their training is that of political awareness. I have been amazed and delighted, and I guess I am completely prejudiced, because I have participated in it, in the degree of political awareness that has come to many of these people in the course of preparing to bet their lives on a situation in a foreign country. They do learn a great deal about it.

I could certainly feel that a certain amount of ground work for Freedom Academy courses has already been laid by the military, in the absence of the Freedom Academy, having to teach these folks before they go over there. They have brought in people from all over to give a series of lectures which, were there a Freedom Academy, it would seem to me it would be part of their curriculum, so I would like to turn that one around and say that, yes, additional political training is highly desirable. Highly motivated and skilled people are ready to get it, they are getting a little bit now, which is quite interesting to an observer. And I would certainly feel that there would be every reason to include them in the program, with the extension of many of the things that they are doing.

Their primary need, we will tell you, however, is in, well, language and psychology. If you ask them themselves, "What do you want to know more about?" that would be their answer. I certainly think that is part of it. I am just anxious not to be critical of what they have been doing, because it doesn't deserve criticism.

Mr. SCHIADEBERG. Thank you very much.

Mr. JOHANSEN. May I ask you one question off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. JOHANSEN. Do you want to ask any questions?

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes, Mrs. Chapelle. You were here during my testimony?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. I was. I was delighted to be here, sir.

Mr. CLAUSEN. And then also in recognition of our comments, I am certainly pleased to hear your point of view, and I think that is as fine a testimony as I have ever heard.

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. CLAUSEN. For a number of years, I have held the conviction that communication and transportation are the only vehicles with which we can resolve some of our world's problems. You have more or less substantiated this.

To carry this out, I found that communications by themselves are supremely restricted. Number one, because of the language barrier and, secondly, because they don't have the media, so then I come back to the fact that transportation by itself, possibly, is the real key to get back into these areas, so that you can implement any kind of a program that you want to put over.

As a consequence, for some 15 years, I have had a flight training program in a high school. I have expanded this now to a different college, and I have a number of colleges, associated with a missionary volunteer effort, that are going to be interested in this type of thing, all designed to add to the ability of people that are going to be working

in these fields, the mobility and flexibility that only aircraft, be it rotary wing or fixed wing, can use.

Now with your experience in these various areas, do you think that I am on the right track?

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Well, I am delighted to say that not only am I personally glad to know about this, but I would like to share, to speak with you later about sharing some of it with my readers.

I would like to comment, however, that there have been times abroad in recent years when I have come to exactly the opposite conclusion about transportation. It has been my privilege to ride U.S. helicopters, on one assignment or another, into places which had never seen any evidence of the United States before that chopper came in.

I am thinking of Lebanon and Vietnam, for example, and it has been my privilege to work very closely with, and I hope to glorify the tremendous bravery of, American fliers all over the world who have gotten me out of more trouble than is imaginable, and yet I hesitate to give you an unqualified affirmative, for this reason:

One of the barriers to communication that seems so tremendous to me is this dependence on any kind of mechanical device. It is the mere fact that you came into a village on an airplane or a helicopter that sets you so far apart from the villagers that you have got a 2-week—you are going to have to live there for a couple of weeks before you get to be their friend, whereas, if you just walked in—and on my old legs, gentlemen, that gets to be kind of a problem every now and then—if you just walked in, if you didn't come in related in their minds to this godlike device, it would be easier. So let me go this far: When it comes to landing that aircraft 5 miles away from the village, I am with you, sir. When it comes to letting me walk that last 5 miles, it is worth it; and I would hope that the Freedom Academy would evolve a method whereby we could have the virtues of the transportation without the barriers of mechanical devices.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Well, along these lines, of course, I might add—and this, of course, is for the record, and this is making a record on this—part of our program is to see that those people who are going to be fliers also have the ability to maintain the aircraft.

Mrs. CHAPELLE. No unimportant point. The photographs—the last photograph I made in Vietnam, of which I am extremely proud, was made because we didn't have proper maintenance. The engine quit over enemy territory, and the only reason I kept on taking pictures all the way down was because I thought I would be less frightened that way. The fact that one of the pictures is good is a net gain for our side, so to speak.

I think the maintenance abroad and the extension of the simplified aircraft which can be maintained abroad is very important.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Well, I am not talking about jets, believe me. I am talking about something in the way of the Super Cub.

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Right. Nor am I, sir; nor am I. The word, the jet—we don't have an extramilitary tactic yet, but I am sure when these are evolved, as I am sure they will through the Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy, that the jet will have very little part in the critical flying abroad.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, I was just going to say—well, if we have no more time, I will conclude on this. I will be looking forward

to visiting with you on this; and, Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to visit with some of the members of the committee about some advanced ideas that I have.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mrs. Chapelle, we have a quorum call and we are going to have to cut this short.

Mrs. CHAPELLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. We appreciate your appearance, and your testimony is very, very helpful to the committee.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. JOHANSEN. The committee will recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

(The committee reconvened pursuant to call at 12:50 p.m.)

Mr. JOHANSEN (presiding). The committee will come to order.

The Reverend James Robinson. We are happy to have you here, Mr. Robinson. We are sorry for the delay and the inconvenience we caused you.

Will you give us a little bit of a background about yourself, your education, and your current activities?

STATEMENT OF JAMES ROBINSON

Mr. ROBINSON. I will, sir. I was educated at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania and at Union Theological Seminary in New York. I was ordained into the ministry of the Presbyterian Church in 1938. I founded a church in Harlem and, along with it, summer camps for underprivileged children in New Hampshire, a credit union, and a co-op store, and I have been vitally involved in social welfare work and agencies in the city of New York.

The background out of which I come to testify on this occasion before this committee is the following: Because of the work I have done with students here in the United States for over a period of 10 years on almost 600 or 700 campuses of prep schools and colleges and universities and what I have been able to get them to do in building this camp and in undertaking many other important activities, I was asked by the Presbyterian Church to go around the world in 1951 and loaned to anybody who wanted my services, such as the Minister of Defense in those days in the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay; Chester Bowles, who was our Ambassador recently in India; and to James Flint, the religious affairs officer of the occupation forces in Berlin in 1951, when the first great German youth conference, World Youth Conference of Communist young people, supposedly, was organized in August of that year.

Since that time, I have kept up this worldwide interest and have now developed an organization known as Operation Crossroads Africa, which since 1957 takes a carefully selected group of tough-minded young people to the African Continent, with the hope of making an impact of faith and freedom. This year we will be going to 21 countries, and there will be 310. These were selected out of more than 4,000 who applied, 3 of whom will be from the Military Academy at West Point, who every year selects 3. They had 67 who applied.

Now next year, they would like us to take five or six. We are not sure that we can give them the increase, because everybody else wants an increase, although we would certainly give them preference, if we can.

This experience also led me to have many activities with Communists, or people who were related to Communists. In Berlin, my task was to go over the Eastern Zone border into the East, as far as I could, and get back safely. I went up to the Polish border. I talked to hundreds of young people, some of whom mistook me for a Communist, which I didn't mind, because that was the only way I could get the information I sought.

I reported this back to James Flint. One evening in Eastern Berlin, I stayed in the basement of St. Marian's Church, on what was to be a good, safe conduct in case we were there at night and would have been arrested by the German secret police. And in a confrontation with about 75 young Communists, along with a number of other people who were with me, my colleague was a young German Communist who taught me a lesson. He carried a Communist Party card, but he actually was working for James Flint of the occupation people. That was the first time I found some people who had learned to fight communism skillfully, because I said to him, "How come you have this card, and you are also working for the Studentegemeinde, the Student Christian Program, and James Flint?" And he said a very interesting thing, a very simple thing, to me: "How do you know what you are against if you don't know what it is?" He said, "This is one of the troubles with you Americans. You try to fight communism with heat and anger, rather than with light and intelligence."

He introduced me to hundreds of young Communists. After our meeting in St. Marian's Church, 25 young people who had come to that conference came over to the Western Zone, renounced their communism and sought asylum.

I also learned that there were thousands of young people there who weren't Communists. This was the first time they had a free trip anywhere. This was the first time they had been to a big city, and I said to myself, "What an opportunity if we had young people trained and skilled who just came to a conference like this and did our own work."

When I came back and talked to many people in the United States about this, I was shocked at the attitude that if you had anybody who went to do that, they might be won over, instead of converting somebody else. Now if that is true, then we ought to give it up right now, because if that's true, they are going to win it anyway. I don't believe that.

Well, when I came back, I worked with a good many people on a number of projects. I protested strongly when we took away the passports of 41 young people who went to Moscow and Peking, not because we took them away, but because that's all we did. We should have known that every 4 years, just like right now, there is a big Communist World Youth Conference. It seems to me the simple thing to do is if you could send some people who are trained and skilled, you could do a whole lot of work, because you could take advantage of a lot of people who come who are no more Communists than you and I are, but it is some kind of fear, for example, that kept us from making a bold, creative strategy.

When I came back from my world trip in 1952, I did two things. One, for the old Mutual Security Agency, under Donald Stone, now head of International Affairs of the University of Pittsburgh, I drew up a little pamphlet with eight other Negroes to help make a document available for Americans going abroad on race relations. I saw people from our Government, from education, professors from big universities, businessmen, whom you would call tycoons, ignorant, and I must use the word "stupid," but the first thing anybody does is try to corner them on American race relations. And it seems to me that the simplest thing for us to have done would have been for every person in the diplomatic corps, every businessman, every student, every professor, even every missionary, since race relations is one of the great tools used against us by the Communists, and to be sure, we give them a lot of the racial failures on which to attack us, but on the other hand, we haven't done our homework on the things that we could do to put a simple document in the hands of every person going abroad which he could be trained to use and which would help them to be intelligent about the problem of American race relations historically and what is happening now, constructively as well as destructively.

The thing that amazed me was I didn't find many people who were constructive about this. All they did was to get angry. I remember, for example, at the University of Delhi, with the American consul sitting down in the front seat, answering questions, for more than 3 hours, with more than 5,000 students crowded into that place, on communism to be sure, but many more not on communism, but on race relations—which partly had been inspired by Communists, using this as a tool to embarrass us. The same thing in Lahore, Pakistan, but worst of all, I heard a colonel in the American occupation forces in Japan, at the University in Sendai, Japan, trying to answer these questions, and literally booed off the platform. And I thought that was a needless loss, and a needless victory for the young people who were pushing him around like that, partly because nowhere did I find any simple document, say a hundred or 200 pages, where they could have had the basic material and information to use on the more positive aspects of interracial achievement.

I wrote a little pamphlet called, *Love of This Land*, which USIS later had translated into about seven languages for distribution in various countries. Then I wrote a little book called *Tomorrow is Today*, which was published in 1954, in which I had a chapter on communism dealing with our need to have a more creative, adventurous thrust against it, instead of being defensive, waiting for it to win in some area, and then trying to defeat or counter it, or being entirely negative and fearful about it.

Among the things I pointed out was that we really ought to be teaching Marx and Engels, so that people who are going abroad can both know it and fight it intelligently. I didn't find many missionaries, for example, who knew much about this. In the Cameroons, I saw our mission young people and older people, too, defeated roundly and soundly by young Africans who had come back from France, whose minds had been captured by the leaders of Communist-dominated French labor movement, the Committee Central de Travail, which was Communist dominated, and which had a plan to win the mind of every African student whom the French were taking to universities

in France. They got at them first, even though the government was spending the money to take them there.

And one of the things I talked about when I came back was that there was nobody among our missionaries or in our colleges that we had built, or high schools, who knew enough about communism to meet these young people intellectually on their own level. I speak mainly of the Presbyterians, although at the time I'm sure most, if not all, of the denominational and faith missions were no better.

As a result of that, I gave a sermon in the church of which I was the pastor, and one young man, a graduate of MIT, decided that he and his wife would go out and undertake that job. Their father—this has no bearing on the record—did not speak to me since that day, although he was the president of the board of trustees of the church, because he said that I had destroyed his family and “sent them out to God-forsaken Africa,” but this young man and his wife went because when the Communist group had tried to take over some of the young engineers at Farmingdale, N.Y., at Republic Aviation, he organized the group against them. They did a lot of study and preparation, and he was the right man to go, because he was a young man, he knew youth, and who wins the youth and has the biggest influence upon the minds of young people in Africa and the rising youth of Africa are going to have the biggest influence in the long run of the future on that continent.

Well, in that chapter, 1953, I pointed out a lot of these things that I thought could be done, but there was no organization or agency to do this. So when I started Operation Crossroads Africa, I knew from my experiences that our young people, when they got to Africa, were going to run into this question again and again and again, and they were going to meet with some of these young people. Therefore, one of the things we do in Crossroads is, when we select a young person, we put them in a training course. Even though it is this semester with all their schoolwork, they have to work with approximately 25 books on Africa. We indicate what books on Communist strategy they should read and what books on race relations. They have to write a 15-page term paper for us that is due the 15th—that was just last week—of May; otherwise, we don't take them. Nobody flunks his regular schoolwork because of this additional work. As a matter of fact, they get better grades. They even take a language, learn a dialect, so they can meet people at their own level.

We have had good success with this. It is a nonprofit group. We raise all the money for it, but our big problem is we can't project a program over a 5- or 10-year period, because a foundation will give you money for 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and you don't know if you are going to get anymore money, and you need a good solid backlog of assured funds to do this, which brings me to my own point of view about how are you going to finance something like this.

I want to give my firm assent to the need for a separate Freedom Academy, and not because the Army or the Navy or the State Department give some orientation about and against communism in all their institutions, but because the biggest asset this is going to have on the thousands of non-Government people who go abroad. Every person who goes out of this country is an unofficial diplomat, an unofficial ambassador, and they are the people who can do a good deal more

in the disarming way to get ideas of a faith and freedom across, for example. But the big problem is who is going to train them and of what will that training consist.

When the Presbyterians sent me out, they didn't give me any training. The first couple of months, I got beat all over the lot but I learned, as a result of the experience, as to who was who, what was his background, what was his strategy, how he tried to cleverly take over the audience which came to hear me, and I could begin to spot that pretty soon in meetings.

Their strategy was very clever. They would let me speak, and then they would get the floor, and there might be as many as 4,000 students there, but the Communists would get the floor first, and they would pass me around between them like a football, and I kept saying to myself, "Where are the Christians?" or "Where are the other young people?" or "Who knows something about this?" So what we need is an agency by which we can expose people to some kind of training on various levels, and do this for Government personnel abroad. I am more concerned, because this is my field, about the large number of private groups.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Now may I interrupt right there at that point, so that we have it in sequence? You have mentioned Operation Crossroads Africa. Would you just fill in at this point—and then resume what you were headed toward—the basic purposes, objectives, and operations of Operation Crossroads?

Mr. ROBINSON. Its objectives are several-fold. First, it is to make a good impact and a good image for the United States in the new countries of Africa. Secondly, it is to build a bridge of friendship and understanding and to provide the young people who go with the basis of new desire to educate themselves about the African Continent in the hopes that we will build a reservoir out of which State Department, the USIS, ICA, missions, anybody else, business, at work in Africa can begin to draw a group of young people who have an understanding of Africa—not just some hearsay, but a feeling, who developed friendships, and who can go back after they have gotten their education and work more effectively rather than just picking up almost anybody as we have had to do before 1957.

We have opened 29 new embassies in Africa. We didn't have people who understood or had a positive feeling about Africa, or who had been there at the grassroots level to man all these engagements. Our idea in Crossroads is that if we can get young people in their formative years to go and build friendships, to get an understanding, and then begin to pursue that—it is a long-range program of preparing a capable, skilled leadership for America in Africa, and, needless to say, we are way behind.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Let me stop you right there. Are these persons who participate in this program persons from Africa in this country, or is it done in Africa?

Mr. ROBINSON. These are young people from the United States who go to Africa on a short-term program on their vacation period, for 9 weeks.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I see. These are Americans that go to Africa.

Mr. ROBINSON. That is right.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Now is the purpose of the program primarily for their enlightenment and education, or for that of the peoples in Africa with whom they have contact, or both?

Mr. ROBINSON. It is both, equal. One, that they have to say to Africans, "We believe in you. We want to help you. We would like you to see what we know and believe about the democratic way of life, about individual initiative and responsibility."

Secondly, as a result of the experience, of learning and helping, lasting friendships are made, a better impression of America is given, and substantial assistance provided. Incidentally, we don't say it, but the greatest benefit comes to us, to the United States, because when they get back, they must make 50 talks each year for 2 years about their experiences. Each one becomes an innocent, but unofficial, ambassador here at home. Over 70 of them are now in graduate schools of African studies preparing for a lifetime of service in African-American relations.

Peace Corps, which I sometimes humorously say ought to pay us for building a reservoir, now has 100 former Crossroaders. Mr. Shriver has a telegram at the door of every person who leads one of our units when they return, saying, "Won't you come down for an interview about service in Peace Corps after your experience in Crossroads?"

Eleven of them have gone back. I say over 100 are back in Africa already, with Peace Corps, USIA, missions, ICA, the Columbia-London University teachers program in East Africa, and so on.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Are the Americans who participate in this program biracial? Are they both Negro and white?

Mr. ROBINSON. They are both Negro and white. The trouble is we don't get enough Negroes. The main reason is that each person who goes has to raise a part of his own money, and the average Negro student, if he can't work this summer, can't get back in school, let alone to raise money to spend on Crossroads.

We have to go out and get more scholarship money to get help for them, and also help to get them back in school, because it would serve no purpose if they couldn't get back in school and continue their education.

Mr. JOHANSEN. But your foundation and other funds that you raise go in part to subsidize those who can't pay their own way. Is that correct?

Mr. ROBINSON. That is correct. The students themselves raise about \$180,000 a year, as evidence of what they believe is their responsibility, and then secondly, I and the members of the board of directors, we raise about \$310,000 a year, to supplement what they raise.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Is this basically a Presbyterian project, or is it interdenominational?

Mr. ROBINSON. It is nonreligious.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I see.

Mr. ROBINSON. We take everybody. Even an atheist who can convince us that he believes in people and believes in us, and is not trying to convert somebody, can go. We have a number of Catholics. For example, at Georgetown is one of our cooperating institutions, the rector, Father Bunn has provided \$1,000 for the students, and the boys at Georgetown have washed cars on Saturdays to raise money to help

themselves go, so we are a broad, inclusive program, with no religious test. I happen to be a Presbyterian minister, but we have Jews, everybody in it who is devoted to freedom, democracy, and better world relations.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I didn't mean to divert you. This is a fascinating narrative.

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, our other aim and objective is that we will make such an appeal to young people in Africa that they will ask us back to share in the development of their programs, because they feel this kind of confrontation with what we have to give can help them to develop whole democratic understanding, and can also help both us and them to outmatch what Communists do.

The Communist goes to these countries to try to make people believe they are their real friends, that they have come to share with them, that they alone want to see them advance. But we have to outmatch that. We can outmatch it. We have more invitations than we can get money to send students. We have invitations this year for 47 groups. We can only take 26 groups, because there just aren't enough funds to do it.

Now our other aim and objective is that it is our hope that these young people, as I indicated before, when they are through college, will have laid a foundation upon which they will be better witnesses for the United States in carrying out policy and developing friends, and communicating the whole democratic structure, and being able to combat communism intelligently and effectively when they come to their maturity.

We feel we have to start now. I wish, for example, that if there were a Freedom Academy, that they could help us in the training of our young people each summer in the aspect of what do you do about communism; what is it? How do you determine who is a Communist, skillfully; how do you deal with Communist strategy, etc.?

How do you answer their questions? How do you keep a little handful of them from taking the audience away from you? That is what happened to me in northern Italy, for example, in the beginning, and in France. When I first went out for the Presbyterians who were naive about this for they gave me no preparation and my Communist opponents took the audience away. Till I learned their ideology, the content, and their strategy, I couldn't even begin to operate, or they would ask a question, for example, if I may take the time, like in the University of Tokyo, Japan, "They sent you out here, you must be an important man. Could you be President?"

Well, I had to say, "No, I don't think I could in the foreseeable future. It is not likely that a Negro would be President now." If I answered the other way, I was sunk. They had me trapped. This is what they were expecting me to do. But then once I could isolate who they were, then I would know how to answer, and finally, after some jockeying, I would say, very simply, "No, I don't think I could be President, but sometimes, I have seen Presidents elected in my country that I was sorry for, because I think I could have done a better job," and the whole audience laughed and they laughed at them, because then they saw the ridiculous nature of the question, and then I could be much more constructive about this, and it was only because I had begun on that 7 months facing them so often,

trying to take my meetings away, or when I couldn't speak any of the languages in India, sometimes a Communist was my interpreter. That is a great act of faith, because after you get through, you don't know what he has said, but I found out what he was saying, but then I couldn't do anything, because that whole audience was gone, you see, and it made me look bad.

Well, it is in this area that we need some agency that can help all of us with these problems and, may I add, opportunities. More Americans are going abroad. Most of them are naive about communism. They get these questions, they get angry, and you lose the audience when you get angry, and that isn't what you want to do. You want to win the audience, or you want to make as much capital as you can to get your point of view across, but you have to be skilled and trained to do this, because we are combating a whole new kind of unrelenting, ideological war.

And this is why it needs to be on its own. It does not need to be in the State Department. They have got their problems. It can be helpful to the State Department in some of the things they do, and some of the people they send. It could be helpful to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, or to any agency representing the United States abroad. But it needs to be an independent organization, so it can be flexible and it can change its policy and its strategy as the time and situation demands, and shouldn't have to go all the way up to the top, for example, in an echelon of a secretary who is not basically concerned about this problem, and take all that time, because we don't have a whole lot of time.

I had hoped that back in 1953 and 1954, we could have gotten some things done. What exactly? In 1952, we didn't have any program in America for the education of any considerable number of African students. Down on East 17th Street, in New York, just east of Fifth Avenue, there was a house known as the Council on African Affairs. This organization used to get about \$200,000 a year from Communist sources. Its job: get a hold of every African student who came here by mission, boards, or college and get a hold of his mind. Know what his basic needs are; supply them in order to ingratiate him; win him; and if you can't win him—neutralize him.

I helped a lad from Sierra Leone to go to the University of Denver. The university gave him a full scholarship. I didn't know that Denver was 5,000 feet elevation. Oh, I knew it, but it didn't make much difference to me; I didn't think too much about it. He comes out of a country with a hot climate, and in the winter Denver is a cold climate. He didn't even have an overcoat. Nobody else thought about it. But the Communists did. Nor, for example, think much about the facts, how lonely he was going to be and how desperately he'd latch on to anyone who gave him friendship. Everybody else on the campus was too busy. But not the leftists and the Communists; they gave him friendship and an overcoat. We've got a gold mine with foreign students here, over 70,000 every year. If we don't make an impact on these who are here 4 to 10 years, we deserve to lose them.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And we are defeating the purpose of encouraging them to come over here.

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes. And sometimes we spend the money and bring them, and then somebody else wins their minds—like this young man.

He became a Communist, and a part of it was that the Communists were skillful enough to know, first, he needs an overcoat, and they gave it to him and, second, that he was lonely. Everybody else is too busy, all the student organizations and the faculty, and here was a guy who was lonely, and it is as simple as that, sometimes, and that is what I have seen Communists do abroad.

The simple technique of getting to the people where they are, and then getting inside them and winning their minds and making them feel we are the people who really care, who want to be friends and partners with them for a better country—a better world.

Well, it is in this sense that it would seem to me an Academy like this could do great good for all the people in the United States, and especially that great group increasingly who are going abroad, as well as for the increasing number coming here.

MR. SCHADEBERG. One question. Based on your experience with Operations Crossroads Africa, do you think that the Negroes of America—are they any better accepted in Africa than the white personnel who are sent over there?

MR. ROBINSON. I talked about that yesterday to a conference of 30 African cabinet members and staff functionaries up at Corning, New York, who were brought here by Corning Glass. I talked about it, because they asked me, first of all, and this was the question the Africans were raising, "Why don't you send more Negroes?" And over and over again I have to say, as I have written on many occasions, that we have in the United States with a highly color-conscious world, not only Africa but Asia, a gold mine in American Negroes that we haven't used very well. But more American Negroes would be a great asset to American policy and aims abroad.

I serve on the advisory committee of the State Department on the search for Negro personnel, and the last time we met was just about 3 weeks ago down here for 2 days. My point was that everywhere Crossroads goes, if I don't have a good percentage of Negroes in Crossroads in Africa, we have got trouble in that community.

Now we just need to have more money to get them.

MR. SCHADEBERG. Why, why do you have trouble?

MR. ROBINSON. We have trouble because the first question they ask is—and they are asking me this, this is what makes it so funny—"You mean to tell me you are one of those people who doesn't want to bring our people out here? Do you discriminate against Negroes?"

MR. SCHADEBERG. Aren't they discriminating if they think only in terms of their own? I don't want to get into an argument but—

MR. ROBINSON. No, they are not thinking that for Negroes alone, but you see, they have a great empathetic relation to American Negroes—who came from their coasts and they know our race problem and wonder why we don't use more of our Negro citizens—and again and again, when leadership people are brought here by the State Department, they are often very unhappy because we often fail to associate them with the Negro community. Crossroads, in cooperation with the Department of State, is bringing a group of 10 leadership students from four countries in Africa this summer, and we asked a Negro lad, a former Crossroader, to help take care of them.

If it is successful, we will make it 50 or 100 next year. The young Negro who wrote me, whom I had asked to join my staff, would he be one of the two leaders to take these around, because he speaks French,

and we have some French-speaking Africans, he can't go, but he said, "For heaven's sake, please have at least one of the two people who take this group around be a Negro," because I have run into so many groups who are brought here by State Department, and they never have a Negro to work with them or get to Negro homes. In our office, we get Africans saying, "Look, we want to see some Negroes." This really is ridiculous because most of the escorts are people who don't know a thing about the Negro community or have no contacts with Negro Americans. They are handicapped, and these people go back disenchanting with us because of this failure.

If I might just say one more thing, I had to spend \$75 of my own money to cable back here from Kenya (where I was a guest of the Kenya Government, of Jomo Kenyatta, himself, because of the work of our young people, which was why he invited my wife and myself), because their Kenya delegation was coming to the United States to become a member of the U.N., and Prime Minister Kenyatta said, "We need your help in seeing that this group gets to go to Atlanta and to some other places where they can have some relationship with Negroes and get to know more about the race problem and what is being done about it."

So I took it upon myself to cable back to Roy Wilkins and Philip Randolph and some other people, Whitney Young, to say that one of the greatest things you can do, now that Kenya is independent, is to make some good contacts of Negroes who can be of help to them, because they have this great interest. We have this reservoir of Negro people, but we ought to make better use of them.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Clausen.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Along this point, I was one of the Members of the Congress that wrote the civil rights bill, sir, so that you know exactly where I stand, but I have always felt in my own mind the very point that you have just made here is that we could use this as a great relief valve for the Civil Rights problem as it now exists in this particular country, if we were to take advantage of this so-called gold mine of human resources that is available. Would you comment on this?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, this is one of the great problems among Negroes, their desire to serve America in the world on the international scene.

Mr. CLAUSEN. I mean, couldn't we expand and take advantage of this? Couldn't we expand the opportunity for the Negro, not only in Africa, but also South America?

Mr. ROBINSON. South America and in Asia?

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And in Asia?

Mr. ROBINSON. And in Asia.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I want to ask a question that is directly related to this Freedom Academy. You said something about you being involved in two areas, the private and the governmental sector, insofar as Crossroads Africa and the Peace Corps, which is somewhat the same work. What would you consider to be the relative value of a governmental agency for the Freedom Academy as opposed to a private agency for the Freedom Academy, or a second part of that question is: Who could you think should be sponsoring it, or should be cosponsoring?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, right off the top of my mind, I have to say that inasmuch as you have a Defense Department because sometimes you have to defend the survival of the country by military actions, you have now a worldwide attempt to remake the world in the very evil image of what Archibald MacLeish once defined as, "Communism is the fraudulent justification of the most heinous of means to achieve the most despicable of ends."

That is a big thing; it is a worldwide thing. I don't think anybody can do that, can be big enough and have the support that it needs, but the Government, because we can be defeated more resoundingly ideologically than we can even by military action, which is what I don't think the Communists want to try to do now.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Would there be any advantage in having a private sector contribute?

Mr. ROBINSON. I think very definitely. I would hope that private organizations that are concerned would have a very real part in this, because, after all, they are the majority of the people going abroad all the time.

Mr. JOHANSEN. What you say, then, when you speak of the importance of Government support, doesn't close the door or preclude the role of the private sector?

Mr. ROBINSON. Absolutely not. I would hope that it would be a real large place for private organizations to share in such a program.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I mean, your own dedication to Crossroads is proof that you are committed to the private-sector approach very strongly.

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes. I think we need both. I am committed to the private structure, because sometimes the private organization can move with greater speed, less suspicion, and greater depth. When there are difficulties between our nations and some other, that door doesn't keep us out. For example, our best relationship is in Ghana. We don't have to pay for room, board, or transportation in Ghana.

Now, everybody thinks this is odd, and I wonder about it myself, too, but they know what we are and who we are, and when they are difficulties with our Government and Ghana, for example, we don't have any at all.

And I think if the door is open, keep your foot in it. That is why, when the newspapers came out like the *Daily News* and said, and I quote them, "We should pull our Peace Corps people out of Ghana before they are killed, stewed, and eaten," that doesn't win friends for us anywhere in the world, and newspapers sometimes could use a little understanding of how you fight this battle. It wasn't what the Ghanians thought about this that disturbed me. It was what the Nigerians thought, who are strong friends of us, and they resented that, for example, although they knew it wasn't our Government policy.

Well, I don't share with that. I think if the door is open, you keep your foot in there and you keep somebody in there. No matter how high the price or how hard the difficulties, somebody has got to stay in there with the ideas that we believe are worth standing for, also worth dying for—although I want to see more people stand for than die for them.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Let me ask this question: Where the Peace Corps is obviously a Government agency and is, therefore, open to the attack, however baseless, that, after all, this is an arm of State Department

policy or United States policy, is the organization such as you represent, because it comes from non-Government background and with nongovernmental support, less subjected to the charge, particularly by Communists in these countries, or is it more difficult for the Communists to pin the tag of agents of imperialism or capitalism for the United States Government on the private enterprise type of group?

Mr. ROBINSON. It is more difficult for them, although I must admit they try to do it, to pin a label on Crossroads. They try to do that to us, for example, try to make people believe that we are really are a back-door Government-sponsored organization and that all this business about private support doesn't avail very much, but we have been able to effectively counteract their attempts.

Mr. JOHANSEN. The truth doesn't bother the Communists.

Mr. ROBINSON. It doesn't bother them. What we have to do is to convince the people they are trying to convince, and we have been able to convince the people they are trying to con. There is no country we have been in, although in Uganda and Ghana they tried to make it look as though we were CIA agents or an organization trying to subvert their youth, but we were able to defeat them at it, and in both countries, they have asked us to bring two or three groups a year.

We can only take one group to each country despite all they did, so it is those people, the masses of people whom we want to convince, and we can keep doing that, and when you say to people, these students raised this money, this Kiwanis Club, this temple or synagogue, this church, this Rotarian Club, this group of students help make our work possible out here, that speaks for democracy with a witness that nothing else can controvert.

Mr. JOHANSEN. What specific type of activities do these groups of yours pursue in these foreign countries?

Mr. ROBINSON. We use the work camp technique as a vehicle to be able to talk, to live with, and to get people to listen to us. This year, for example, we are going to build eight little two- to five-room schools in a village where there has been no school.

We are going to do a rural health project in preventive medicine, with three doctors and eight nurses in eastern Nigeria; and from Tufts University, we are taking 12, at least, students to do a youth and sports and physical education program.

Everybody wants athletics. They want to train for their African games and the Olympic games. In Mali, which has just admitted us for the first time—Mali never let us in before because they didn't believe we were a private organization—we have a project this summer; we have convinced them. They want, for example, four coaches and a basketball team. Five countries wanted a basketball team. Some people we go to for money laugh at me, and they say, "It's a waste to send a basketball team."

Look, you send a basketball team, you will be having an opportunity to talk to every youth in the country, and you are not playing basketball all day; you are sitting around the fireside of the evening and communicating ideas of democracy, faith, and freedom.

You are going to look at a new dam site, for example, or you are going to talk to a chief of the village or the head of the political party or the opposition leader, and this is where we get our chance to

get across our ideas, and then they come back again and again with questions, and the discussion deepens.

I would say, sir, that over 10,000 letters a year flow now between the young people in this country and young leaders in the African countries, so we use this as a vehicle, you see.

We give a service, we say, "We have come to serve you. This is what the democracy is. It comes from within committed people, who are not sent, but who believe this is their duty and responsibility, and then it comes outside, and it changes other people, because they begin to believe in you. This is our greatest opportunity."

Now, out of that, we have gotten young African leaders to begin to take responsibility they never took before. When we first went, we had 62 in five countries. We got less than 30 African students to come and work with us.

They would folk dance with us, talk about Little Rock, argue about race relations, about labor, but they wouldn't work, because they were the elite. If they were in high school and college, and you didn't touch anything with your hands. That was beneath them. But it interested them, why students would come all the way from the United States, pay their own money, give up their vacations, and live in a village under primitive conditions and avoid the cities.

We take them out into the villages, under the most primitive conditions, and we tell them, "If you're not tough enough, you can't go with us, because we promise you dysentery, we promise you some malaria. It won't hurt you if you follow our rules, but you are going to get all of these things. Sometimes, you are going to say to yourself, 'Why did I ever let that fellow Robinson get me out in a place like this?'" But we also promise you will be there at what Tillich calls the Kairos, where time enters eternity, and they are a part of the forces helping make good history of a better, more secure, more peaceful, and a more democratic world.

Mr. CLAUSEN. You have made a very key point here, I think, and that is that we have the maximum flexibility, because of the fact that you are operating in a private sector. Could you comment on the restrictions that anyone associated with the public sector will have, in operating in this same environment?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, I can.

I would say, let's take Peace Corps. I serve as a member of the Advisory Committee, the National Advisory Committee—in fact, as one of the four vice chairmen of the National Advisory Committee—and I did a survey for Peace Corps, to see what was the reaction of Europeans, expatriates, the Government people, the opposition party people, the Communists, student leaders, and so on, 2 years ago, which I sent back to the headquarters here in Washington.

Now, the difficulty with most Government agencies working abroad is that they have to get an appropriation from Congress. If I may be completely frank—

Mr. JOHANSEN. That is why we value your testimony. Be perfectly frank.

Mr. ROBINSON. And it has got to be set up, and rules have got to be set for it, and then I find so many people have to say, "What is Congress going to think?" First, let me give you an example. The United States Foreign Service made a film for us, beautifully done.

They took some scenes of our students talking about politics with Jomo Kenyatta; Julius Nyerere, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika; and with Tom Mboya about race relations, and they are making this film, in color, on which they spent thousands of dollars, translating it into French, Arabic, and Swahili, as well as English, to show that dynamism of American democratic young people, but they took all of the conversation on politics and the confrontations on race relations out, rightly or wrongly, because they said, "This might be an offense to Congress."

Now, I think this is stupid, myself, that they even think this. I said, "Why don't you put it in, and let's see what comes afterwards?" Because you can't talk to African groups unless you talk on these terms. What did the film turn out to be, a beautiful travelogue in color, girls carrying cement blocks on their heads, but we wanted to show them we were concerned about their future, and that is where they are now, deeply involved in political development and independence and vitally concerned about American race relations.

MR. JOHANSEN. Now, a private program could have done that.

MR. ROBINSON. Yes. We did do that. CBS, the first time we got into Guinea in 1960, when our Government had bad relations with Guinea, they didn't like us and we didn't like them, but we got in.

CBS then promised them \$4,000 to help build a building so that they could get in, and Ed Murrow's last "CBS Reports" was "*Operation Crossroads Africa, Pilot Project for Peace Corps*," but in that film, there was confrontation with the villagers about race relations, confrontation with Sekou Toure about American relations with Guinea, for example, which we could do, and they did, and it is a very powerful film.

MR. CLAUSEN. What you are saying, then, sir, is that there are always going to be limitations in any program associated with Government, whereas, you have a minimal amount of limitations if the emphasis is placed in the private sector. Is that correct?

MR. ROBINSON. That is correct. But the big problem here is that no private agency can raise the money necessary to do the job that has to be done.

MR. CLAUSEN. All right. Will you yield on that point? After hearing your testimony, and I think we have hit, Mr. Chairman, on a very key point. It is conceivable that we will have to develop a partnership program between Government and the private sector with incentive for the leadership of our private sector to move out and do a better job than they have been doing, but in the meantime, show the Government interest and a matching program, possibly.

MR. ROBINSON. I think we can be creative enough to get the maximum amount of using both Government and private agencies. When President Kennedy, former President Kennedy, announced the Peace Corps, he said, "There will be a place for the Government service, there will be a place for Crossroads, there will be a place for colleges and universities." My biggest quarrel with Peace Corps is that it became another bureaucracy, and didn't leave enough room to do private contracts. I want to add, however, the Peace Corps is doing a magnificent job.

If it is going to do an educational project, for example, why not get the education department of a school of education to do it in a country? They are beginning to do a little of that now.

They had a whole section on contract with private agencies, but that has been pulled in, until it is almost nothing now, so that they could do creative things in a more reflective way if they could set the standard and the rule and say to this agency, "You do this job. We will not supervise it, but we will check you every 6 months or a year."

Mr. JOHANSEN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. JOHANSEN. I would like to express my appreciation and, I am sure, of my colleagues for your appearance here and your testimony. I hope some of us can avail ourselves of the opportunity of talking with you personally when you are in Washington.

Mr. ROBINSON. I will be delighted.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And possibly there may be further opportunities to appear before the committee, but we do thank you for appearing.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question for the record, before the gentleman leaves?

Mr. JOHANSEN. Surely.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Because I have been developing the matter of utilization of aircraft. I don't know if you were here or not when I made the point with the previous witness about the implementation of, or the use of, aircraft in these remote sections of Africa. Could you use this in your program to expedite the Operations Crossroads in Africa?

Mr. ROBINSON. I don't want to be ambivalent about that. Our largest expenditure is getting 310 people to Africa. We sometimes have thought about the possibility, and the superintendent of the West Point Military Academy actually took it up with somebody in the Air Force about the possibility of their flying us over. The \$220,000 we spend on flying them out by jet, even though it is cheaper than commercial fare, could double the number of people we are working with in many places.

Mr. CLAUSEN. The point that we are making is that transportation of qualified people into the area is one of the greatest needs.

Mr. ROBINSON. Absolutely. It is the biggest expense.

Mr. JOHANSEN. We will release you now to take your own aircraft.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. JOHANSEN. The committee will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 1964

(The committee reconvened at 2:25 p.m., Representative Richard Ichord, of Missouri, presiding.)

Mr. ICHORD. The meeting will come to order.

This meeting is a continuation of the hearing on the Freedom Academy bills.

The next witness is Mr. Walter Joyce.

Mr. Joyce, it is a pleasure to have you before the committee. I wish to apologize that the other members are not here to hear your testimony, but we do have some important legislation on the floor of the House today, and a vote is expected at any time. I do hope that we can conclude with your testimony before the bell rings.

I would ask, sir, that you give us a brief sketch of your background for the reporter before you get into your testimony.

STATEMENT OF WALTER JOYCE

Mr. JOYCE. Mr. Chairman, I am managing editor of *Printers' Ink Magazine*, the weekly news magazine of marketing and advertising, and I am also the author of a recently published book called *The Propaganda Gap*. A continuing analysis of the media of communications and the use of persuasive communications in the world of business is my vocation.

A continuing study of the use of the persuasive communications in the international conflict of ideologies is my avocation.

My testimony will be brief.

Because of my specialized background and experience, however, I trust I can cast a little light from a slightly different angle on the need for the Freedom Academy.

Knowledge in a vacuum is like an unopened telephone book. Applied knowledge gives birth to new intelligence. That is why every major enterprise today is, first of all, a consumer of ideas and facts. Business draws its operating knowledge from virtually every intellectual discipline. It employs sociologists, anthropologists, economists, psychologists, semanticists, philosophers, researchers, and practitioners of all of the creative arts.

It is the meshing of these disciplines that adds much to the dynamics of business today.

Until this century the meshing was accomplished on a haphazard basis. Then came the business school and the era of the management generalist, who orchestrates the many disciplines into an operational approach, knowledge is converted into something. There is a constant quest for more and more knowledge, and there is a continuous feedback on the effects of the operational approach so that it can be refined and refined.

This is not being done in the ideological struggle. There is no repository of pertinent knowledge from all of the disciplines. There is no faculty interpreting that knowledge in terms of the needs of the cold war, as the faculties of business schools interpret knowledge in terms of the needs of the business world. There is no school turning out the generalists, who orchestrate the bits and pieces of knowledge into an approach that fits the needs of the immediate situation.

During World War I there was concern because we were training some of our soldiers with broomsticks instead of guns, but we did arm them with guns before we sent them to battle. Now we send out our cold warriors to the battlefield armed figuratively with nothing more than broomsticks. If our military academies can turn out well-prepared warriors for a hot war, there is no reason we cannot have an academy to turn out fighters for the only war we are in.

At this point may I make a special plea that the training be extended to as many citizens of other countries as possible. Common sense, of course, would tell us that nationals can influence their fellow citizens to a greater degree than outsiders can, but the differences may be more pronounced and more varied than is appreciated. This has been learned through hard practice by the United States adver-

tising agencies that have expanded abroad. Our advertising techniques are effective in other countries, but they are most effective when adapted by the nationals of those countries. That is why most foreign branches of U.S. agencies are staffed from top to bottom with nationals or near-nationals.

I believe you have been hearing a sufficient number of arguments in favor of training Government foreign affairs personnel in the Freedom Academy, but that bill also provides for special courses for people from the private sector of our society. Let us give full weight to the value of such courses.

Some 35,000 American businessmen work in other countries. That, I believe, is more than the total number of State Department, USIA, and AID personnel abroad. These businessmen generally remain in the host countries longer than Government personnel. For example, the minimum tour for USIA personnel in one country was changed from 2 to 3 years just recently.

American businessmen often have a wider range of direct contact with local businesses, local citizens, and can do more by word and deed to influence attitudes. These men now must learn on the job how to cope with the conflicting ideological forces.

Many go abroad without the background needed to meet the challenge, yet imagine what exponents of our economic system and our total society American businessmen abroad could be.

The anthropologist, Ethel J. Alpenfels, has observed that the traveling salesman has been the most effective builder of civilizations. She has recalled that in the Aztec kingdom the traveling salesman rated a special heaven alongside of women who died in childbirth and men who died in battle.

"If we look at the West," she has said, "it is not the Government official who most changes people, nor is it the missionary, it is the trader, traveling salesmen, businessmen who followed. The ideas of our country come through the products we sell."

Yet, it was not until 1961 that the USIA took the first halting step toward enlisting the help of U.S. business; through its office of private cooperation, the USIA distributes kits of background information on our Government's positions to some 450 international firms, which in turn distribute the kits to their overseas employees.

While this, of course, is an admirable effort, it is just a halting step by an agency that was not even established to do a training job in the private sector.

American businessmen abroad are generally keenly conscious of our engagement in the ideological struggle and many think that Government is falling down on the job. To take up the slack to some degree they have formed such organizations as the Business Council for International Understanding, the U.S. Inter-American Council, the National Foreign Trade Council, the Pan American Society, the Latin American Information Committee, and innumerable others. Their activities vary, but their objectives all include a deeper commitment to the ideological conflict. Some are outright propaganda organizations. The Information Council of the Americas in New Orleans, for example, tapes programs on Communist perfidy and distributes them to Latin America. With Government guidance and endorsement, highly significant programs can be developed in the private sector.

We already have CARE, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the International Rescue Committee, and the People-to-People Program. Then there is religion, another antithesis to communism. The National Council of Churches reports there are some 33,000 U.S. missionaries in 146 foreign countries and territories. American churchgoers support them with \$170 million a year in contributions.

Private corporations and foundations are also active. Overseas, the Ford, Rockefeller, Near East, and other foundations are spending some \$40 million a year on research, scholarships, and economic development.

It can be said without much contradiction that these efforts are not tied in with the ideological objectives of free men as closely as they could be with enlightened guidance. We don't have the enlightenment because we have not applied our resources to the problem.

The appalling fact is that the resources and the talents are available but there has been no real move to conscript them.

At the heart of the question are ideas and the ability to win true believers in those ideas. We, our country, has just a few basic ideas, primarily that the freedom and dignity of each individual are inviolate and to recognize that principle is to benefit all mankind. It has worked for us and for many others in the free world. Yet those ideas are seriously challenged by fraudulent promises. It need not be. This Nation possesses the resources of persuasive communications in such quantity and quality that we could turn the Communist siren song into an ineffectual moan. Our technology in transmitting sound, pictures, and printed word is unmatched. Our capacity for producing communications media is without parallel. Our command of the methodology is unchallenged.

Thanks to our leadership in the field of electronic computers, our capability to assemble information and process it to meaningful communications ends is unlimited. And thanks to our open, competitive society our fund of creative talent in the art of persuasion and the use of all media is abundant.

While Government, through the Freedom Academy, could provide guidance, it could also employ the services and other elements of the private sector.

For example, Government could engage one of the great organizations in international communications to conduct intense studies of political attitudes throughout the world—and to analyze the facts, concepts, and ideas that have shaped, and could reshape, these attitudes.

Government and business together could conduct studies to determine the most progressive and promising policies, in the terms of cold war objectives, for business in each area of the world.

Government could turn over the findings of the attitudinal studies to one or more of our major communications agencies for the development of special projects. One special project could be the initiation of ideas and approaches for dramatizing to the people of Latin America the treacheries of communism in Cuba.

Government could engage private-sector communications specialists to analyze in depth the magazines, exhibits, motion pictures, radio broadcasts, television programs, and other efforts by Government to influence the peoples of the world.

During the past few years few have delved more deeply into all of the hearings, reports, analyses, speeches, and news stories on the ideological struggle than I have. Two impressions are predominant: There is wide agreement that we have not really begun to commit ourselves to the ideological struggle and there is endless haggling over the kind of commitment because parochial preserves will be challenged.

You have the opportunity now to make the commitment. You also are sophisticated enough to know that, if you do, if you enact the Freedom Academy bill, a new balance in our foreign affairs structure will be achieved. The striped-pants diplomat, with his polite government-to-government charade, will enjoy less stature. Our aid program will be administered with more attention to positive objectives. It will be a new kind of foreign affairs, and some entrenched interests will not like it. But I think I am speaking for the majority when I urge, commit us.

Thank you.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Joyce, for your very fine testimony.

I was not present at the meeting this morning but I understand that one of the witnesses advanced the thought that perhaps the Freedom Academy could be financed by private funds rather than by governmental appropriations.

I rather believe that that idea was probably advanced by Representative Clausen, whom I had talked to earlier and he was in favor of a private-financing approach.

For the record I would like to ask, Do you believe that that would be feasible, that is, that foundations and corporations could be relied upon to furnish sufficient funds for the operation of a Freedom Academy?

Mr. JOYCE. I think it is feasible to get funds, but it is probably an unrealistic way to get funds.

I do not think that is the resolution of the problem right now. I think this should be an official Government program and it should belong to all of the people. It should not be identified with business; it should be identified with all of us.

Mr. ICHORD. You are not advocating the Government set up the Academy and then finance it out of private appropriations or private funds, are you?

Mr. JOYCE. No, I am not. I advocate that this be supported by tax money.

Mr. ICHORD. You would prefer that it be supported by tax money to make it a project of all of the American people?

Mr. JOYCE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. One more question. Do you believe that there is sufficient awareness in the business community to insure that it could be counted upon to support the Freedom Academy and take full advantage of all of its facilities?

Mr. JOYCE. I am convinced there is. One reason that I wrote the book or started research for the book—my book, *The Propaganda Gap*—was the increasing number of criticisms we got at *Printers' Ink* of the United States position as a persuader abroad. As you know, more and more business has gone abroad since World War II, and particularly our communications agencies, our advertising agen-

cies, our marketing organizations. These are people sophisticated in communications and inevitably they think our Government is doing a poor job. A number of them have approached the USIA and offered their assistance.

Mr. ICHORD. It is your feeling then that these people could attend the Academy and be prepared to help their Government when they are abroad?

Mr. JOYCE. I am convinced they would; yes.

Mr. ICHORD. The reason why I was not at the hearings this morning was that I am a member of the Committee on Armed Services and we heard Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, on the South Vietnam situation and the Secretary at the hearing this morning—of course, I cannot relate all that went on at the hearing, but he did go over essentially the same thing that he went over in his speech of March the 28th to the effect that we essentially had four alternatives in South Vietnam; he only mentioned three, but I could tell from his testimony pretty well what the fourth alternative was.

One, would be to go all out to win the war in South Vietnam; second, would be to get out altogether; third, would be to do as we are doing now; and the fourth, would be some kind of a neutrality arrangement much like that in Laos. Of course, that would be out because we, in effect, have already had division in Vietnam, division of North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

We cannot under any circumstances pull out, I believe, because it would open up Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, all down the line there to Communist advancements.

Of course, the Freedom Academy operating on a situation like South Vietnam is too late.

Mr. JOYCE. Yes.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you feel this Academy would have helped us in a situation, say, 10 or 12 years ago in Vietnam?

Mr. JOYCE. If the concept worked, presumably we would have leadership in South Vietnam—knowledgeable, free-world style leadership that would have recognized the Communist threat a long time ago and would have confronted it headlong.

I think also a commitment to the whole idea of the Freedom Academy would have meant that not only would South Vietnam be on contention as it is now, but North Vietnam, too.

If we commit ourselves to the principles of freedom, we cannot accept the idea that what's theirs is theirs, and what's ours we will struggle over. I think there is a conflict of ideas and our ideas would have invaded North Vietnam. Our ideas would be more alive behind the Iron Curtain than they are now.

Mr. ICHORD. You are thinking then in terms of a counteroffensive rather than being on the defensive all of the time?

Mr. JOYCE. It inevitably would have to be that.

If we commit ourselves to the ideological struggle, it has to be that. The Communists are totally committed to it; there is no letup, although there might be an accommodation on the diplomatic level, there is no letup to their commitment on the ideological level.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Joyce, for your testimony.

The meeting will stand adjourned until further call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., Wednesday, May 20, 1964, the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

STATEMENT OF LOUIS DONA O'HARA FOR THE TAXPAYERS LEAGUE OF BLACKSTONE VALLEY, PROVIDENCE AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

(Subsequent to the May 20 hearings, the following statement was received by the committee from Mr. Louis Dona O'Hara, president of the League. It is hereby made a part of the record:)

P.O. Box 777
Pawtucket, Rhode Island
June 9, 1964

Honorable Edwin E. Willis, Ch.
Committee on American Activities
House of Representatives
Washington

Dear Sir:

The recent death of Douglas MacArthur brings to light the value of dedicated service gained for the nation. What motivated Douglas in his tasks? Wasn't it the fidelity which emanated from his soul in early manhood during the constructive period of his life when he received the bounty of special talents from Uncle Sam at West Point? Like other men such as Washington, Custer, Roberts, Pershing, Bradley, Patton, Grant, Sherman, Bowie, Eisenhower, and many others, he was expressing the sustaining force of his vitality to fulfill America's role of leadership. In some of these cases, the aptitude is quiet and in others it is vocal. The navy also has its heroes such as Dewey, Nimitz, Halsey, King and others. The air has its men such as Arnold, Vandenberg, Spaatz, and Mitchell. The list is long but it started in 1802 with a first national school through the urgings of Washington and Jefferson. Long may it continue.

In analysis we compare what these men have done for Western Civilization in the American sense in comparison to other nations when they wore the mantle of leadership. We can say that Uncle Sam's investment in breeding special talent has advantages beyond measure in the tally of history.

In all this there is one flaw and that is that the success gained was with military arms with blood as the price. A true American sense has a separate quality in that although we have victories for our flag, the measure of our glory was blended with compassion as was ably expressed by Grant in returning Lee's sword along with his horses. The Marshall plan was a form of compassion. MacArthur's success in Japan after VJ Day was also the revelation of a compassionate heart.

Military might is necessary for it was fear of Caesar that brought forth the 200 years of peace for the Roman Empire. We, as Americans seek to duplicate such an achievement of peace over a longer and indefinite term. We are seeking an infinite tenure of peace. Atomic potential dictates the wisdom of such a course. If such be the case, the leadership will come to "cold war" leaders rather than leadership by force of arms. Caesar was fortunate in that the weapons then were limited whereas now the weapons are infinite and limitless.

It is in the power of Americans to create a world of love that will bring forth a grandeur and splendor greater than Rome. Prosperity could be achieved without war economies. To create a world of love and charity which is disciplined towards mutual acceptance of dependency on one another without avoiding responsibility. America now seeks unsung heroes. The challenge of such a program is equal to victory in war. In this work, the glory is not personified as it must be in the military art, but the achievement comes closest to the great message of the Messiah who took advantage of Caesar's peace to do his work. The christian message of our Messiah has lasted long and remains with us.

You, the members of your committee have the opportunity to create civilian heroes of peace and for these men the tunic of service shall be plain cloth as is usually worn by civilians rather than the public image which the uniform must represent. America needs both uniforms and tunics in the performance of its future missions.

To create such talent, the Freedom Academy has been proposed. In my considered judgment, in the era of 1999, a graduate of this Freedom Academy will probably perform a service for the Congress that will prove the merit of its decision in creating same, and I recommend the bill's immediate passage.

My regards to all the members of your committee although I had a lot of statistics to submit, I chose rather to submit this prepared statement for the record.

I recommend immediate passage in this session of the Congress.

Respectfully submitted,

Louis Dona O'Hara, P.E.
President

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¹ Spelled Bukarin in this reference.

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